d9fa00bb38d19a5cddb28780c280d5fc9b785779
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
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0a042df8e0 |
feat(chat): per-conversation delete (revive + block); memoize chat/badge render
Adds a per-conversation "delete" with two modes, and removes the per-frame rescans of the chat history that shared these files. Delete conversation (header trash icon → confirm dialog): - Delete (revive-on-new-message): clears local history and tombstones the messages (new chat_deleted table, keyed dedup hashes) so the every-few- seconds memo re-scan can't re-import them; a genuinely NEW message (new txid) revives the thread. - Delete & block: removes history WITHOUT a tombstone and records the cid as blocked (settings); ChatService::ingest drops that conversation's messages — old and future — until unblocked from the "Blocked" manager, which then re-imports the conversation from chain. - Local-only (messages remain on-chain; the peer keeps their copy). deleteConversation() deletes the DB rows FIRST and only then mutates the store, so a failed write can't leave the two diverged. Unit-tested (revive / tombstone-survives-reload / block / unblock) and adversarially reviewed (store/DB divergence, half-open DB, revive-unread). Performance (chat + badge hot paths, from the perf audit): - ChatStore gains revision(); the Chat unread badge is now a single O(N) no-alloc pass cached on it (was O(conversations x messages) copy+sort every frame). The conversation list and open thread are memoized on revision() (+ show-hidden and AddressBook::revision() for peer-name resolution). - AddressBook gains revision() so an in-place contact rename invalidates the chat memo (an edit keeps entries().size() constant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DanSandClaude Fable 5
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bcee4bfe72 |
fix(security): apply audit remediations to dev (ported + dev-only)
Dev-branch audit (docs/_archive/security-audit-dev-2026-07-22.md) re-found the
master issues (absent on dev) plus new ones in dev-only code. Applied here;
full-node build + test suite green; the subtle fixes were adversarially re-verified.
Ported from the master remediation (adapted to dev's code):
- bootstrap: reject zip-slip / path-traversal archive members (isSafeArchivePath)
before writing (S2-1). (dev already fail-closes on a missing checksum.)
- xmrig updater: fail closed when a signature is required but no key is pinned (F1-1).
- http_download.httpGetString: 16 MiB hard cap + MAXFILESIZE on the shared
metadata/price fetch (F1-2 / caps the updater + exchange paths at one site).
- rpc_client: explicit SSL_VERIFYPEER/VERIFYHOST (F4-1) and a 256 MiB response
cap in WriteCallback (F4-3).
- lite_connection_service: reject remote http:// lite servers, loopback only (L1-1).
Loopback is matched by a strict dotted-decimal 127.0.0.0/8 check (not a
startsWith("127.") prefix, which would wrongly accept 127.0.0.1.evil.com), with
userinfo/fragment stripping.
- lite controller: propagate encrypt/decrypt save() failure instead of reporting
success (F7-1).
- xmrig_manager: chmod(0600) the pool config before writing secrets (F5-2).
- app: clear the copied secret from the OS clipboard on shutdown (F3b-1).
- export_transactions: neutralize CSV/spreadsheet formula injection (F13-1).
- build pipeline: build-from-source lite backend + remove the self-attested
CMake signature gate (F15-1); pinned+verified appimagetool (F15-3/4);
verified Sapling params in setup.sh (F15-6); build.sh exits 0 on success.
(F14-1 empty-quoted-arg and F8-2 NUL-termination were already fixed on dev.)
Dev-only findings:
- rpc_client.callRaw: scrub the raw buffer + parsed tree (templated scrubJsonSecrets
for ordered_json) so console dumpprivkey/z_exportkey keys don't linger in freed
heap (N1-1).
- seed_wallet_creator: wipe the exported mnemonic on the failure path so a discarded
failed result never carries a live seed (W1-2).
- export_all_keys: write the plaintext key dump 0600 + atomically via
writeFileAtomically (U1-2).
- chat_database: restrict chat_messages.sqlite and its WAL/SHM sidecars to owner-only (C3-1).
Not done (need a decision, documented in the report):
- Chat header metadata (cid/z/p) rides outside the AEAD (C1/C2) — binding it is a
wire-protocol change requiring SilentDragonXLite interop review.
- Bootstrap lacks an offline-rooted signature (S2-2 residual) — needs signing infra.
- Console scrollback retains console-typed key-export output in plaintext (N1-1
residual) — inherent to an echoing console; would need output redaction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
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76093fe82d |
fix(chat): address adversarial review of the send-path change
Four confirmed findings from the review of
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DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
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ef247c95ff |
feat(chat): fee floor, real delivery status, pay-from-funded, funds pre-check
Chat sends move 0 value, so the network fee is structurally load-bearing (it's the only thing that forces a real shielded input; 0-value + 0-fee builds a degenerate, unrelayable tx). Three gaps addressed: 1. Fee floor — broadcastChatMemos now uses max(getDefaultFee(), kChatMinFeeDrgx), so a 0 / too-low global default-fee setting can't silently break chat. 2. Real delivery status — the echo was marked Sent on SUBMIT regardless of the on-chain outcome (the z_sendmany callback was empty), so failures were invisible and the Retry affordance never fired for async failures. Add a third ChatDelivery::Sending state (appended so persisted 0=Sent stays valid); record the echo in-memory as Sending, and resolve it to Sent/Failed from the z_sendmany completion callback — persisting only the final status (so a restart never shows a stuck spinner; a stray persisted Sending loads as Sent). A subtle "sending…" label shows while in flight. 3. Pay-from-funded + pre-check — z_sendmany spends from one z-address, and the identity reply address may be unfunded while funds sit elsewhere. chatPayFromZaddr picks a spendable z-address that can cover the fee (preferring the identity address); the memo still advertises the identity address as reply-to, so paying from a different note is transport-transparent. If nothing can cover the fee, a clear "need a small shielded balance" toast replaces the cryptic failure. Full node only for the callback path; lite resolves optimistically on queue. 8-language strings + CJK subset (+1 glyph 賄). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
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6bfb56aeb9 |
feat(chat): mark outgoing messages that fail to send
Outgoing echoes were recorded optimistically regardless of whether the broadcast was actually submitted. Now broadcastChatMemos / broadcastChatMemosLite return whether the send was submitted (false on immediate failures: not connected, no spendable z-address, or a lite send already in progress), and the echo records a ChatDelivery status (Sent / Failed). The Chat tab shows a "not sent" marker in the error color on failed messages. The status persists in the DB (backward- compatible: old rows deserialize as Sent). (A later async failure — an opid that fails after submission — still surfaces via the existing send-progress notification; only the submit gate is reflected here.) Also removes the now-unused chat_readonly_note string (the composer replaced the read-only footer). Test: delivery status round-trips through the DB. Verified: Linux + Windows build with chat ON, ctest 100%, hygiene clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
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46eec37013 |
feat(chat): persistent, seed-encrypted message store (Phase 2)
Swap the in-memory-only chat store for durable sqlite persistence with real
per-transaction timestamps, encrypted at rest under a key derived from the
wallet's own seed (no passphrase, works on encrypted and unencrypted wallets).
- ChatDatabase (src/chat/chat_database.{h,cpp}): sqlite store mirroring
data::TransactionHistoryCache. unlockWithSecret(seed) derives a 32-byte AEAD
storage key and a wallet-partition tag via domain-separated keyed BLAKE2b
(generichash) contexts. Every record — bodies, peer z-addrs, threading,
timestamps — is crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf-encrypted with a random
nonce and the wallet tag as associated data; even the dedup key is a keyed
hash of txid+position, so nothing about your conversations is in cleartext on
disk. Rows are partitioned per-wallet; a different seed sees nothing. Messages
are decrypted once at ingest then re-encrypted under the storage key, so
load() needs only the storage key, not the chat identity.
- ChatService: ingest() now stamps each message with its own transaction time
(txid->time map + fallback) and writes new (store-deduped) messages through to
the database; loadFromDatabase() rehydrates the in-memory read model on unlock.
- App: unlock the chat DB with the same seed in provisionChatIdentityFromSecret
and load prior history; lock the DB + clear the decrypted in-memory store on
relock and on lite-controller rebuild.
Adversarial review (4 confirmed findings, all fixed): don't provision if the
wallet locks mid-fetch (re-check isLocked at completion); wipe the serialized
plaintext temporary in append(); trim the seed into a separate fully-wiped
buffer (no residue past a shrunk size()); scrub the mnemonic copy in the RPC
json result.
Tests: ChatDatabase round-trip (persist/reload, field + order fidelity), dedup,
per-wallet isolation, lock inertness, and ChatService write-through + reload
without an identity. Gated by DRAGONX_ENABLE_CHAT (default OFF). Verified:
Linux + Windows(mingw) build with chat ON, ctest 100%, hygiene clean; caches
restored to the OFF default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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