The Validate address dialog chose its RPC from the first character of
the input, then asked the transparent-only validateaddress for every
case. That RPC is Base58-only, so a valid Sapling (z) address came back
isvalid=false and was reported invalid.
- The input is now classified with the checksum-verified recognizers,
and a shielded address is sent to z_validateaddress while a
transparent (mining) address keeps validateaddress.
- Anything that is not an address - a typo, garbage, or a pasted
viewing/spending key - is judged invalid on the spot and never sent to
the node, so a key pasted into the field is not leaked to an RPC.
- On Lite there is no node to ask, so the dialog shows the checksum
verdict alone and hides the "owned by this wallet" row.
Tests: validateRpcMethod maps shielded to z_validateaddress, transparent
to validateaddress, and a key or empty string to no RPC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DragonX is a private chain (-ac_private=1): consensus rejects any
non-coinbase output to a transparent address, so a t-address can only
ever receive mining rewards, and its coins can only move to a shielded
address. The wallet treated them like ordinary recipients.
Block paying one:
- Send: a transparent recipient shows "Mining address - can't be paid"
and disables Review Send (tooltip explains; ask for a zs... address).
Typing, paste, contacts and payment URIs all go through this field.
- Overview drag-to-transfer: a mining-address row is never a transfer
target (it only reorders).
- Pool payout must be shielded (pools pay with ordinary transactions):
field tooltip, disabled Start button and the start check say why.
- isValidRecipientAddress() is now shielded-only; new isDragonXAddress()
and classifyRecipient() (Shielded / MiningOnly / Invalid).
Call them mining addresses:
- Overview: "Mining rewards" card (amber "Not yet shielded" when there
is a balance; hover explains; click opens the Shield dialog), "New
mining address" button with a tooltip, rows typed "Mining".
- QR / label dialogs, portfolio filter, contact badge ("Mining only"),
Receive notifications.
i18n: 17 new keys in all 8 languages, 12 dead keys removed, CJK subset
rebuilt. Tests: recipient classification, translation completeness.
UI sweep: new "send-mining-recipient" target.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same defect class as the import-key fix: a hardcoded prefix/length pre-filter
layered over the checksum validators rejected valid addresses before the daemon
saw them. The send-screen recipient gate required a[0]=='R', and the payment-URI
parser accepted only 'R'/'t' with rigid length bands — so every valid P2SH /
multisig address (DragonX SCRIPT_ADDRESS=85 → 'b…') was silently refused, leaving
the Send button disabled with no usable recipient.
Centralize recipient recognition in util/address_validation:
- isTransparentAddress: Base58Check with a 21-byte version+hash160 payload —
covers P2PKH ('R…', v60) AND P2SH ('b…', v85) on every network, rejects WIF
keys / typos by real checksum.
- isShieldedAddress: Bech32 + a Sapling payment-address HRP (zs / ztestsapling /
zregtestsapling), distinguishing a payment address from a viewing key.
- isValidRecipientAddress: either of the above.
send_tab's two validity helpers (the single choke point for all 5 call sites) and
the payment-URI format check now route through these. The URI parser now
checksum-validates the recipient (fail-fast on transcription errors) rather than
being prefix/length-only.
Tests use real checksummed vectors (P2PKH/P2SH/shielded, WIF- and typo-rejection);
testPaymentUri updated off its old fake fixed-char addresses. Suite green (1/1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The client-side pre-check rejected legitimate keys before the daemon ever
saw them, surfacing "Unrecognized key format" / a cryptic daemon "Invalid"
error. Two concrete defects plus the brittle heuristic behind them:
- Viewing keys: isViewingKey looked for Zcash's "zxview" extended-FVK
prefix, but DragonX's z_exportviewingkey emits a Sapling *incoming*
viewing key (HRP "zivks"), which z_importviewingkey is the only form the
daemon decodes. Every real DragonX viewing key was refused. (F1)
- Uncompressed transparent WIF: the length+first-char heuristic accepted
{5,K,L,U} only, but a version-188 uncompressed key starts with '7'. (F2)
Replace the heuristic with structural validation using the existing
checksum validators (F3): add util::decodeBase58Check (checksum-stripped
payload) and util::bech32Hrp (HRP of a valid Bech32 string). Transparent
keys are now accepted by decoding Base58Check and checking the payload is a
33/34-byte secret key with a DragonX SECRET_KEY version byte (188 main/
regtest, 128 testnet) — covering compressed and uncompressed, rejecting
addresses/typos by real checksum. Viewing keys are matched by the real
incoming-VK HRPs (zivks / zivktestsapling / zivkregtestsapling).
The Sweep gate and the dialog's live type indicator run off the same
predicates, so they are fixed too (F4). Messaging now names the likely
cause and appends a wrong-coin/network hint to the daemon's raw "Invalid"
error (F5).
Adds testPrivateKeyImportRecognition plus decodeBase58Check/bech32Hrp
coverage; suite green (1/1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The send screen labelled any prefix+length match as a "Valid" address, so a
mistyped address that still matched the pattern passed the gate. Add pure,
offline checksum validation — Base58Check (transparent R-addresses) and Bech32
(Sapling zs-addresses) — and require it in the validity check. Both verifiers are
version-byte/HRP agnostic (the HRP is taken from the string, the Base58 checksum
is chain-independent), so a correct implementation never rejects a genuine
address while catching transcription errors. Works for both build variants
(no daemon round-trip), unit-tested against standard BIP173 / Base58Check vectors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8