Both the HEAD size probe and the archive download followed redirects
with no restriction on where they could go. A redirect could therefore
downgrade the transfer to plain http or point at a file:// URL, defeating
the TLS verification the initial https request was relying on.
- Redirects on both requests are now limited to https, so a redirect can
no longer leave TLS or reach a local path.
- The limit is set with the string-based curl option where available and
the protocol-mask option on older libcurl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resuming a partial download leaned entirely on the remote size from a
HEAD request. When that size could not be determined the code played it
safe by deleting the partial file and starting over, so a flaky HEAD (or
an offline mirror) threw away gigabytes that were fine to resume. It also
could not tell a real size from an error page, and if the server answered
a ranged request with the whole file (200, not 206) libcurl could append
it to the partial and silently corrupt the archive.
- The HEAD now returns transport status, HTTP code, and size together,
and a size counts as authoritative only on a 2xx reply with a positive
Content-Length.
- A pure helper decides what to do from the existing bytes and that
authoritative flag: start fresh, truncate a stale oversized file, reuse
a complete one, or resume with a ranged GET. When the size is not
authoritative the partial is kept and a ranged GET is attempted rather
than discarded.
- A ranged request that comes back as 200 instead of 206 now restarts
cleanly from scratch instead of appending to the partial.
- The free-space pre-check runs only when the size is authoritative, and
a failed download reports how many bytes were kept for the retry.
Tests cover the resume-decision helper across the fresh, stale, complete,
resuming, and non-authoritative cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Any verification failure deleted the downloaded archive and forced a
full multi-GB re-download on the next attempt. But most failures are not
a corrupt archive: a missing or unreadable checksum sidecar, or a fetch
blip while pulling the checksum, would throw away a perfectly good file.
On top of that the checksum parser took the first token of whatever came
back, so an HTTP error page could be mistaken for a digest.
- The archive is now removed only on a genuine digest mismatch. A
missing sidecar, an unusable one, or a transient fetch error keeps the
file so the next attempt can reuse or resume it; the no-checksum case
still fails closed and keeps the archive.
- The checksum parser now accepts a token only if it is exactly the
expected length and all hex, lowercasing it; anything else (an error
page, a truncated or wrong-width digest) is rejected.
- The small-file fetch moved onto the shared capped HTTP helper, and MD5
is consulted only as a fallback when no SHA-256 is published.
Tests cover the checksum parser across good, wrong-length, non-hex, and
error-page inputs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The checksum and MD5 passes measured the file for their progress bar
with fseek/ftell. On Windows a long is 32-bit, so ftell overflows on
any archive larger than 2 GiB and hands back a wrong (often negative)
size, which makes the verify progress percentage meaningless on exactly
the multi-gigabyte downloads this code exists for.
- Both passes now take the size from std::filesystem::file_size, which
is 64-bit on every platform, through a small helper that returns 0 if
the size can't be read.
- No seek is performed just to size the file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Several HTTP fetches read a remote body into memory without a tight
bound. The price and exchange-ticker calls shared one large 16 MiB
metadata cap, and the bootstrap checksum download had no size limit at
all, so a hostile or MITM'd server streaming an unbounded (and
Content-Length-free) response could grow memory far past anything these
endpoints legitimately return.
- The HTTP GET helper now takes a per-call byte cap and redirect limit.
The write callback refuses bytes past the cap, which aborts the
transfer, and the same value is set as curl's max file size.
- The price call is capped at 256 KiB and the ticker list at 2 MiB,
each sized to its real payload rather than the shared default.
- The bootstrap checksum fetch caps its body at 64 KiB in both the
write callback and curl's max file size.
Tests cover the sink accept/abort boundary.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bootstrap preflight's protected names could be bypassed by names
that resolve onto them, and its cancel and quit paths had two timing
gaps.
- Entry names are judged as the file system resolves them: '\' is a
separator, "." components are dropped and each component loses its
trailing dots and spaces, as Win32 does ("./wallet.dat" and
"DRAGONX.conf." name protected files). The whole archive is refused
for an absolute or drive-rooted name, a ".." component, any ':'
(drive letter or NTFS alternate data stream, "DRAGONX.conf::$DATA"),
an 8.3 short name ("DRAGON~1.CON"), a component of only dots or
spaces (other than "."), and any byte >= 0x80 or ASCII control
character: macOS folds or ignores some Unicode (U+017F, U+212A,
U+200C) onto a protected name, and the published bootstrap archive
uses plain ASCII names. A refused name is echoed
with \xNN escapes. A member is written at the path it was checked
under, and the protected-name check runs on the resolved name.
- The user's Cancel (Settings dialog and first-run wizard) goes through
requestCancel(). It is refused once the old chain data starts being
replaced, and the start of that window re-checks a cancel under the
same lock, so a click lands before the old chain is touched or not at
all.
- Quit cancels the wizard's and the Settings bootstrap when the
shutdown starts; the HEAD and checksum requests now end at once on
cancel, and a cancelled HEAD keeps the partial download. A run
cancelled before the window leaves the old chain as it was. A run
inside it stops extracting and removes its partial chain while the
shutdown screen shows "Cleaning up...", so it ends with no chain data
(wallet.dat untouched; Retry reuses the zip, or the node resyncs).
That wait is bounded: at most 2 minutes from the start of the
shutdown, then 3 s in shutdown(), after which a worker still running
is left to the process exit. Only a cleanup that overruns that cap
can leave a partial chain, which dragonxd then answers with its
reindex offer.
Tests: refusal of the Windows-resolved, non-ASCII and control-character
names with the escaped echo; the protected-name list incl. the resolved
forms and a planted -wallet file, conf and database/ that stay
byte-identical; the user-cancel window; the bounded quit wait and
safeToAbandon(); a cancel ends a HEAD request that never answers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bootstrap removed blocks/, chainstate/ and notarizations/ first and
only then opened the archive. An unsafe entry, a full disk or a corrupt
member therefore left no chain, or a half-written one for dragonxd to
start on.
- Preflight before anything is deleted: every archive entry must be
safe (no absolute path, no "..") and readable, and the disk must hold
the extracted size plus max(256 MiB, 5%), counting what removing the
old chain frees (a symlinked chain dir counts 0). Free space counts as
unknown only when the probe errors, the capacity is 0 or the
available size is -1; a known disk with 0 bytes free is a refusal.
The old chain is kept on every preflight failure.
- Protected members are skipped, compared case-insensitively: any path
component starting with "wallet", any "database" component, a .cookie
or *.conf file, and top-level *.dat files other than fee_estimates,
peers and banlist. The number of non-critical member failures is
logged.
- The removal of the old chain is verified (a locked file fails the run
instead of mixing old and new chain files). If the extraction fails or
is aborted, the partial chain is removed again before the failure is
published; isDone() turns true only after the worker's last
filesystem change.
- Cancel is disabled while the old chain data is being replaced, and
quit aborts a running bootstrap.
- A complete zip from an earlier attempt is reused on Retry; its
checksum is re-verified. A download that cannot fit fails early, and a
disk-full write error says so.
Tests: the space rule (boundaries, unknown vs. full disk, saturation);
planArchive sizes, zip-slip, garbage and truncated zips; the
protected-name list; reclaimableBytes with symlinks; each preflight
refusal keeps the old chain and wallet.dat byte-identical; a corrupt
critical member removes the partial chain before the failure is
published.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every operation that stops the node (restart, rescan, repair, delete
chain data, reinstall, bootstrap, wallet switch/adopt/restore/rebuild,
wizard restart, encrypt, decrypt) now:
- refuses up front while the node is rebuilding witnesses or has not
answered for 30s, with a "try again when it's done" warning, and sends
no stop;
- goes ahead only once the node's PROCESS has exited, not its RPC port.
A stop that doesn't finish within 120s cancels the operation (warning;
a cancelled rescan/repair disarms its flags); nothing is started over
the old node, chain data isn't deleted, wallet.dat isn't swapped.
Specifics:
- stopDaemonForWalletSwitch() no longer reports "stopped" when the app
is quitting (adopt could swap wallet.dat under a live node).
- Decrypt waited a fixed 3s after "stop" before renaming wallet.dat; it
now waits for the process to exit, and scrubs the key export if not.
- Bootstrap waits for the process before cleanChainData and stops the
node through the stop routine instead of the shared RPC client.
- StopScope::Connected lets switch/reinstall/decrypt stop an adopted or
external node through the same never-kill routine.
- A bounded stop that can't reach the node (a foreign node refusing our
credentials) gives up after 5s instead of 120s.
- macOS: isDaemonProcessRunning() checks processes (libproc), not the
RPC port.
- rpcBusyWhileAlive() also reads the busy gate: since the gate, the
first timeout usually lands on another lane and the 30s clock never
started (also weakened the quit prompt for a silent rebuild).
- Notifications render during the first-run wizard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dev-branch audit (docs/_archive/security-audit-dev-2026-07-22.md) re-found the
master issues (absent on dev) plus new ones in dev-only code. Applied here;
full-node build + test suite green; the subtle fixes were adversarially re-verified.
Ported from the master remediation (adapted to dev's code):
- bootstrap: reject zip-slip / path-traversal archive members (isSafeArchivePath)
before writing (S2-1). (dev already fail-closes on a missing checksum.)
- xmrig updater: fail closed when a signature is required but no key is pinned (F1-1).
- http_download.httpGetString: 16 MiB hard cap + MAXFILESIZE on the shared
metadata/price fetch (F1-2 / caps the updater + exchange paths at one site).
- rpc_client: explicit SSL_VERIFYPEER/VERIFYHOST (F4-1) and a 256 MiB response
cap in WriteCallback (F4-3).
- lite_connection_service: reject remote http:// lite servers, loopback only (L1-1).
Loopback is matched by a strict dotted-decimal 127.0.0.0/8 check (not a
startsWith("127.") prefix, which would wrongly accept 127.0.0.1.evil.com), with
userinfo/fragment stripping.
- lite controller: propagate encrypt/decrypt save() failure instead of reporting
success (F7-1).
- xmrig_manager: chmod(0600) the pool config before writing secrets (F5-2).
- app: clear the copied secret from the OS clipboard on shutdown (F3b-1).
- export_transactions: neutralize CSV/spreadsheet formula injection (F13-1).
- build pipeline: build-from-source lite backend + remove the self-attested
CMake signature gate (F15-1); pinned+verified appimagetool (F15-3/4);
verified Sapling params in setup.sh (F15-6); build.sh exits 0 on success.
(F14-1 empty-quoted-arg and F8-2 NUL-termination were already fixed on dev.)
Dev-only findings:
- rpc_client.callRaw: scrub the raw buffer + parsed tree (templated scrubJsonSecrets
for ordered_json) so console dumpprivkey/z_exportkey keys don't linger in freed
heap (N1-1).
- seed_wallet_creator: wipe the exported mnemonic on the failure path so a discarded
failed result never carries a live seed (W1-2).
- export_all_keys: write the plaintext key dump 0600 + atomically via
writeFileAtomically (U1-2).
- chat_database: restrict chat_messages.sqlite and its WAL/SHM sidecars to owner-only (C3-1).
Not done (need a decision, documented in the report):
- Chat header metadata (cid/z/p) rides outside the AEAD (C1/C2) — binding it is a
wire-protocol change requiring SilentDragonXLite interop review.
- Bootstrap lacks an offline-rooted signature (S2-2 residual) — needs signing infra.
- Console scrollback retains console-typed key-export output in plaintext (N1-1
residual) — inherent to an echoing console; would need output redaction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the app-wide robustness audit (calibrated to the import-key dialog). These
are the safety-critical fixes; several could cost users funds:
- Backup/export false success (FUND LOSS): exportAllKeys pre-seeded a header, so
a keyless result (the usual case when the wallet is encrypted+locked) still
looked non-empty and backupWallet wrote a private-key-less file and reported
"Backup saved". Now exportAllKeys returns an exported count; backupWallet and
the export-all dialog refuse to write / report success on 0 keys, disclose the
count, flag partial results as INCOMPLETE, and the backup dialog confirms
before overwriting an existing file (+ trims the path).
- Bootstrap: fail CLOSED — refuse to install an unverified multi-GB archive when
no checksum is published (was `return true`), mirroring the xmrig/daemon updaters.
- Restore-from-seed: require a valid BIP39 word count (12/15/18/21/24) with a live
"should be 24 words — you have N" hint instead of accepting any non-empty text.
- Encryption passphrase: detect leading/trailing whitespace and BLOCK with a
warning (not a silent trim, which would change the passphrase and lock the user
out).
- Receive payment QR: emit the canonical `drgx:` scheme with a URL-encoded memo
via a new shared util::buildPaymentUri (the request-payment dialog now routes
through it too, so they can't diverge); the old "dragonx:" + raw memo was
unparseable by the wallet's own scanner.
Also clamps the receive "Recent Received" list to the 4 most recent (companion to
the recent-lists commit).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windows identity:
- Add VERSIONINFO resource (.rc) with ObsidianDragon file description
- Embed application manifest for DPI awareness and shell identity
- Patch libwinpthread/libpthread to remove competing VERSIONINFO
- Set AppUserModelID and HWND property store to override Task Manager cache
- Link patched pthread libs to eliminate "POSIX WinThreads" description
Address creation (+New button):
- Move z_getnewaddress/getnewaddress off UI thread to async worker
- Inject new address into state immediately for instant UI selection
- Trigger background refresh for balance updates
Mining tab:
- Add pool mining dropdown with saved URLs/workers and bookmarks
- Add solo mining log panel from daemon output with chart/log toggle
- Fix toggle button cursor (render after InputTextMultiline)
- Auto-restart miner on pool config change
- Migrate default pool URL to include stratum port
Transactions:
- Sort pending (0-conf) transactions to top of history
- Fall back to timereceived when timestamp is missing
Shutdown:
- Replace blocking sleep_for calls with 100ms polling loops
- Check shutting_down_ flag throughout daemon restart/bootstrap flows
- Reduce daemon stop timeout from 30s to 10s
Other:
- Fix market chart fill artifact (single concave polygon vs per-segment quads)
- Add bootstrap checksum verification state display
- Rename daemon client identifier to ObsidianDragon
Full-node GUI wallet for DragonX cryptocurrency.
Built with Dear ImGui, SDL3, and OpenGL3/DX11.
Features:
- Send/receive shielded and transparent transactions
- Autoshield with merged transaction display
- Built-in CPU mining (xmrig)
- Peer management and network monitoring
- Wallet encryption with PIN lock
- QR code generation for receive addresses
- Transaction history with pagination
- Console for direct RPC commands
- Cross-platform (Linux, Windows)
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8