fix(security): don't silently leave a wallet unencrypted or unlocked (W2-2, W2-4)

P0-B encryption-integrity cluster.

W2-2: the first-run wizard's "encrypt" stored the passphrase only in memory and let the
user into the app immediately, so a quit/crash or a failed daemon connect before the
deferred encryption applied left the wallet unencrypted with NO record encryption was
ever requested — the user believing it was encrypted. A persisted encryption_pending
settings flag is now set the moment encryption is requested (never the passphrase, only
the fact). refreshWalletEncryptionState() reconciles it on every connect: wallet observed
encrypted -> clear the flag; wallet NOT encrypted while the flag is set and no deferred
encryption is pending/in-flight -> a once-per-session "your wallet is NOT encrypted — open
Settings to finish" warning (the flag stays set, so it recurs each launch until resolved).
The passphrase is deliberately never persisted to auto-complete — surfacing it is the
secure choice.

W2-4: lockWallet()'s continuation only handled success — a failed walletlock RPC silently
left the wallet UNLOCKED (an unfulfilled auto-lock). It now logs and warns once (reset on
the next successful lock) so a failing auto-lock is visible instead of leaving the wallet
exposed.

Touches settings.{h,cpp}, app_wizard.cpp, app_security.cpp, app.h. Not unit-testable at
this layer (RPC/connect-driven state). Build-clean; ctest 1/1. See docs/wallet-hardening.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-02 14:48:02 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent c7d163f44a
commit 8c12b27c0a
6 changed files with 50 additions and 1 deletions
+29
View File
@@ -487,7 +487,17 @@ void App::lockWallet() {
state_.locked = true;
state_.unlocked_until = 0;
resetTransactionHistoryCacheSession();
lock_failure_warned_ = false;
DEBUG_LOGF("[App] Wallet locked\n");
} else {
// The walletlock RPC failed — the wallet is still UNLOCKED. Surface it (once) rather
// than silently leaving an auto-lock unfulfilled and the wallet exposed (W2-4).
DEBUG_LOGF("[App] walletlock failed — wallet remains unlocked\n");
if (!lock_failure_warned_) {
lock_failure_warned_ = true;
ui::Notifications::instance().warning(
"Couldn't lock the wallet — it is still unlocked. Check the daemon connection.", 12.0f);
}
}
};
});
@@ -564,6 +574,12 @@ void App::refreshWalletEncryptionState() {
state_.unlocked_until = until;
state_.locked = (until == 0);
state_.encryption_state_known = true;
// Wallet is encrypted — any pending deferred-encryption request has now been
// satisfied (however it completed). Clear the persisted flag (W2-2).
if (settings_ && settings_->getEncryptionPending()) {
settings_->setEncryptionPending(false);
settings_->save();
}
if (state_.locked) {
resetTransactionHistoryCacheSession();
} else if (state_.transactions.empty()) {
@@ -576,6 +592,19 @@ void App::refreshWalletEncryptionState() {
state_.locked = false;
state_.unlocked_until = 0;
state_.encryption_state_known = true;
// W2-2: encryption was requested (persisted flag) but the wallet is NOT encrypted,
// and no deferred encryption is pending/in-flight — it was lost to a quit/crash or a
// failed connect before it applied. Warn (once/session) instead of silently leaving
// an unencrypted wallet the user believes is protected. The flag stays set until the
// wallet is actually encrypted, so the warning recurs each launch until resolved.
if (settings_ && settings_->getEncryptionPending() &&
!wallet_security_.hasDeferredEncryption() && !encrypt_in_progress_ &&
!encryption_incomplete_warned_) {
encryption_incomplete_warned_ = true;
ui::Notifications::instance().warning(
"Wallet encryption did not complete — your wallet is NOT encrypted. "
"Open Settings to finish encrypting it.", 30.0f);
}
if (state_.transactions.empty()) {
loadTransactionHistoryCacheIfAvailable();
} else {