fix(lite-backend): never hang or panic a sync on malformed server data

The lightwalletd server controls the compact ciphertext length, the
block, prev-block and tx hash lengths, and (through the chain) the full
txs' epks. Each of these could wedge or poison a sync:

- try_sapling_compact_note_decryption asserts a 52-byte ciphertext. A
  shorter (or full 580-byte) one panicked a pool job in
  scan_output_internal while the original sender stayed alive, so the
  collector waited forever with sync_lock, txs.write() and a wallet read
  guard held.
- scan_taddress_txids kept its own sender alive too: one panicking
  t-address job (scan_full_tx) left crx.iter().take(n) blocked forever.
- CompactBlock::hash()/prev_hash() assert 32 bytes when no header is
  sent, and every vtx hash is copied into a [u8; 32], one of them under
  txs.write(): a 31-byte tx hash poisoned the wallet for good, and a bad
  hash in the block's txid list panicked after the witnesses had moved.
- scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx unwrapped as_prime_order() on
  the epk. Consensus rejects only a small-order epk, so a mixed-order
  one can be mined: an own tx then failed every sync, and the mempool
  receiver thread died silently.

Changes:
- append_leaf(node: Node, ..) commits a leaf to the existing, block and
  new witnesses and the tree; the epk-error path, the new
  short-ciphertext path and the normal path all use it (a
  behaviour-neutral extraction).
- A compact ciphertext under 52 bytes is skipped with its cmu still
  committed; a longer one is truncated to 52 bytes, which is exact (the
  compact plaintext is those bytes and the cmu re-check validates it).
- Each decryption job catches a panic and sends exactly one message;
  drop(tx) after the dispatch, and the collector logs a vanished or
  panicked job and treats the output as not ours.
- scan_taddress_txids runs through the private seam
  scan_taddress_txids_with(job): catch_unwind per job, drop(ctx), and a
  count check, so a dead job is an error, never a hang or a silent
  partial success.
- scan_block_with_pool checks the block, prev-block and vtx hash lengths
  right after the parse and returns Err(-1), as for an unparsable block,
  before any change (Err(height) would refetch the same block forever
  under sync_lock).
- scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx skip an output whose epk is not
  in the prime-order subgroup (one check per output, used by every
  decryption and the outgoing recovery).
- The mempool receiver thread catches a panic of scan_full_mempool_tx.

Flagged behaviour changes:
- a compact ciphertext under 52 bytes is skipped (its cmu is still
  committed); one over 52 bytes is truncated;
- pool-job panics are reported (logged; the output is treated as not
  ours, which a rescan repairs) instead of hanging the sync;
- bad hash lengths return Err(-1) before any change;
- outputs with a non-prime-order epk are skipped;
- the mempool thread survives a bad tx.
Wallet format v9 is unchanged; no ABI or symbol change. Honest data
takes the same path as before (an old-vs-new run over generated honest
chains is byte-identical).

Tests (each on its own thread under a 15 s watchdog):
0/51/52/53/580-byte ciphertexts in one block on the inline and deferred
witness paths (the 51-byte notes are skipped, the 53- and 580-byte notes
are found, the tree and every witness match the reference); a 31-byte tx
hash, an empty block hash, a 31-byte prev hash and a 33-byte foreign tx
hash each return Err(-1) with the txs lock usable and
last_scanned_height, trees and witnesses unchanged; a mixed-order epk in
scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx does not panic and decrypts
nothing while the real epk still decrypts; a t-address job panicking for
1 of 3 addresses is an Err. The oracle generator gains short
(0..=51-byte) and full (580-byte) ciphertext outputs without an extra
random draw, so each seed keeps its sequence of blocks, values and
keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/oracle_tests.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
 //! A seeded generator builds random fake compact chains and feeds them to a `LightWallet`
 //! through its public entry points (`scan_block_with_pool`, `invalidate_block`, `read`/`write`,
 //! `send_to_address`, `scan_full_tx`). It covers receives to HD, diversified, imported-sk,
-//! view-only and foreign keys, zero-value and dust notes, outputs with an unparseable epk,
+//! view-only and foreign keys, zero-value and dust notes, outputs with an unparseable epk or a
+//! malformed compact ciphertext (0..=51 bytes: skipped; the full 580 bytes: truncated to 52),
 //! compact spends with change, real `send_to_address` sends that are mined later (or never),
 //! reorgs of 1..=100 blocks (in one call or block by block, with spends re-mined on the new
 //! branch), and save/reload.
@@ -358,6 +359,18 @@ enum SendKind {
     Real,
 }
 
+/// How `make_output` encodes an output's compact form. Every kind has a parseable cmu, i.e. is a leaf.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+enum OutKind {
+    Good,
+    /// A 31-byte (unparseable) epk: never decrypted.
+    BadEpk,
+    /// A 0..=51-byte ciphertext (C245): never decrypted.
+    ShortCt,
+    /// The full 580-byte ciphertext (C245): the compact plaintext is its first 52 bytes, so the note is found.
+    FullCt,
+}
+
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct Stats {
     blocks: usize,
@@ -374,6 +387,9 @@ struct Stats {
     requeued: usize,
     remined: usize,
     full_checks: usize,
+    /// Generated outputs with a short (0..=51-byte) / the full (580-byte) compact ciphertext.
+    short_ct: usize,
+    full_ct: usize,
     /// Reorgs while a note is pending, by `at`: above the sent tip, across it (anchor kept),
     /// popping the anchor block.
     pending_reorgs: [usize; 3],
@@ -566,7 +582,9 @@ impl Sim {
         }
     }
 
-    fn make_output(&mut self, ovk: OutgoingViewingKey, to: &PaymentAddress<Bls12>, value: u64, bad_epk: bool)
+    /// BadEpk and ShortCt draw the same 31 random bytes (the epk, or what sets the ciphertext length), so the
+    /// generator's stream does not depend on the kind: every seed generates the same chain as before ShortCt existed.
+    fn make_output(&mut self, ovk: OutgoingViewingKey, to: &PaymentAddress<Bls12>, value: u64, kind: OutKind)
                    -> (CompactOutput, Note<Bls12>) {
         let note = Note {
             g_d: to.diversifier.g_d::<Bls12>(&JUBJUB).unwrap(),
@@ -577,19 +595,36 @@ impl Sim {
         let enc = SaplingNoteEncryption::new(ovk, note.clone(), to.clone(), Memo::default(), &mut self.rng);
         let mut cmu = vec![];
         note.cm(&JUBJUB).into_repr().write_le(&mut cmu).unwrap();
+        let mut junk = vec![];
+        if kind == OutKind::BadEpk || kind == OutKind::ShortCt {
+            junk.resize(31, 0);
+            self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut junk);
+        }
         let mut epk = vec![];
-        if bad_epk {
+        if kind == OutKind::BadEpk {
             // Unparseable epk: the wallet must still append the cmu to the tree.
-            epk.resize(31, 0);
-            self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut epk);
+            epk = junk.clone();
         } else {
             enc.epk().write(&mut epk).unwrap();
         }
         let ct = enc.encrypt_note_plaintext();
+        let ct = match kind {
+            // Undecryptable: the wallet must skip it (no hang, no panic) and still append the cmu to the tree.
+            OutKind::ShortCt => {
+                self.stats.short_ct += 1;
+                ct[..junk[0] as usize % 52].to_vec()
+            }
+            // The wallet must truncate it to 52 bytes and find a note of ours.
+            OutKind::FullCt => {
+                self.stats.full_ct += 1;
+                ct.to_vec()
+            }
+            _ => ct[..52].to_vec(),
+        };
         let mut co = CompactOutput::new();
         co.set_cmu(cmu);
         co.set_epk(epk);
-        co.set_ciphertext(ct[..52].to_vec());
+        co.set_ciphertext(ct);
         (co, note)
     }
 
@@ -604,7 +639,9 @@ impl Sim {
         } else {
             fvk.default_address().unwrap().1
         };
-        let (co, note) = self.make_output(fvk.fvk.ovk, &to, value, false);
+        // Value 7 mod 16 (no extra draw): the full 580-byte ciphertext.
+        let kind = if value % 16 == 7 { OutKind::FullCt } else { OutKind::Good };
+        let (co, note) = self.make_output(fvk.fvk.ovk, &to, value, kind);
         (co, Owned { account, note, to })
     }
 
@@ -695,7 +732,15 @@ impl Sim {
                 let (ovk, to) = self.foreign[self.rng.gen_range(0, self.foreign.len())].clone();
                 let v = self.gen_value();
                 let bad = self.rng.gen_bool(0.04);
-                let (co, _) = self.make_output(ovk, &to, v, bad);
+                // A bad output has an unparseable epk (even value) or a short ciphertext (odd value); a good one with
+                // value 7 mod 16 carries the full ciphertext. No extra draw: the generator's stream is unchanged.
+                let kind = match (bad, v % 2, v % 16) {
+                    (true, 0, _) => OutKind::BadEpk,
+                    (true, _, _) => OutKind::ShortCt,
+                    (false, _, 7) => OutKind::FullCt,
+                    _ => OutKind::Good,
+                };
+                let (co, _) = self.make_output(ovk, &to, v, kind);
                 ctx.outputs.push(co);
                 ours.push(None);
             }
@@ -1581,11 +1626,13 @@ impl Sim {
 
     fn summary(&self) -> String {
         let s = &self.stats;
-        format!("seed {:#x}: {} blocks, {} outputs ({} ours, {} notes), {} compact spends, {} reorgs (max {}), \
+        format!("seed {:#x}: {} blocks, {} outputs ({} ours, {} notes; {} short-ct, {} full-ct), {} compact spends, \
+                 {} reorgs (max {}), \
                  {} reloads, {} probes, {} sends ({} mined), {} insufficient, {} requeued/{} re-mined, \
                  {} full checks, max {} cleared lists, {} keys; time gen {:.1}s scan {:.1}s ref {:.1}s \
                  check {:.1}s send {:.1}s reorg {:.1}s reload {:.1}s periodic {:.1}s; {}",
-                self.seed, s.blocks, s.outputs, s.ours, self.notes.len(), s.spends, s.reorgs, s.max_depth,
+                self.seed, s.blocks, s.outputs, s.ours, self.notes.len(), s.short_ct, s.full_ct, s.spends, s.reorgs,
+                s.max_depth,
                 s.reloads, s.probes, s.sends, s.mined_sends, s.insufficient, s.requeued, s.remined,
                 s.full_checks, self.cleared_seen.get(), self.w.zkeys.read().unwrap().len(),
                 s.t_gen, s.t_scan, s.t_ref, s.t_check, s.t_send, s.t_reorg, s.t_reload, s.t_full,

third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/tests.rs

@@ -3696,3 +3696,100 @@ fn test_seed_phrase_empty_when_encrypted_seed_is_zero() {
     wallet.seed = [0u8; 32];
     assert_eq!(wallet.get_seed_phrase(), "");
 }
+
+/// Runs `f` on its own thread and returns its result, failing when there is none within 15 s: a scan that hangs (the
+/// C245 failure mode) fails its test instead of wedging the suite. A panic in `f` is re-raised here.
+pub(crate) fn within_watchdog<T: Send + 'static, F: FnOnce() -> T + Send + 'static>(what: &str, f: F) -> T {
+    use std::sync::mpsc::{channel, RecvTimeoutError};
+    let (tx, rx) = channel();
+    let t = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        let _ = tx.send(f());
+    });
+    match rx.recv_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15)) {
+        Ok(v) => {
+            let _ = t.join();
+            v
+        }
+        Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => panic!("{}: no result within the 15 s watchdog (hang)", what),
+        Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => match t.join() {
+            Err(p) => std::panic::resume_unwind(p),
+            Ok(()) => panic!("{}: the test thread ended without a result", what),
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_scan_full_tx_mixed_order_epk_no_panic() {
+    // C245 Fix 4. A full tx's epk is chain data: Sapling consensus rejects only a small-order epk, so an epk plus a
+    // point of order 2 can be mined. scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx unwrapped as_prime_order() and panicked
+    // (an own tx failed every sync; the mempool thread died). The output is skipped now; with its real epk the same
+    // output still decrypts.
+    within_watchdog("mixed-order epk", || {
+        use pairing::bls12_381::Fr;
+        use std::panic::{catch_unwind, AssertUnwindSafe};
+        use zcash_primitives::jubjub::{edwards, Unknown};
+        use zcash_primitives::transaction::components::{OutputDescription, GROTH_PROOF_SIZE};
+
+        let mut rng = OsRng;
+        let wallet = LightWallet::new(None, &get_test_config(), 0, 0).unwrap();
+        let extfvk = wallet.zkeys.read().unwrap()[0].extfvk.clone();
+        let to = extfvk.default_address().unwrap().1;
+        let note = Note {
+            g_d: to.diversifier.g_d::<Bls12>(&JUBJUB).unwrap(),
+            pk_d: to.pk_d.clone(),
+            value: 50_000,
+            r: Fs::random(&mut rng),
+        };
+        let memo = Memo::from_bytes(b"C245 mixed-order epk").unwrap();
+        let enc = SaplingNoteEncryption::new(extfvk.fvk.ovk, note.clone(), to.clone(), memo.clone(), &mut rng);
+        let cmu = note.cm(&JUBJUB);
+        let cv: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> =
+            edwards::Point::<Bls12, Unknown>::rand(&mut rng, &JUBJUB).mul_by_cofactor(&JUBJUB).into();
+        let epk: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = enc.epk().clone().into();
+
+        // (0, -1) has order 2: epk + (0, -1) is on the curve but outside the prime-order subgroup.
+        let mut minus_one = Fr::one();
+        minus_one.negate();
+        let t2 = edwards::Point::<Bls12, Unknown>::get_for_y(minus_one, false, &JUBJUB).unwrap();
+        assert!(t2 != edwards::Point::zero() && t2.double(&JUBJUB) == edwards::Point::zero());
+        let mixed = epk.add(&t2, &JUBJUB);
+        assert!(epk.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).is_some() && mixed.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).is_none());
+
+        let mut txid = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut txid);
+        let tx_with_epk = |e: &edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown>| {
+            let mut data = TransactionData::new();
+            data.shielded_outputs.push(OutputDescription {
+                cv: cv.clone(),
+                cmu,
+                ephemeral_key: e.clone(),
+                enc_ciphertext: enc.encrypt_note_plaintext(),
+                out_ciphertext: enc.encrypt_outgoing_plaintext(&cv, &cmu),
+                zkproof: [0u8; GROTH_PROOF_SIZE],
+            });
+            Transaction { txid: TxId(txid), data }
+        };
+        let honest = tx_with_epk(&epk);
+        let bad = tx_with_epk(&mixed);
+
+        // The wallet holds the note (compact scan of the honest tx), without its memo yet.
+        let mut cb = FakeCompactBlock::new(0, BlockHash([0; 32]));
+        cb.add_tx(&honest);
+        wallet.scan_block(&cb.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        let memo_of = |w: &LightWallet| w.txs.read().unwrap()[&TxId(txid)].notes[0].memo.clone();
+        assert!(memo_of(&wallet).is_none());
+
+        let r = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| wallet.scan_full_tx(&bad, 0, 0)));
+        assert!(r.is_ok(), "scan_full_tx panicked on a mixed-order epk");
+        assert!(memo_of(&wallet).is_none(), "an output with a mixed-order epk was decrypted");
+        let r = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| wallet.scan_full_mempool_tx(&bad, 1, 0, true)));
+        assert!(r.is_ok(), "scan_full_mempool_tx panicked on a mixed-order epk");
+        assert!(wallet.incoming_mempool_txs.read().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+        // Control: the same output with its real epk is ours, in both scans.
+        wallet.scan_full_tx(&honest, 0, 0);
+        assert!(memo_of(&wallet) == Some(memo.clone()), "the honest output did not decrypt");
+        wallet.scan_full_mempool_tx(&honest, 1, 0, true);
+        assert!(wallet.incoming_mempool_txs.read().unwrap().contains_key(&TxId(txid)));
+    });
+}

third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/witness_tests.rs

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ use zcash_primitives::{
 };
 
 use super::data::SaplingNoteData;
+use super::tests::within_watchdog;
 use super::{LightWallet, MAX_REORG};
 use crate::lightclient::LightClientConfig;
 
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@ fn foreign() -> ExtendedFullViewingKey {
 
 /// An output paying `value` to the default address of `fvk` (the body of tests.rs add_tx_paying_to).
 fn out_to(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64) -> CompactOutput {
+    out_to_ct(fvk, value, 52)
+}
+
+/// out_to whose compact ciphertext is the first `ct_len` bytes of the full 580-byte note ciphertext (out_to: 52).
+fn out_to_ct(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64, ct_len: usize) -> CompactOutput {
     let mut rng = OsRng;
     let to = fvk.default_address().unwrap().1;
     let note = Note {
@@ -94,7 +100,7 @@ fn out_to(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64) -> CompactOutput {
     let mut cout = CompactOutput::new();
     cout.set_cmu(cmu);
     cout.set_epk(epk);
-    cout.set_ciphertext(enc_ciphertext[..52].to_vec());
+    cout.set_ciphertext(enc_ciphertext[..ct_len].to_vec());
     cout
 }
 
@@ -794,3 +800,121 @@ fn deferred_append_path_with_bad_outputs() {
     deferred_case(17);
     deferred_case(3);
 }
+
+// C245: malformed server data. Each test runs on its own thread under a 15 s watchdog (within_watchdog), so the old
+// failure mode, a scan waiting forever for a pool job that died, fails the test instead of wedging the suite.
+
+/// A block at the chain's next height on its tip, carrying `txs`. Not applied to the model.
+fn raw_block(c: &Chain, txs: Vec<CompactTx>) -> CompactBlock {
+    let mut cb = CompactBlock::new();
+    cb.set_height(c.next as u64);
+    cb.hash = random_hash().to_vec();
+    cb.prevHash = c.prev.0.to_vec();
+    for (i, mut t) in txs.into_iter().enumerate() {
+        t.set_index(i as u64);
+        cb.vtx.push(t);
+    }
+    cb
+}
+
+/// K notes, then one block whose outputs carry compact ciphertexts of 0, 51, 52, 53 and 580 bytes. The server controls
+/// that length, and try_sapling_compact_note_decryption asserts 52. Shorter: the output cannot be trial-decrypted and
+/// is skipped, even when it pays us, but its cmu is a leaf like any other. Longer (53, or the full 580 bytes from a
+/// server that sends full ciphertexts): the compact plaintext is the first 52 bytes, so the note is found. The model is
+/// the reference: it appends every parseable cmu whatever the ciphertext, i.e. exactly what a wallet fed 52-byte
+/// ciphertexts in those slots commits. K = 3 takes the inline witness path, K = 17 the deferred one.
+fn bad_ciphertext_case(k: usize) {
+    let mut c = Chain::new();
+    for _ in 0..k {
+        let g = c.pay_us(10_000);
+        c.mine(vec![g]);
+    }
+    let ctx = format!("bad ciphertext K={}", k);
+    let f = foreign();
+    let ours = c.ours();
+    // tx1: our note; our note with a 51-byte ciphertext (skipped); a foreign note
+    let (t1, id1) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 1_111), out_to_ct(&ours, 9_999, 51), out_to(&f, 1)], vec![]);
+    // tx2: a foreign 51-byte ciphertext; our note with the full 580-byte ciphertext (found)
+    let (t2, id2) = tx_with(vec![out_to_ct(&f, 2, 51), out_to_ct(&ours, 2_222, 580)], vec![]);
+    // tx3: our note with a 53-byte ciphertext (found); a foreign empty ciphertext
+    let (t3, id3) = tx_with(vec![out_to_ct(&ours, 3_333, 53), out_to_ct(&f, 3, 0)], vec![]);
+    let size_before = c.model.tree.size();
+    c.mine(vec![
+        GenTx { ctx: t1, txid: id1, ours: Some(0), spends: vec![] },
+        GenTx { ctx: t2, txid: id2, ours: Some(1), spends: vec![] },
+        GenTx { ctx: t3, txid: id3, ours: Some(0), spends: vec![] },
+    ]);
+    assert_eq!(c.model.tree.size() - size_before, 7, "{}: every output is a leaf", ctx);
+    c.compare(true, &ctx);
+    {
+        let txs = c.wallet.txs.read().unwrap();
+        let values = |id: &TxId| txs[id].notes.iter().map(|nd| nd.note.value).collect::<Vec<u64>>();
+        assert_eq!(values(&id1), vec![1_111], "{}: the 51-byte note must be skipped", ctx);
+        assert_eq!(values(&id2), vec![2_222], "{}: the 580-byte note must be found", ctx);
+        assert_eq!(values(&id3), vec![3_333], "{}: the 53-byte note must be found", ctx);
+    }
+    let root = c.wallet.blocks.read().unwrap().last().unwrap().tree.root();
+    assert!(root == c.model.tree.root(), "{}: tip root differs from the reference", ctx);
+    assert!(check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, &ctx) >= k + 3, "{}: every live note is checked", ctx);
+
+    // One more block: every note, including the three from the bad-ciphertext block, advances.
+    let g = c.pay_foreign(2);
+    c.mine(vec![g]);
+    c.compare(true, &ctx);
+    check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, &ctx);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn bad_compact_ciphertext_is_skipped_or_truncated() {
+    within_watchdog("bad compact ciphertext", || {
+        bad_ciphertext_case(3);
+        bad_ciphertext_case(17);
+    });
+}
+
+/// Hash lengths are server data too. CompactBlock::hash()/prev_hash() assert 32 bytes when no header is sent, and every
+/// tx hash was copied into a [u8; 32]: for a tx of ours under txs.write() (the panic poisoned the wallet for good), and
+/// for the block's txid list after the witnesses had moved. Each is Err(-1) now, before any change: the lock is usable,
+/// last_scanned_height and every tree and witness are unchanged, and the next good block scans.
+#[test]
+fn malformed_hashes_are_an_error_before_any_change() {
+    within_watchdog("malformed hashes", || {
+        let mut c = Chain::new();
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let g = c.pay_us(10_000);
+            c.mine(vec![g]);
+        }
+        let ours = c.ours();
+        let mut cases: Vec<(&str, CompactBlock)> = vec![];
+        let (mut t, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
+        t.hash.truncate(31);
+        cases.push(("our tx with a 31-byte hash", raw_block(&c, vec![t])));
+        let (t, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
+        let mut b = raw_block(&c, vec![t]);
+        b.hash = vec![];
+        cases.push(("an empty block hash and no header", b));
+        let mut b = raw_block(&c, vec![]);
+        b.prevHash.truncate(31);
+        cases.push(("a 31-byte prev hash and no header", b));
+        let (t1, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
+        let (mut t2, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&foreign(), 1)], vec![]);
+        t2.hash.push(0);
+        cases.push(("our tx and a foreign tx with a 33-byte hash", raw_block(&c, vec![t1, t2])));
+
+        let h = c.wallet.last_scanned_height();
+        for (name, b) in cases {
+            let bytes = b.write_to_bytes().unwrap();
+            let w = &c.wallet;
+            let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| w.scan_block(&bytes)));
+            assert!(r.is_ok(), "{}: scan_block panicked", name);
+            assert_eq!(r.unwrap(), Err(-1), "{}", name);
+            assert!(c.wallet.txs.read().is_ok(), "{}: the txs lock is poisoned", name);
+            assert_eq!(c.wallet.last_scanned_height(), h, "{}: last_scanned_height moved", name);
+            c.compare(true, name);
+        }
+        let g = c.pay_us(7_000);
+        c.mine(vec![g]);
+        c.compare(true, "after the malformed blocks");
+        check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, "after the malformed blocks");
+    });
+}