fix(security): only a real wrong passphrase counts toward unlock lockout

A failed wallet unlock was always treated as a wrong guess: the lockout
counter was bumped and the back-off curve armed no matter why the RPC
failed. A busy or warming-up node, a transport timeout, or a wallet that
is not actually encrypted would all eat an attempt and could push a user
into a lockout without a single mistyped passphrase.

The failed call is now classified before it is acted on:

- Only the daemon's "passphrase incorrect" error counts as a wrong
  guess and advances the lockout.
- A warming-up or unreachable node, a reply timeout, or a full queue is
  reported as a transient busy-node condition with no attempt charged.
- A "wallet is not encrypted" reply refreshes the local encryption state
  instead of penalising the user.
- Any unknown error surfaces its message without touching the counter.

The PIN path got the same treatment: when the vault decrypts correctly
but the unlock RPC then fails for a non-credential reason, the attempt
is no longer counted.

Tests cover the classification of each failure kind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

res/lang/fr.json

@@ -1707,6 +1707,7 @@
     "sec_total_elapsed_fmt": "Temps total écoulé : %dm %02ds",
     "sec_unlock_button": "Déverrouiller",
     "sec_unlock_failed_prefix": "Échec du déverrouillage : ",
+    "sec_unlock_node_busy": "The node is busy; try again in a moment.",
     "sec_unlocking_fmt": "Déverrouillage%s",
     "sec_use_passphrase_instead": "Utiliser une phrase secrète",
     "sec_use_pin_instead": "Utiliser un PIN",