feat(chat): stamp sender compose-time in message header (clock-clamped)

Carry the sender's compose time as an optional "ts" (Unix seconds) in the
plaintext header JSON that rides outside the AEAD, and prefer it as the
displayed message time so both ends show the same send time regardless of when
the tx confirms. Parse "ts" leniently. On ingest, clamp: reject a "ts"
implausibly in the future vs the receive/block time (1h skew tolerated) so a
wrong/ahead peer clock can't pin messages to the bottom of a thread; a past
compose time is fine (the note buffer may broadcast a queued message later, and
a confirmed tx's block time is always >= compose time). Tests cover the
round-trip and the future-clock clamp.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-20 21:59:46 -05:00
parent e08121af2b
commit 4471f54842
5 changed files with 60 additions and 6 deletions

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@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ std::string buildHeaderMemo(const std::string& replyZaddr,
const std::string& conversationId, const std::string& conversationId,
const char* type, const char* type,
const std::string& streamHeaderHex, const std::string& streamHeaderHex,
const std::string& publicKeyHex) const std::string& publicKeyHex,
std::int64_t sentAt)
{ {
nlohmann::json header; nlohmann::json header;
header["h"] = 1; // header number (>= 1) header["h"] = 1; // header number (>= 1)
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ std::string buildHeaderMemo(const std::string& replyZaddr,
header["t"] = type; // "Memo" or "Cont" header["t"] = type; // "Memo" or "Cont"
header["e"] = streamHeaderHex; // 48-hex secretstream header (Memo) / "" (Cont) header["e"] = streamHeaderHex; // 48-hex secretstream header (Memo) / "" (Cont)
header["p"] = publicKeyHex; // my 64-hex crypto_kx public key header["p"] = publicKeyHex; // my 64-hex crypto_kx public key
if (sentAt > 0) header["ts"] = sentAt; // optional sender compose time (Unix s) — receiver shows this
return header.dump(); return header.dump();
} }
@@ -67,7 +69,8 @@ ChatComposeStatus buildOutgoingMessage(const ChatKeyPair& mine,
OutgoingChatMemos memos; OutgoingChatMemos memos;
memos.recipientZaddr = peerZaddr; memos.recipientZaddr = peerZaddr;
memos.headerMemo = buildHeaderMemo(myReplyZaddr, conversationId, "Memo", streamHeaderHex, myPublicKeyHex); memos.headerMemo = buildHeaderMemo(myReplyZaddr, conversationId, "Memo", streamHeaderHex, myPublicKeyHex,
static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::time(nullptr)));
memos.payloadMemo = ciphertextHex; memos.payloadMemo = ciphertextHex;
if (memos.headerMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit || if (memos.headerMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit ||
memos.payloadMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit) { memos.payloadMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit) {
@@ -95,7 +98,8 @@ ChatComposeStatus buildOutgoingContactRequest(const std::string& myPublicKeyHex,
OutgoingChatMemos memos; OutgoingChatMemos memos;
memos.recipientZaddr = peerZaddr; memos.recipientZaddr = peerZaddr;
memos.headerMemo = buildHeaderMemo(myReplyZaddr, conversationId, "Cont", "", myPublicKeyHex); memos.headerMemo = buildHeaderMemo(myReplyZaddr, conversationId, "Cont", "", myPublicKeyHex,
static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::time(nullptr)));
memos.payloadMemo = requestText; memos.payloadMemo = requestText;
if (memos.headerMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit || if (memos.headerMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit ||
memos.payloadMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit) { memos.payloadMemo.size() > kHushChatMemoByteLimit) {

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@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ HushChatHeaderParseResult parseHushChatHeaderMemo(const std::string& memo)
if (!readRequiredString(object, "t", type, error)) return fail(error); if (!readRequiredString(object, "t", type, error)) return fail(error);
if (!readRequiredString(object, "e", header.secretstream_header_hex, error)) return fail(error); if (!readRequiredString(object, "e", header.secretstream_header_hex, error)) return fail(error);
if (!readRequiredString(object, "p", header.public_key_hex, error)) return fail(error); if (!readRequiredString(object, "p", header.public_key_hex, error)) return fail(error);
// Optional sender compose time (Unix seconds). Absent on older senders — leave sent_at = 0 so the
// receiver falls back to the tx/receive time. Read leniently; never fail the header on a bad value.
if (auto it = object.find("ts"); it != object.end() && it->is_number_integer())
header.sent_at = it->get<std::int64_t>();
if (header.header_number < 1) return fail("header number must be positive"); if (header.header_number < 1) return fail("header number must be positive");
if (header.version != kHushChatSupportedVersion) return fail("unsupported HushChat version"); if (header.version != kHushChatSupportedVersion) return fail("unsupported HushChat version");
@@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ HushChatTransactionExtractionResult extractHushChatTransactionMetadata(
metadata.sender_public_key_hex = pair.header.public_key_hex; metadata.sender_public_key_hex = pair.header.public_key_hex;
metadata.secretstream_header_hex = pair.header.secretstream_header_hex; metadata.secretstream_header_hex = pair.header.secretstream_header_hex;
metadata.payload_memo = pair.payload_memo; metadata.payload_memo = pair.payload_memo;
metadata.sent_at = pair.header.sent_at; // carry the sender's compose time (0 if absent)
result.metadata.push_back(std::move(metadata)); result.metadata.push_back(std::move(metadata));
} }

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@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ struct HushChatHeader {
HushChatHeaderType type = HushChatHeaderType::Message; HushChatHeaderType type = HushChatHeaderType::Message;
std::string secretstream_header_hex; std::string secretstream_header_hex;
std::string public_key_hex; std::string public_key_hex;
// Optional sender-stamped compose time (header "ts", Unix seconds). 0 = absent (older sender) → the
// receiver falls back to the tx/receive time. Lets both sides show the SAME (send) time.
std::int64_t sent_at = 0;
}; };
struct HushChatHeaderParseResult { struct HushChatHeaderParseResult {
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ struct HushChatTransactionMetadata {
std::string sender_public_key_hex; // header "p": peer crypto_kx public key (hex) std::string sender_public_key_hex; // header "p": peer crypto_kx public key (hex)
std::string secretstream_header_hex; // header "e": secretstream header (hex; empty for ContactRequest) std::string secretstream_header_hex; // header "e": secretstream header (hex; empty for ContactRequest)
std::string payload_memo; // ciphertext hex (Message) or plaintext request text (ContactRequest) std::string payload_memo; // ciphertext hex (Message) or plaintext request text (ContactRequest)
std::int64_t sent_at = 0; // header "ts": sender compose time (Unix s); 0 = absent → use tx time
}; };
struct HushChatTransactionExtractionResult { struct HushChatTransactionExtractionResult {

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@@ -45,8 +45,21 @@ int ChatService::ingest(const std::vector<HushChatTransactionMetadata>& metadata
message.conversation_id = meta.conversation_id; message.conversation_id = meta.conversation_id;
message.peer_zaddr = meta.reply_zaddr; message.peer_zaddr = meta.reply_zaddr;
message.peer_public_key_hex = meta.sender_public_key_hex; message.peer_public_key_hex = meta.sender_public_key_hex;
// Reference time: the tx/receive time (block time if confirmed, else the receiver's wall clock for
// a mempool receive).
const auto timeIt = txTimestamps.find(meta.txid); const auto timeIt = txTimestamps.find(meta.txid);
message.timestamp = timeIt != txTimestamps.end() ? timeIt->second : fallbackTimestamp; const std::int64_t refTime = timeIt != txTimestamps.end() ? timeIt->second : fallbackTimestamp;
// Prefer the sender's stamped compose time (header "ts") — the true send time, shown identically on
// both ends. But REJECT a value implausibly in the FUTURE vs the reference: a wrong/ahead peer clock
// would otherwise pin their messages to the bottom of the thread forever. A compose time in the
// PAST is fine — the note buffer can broadcast a queued message long after it was composed, and a
// confirmed tx's block time is always >= the compose time.
constexpr std::int64_t kSenderTsFutureToleranceSec = 3600; // 1 hour of clock skew tolerated
if (meta.sent_at > 0 && (refTime <= 0 || meta.sent_at <= refTime + kSenderTsFutureToleranceSec)) {
message.timestamp = meta.sent_at;
} else {
message.timestamp = refTime;
}
message.payload_position = meta.payload_position; message.payload_position = meta.payload_position;
if (meta.type == HushChatHeaderType::ContactRequest) { if (meta.type == HushChatHeaderType::ContactRequest) {

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@@ -6198,12 +6198,17 @@ void testHushChatOutgoing()
ChatService bobSvc; ChatService bobSvc;
bobSvc.setIdentity(bob); bobSvc.setIdentity(bob);
EXPECT_EQ(bobSvc.ingest(extracted.metadata, {}, 5), 1); // Realistic receive-time fallback (the header "ts" is a real std::time stamp; an artificially-tiny
// fallback would trip the future-plausibility clamp in ingest and reject the real ts).
EXPECT_EQ(bobSvc.ingest(extracted.metadata, {}, static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::time(nullptr))), 1);
std::vector<ChatMessage> conv = bobSvc.store().conversation(cid); std::vector<ChatMessage> conv = bobSvc.store().conversation(cid);
EXPECT_EQ((int)conv.size(), 1); EXPECT_EQ((int)conv.size(), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].body, std::string("hello bob")); EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].body, std::string("hello bob"));
EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].peer_public_key_hex, ra.public_key_hex); // Bob learns Alice's key EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].peer_public_key_hex, ra.public_key_hex); // Bob learns Alice's key
EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].peer_zaddr, aliceZ); EXPECT_EQ(conv[0].peer_zaddr, aliceZ);
// The header now carries the sender's compose time (header "ts"); ingest prefers it over the fallback
// (5) so both ends show the same send time. A real std::time() stamp is well past year-2001.
EXPECT_TRUE(conv[0].timestamp > 1000000000);
// Plaintext contact request Alice -> Bob. // Plaintext contact request Alice -> Bob.
OutgoingChatMemos creq; OutgoingChatMemos creq;
@@ -6240,7 +6245,9 @@ void testHushChatOutgoing()
echo.peer_zaddr = aliceZ; echo.peer_zaddr = aliceZ;
echo.peer_public_key_hex = ra.public_key_hex; echo.peer_public_key_hex = ra.public_key_hex;
echo.body = "reply!"; echo.body = "reply!";
echo.timestamp = 7; // A reply is sent AFTER the received message; the incoming "hello bob" now carries a real compose-time
// "ts" (~now), so stamp the echo just after it (not the old artificial 7, which would sort before it).
echo.timestamp = static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::time(nullptr)) + 10;
echo.txid = "out:local1"; echo.txid = "out:local1";
echo.payload_position = 0; echo.payload_position = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(bobSvc.recordOutgoing(echo)); EXPECT_TRUE(bobSvc.recordOutgoing(echo));
@@ -6248,6 +6255,27 @@ void testHushChatOutgoing()
EXPECT_EQ((int)conv2.size(), 2); EXPECT_EQ((int)conv2.size(), 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(conv2.back().direction == ChatDirection::Outgoing); EXPECT_TRUE(conv2.back().direction == ChatDirection::Outgoing);
EXPECT_EQ(conv2.back().body, std::string("reply!")); EXPECT_EQ(conv2.back().body, std::string("reply!"));
// Future-clock clamp: a header "ts" implausibly ahead of the receive time is rejected (falls back to
// the receive time), so a wrong/ahead-clocked peer can't pin their messages to the bottom of a thread.
{
const std::int64_t nowSec = static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::time(nullptr));
const std::int64_t futureTs = nowSec + 10 * 24 * 3600; // 10 days ahead — well past the 1h tolerance
nlohmann::json h;
h["h"] = 1; h["v"] = 0; h["z"] = aliceZ; h["cid"] = "conv-clamp";
h["t"] = "Cont"; h["e"] = ""; h["p"] = ra.public_key_hex; h["ts"] = futureTs;
HushChatTransactionInput ctx;
ctx.txid = "txclamp";
ctx.outputs.push_back({0, h.dump()}); // header at the lower position
ctx.outputs.push_back({1, "please add"}); // contact-request plaintext payload (must not start with '{')
auto exc = extractHushChatTransactionMetadata(ctx, true);
EXPECT_EQ((int)exc.metadata.size(), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(exc.metadata[0].sent_at, futureTs); // the future ts parses through
bobSvc.ingest(exc.metadata, {}, nowSec); // realistic receive time
auto cc = bobSvc.store().conversation("conv-clamp");
EXPECT_EQ((int)cc.size(), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(cc[0].timestamp, nowSec); // clamped to receive time, NOT the future ts
}
} }
// Phase 5: the transport encoding (chatSendOutputs) — header first, "utf8:" for full-node / raw for // Phase 5: the transport encoding (chatSendOutputs) — header first, "utf8:" for full-node / raw for