Rewrite scripts/sign-xmrig-release.sh to use OpenSSL (>= 1.1.1) instead of PyNaCl, so signing
needs no Python deps. OpenSSL's ed25519 is PureEdDSA (RFC 8032) — interop-verified against the
wallet's libsodium crypto_sign_verify_detached (script-produced .sig -> VERIFY-OK; tamper ->
VERIFY-FAIL). keygen/pubkey/sign subcommands; emits base64 raw-64-byte signatures as <file>.sig.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the supply-chain gap the review flagged: today the archive and its SHA-256 share one
trust root (the release body), so a compromised/edited release can ship an arbitrary binary
that still "verifies". This adds authenticity via a detached ed25519 signature checked against
a public key PINNED IN THE BINARY (not fetched), using libsodium's crypto_sign_verify_detached.
Opt-in / soft rollout:
- kXmrigSignaturePublicKeyBase64 in xmrig_updater.h is EMPTY by default -> signatures are not
checked and behavior is unchanged (TLS + SHA-256 only). Paste the base64 public key to enable.
- Once a key is pinned, an install verifies a "<archive>.sig" asset (base64/raw 64-byte ed25519
signature over the archive bytes) when present; kXmrigRequireSignature=true additionally
refuses installs that publish no signature.
- The check runs after the SHA-256 check, over the same already-read archive bytes; refuses on
a missing key-but-required, unreachable .sig, or invalid signature.
- verifyXmrigSignature + selectXmrigSignatureAsset are pure (libsodium only) and unit-tested:
valid base64 + raw-64-byte signatures verify; tampered data, wrong key, and malformed/empty
inputs all fail closed. Cross-tool interop verified (Python stdlib base64 == sodium base64).
- scripts/sign-xmrig-release.sh: keygen / sign / pubkey helper (PyNaCl = same libsodium ed25519)
to produce the .sig assets and the public key to pin.
No behavior change until a key is pinned. Both variants build; suite passes; live worker
re-verified (signatures off by default).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
