Merge dev: format release-note checksums as a table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwycPDQSfEKtrTS2uC4JeT

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ if(APPLE)
 endif()
 
 project(ObsidianDragon
-    VERSION 2.0.1
+    VERSION 2.0.2
     LANGUAGES C CXX
     DESCRIPTION "DragonX Cryptocurrency Wallet"
 )
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ set(DRAGONX_VERSION_SUFFIX "")
 # ObsidianDragonLite is versioned INDEPENDENTLY of the full-node app above. The active variant's
 # version flows to the generated header, the Windows .rc/manifest, and build.sh's release names via
 # DRAGONX_APP_VERSION* (resolved in the lite/full block below).
-set(DRAGONX_LITE_VERSION "1.1.0")
+set(DRAGONX_LITE_VERSION "1.1.1")
 set(DRAGONX_LITE_VERSION_SUFFIX "")
 
 # C++17 standard

docs/release-notes/lite-v1.1.1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+**DragonX (DRGX) Lite Desktop Wallet — v1.1.1**
+
+ObsidianDragonLite is the lightweight, node-free companion to ObsidianDragon — it connects to a DragonX lite-wallet server for near-instant startup, with the same native ImGui interface and shielded-first workflow. **v1.1.1 is a maintenance release** centered on an important wallet-encryption fix.
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ Security fix — please read
+
+**Creating or restoring a Lite wallet with a passphrase now actually encrypts it.**
+
+In prior versions, the create / restore / open flow used by the Settings UI **silently discarded the passphrase you entered**:
+
+- A **newly created or restored** wallet was saved to disk **unencrypted** — the seed and spending keys were stored in the clear even though you set a passphrase.
+- **Opening** an already-encrypted wallet did not unlock it with the supplied passphrase (it opened locked and re-prompted).
+
+v1.1.1 fixes this: create/restore now **encrypt** the wallet with your passphrase (the backend encrypts and locks it), and open now **unlocks** it.
+
+**What you should do:** if you created or restored a Lite wallet **with a passphrase** on an earlier version, treat that wallet's on-disk data as unencrypted. Open it in v1.1.1 and re-apply encryption from **Settings → encrypt** (and, if you're concerned the plaintext wallet file may have been exposed, move the funds to a freshly created encrypted wallet). Wallets you never set a passphrase on are unaffected.
+
+---
+
+## Also fixed
+
+- **Chinese, Japanese, and Korean FAQ text renders correctly.** Several Help/FAQ titles showed `??` instead of characters (e.g. 什么, 门) after the previous translation back-fill; the bundled CJK font subset now includes those glyphs.
+
+---
+
+## Downloads
+
+macOS builds are x86-64 (Intel; run on Apple Silicon via Rosetta 2).
+
+| File | SHA-256 |
+|------|---------|
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1.AppImage | `323ff5f8658a5550aa12678ce4be37e32a2bfd3f3b0543074cc86a4267895dcf` |
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1-Linux-x64.zip | `e8604e479aed7e020946df45bf0d9373401354907e10565011694efa9978e631` |
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1.exe | `4cdcf291fe43c4fed04258aa55bb4e9b591f52780f9db5fb8f8bef522c43a351` |
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1-Windows-x64.zip | `c387bfcda508f32195c41fabec9f23d8b094d693a5dba41fbf8ec4abab6f2f6e` |
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1-macOS-x86_64.dmg | `bb0c491cb8f90ae55d162ec7c04c8f30988fa2f79c7911471220cddab44f99a5` |
+| ObsidianDragonLite-1.1.1-macOS-x86_64.app.zip | `a2a75fe40bf1f4db3abed8206dcc40d9fc74d8db2df7704afc9c834106b1c247` |
+
+---
+
+For the full feature set (node-free operation, wallet lifecycle, shielded + transparent send/shield/receive, HushChat, server browser with failover, 8-language UI), see the **lite-v1.0.0** release notes — v1.1.1 changes only the items listed above.

docs/release-notes/v2.0.2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+**DragonX (DRGX) Full-Node Desktop Wallet — v2.0.2**
+
+ObsidianDragon is a native ImGui-based full-node wallet for the DragonX network, with an embedded `dragonxd` daemon and the integrated DRG-XMRig CPU miner. **v2.0.2 is a maintenance release** — a focused set of transaction-history, sync-safety, and correctness fixes on top of v2.0.x. No configuration changes are required; just replace the binary.
+
+---
+
+## What's Fixed in v2.0.2
+
+### Transaction history
+
+- **Outgoing shielded sends now appear in History.** Sends *from* a shielded (z-)address — both **z→z** (shielded-to-shielded) and **z→t** (deshield to a transparent address) — were missing from the History tab, because the daemon's `listtransactions` doesn't report them and `z_viewtransaction` doesn't expose the transparent leg. The wallet now enumerates them via `z_listsentbyaddress`, so **your History matches your balance.** (Your funds were never affected — only the display.)
+- **More accurate send rows** — a single transaction with two equal-value outputs to different recipients is no longer collapsed into one row, and a transparent self-send / change output is no longer double-counted as both sent and received.
+
+### Sync & fund safety
+
+- **A node that loses all its peers is no longer reported as "synced."** Previously, a wallet whose node dropped to **0 peers** could keep showing a stale balance as if it were current — and allow a Send against it. The wallet now treats a node with no peer-derived chain tip as *not synced*, and a new **"Connected, but no network peers — the node can't sync"** banner explains the stall instead of silently looking healthy.
+- **Migrate-to-seed hardening.** If a migrate-to-seed was interrupted (app or daemon restart) *after* the sweep transaction had broadcast but *before* it confirmed, the wallet could mistake the temporarily-zero balance for an empty wallet and adopt the new seed wallet — swapping `wallet.dat` — before the sweep was mined. It now records that a sweep is in flight and **will not swap your wallet until the sweep confirms**, so funds can't be stranded in the timestamped backup.
+- **Fixed a rare crash** caused by a data race on the daemon-status text (the daemon-monitor thread writing it while the UI thread read it).
+
+### Display / internationalization
+
+- **Chinese, Japanese, and Korean FAQ text renders correctly.** Several Help/FAQ titles showed `??` instead of characters (e.g. 什么, 门) after the previous translation back-fill; the bundled CJK font subset now includes those glyphs.
+
+---
+
+## Downloads
+
+macOS builds are x86-64 (Intel; run on Apple Silicon via Rosetta 2).
+
+| File | SHA-256 |
+|------|---------|
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2.AppImage | `9bf7328965c6348113ba7a30b0284f15787c635af17efae3dfa8a87e56e10c9b` |
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2-Linux-x64.zip | `1371880c4187a94d4cb56d535471142c5f1a8053ef73fffd99d59e7b78c75c42` |
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2.exe | `673347d2696fb6f5bd09dc25e415d5ae8e532abde75b8d48c3cd26545461de50` |
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2-Windows-x64.zip | `f5ea7c45e66c6c1b90a8127f96dee04235691acb913ddc86327f2060798cd28c` |
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2-macOS-x86_64.dmg | `7038580807a8e93e5443bdc04f2aede3ae1c30e5bc9f8776a207edb2e87771d1` |
+| ObsidianDragon-2.0.2-macOS-x86_64.app.zip | `78159512ca684b95528231fd46f2d07b5bcc6f2da4d815fc1ecb2ff52127f41c` |
+
+---
+
+For the full feature set (HushChat messaging, seed-phrase wallets & migrate-to-seed, in-app node/miner updaters, built-in mining, 8-language UI), see the **v2.0.0** release notes — v2.0.2 changes only the fixes listed above.

src/app.cpp

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "rpc/rpc_worker.h"
 #include "rpc/connection.h"
 #include "config/settings.h"
+#include "data/seed_migration_resume.h"
 #include "wallet/lite_wallet_controller.h"
 #include "wallet/lite_wallet_server_selection_adapter.h"
 #include "wallet/lite_rollout_policy.h"
@@ -2299,6 +2300,8 @@ void App::renderNodeStatusBanner()
     in.connection_status      = connection_status_;
     in.daemon_last_error      = daemon_controller_ ? daemon_controller_->lastError() : std::string();
     in.lite_open_error        = lite_open_error_;
+    in.tip_known              = state_.sync.tip_known;
+    in.blocks                 = state_.sync.blocks;
 
     const ui::NodeBannerState banner = ui::evaluateNodeStatusBanner(in);
     if (!banner.show) return;
@@ -2331,6 +2334,8 @@ void App::renderNodeStatusBanner()
             title = TR("node_banner_crashed_title");     icon = ICON_MD_ERROR;     break;
         case ui::NodeBannerReason::LiteOpenFailed:
             title = TR("node_banner_lite_open_failed");   icon = ICON_MD_ERROR;     break;
+        case ui::NodeBannerReason::NoPeers:
+            title = TR("node_banner_no_peers_title");     icon = ICON_MD_CLOUD_OFF; break;
         case ui::NodeBannerReason::FullNodeOffline:
         default:
             title = TR("node_banner_offline_title");      icon = ICON_MD_CLOUD_OFF; break;
@@ -2817,7 +2822,8 @@ void App::renderStatusBar()
                 ImGui::TextDisabled("%s", statusShown.c_str());
             }
             occupiedX = statusX;
-        } else if (!daemon_status_.empty() && daemon_status_.find("Error") != std::string::npos) {
+        } else if (const std::string ds = getDaemonStatus();
+                   !ds.empty() && ds.find("Error") != std::string::npos) {
             const char* errText = TR("sb_daemon_not_found");
             float statusW = ImGui::CalcTextSize(errText).x;
             float statusX = versionX - statusW - gap;
@@ -4314,8 +4320,33 @@ void App::renderSeedMigrationDialog()
             break;
         }
         if (seed_migration_balance_ <= DRAGONX_DEFAULT_FEE) {
-            // Nothing to sweep — adopt the fresh seed wallet directly. Its wallet.dat replaces the
+            const bool sweepSubmitted = settings_ && settings_->getSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted();
-            // current (empty) one; adopt still moves the legacy wallet aside to a timestamped backup.
+            if (!dragonx::sweepGateMayAdoptEmptyWallet(sweepSubmitted)) {
+                // A sweep was already broadcast but its txid was lost (its opid didn't survive a
+                // daemon/app restart). A ~0 balance is AMBIGUOUS — the sweep may still be unconfirmed
+                // in the mempool and could revert on a drop/reorg — so we must NOT adopt (swap
+                // wallet.dat) here. Try to locate the sweep tx to resume the confirmation gate (which
+                // requires >=1 conf); until then, wait/refresh. If the sweep was dropped the balance
+                // simply returns and the normal Sweep UI reappears — the user is never trapped.
+                ImGui::TextWrapped("%s", TR("mig_sweep_inflight"));
+                ImGui::Spacing();
+                ImGui::TextColored(kMedium, "%s%s", TR("mig_checking_sweep"), ui::material::LoadingDots());
+                ImGui::Spacing();
+                if (ui::material::TactileButton(TR("mig_check_sweep"), ImVec2(190 * dp, 0)))
+                    locateSweepTxid();
+                ImGui::SameLine();
+                if (ui::material::TactileButton(TR("refresh"), ImVec2(110 * dp, 0))) {
+                    refreshSeedMigrationBalance();
+                    locateSweepTxid();
+                }
+                ImGui::SameLine();
+                if (ui::material::TactileButton(TR("mig_later"), ImVec2(100 * dp, 0)))
+                    close();
+                break;
+            }
+            // Nothing to sweep and no sweep was ever submitted (a genuinely empty wallet) — adopt the
+            // fresh seed wallet directly. Its wallet.dat replaces the current (empty) one; adopt still
+            // moves the legacy wallet aside to a timestamped backup.
             ImGui::TextWrapped("%s", TR("mig_no_funds"));
             ImGui::Spacing();
             ImGui::TextWrapped("%s%s", TR("mig_to"), seed_migration_dest_.c_str());
@@ -5166,6 +5197,18 @@ void App::setCurrentTab(int tab) {
         setCurrentPage(kTabMap[tab]);
 }
 
+std::string App::getDaemonStatus() const
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lk(daemon_status_mutex_);
+    return daemon_status_;  // a copy — safe to use after the lock is released
+}
+
+void App::setDaemonStatus(std::string s)
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lk(daemon_status_mutex_);
+    daemon_status_ = std::move(s);
+}
+
 bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
 {
     if (!supportsEmbeddedDaemon()) {
@@ -5185,16 +5228,16 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
         // Try to extract embedded resources if available
         if (resources::hasEmbeddedResources()) {
             DEBUG_LOGF("Extracting embedded Sapling params...\n");
-            daemon_status_ = TR("sb_extracting_sapling");
+            setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_extracting_sapling"));
             if (!resources::extractEmbeddedResources()) {
-                daemon_status_ = TR("sb_daemon_extract_failed");
+                setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_daemon_extract_failed"));
                 DEBUG_LOGF("[ERROR] extractEmbeddedResources() failed — disk full or permission denied?\n");
                 return false;
             }
             
             // Check again after extraction
             if (!rpc::Connection::verifySaplingParams()) {
-                daemon_status_ = TR("sb_sapling_failed");
+                setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_sapling_failed"));
                 DEBUG_LOGF("Sapling params still not found after extraction!\n");
                 DEBUG_LOGF("Expected location: %s\n", rpc::Connection::getSaplingParamsDir().c_str());
                 return false;
@@ -5211,7 +5254,7 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
             if (!exe_dir.empty()) {
                 std::string dirErr;
                 if (!util::Platform::ensureDirectory(daemon_dir, &dirErr)) {
-                    daemon_status_ = dirErr;
+                    setDaemonStatus(dirErr);
                     DEBUG_LOGF("[ERROR] %s\n", dirErr.c_str());
                     return false;
                 }
@@ -5245,7 +5288,7 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
             if (copied && rpc::Connection::verifySaplingParams()) {
                 DEBUG_LOGF("Sapling params copied from exe directory successfully\n");
             } else {
-                daemon_status_ = TR("sb_sapling_not_found");
+                setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_sapling_not_found"));
                 DEBUG_LOGF("Sapling params not found and no embedded resources available!\n");
                 DEBUG_LOGF("Expected location: %s\n", rpc::Connection::getSaplingParamsDir().c_str());
                 return false;
@@ -5262,7 +5305,7 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
         if (!exe_dir.empty()) {
             std::string dirErr;
             if (!util::Platform::ensureDirectory(daemon_dir, &dirErr)) {
-                daemon_status_ = dirErr;
+                setDaemonStatus(dirErr);
                 DEBUG_LOGF("[ERROR] %s\n", dirErr.c_str());
                 return false;
             }
@@ -5298,7 +5341,7 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
             if (copyFailed) {
                 char buf[512];
                 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), TR("sb_daemon_files_failed"), daemon_dir.c_str());
-                daemon_status_ = buf;
+                setDaemonStatus(buf);
                 DEBUG_LOGF("[ERROR] One or more daemon files failed to copy to %s\n", daemon_dir.c_str());
                 return false;
             }
@@ -5311,21 +5354,22 @@ bool App::startEmbeddedDaemon()
         
         // Set up state callback
         daemon_controller_->setStateCallback([this](daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State state, const std::string& msg) {
+            // NB: this callback runs on EmbeddedDaemon's monitor thread — write via the locked setter.
             switch (state) {
                 case daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State::Starting:
-                    daemon_status_ = TR("sb_starting_daemon");
+                    setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_starting_daemon"));
                     break;
                 case daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State::Running:
-                    daemon_status_ = TR("sb_dragonxd_running");
+                    setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_dragonxd_running"));
                     break;
                 case daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State::Stopping:
-                    daemon_status_ = TR("sb_dragonxd_stopping");
+                    setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_dragonxd_stopping"));
                     break;
                 case daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State::Stopped:
-                    daemon_status_ = TR("sb_dragonxd_stopped");
+                    setDaemonStatus(TR("sb_dragonxd_stopped"));
                     break;
                 case daemon::EmbeddedDaemon::State::Error:
-                    daemon_status_ = "Error: " + msg;
+                    setDaemonStatus("Error: " + msg);
                     break;
             }
         });
@@ -6958,7 +7002,7 @@ std::string App::buildDiagnosticsReport()
        << (state_.warming_up ? "  (warming up)" : "") << "\n";
 
 #if !DRAGONX_LITE_BUILD
-    os << "daemon status: " << daemon_status_ << "\n";
+    os << "daemon status: " << getDaemonStatus() << "\n";
     if (daemon_controller_) {
         os << "daemon running: " << (daemon_controller_->isRunning() ? "yes" : "no")
            << ", crashes: " << daemon_controller_->crashCount() << "\n";

src/app.h

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ public:
     bool isConnected() const { return state_.connected; }
     int getBlockHeight() const { return state_.sync.blocks; }
     const std::string& getConnectionStatus() const { return connection_status_; }
-    const std::string& getDaemonStatus() const { return daemon_status_; }
+    std::string getDaemonStatus() const;  // thread-safe copy (daemon_status_ is written off-thread)
 
     // Balance info (convenience wrappers)
     double getShieldedBalance() const { return state_.shielded_balance; }
@@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ private:
     std::function<void(bool, const std::string&)> makeSweepCompletionCallback(bool resumed);
     void beginSweepToSeedWallet();       // z_mergetoaddress ["ANY_TADDR","ANY_ZADDR"] -> dest
     void pollSweepStatus();              // Confirming step: poll sweep confirmations + legacy balance
+    void locateSweepTxid();              // recover a lost sweep txid (send to dest) -> Confirming gate
     void beginAdoptSeedWallet();         // stop daemon -> swap wallet.dat -> restart with -rescan
     void provisionChatIdentityFromSecret(std::string secret);
     std::string chatReplyZaddr();                                // a stable (persisted) wallet z-addr — chat IDENTITY (reply-to)
@@ -1123,7 +1124,13 @@ private:
 
     // Embedded daemon state
     bool use_embedded_daemon_ = wallet::supportsEmbeddedDaemon(wallet::currentWalletCapabilities());
-    std::string daemon_status_;
+    // Written by the DaemonController state callback (which fires on EmbeddedDaemon's monitor thread)
+    // AND read on the UI thread — so all access goes through set/getDaemonStatus() under this mutex.
+    // getDaemonStatus() returns a COPY: a returned reference could dangle if the monitor thread
+    // reassigned the string mid-read (data race / use-after-free).
+    mutable std::mutex daemon_status_mutex_;
+    std::string daemon_status_;  // guarded by daemon_status_mutex_ — use set/getDaemonStatus()
+    void setDaemonStatus(std::string s);
     mutable std::string daemon_mem_diag_;  // diagnostic info for daemon memory detection
     size_t daemon_output_offset_ = 0;      // for incremental output parsing (rescan detection)
     

src/app_network.cpp

@@ -4701,6 +4701,9 @@ void App::showSeedMigrationDialog()
         seed_migration_balance_loaded_ = false;
         seed_migration_nofunds_confirmed_ = false;
         refreshSeedMigrationBalance();
+        // If a sweep was already broadcast (the marker survives a lost opid), try to locate its tx so
+        // we resume at the confirmation gate instead of risking a premature "no funds -> adopt".
+        if (settings_ && settings_->getSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted()) locateSweepTxid();
         break;
     case MigrationResume::Intro:
     default:
@@ -4768,6 +4771,12 @@ void App::beginSweepToSeedWallet()
     }
     seed_migration_step_ = SeedMigrationStep::Sweeping;
     seed_migration_status_ = "Building the sweep transaction…";
+    // Mark the sweep as submitted BEFORE broadcasting (persisted synchronously). If the app or daemon
+    // then dies after the tx reaches the mempool but before its opid/txid is persisted, a resumed
+    // migration still knows a sweep is in flight and won't mistake the resulting ~0 legacy balance for
+    // an empty wallet and adopt (swap wallet.dat) prematurely — funds in an unconfirmed sweep can still
+    // revert on a drop/reorg. Cleared below only if the submit definitively fails (nothing broadcast).
+    if (settings_) { settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted(true); settings_->save(); }
     const std::string dest = seed_migration_dest_;
     worker_->post([this, dest]() -> rpc::RPCWorker::MainCb {
         std::string opid, err;
@@ -4780,6 +4789,8 @@ void App::beginSweepToSeedWallet()
         } catch (const std::exception& e) { err = e.what(); }
         return [this, opid, err]() {
             if (!err.empty() || opid.empty()) {
+                // Submit failed — nothing was broadcast, so drop the "sweep in flight" marker.
+                if (settings_) { settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted(false); settings_->save(); }
                 seed_migration_status_ = err.empty() ? "The sweep failed to start." : err;
                 seed_migration_step_ = SeedMigrationStep::Error;
                 return;
@@ -4882,6 +4893,69 @@ void App::pollSweepStatus()
     });
 }
 
+// Best-effort recovery when a sweep was broadcast but its opid was lost (e.g. a daemon restart wiped
+// the in-memory op queue) so we have no txid to confirm against. The sweep is an outgoing send to
+// seed_migration_dest_; find it among the wallet's own sends (z_listsentbyaddress) and, if present,
+// adopt its txid and resume at the confirmation gate (pollSweepStatus / Confirming). Read-only, and
+// backstopped by that gate (confs >= 1 && legacy balance ~0), so a wrong match cannot lose funds —
+// it only avoids the premature "no funds -> adopt" short-circuit while a sweep is unconfirmed.
+void App::locateSweepTxid()
+{
+    if (capture_mode_) return;
+    if (!rpc_ || !worker_ || !state_.connected) return;
+    if (seed_migration_confirm_in_flight_ || !seed_migration_sweep_txid_.empty()) return;
+    if (seed_migration_dest_.empty()) return;
+    seed_migration_confirm_in_flight_ = true;
+    const std::string dest = seed_migration_dest_;
+    worker_->post([this, dest]() -> rpc::RPCWorker::MainCb {
+        std::string found;
+        rpc::RPCClient::TraceScope trace("Migrate / locate sweep");
+        try {
+            // z_listsentbyaddress ignores its address argument and returns ALL wallet sends
+            // (oldest -> newest); the sweep is the latest send whose outputs include the destination.
+            auto sent = rpc_->call("z_listsentbyaddress", {dest, 0});
+            if (sent.is_array()) {
+                for (const auto& e : sent) {
+                    if (!e.is_object() || !e.contains("sends") || !e["sends"].is_object()) continue;
+                    const auto& s = e["sends"];
+                    bool toDest = false;
+                    for (const char* leg : {"saplingSends", "transparentSends"}) {
+                        auto it = s.find(leg);
+                        if (it == s.end() || !it->is_array()) continue;
+                        for (const auto& o : *it) {
+                            if (o.is_object() && o.value("address", std::string()) == dest) {
+                                toDest = true;
+                                break;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        if (toDest) break;
+                    }
+                    if (toDest) {
+                        auto t = e.value("txid", std::string());
+                        if (!t.empty()) found = t;  // keep scanning; entries are oldest->newest
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } catch (...) {}
+        return [this, found]() {
+            seed_migration_confirm_in_flight_ = false;
+            if (found.empty() || !seed_migration_sweep_txid_.empty()) return;
+            // Adopt the recovered txid and hand off to the confirmation gate (which alone permits adopt).
+            seed_migration_sweep_txid_ = found;
+            if (settings_) {
+                settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepTxid(found);
+                settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepOpid("");
+                settings_->save();
+            }
+            seed_migration_sweep_confs_ = 0;
+            seed_migration_legacy_remaining_ = -1.0;
+            seed_migration_poll_timer_ = 0.0f;
+            seed_migration_status_.clear();
+            seed_migration_step_ = SeedMigrationStep::Confirming;
+        };
+    });
+}
+
 // Phase 2 step 2: adopt the new seed wallet as the primary wallet. Stop the daemon, move the
 // legacy wallet.dat aside to a timestamped backup (NEVER delete it), copy the new wallet in, and
 // restart with -rescan so the new keys pick up the swept funds. Runs on a background thread.
@@ -5308,6 +5382,7 @@ void App::pumpSeedMigration()
                     settings_->setSeedMigrationTempDir("");
                     settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepTxid("");
                     settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepOpid("");  // W3-3
+                    settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted(false);
                     settings_->save();
                 }
                 seed_migration_status_ = err;  // a non-empty warning here (e.g. restart hiccup) is shown on Done
@@ -5355,6 +5430,7 @@ void App::pumpSeedMigration()
             // txid/opid (the resume block reads these whenever the migration is pending).
             settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepTxid("");
             settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepOpid("");
+            settings_->setSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted(false);
             settings_->save();
         }
     } else {

src/config/settings.cpp

@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ bool Settings::load(const std::string& path)
         loadScalar(j, "seed_migration_temp_dir", seed_migration_temp_dir_);
         loadScalar(j, "seed_migration_sweep_txid", seed_migration_sweep_txid_);
         loadScalar(j, "seed_migration_sweep_opid", seed_migration_sweep_opid_);
+        loadScalar(j, "seed_migration_sweep_submitted", seed_migration_sweep_submitted_);
         loadScalar(j, "auto_lock_timeout", auto_lock_timeout_);
         loadScalar(j, "unlock_duration", unlock_duration_);
         loadScalar(j, "pin_enabled", pin_enabled_);
@@ -559,6 +560,7 @@ bool Settings::save(const std::string& path)
     j["seed_migration_temp_dir"] = seed_migration_temp_dir_;
     j["seed_migration_sweep_txid"] = seed_migration_sweep_txid_;
     j["seed_migration_sweep_opid"] = seed_migration_sweep_opid_;
+    j["seed_migration_sweep_submitted"] = seed_migration_sweep_submitted_;
     j["auto_lock_timeout"] = auto_lock_timeout_;
     j["unlock_duration"] = unlock_duration_;
     j["pin_enabled"] = pin_enabled_;

src/config/settings.h

@@ -396,6 +396,12 @@ public:
     // in the same write that persists the txid, so the txid always outranks it (see [[decideSeedMigrationResume]]).
     std::string getSeedMigrationSweepOpid() const { return seed_migration_sweep_opid_; }
     void setSeedMigrationSweepOpid(const std::string& v) { seed_migration_sweep_opid_ = v; }
+    // Set TRUE synchronously when a sweep is broadcast; survives the stale-opid resume fallback so the
+    // Sweep step knows a ~0 legacy balance may be an UNCONFIRMED in-flight sweep (funds not yet safe)
+    // and must NOT short-circuit to adopt/swap wallet.dat. Cleared on confirmed-adopt / reset / a
+    // failed submit. See [[decideSeedMigrationResume]] and App::renderSeedMigrationDialog (fund-safety).
+    bool getSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted() const { return seed_migration_sweep_submitted_; }
+    void setSeedMigrationSweepSubmitted(bool v) { seed_migration_sweep_submitted_ = v; }
 
     // Security — auto-lock timeout (seconds; 0 = disabled)
     int getAutoLockTimeout() const { return auto_lock_timeout_; }
@@ -640,6 +646,7 @@ private:
     std::string seed_migration_temp_dir_;
     std::string seed_migration_sweep_txid_;
     std::string seed_migration_sweep_opid_;
+    bool seed_migration_sweep_submitted_ = false;
     int auto_lock_timeout_ = 900;   // 15 minutes
     int unlock_duration_ = 600;     // 10 minutes
     bool pin_enabled_ = false;

src/data/seed_migration_resume.h

@@ -34,4 +34,12 @@ inline MigrationResume decideSeedMigrationResume(bool pending,
     return MigrationResume::SweepGate;
 }
 
+// At the Sweep step with a ~0 legacy balance, may we offer the direct "no funds -> adopt" short-cut
+// (swap wallet.dat immediately)? Only when NO sweep has been submitted — a genuinely empty wallet.
+// If a sweep WAS submitted, a ~0 balance is ambiguous: the sweep tx may be unconfirmed in the mempool
+// and could revert on a drop/reorg, so adopting now can strand the funds in the moved-aside backup.
+// In that case adopt must go through the confirmation-gated path (>=1 conf) instead — never swap
+// wallet.dat on an unconfirmed sweep. (fund-safety: audit)
+inline bool sweepGateMayAdoptEmptyWallet(bool sweepSubmitted) { return !sweepSubmitted; }
+
 }  // namespace dragonx

src/data/wallet_state.h

@@ -149,7 +149,13 @@ struct SyncInfo {
     float witness_progress = 0.0f;  // 0.0 - 1.0, within the current sub-phase
     int witness_remaining = 0;      // blocks left in the cache walk (0 if unknown / phase 1)
 
-    bool isSynced() const { return !syncing && blocks > 0 && blocks >= headers - 2; }
+    // True only when the daemon reports a positive peer-derived tip (longestchain > 0). A node with
+    // no peers reports longestchain == 0, so `blocks` is then only the LOCAL best height and cannot be
+    // trusted as "at the network tip". isSynced() gates on this so a peerless / cold-started node is
+    // never reported synced (which would enable Send against a stale balance). (audit: peerless-synced)
+    bool tip_known = false;
+
+    bool isSynced() const { return tip_known && !syncing && blocks > 0 && blocks >= headers - 2; }
 };
 
 /**

src/services/network_refresh_service.cpp

@@ -853,8 +853,11 @@ void NetworkRefreshService::appendViewTransactionOutputs(std::vector<Transaction
     for (const auto& out : entry.outgoing_outputs) {
         bool alreadyTracked = false;
         for (const auto& existing : transactions) {
+            // Key on address as well as amount: two outgoing outputs of EQUAL value to DIFFERENT
+            // recipients in one tx are distinct rows — an amount-only match would drop the second.
             if (existing.txid == txid && existing.type == "send" &&
-                std::abs(existing.amount + out.value) < 0.00000001) {
+                std::abs(existing.amount + out.value) < 0.00000001 &&
+                existing.address == out.address) {
                 alreadyTracked = true;
                 break;
             }
@@ -885,6 +888,55 @@ void NetworkRefreshService::appendViewTransactionOutputs(std::vector<Transaction
     }
 }
 
+void NetworkRefreshService::appendSentTransparentOutputs(std::vector<TransactionInfo>& transactions,
+                                                         const std::string& txid,
+                                                         const nlohmann::json& sentEntry)
+{
+    if (!sentEntry.is_object() || !sentEntry.contains("sends") || !sentEntry["sends"].is_object())
+        return;
+    const auto& sends = sentEntry["sends"];
+    auto it = sends.find("transparentSends");
+    if (it == sends.end() || !it->is_array()) return;
+
+    // Per-tx metadata for the synthesized rows.
+    int confirmations = 0;
+    std::int64_t timestamp = 0;
+    if (auto v = readOptional<int>(sentEntry, "confirmations")) confirmations = *v;
+    if (auto v = readOptional<std::int64_t>(sentEntry, "blocktime")) timestamp = *v;
+    if (timestamp == 0) {
+        if (auto v = readOptional<std::int64_t>(sentEntry, "time")) timestamp = *v;
+    }
+
+    for (const auto& out : *it) {
+        auto amount = readOptional<double>(out, "amount");
+        if (!amount) continue;
+        const double debit = -std::abs(*amount);  // the daemon reports -nValue; a send is a debit
+        std::string address;
+        if (auto a = readOptional<std::string>(out, "address")) address = *a;
+
+        // Dedup against rows already present — notably listtransactions-derived t->t sends, which
+        // this whole-wallet payload ALSO reports. Same txid+address+amount == the same output.
+        bool exists = false;
+        for (const auto& e : transactions) {
+            if (e.txid == txid && e.type == "send" && e.address == address &&
+                std::abs(e.amount - debit) < 0.00000001) {
+                exists = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (exists) continue;
+
+        TransactionInfo info;
+        info.txid = txid;
+        info.type = "send";
+        info.address = address;
+        info.amount = debit;
+        info.confirmations = confirmations;
+        info.timestamp = timestamp;
+        transactions.push_back(std::move(info));
+    }
+}
+
 void NetworkRefreshService::sortTransactionsNewestFirst(std::vector<TransactionInfo>& transactions)
 {
     std::sort(transactions.begin(), transactions.end(),
@@ -985,6 +1037,45 @@ NetworkRefreshService::TransactionRefreshResult NetworkRefreshService::collectTr
     result.shieldedScanComplete = !pendingShieldedIndex.has_value();
     result.nextShieldedScanStartIndex = pendingShieldedIndex.value_or(0);
 
+    // Discover outgoing shielded (z->z) sends. A pure z->z send moves no value in or out of the
+    // transparent pool (valueBalance == 0), so the daemon's `listtransactions` never reports it,
+    // and — being a send rather than a receive — it never shows up in `z_listreceivedbyaddress`
+    // either. Its txid therefore never reaches `knownTxids`, so the z_viewtransaction enrichment
+    // below is never run for it and the send is invisible in History (the reported bug).
+    //
+    // `z_listsentbyaddress` scans the whole wallet for sends — the address argument is NOT used to
+    // filter (the daemon iterates every wallet tx against "*"), so a single call yields all send
+    // txids. Two legs need handling:
+    //   * SHIELDED (z->z) outgoing legs are surfaced by z_viewtransaction, so we fold the txid into
+    //     `knownTxids` and let the z_viewtransaction / appendViewTransactionOutputs path build them.
+    //   * TRANSPARENT outgoing legs (z->t deshields) are NOT surfaced by z_viewtransaction (it
+    //     enumerates only Sapling outputs), and for a z-originated send listtransactions also omits
+    //     the external t-vout (GetAmounts' isFromMyTaddr is false when inputs are shielded). So we
+    //     build those rows directly from the payload's `sends.transparentSends[]` here. They are
+    //     deduped (by txid+address+amount) against listtransactions-derived t->t sends above, so a
+    //     purely-transparent (t->t) send — which the payload ALSO reports — is not double-counted.
+    //
+    // Gated on shieldedScanComplete so it adds no cost during the multi-cycle initial received
+    // scan: it is one more O(mapWallet) pass holding cs_main (comparable to the listtransactions
+    // pass), and the caller's adaptive throttle (txRefreshDue) already accounts for it via scanMs.
+    if (result.shieldedScanComplete && !snapshot.shieldedAddresses.empty()) {
+        try {
+            json sent = rpc.call("z_listsentbyaddress",
+                                 json::array({snapshot.shieldedAddresses.front(), 0}));
+            if (sent.is_array()) {
+                for (const auto& sentTx : sent) {
+                    auto txid = readOptional<std::string>(sentTx, "txid");
+                    if (!txid || txid->empty()) continue;
+                    appendSentTransparentOutputs(result.transactions, *txid, sentTx);
+                    knownTxids.insert(*txid);  // shielded (z->z) legs enriched via z_viewtransaction
+                }
+            }
+        } catch (const std::exception& e) {
+            transactionRpcError = true;
+            DEBUG_LOGF("z_listsentbyaddress error: %s\n", e.what());
+        }
+    }
+
     for (const auto& txid : snapshot.sendTxids) {
         knownTxids.insert(txid);
     }
@@ -1305,6 +1396,10 @@ void NetworkRefreshService::applyCoreRefreshResult(WalletState& state,
     if (result.headers) state.sync.headers = *result.headers;
     if (result.bestBlockHash) state.sync.best_blockhash = *result.bestBlockHash;
     if (result.verificationProgress) state.sync.verification_progress = *result.verificationProgress;
+    // A peerless daemon reports longestchain == 0 (no peer heights). Track that as "tip unknown" from
+    // THIS refresh's raw value (not the retained state, which keeps the last positive value) so a
+    // peerless node isn't reported synced against its own stale local height. (audit: peerless-synced)
+    state.sync.tip_known = (result.longestChain.has_value() && *result.longestChain > 0);
     if (result.longestChain && *result.longestChain > 0) state.longestchain = *result.longestChain;
     if (state.longestchain > 0 && state.sync.blocks > state.longestchain) state.longestchain = state.sync.blocks;
     if (state.longestchain > 0)

src/services/network_refresh_service.h

@@ -310,6 +310,12 @@ public:
     static void appendViewTransactionOutputs(std::vector<TransactionInfo>& transactions,
                                              const std::string& txid,
                                              const TransactionViewCacheEntry& entry);
+    // Build "send" rows from a z_listsentbyaddress entry's sends.transparentSends[] — the transparent
+    // (z->t deshield) outgoing outputs that z_viewtransaction does not surface. Deduped by
+    // txid+address+amount against rows already present (e.g. listtransactions-derived t->t sends).
+    static void appendSentTransparentOutputs(std::vector<TransactionInfo>& transactions,
+                                             const std::string& txid,
+                                             const nlohmann::json& sentEntry);
     static void sortTransactionsNewestFirst(std::vector<TransactionInfo>& transactions);
     static TransactionRefreshResult collectTransactionRefreshResult(RefreshRpcGateway& rpc,
                                                                     const TransactionRefreshSnapshot& snapshot,

src/ui/node_status_banner.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ enum class NodeBannerReason {
     FullNodeOffline,  // a reachable node was lost, or never came up; reconnect offered
     DaemonCrashed,    // the embedded daemon crashed repeatedly and auto-restart stopped
     LiteOpenFailed,   // lite build: the wallet failed to open
+    NoPeers,          // connected to the daemon but no peer-derived tip (0 peers) — stalled, stale
 };
 
 struct NodeBannerState {
@@ -50,6 +51,13 @@ struct NodeBannerInputs {
     bool daemon_initializing  = false;  // daemon launching / block index loading
     bool connection_in_progress = false;  // a connect attempt is actively running
 
+    // Peer connectivity: a full node connected to the daemon but with NO peer-derived tip
+    // (longestchain == 0 -> tip_known false) has no peers, so it silently stalls at a stale height
+    // while balance/sync look "done". `blocks` gates the check so we don't flag the brief window
+    // before the first chain-info refresh. (audit: no-peer-banner)
+    bool tip_known            = true;   // sync.tip_known — a peer-derived network tip is known
+    int  blocks               = 0;      // sync.blocks — >0 once chain info has been fetched
+
     // Full-node embedded-daemon crash signal.
     bool using_embedded_daemon = false;
     bool has_daemon_controller = false;
@@ -81,13 +89,26 @@ inline NodeBannerState evaluateNodeStatusBanner(const NodeBannerInputs& in) {
         return s;
     }
 
-    // Full node. Connected, or in an expected startup phase → the loading/warmup overlay owns
+    // Full node. In an expected startup phase → the loading/warmup overlay owns the screen, so no
-    // the screen, so no banner. An active connect attempt likewise shows progress, not an
+    // banner. An active connect attempt likewise shows progress, not an error — don't flicker a
-    // error — don't flicker a banner over it.
+    // banner over it. (These return even if `connected` has flipped early, matching prior behavior.)
-    if (in.connected) return s;
     if (in.warming_up || in.daemon_initializing) return s;
     if (in.connection_in_progress) return s;
 
+    // Connected to the daemon (RPC works) but with no peer-derived tip → the node has no peers and
+    // cannot learn about new blocks; it silently stalls at a stale height while everything looks
+    // synced. Surface it as a recoverable warning (reconnect won't help, so no action button).
+    if (in.connected) {
+        if (!in.tip_known && in.blocks > 0) {
+            s.show     = true;
+            s.severity = NodeBannerSeverity::Warning;
+            s.reason   = NodeBannerReason::NoPeers;
+            s.action   = NodeBannerAction::None;
+            s.detail   = in.connection_status;
+        }
+        return s;
+    }
+
     // Genuinely offline. Distinguish "the embedded daemon crashed and we stopped retrying" (a
     // hard fault needing a manual restart) from an ordinary lost/failed connection (retryable).
     if (in.using_embedded_daemon && in.has_daemon_controller && !in.daemon_running &&

src/util/i18n.cpp

@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ void I18n::loadBuiltinEnglish()
         // Sweep step: balance still loading / no funds to move
         strings_["mig_checking_balance"] = "Checking your balance";
         strings_["mig_no_funds"] = "Your wallet has no funds to migrate. You can adopt the new seed wallet directly — it replaces your current (empty) wallet with the seed-backed one. Your old wallet is still moved aside to a timestamped backup, just in case.";
+        strings_["mig_sweep_inflight"] = "A sweep was already started and hasn't confirmed yet. Your balance reads zero because the funds are in the pending sweep transaction — they are not lost. Wait for it to confirm before finishing; the wallet will not be swapped until the sweep is mined.";
+        strings_["mig_checking_sweep"] = "Looking for the sweep transaction";
+        strings_["mig_check_sweep"] = "Check the sweep";
         strings_["mig_adopt_now"] = "Adopt seed wallet";
         strings_["mig_nofunds_confirm"] = "I understand this replaces my current wallet with the new seed wallet";
         // Adopting step note (shown under the spinner while the node restarts + rescans)
@@ -1459,6 +1462,7 @@ void I18n::loadBuiltinEnglish()
         strings_["sb_wallet_needs_recovery"] = "Wallet repair available";
         // Persistent node-status banner (App::renderNodeStatusBanner).
         strings_["node_banner_offline_title"] = "Not connected to the DragonX node";
+        strings_["node_banner_no_peers_title"] = "Connected, but no network peers — the node can't sync";
         strings_["node_banner_crashed_title"] = "The node stopped unexpectedly";
         strings_["node_banner_lite_open_failed"] = "Couldn't open your wallet";
         strings_["node_banner_reconnect"] = "Reconnect";

src/wallet/lite_wallet_controller.cpp

@@ -450,31 +450,47 @@ void LiteWalletController::pumpAsyncOpen()
 bool LiteWalletController::beginCreateWalletAsync(LiteWalletCreateRequest request)
 {
     auto req = std::make_shared<LiteWalletCreateRequest>(std::move(request));
-    return beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
+    // Encrypt the brand-new wallet with the user's passphrase once it opens. The async worker
+    // can't (walletOpen_ isn't set until pumpLifecycleResult runs), so stash it and apply on the
+    // main-thread finalize — otherwise the passphrase is discarded and the seed stored in
+    // plaintext (audit C1). Mirrors the synchronous createWallet() wrapper.
+    stashPendingLifecycleSecurity(req->passphrase, PendingSecurityOp::Encrypt);
+    const bool started = beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
         "Create",
         [req](LiteWalletLifecycleService& svc, const std::string& url) {
             req->serverUrl = url;
             return svc.createWallet(*req);
         },
         [req]() { secureWipeLiteSecret(req->passphrase); });
+    if (!started) clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();
+    return started;
 }
 
 bool LiteWalletController::beginOpenWalletAsync(LiteWalletOpenRequest request)
 {
     auto req = std::make_shared<LiteWalletOpenRequest>(std::move(request));
-    return beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
+    // An existing wallet may be encrypted+locked — unlock it with the supplied passphrase on the
+    // main-thread finalize (the async worker can't; walletOpen_ isn't set yet). Without this an
+    // encrypted wallet opens but stays locked and the passphrase is never verified (audit M1).
+    stashPendingLifecycleSecurity(req->passphrase, PendingSecurityOp::Unlock);
+    const bool started = beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
         "Open",
         [req](LiteWalletLifecycleService& svc, const std::string& url) {
             req->serverUrl = url;
             return svc.openWallet(*req);
         },
         [req]() { secureWipeLiteSecret(req->passphrase); });
+    if (!started) clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();
+    return started;
 }
 
 bool LiteWalletController::beginRestoreWalletAsync(LiteWalletRestoreRequest request)
 {
     auto req = std::make_shared<LiteWalletRestoreRequest>(std::move(request));
-    return beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
+    // Encrypt the restored wallet with the user's passphrase once it opens (same rationale and
+    // main-thread finalize as create — audit C1).
+    stashPendingLifecycleSecurity(req->passphrase, PendingSecurityOp::Encrypt);
+    const bool started = beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
         "Restore",
         [req](LiteWalletLifecycleService& svc, const std::string& url) {
             req->serverUrl = url;
@@ -484,6 +500,8 @@ bool LiteWalletController::beginRestoreWalletAsync(LiteWalletRestoreRequest requ
             secureWipeLiteSecret(req->seedPhrase);
             secureWipeLiteSecret(req->passphrase);
         });
+    if (!started) clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();
+    return started;
 }
 
 bool LiteWalletController::beginLifecycleRequestAsync(
@@ -585,15 +603,54 @@ void LiteWalletController::pumpLifecycleResult()
     // log the failure otherwise (shared with the synchronous lifecycle path).
     onLifecycleResult(out);
     if (out.walletReady) {
+        // Wallet is now open (walletOpen_ set by onLifecycleResult) — apply the stashed passphrase:
+        // encrypt a freshly created/restored wallet, or unlock an existing encrypted one (C1/M1).
+        applyPendingLifecycleSecurity();
         lastOpenError_.clear();
         lastOpenWarming_ = false;
     } else {
+        clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();  // wallet didn't open — drop the stashed passphrase
         lastOpenError_ = out.error.empty() ? out.status.message : out.error;
         lastOpenWarming_ = liteOpenErrorIsWarmup(lastOpenError_);
     }
     lastLifecycleResult_ = std::move(out);
 }
 
+void LiteWalletController::stashPendingLifecycleSecurity(const std::string& passphrase,
+                                                         PendingSecurityOp op)
+{
+    clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();            // wipe any stale prior stash first
+    pendingLifecyclePassphrase_ = passphrase;   // independent copy; wiped in apply/clear
+    pendingLifecycleSecurityOp_ = op;
+}
+
+void LiteWalletController::applyPendingLifecycleSecurity()
+{
+    const PendingSecurityOp op = pendingLifecycleSecurityOp_;
+    if (op == PendingSecurityOp::None || pendingLifecyclePassphrase_.empty() ||
+        !walletOpen_.load() || !bridge_) {
+        clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();
+        return;
+    }
+    if (op == PendingSecurityOp::Encrypt) {
+        // encryptWallet() takes its own copy and wipes it; the backend encrypts + locks + saves.
+        const auto enc = encryptWallet(pendingLifecyclePassphrase_);
+        if (!enc.ok)
+            liteLog("wallet created/restored but ENCRYPTION FAILED — wallet is NOT encrypted: " +
+                    enc.error);
+    } else if (op == PendingSecurityOp::Unlock) {
+        if (!unlockWallet(pendingLifecyclePassphrase_))
+            liteLog("wallet opened but unlock failed (wrong passphrase?)");
+    }
+    clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();
+}
+
+void LiteWalletController::clearPendingLifecycleSecurity()
+{
+    secureWipeLiteSecret(pendingLifecyclePassphrase_);  // no-op if already empty
+    pendingLifecycleSecurityOp_ = PendingSecurityOp::None;
+}
+
 void LiteWalletController::startSync()
 {
     if (syncLaunched_.exchange(true)) return;

src/wallet/lite_wallet_controller.h

@@ -388,6 +388,20 @@ private:
         std::make_shared<std::optional<LiteWalletLifecycleResult>>();
     LiteWalletLifecycleResult lastLifecycleResult_;  // main-thread only; last finalized request
 
+    // Passphrase to apply on the main thread once an async create/restore/open finalizes. The
+    // backend wallet is not controller-"open" (walletOpen_) until pumpLifecycleResult() runs
+    // onLifecycleResult(), and encryptWallet()/unlockWallet() gate on walletOpen_ — so the async
+    // worker thread cannot do it. The passphrase is stashed here (main-thread only) and applied in
+    // pumpLifecycleResult(), mirroring the synchronous createWallet()/restoreWallet()/openWallet()
+    // wrappers. Without this the UI's async path silently discarded the passphrase, storing the
+    // seed UNENCRYPTED (create/restore) or never unlocking an encrypted wallet (open) — audit C1/M1.
+    enum class PendingSecurityOp { None, Encrypt, Unlock };
+    std::string pendingLifecyclePassphrase_;                       // main-thread only; wiped after use
+    PendingSecurityOp pendingLifecycleSecurityOp_ = PendingSecurityOp::None;
+    void stashPendingLifecycleSecurity(const std::string& passphrase, PendingSecurityOp op);
+    void applyPendingLifecycleSecurity();  // encrypt (create/restore) or unlock (open), then wipe
+    void clearPendingLifecycleSecurity();  // wipe + reset (rejected request / failed open)
+
     // Joinable background refresh worker (fast iterations: syncstatus, plus data once synced).
     std::thread worker_;
     std::atomic<bool> running_{false};

tests/test_phase4.cpp

@@ -1628,6 +1628,7 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
              {"time", 50}, {"memoStr", "shielded memo"}}
     }));
     transactionRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
+    transactionRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
     transactionRpc.addResponse("z_viewtransaction", json{
         {"spends", json::array({json{{"address", "zs-from"}}})},
         {"outputs", json::array({
@@ -1639,12 +1640,13 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
     auto transactionResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(transactionRpc, snapshot, 321, 4);
     EXPECT_TRUE(transactionRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({
         "listtransactions", "z_listreceivedbyaddress", "z_listreceivedbyaddress",
-        "z_viewtransaction", "gettransaction"
+        "z_listsentbyaddress", "z_viewtransaction", "gettransaction"
     }));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[1].params, json::array({"zs-one", 0}));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[2].params, json::array({"zs-two", 0}));
-    EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[3].params, json::array({"pending-send"}));
+    EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[3].params, json::array({"zs-one", 0}));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[4].params, json::array({"pending-send"}));
+    EXPECT_EQ(transactionRpc.calls[5].params, json::array({"pending-send"}));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionResult.blockHeight, 321);
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionResult.newViewTxEntries.size(), static_cast<size_t>(1));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionResult.newViewTxEntries.count("pending-send"), static_cast<size_t>(1));
@@ -1657,6 +1659,129 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionResult.transactions.front().timestamp, static_cast<int64_t>(500));
     EXPECT_EQ(transactionResult.transactions[1].txid, std::string("transparent-a"));
 
+    // Outgoing shielded (z->z) send discovery. A pure z->z send has valueBalance == 0, so it is
+    // absent from listtransactions AND (being a send, not a receive) from z_listreceivedbyaddress —
+    // it is surfaced only via the whole-wallet z_listsentbyaddress sweep, whose txids are folded
+    // into the z_viewtransaction enrichment to build the send row. Regression test for the
+    // "outgoing transactions missing from History" bug.
+    {
+        Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot zzSnapshot;
+        zzSnapshot.shieldedAddresses = {"zs-mine"};
+        MockRefreshRpc zzRpc;
+        zzRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());         // no transparent movement
+        zzRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());  // it's a send, not a receive
+        zzRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array({
+            json{{"txid", "zz-send"}}                                 // discovered only here
+        }));
+        zzRpc.addResponse("z_viewtransaction", json{
+            {"spends", json::array({json{{"address", "zs-mine"}}})},
+            {"outputs", json::array({
+                json{{"outgoing", true}, {"address", "zs-recipient"}, {"value", 1.25},
+                     {"memoStr", "z2z memo"}}
+            })}
+        });
+        zzRpc.addResponse("gettransaction", json{{"time", 800}, {"confirmations", 3}});
+        auto zzResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(zzRpc, zzSnapshot, 400, 4);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(zzRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({
+            "listtransactions", "z_listreceivedbyaddress", "z_listsentbyaddress",
+            "z_viewtransaction", "gettransaction"
+        }));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions.size(), static_cast<size_t>(1));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions[0].txid, std::string("zz-send"));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions[0].type, std::string("send"));
+        EXPECT_NEAR(zzResult.transactions[0].amount, -1.25, 0.00000001);
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions[0].address, std::string("zs-recipient"));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions[0].memo, std::string("z2z memo"));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.transactions[0].timestamp, static_cast<int64_t>(800));
+        EXPECT_EQ(zzResult.newViewTxEntries.count("zz-send"), static_cast<size_t>(1));
+
+        // Guard: with no shielded addresses the sweep is skipped entirely (transparent sends are
+        // already covered by listtransactions), so no z_listsentbyaddress call is made.
+        Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot noZSnapshot;
+        MockRefreshRpc noZRpc;
+        noZRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
+        auto noZResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(noZRpc, noZSnapshot, 401, 4);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(noZRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({"listtransactions"}));
+        EXPECT_EQ(noZResult.transactions.size(), static_cast<size_t>(0));
+    }
+
+    // z->t deshield: the external transparent recipient is reported ONLY in z_listsentbyaddress's
+    // sends.transparentSends (z_viewtransaction sees only the shielded change note, isOutgoing=false;
+    // listtransactions omits the t-vout because inputs are shielded). The row must be synthesized
+    // directly from that payload — a direct sibling of the z->z gap.
+    {
+        Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot ztSnapshot;
+        ztSnapshot.shieldedAddresses = {"zs-mine"};
+        MockRefreshRpc ztRpc;
+        ztRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());         // z-originated: no t-input row
+        ztRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
+        ztRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array({
+            json{{"txid", "zt-send"}, {"confirmations", 5}, {"blocktime", 900},
+                 {"sends", json{
+                     {"transparentSends", json::array({
+                         json{{"address", "R-recipient"}, {"amount", -2.5}, {"vout", 0}}
+                     })},
+                     {"saplingSends", json::array()}
+                 }}}
+        }));
+        // z->t viewtransaction: only a change note back to self -> no outgoing outputs.
+        ztRpc.addResponse("z_viewtransaction", json{{"spends", json::array()}, {"outputs", json::array()}});
+        auto ztResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(ztRpc, ztSnapshot, 500, 4);
+        EXPECT_EQ(ztResult.transactions.size(), static_cast<size_t>(1));
+        EXPECT_EQ(ztResult.transactions[0].txid, std::string("zt-send"));
+        EXPECT_EQ(ztResult.transactions[0].type, std::string("send"));
+        EXPECT_NEAR(ztResult.transactions[0].amount, -2.5, 0.00000001);
+        EXPECT_EQ(ztResult.transactions[0].address, std::string("R-recipient"));
+        EXPECT_EQ(ztResult.transactions[0].confirmations, 5);
+    }
+
+    // t->t send is reported by BOTH listtransactions AND z_listsentbyaddress's transparentSends —
+    // it must appear ONCE (deduped by txid+address+amount), not doubled.
+    {
+        Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot ttSnapshot;
+        ttSnapshot.shieldedAddresses = {"zs-mine"};
+        MockRefreshRpc ttRpc;
+        ttRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array({
+            json{{"txid", "tt-send"}, {"category", "send"}, {"amount", -1.0},
+                 {"time", 800}, {"confirmations", 3}, {"address", "R-dest"}}
+        }));
+        ttRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
+        ttRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array({
+            json{{"txid", "tt-send"}, {"confirmations", 3}, {"blocktime", 800},
+                 {"sends", json{{"transparentSends", json::array({
+                     json{{"address", "R-dest"}, {"amount", -1.0}, {"vout", 0}}
+                 })}}}}
+        }));
+        ttRpc.addResponse("z_viewtransaction", json{{"spends", json::array()}, {"outputs", json::array()}});
+        auto ttResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(ttRpc, ttSnapshot, 500, 4);
+        int ttSends = 0;
+        for (const auto& t : ttResult.transactions)
+            if (t.txid == std::string("tt-send") && t.type == std::string("send")) ++ttSends;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ttSends, 1);  // not double-counted
+    }
+
+    // Multi-output send: two outgoing outputs of EQUAL value to DIFFERENT recipients in one tx must
+    // both render (address-keyed dedup) — an amount-only dedup dropped the second.
+    {
+        Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot multiSnapshot;
+        multiSnapshot.sendTxids = {"multi-send"};
+        MockRefreshRpc multiRpc;
+        multiRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
+        multiRpc.addResponse("z_viewtransaction", json{
+            {"spends", json::array({json{{"address", "zs-from"}}})},
+            {"outputs", json::array({
+                json{{"outgoing", true}, {"address", "zs-a"}, {"value", 0.5}, {"memoStr", "a"}},
+                json{{"outgoing", true}, {"address", "zs-b"}, {"value", 0.5}, {"memoStr", "b"}}
+            })}
+        });
+        multiRpc.addResponse("gettransaction", json{{"time", 700}, {"confirmations", 2}});
+        auto multiResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(multiRpc, multiSnapshot, 500, 4);
+        int multiSends = 0;
+        for (const auto& t : multiResult.transactions)
+            if (t.txid == std::string("multi-send") && t.type == std::string("send")) ++multiSends;
+        EXPECT_EQ(multiSends, 2);  // both equal-value outputs kept
+    }
+
     Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot cachedOnlySnapshot;
     auto cachedOnlyEntry = cachedEntry;
     cachedOnlyEntry.timestamp = 450;
@@ -1802,6 +1927,7 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
         strictRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
         strictRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
         strictRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
+        strictRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
         auto strictResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(strictRpc, strictSnapshot, 102, 4);
         EXPECT_EQ(strictResult.shieldedAddressesScanned, static_cast<size_t>(2));  // both re-scanned
 
@@ -1813,10 +1939,12 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
         MockRefreshRpc tolerantRpc;
         tolerantRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
         // No z_listreceivedbyaddress responses: the addresses must be skipped (else call() throws).
+        // The shielded scan still completes, so the whole-wallet z_listsentbyaddress sweep runs once.
+        tolerantRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
         auto tolerantResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(tolerantRpc, tolerantSnapshot, 102, 4);
         EXPECT_EQ(tolerantResult.shieldedAddressesScanned, static_cast<size_t>(0));  // both skipped
         EXPECT_TRUE(tolerantResult.shieldedScanComplete);
-        EXPECT_TRUE(tolerantRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({"listtransactions"}));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(tolerantRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({"listtransactions", "z_listsentbyaddress"}));
     }
 
     Refresh::TransactionRefreshSnapshot recentSnapshot;
@@ -1902,10 +2030,11 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
     MockRefreshRpc finalShieldedRpc;
     finalShieldedRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
     finalShieldedRpc.addResponse("z_listreceivedbyaddress", json::array());
+    finalShieldedRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
     auto finalShielded = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(
         finalShieldedRpc, partialShieldedSnapshot, 400, 0);
     EXPECT_TRUE(finalShieldedRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({
-        "listtransactions", "z_listreceivedbyaddress"
+        "listtransactions", "z_listreceivedbyaddress", "z_listsentbyaddress"
     }));
     EXPECT_EQ(finalShieldedRpc.calls[1].params, json::array({"zs-two", 0}));
     EXPECT_TRUE(finalShielded.shieldedScanComplete);
@@ -1922,9 +2051,10 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
     });
     MockRefreshRpc cachedShieldedRpc;
     cachedShieldedRpc.addResponse("listtransactions", json::array());
+    cachedShieldedRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
     auto cachedShielded = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(
         cachedShieldedRpc, cachedShieldedSnapshot, 500, 0);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(cachedShieldedRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({"listtransactions"}));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(cachedShieldedRpc.methodNames() == std::vector<std::string>({"listtransactions", "z_listsentbyaddress"}));
     EXPECT_TRUE(cachedShielded.shieldedScanComplete);
     EXPECT_EQ(cachedShielded.shieldedAddressesScanned, static_cast<size_t>(0));
     EXPECT_EQ(cachedShielded.transactions.size(), static_cast<size_t>(1));
@@ -1970,6 +2100,7 @@ void testNetworkRefreshRpcCollectors()
         json{{"txid", "shielded-mined"}, {"amount", 4.0}, {"confirmations", 102},
              {"time", 210}, {"memoStr", "pool"}}
     }));
+    miningTxRpc.addResponse("z_listsentbyaddress", json::array());
     auto miningTxResult = Refresh::collectTransactionRefreshResult(miningTxRpc, miningSnapshot, 328, 0);
     EXPECT_EQ(miningTxResult.transactions.size(), static_cast<size_t>(2));
     EXPECT_EQ(miningTxResult.transactions[0].type, std::string("mined"));
@@ -2005,6 +2136,25 @@ void testNetworkRefreshResultModels()
     EXPECT_EQ(state.longestchain, 110);
     EXPECT_EQ(state.notarized, 90);
     EXPECT_EQ(state.last_balance_update, static_cast<int64_t>(1234));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(state.sync.tip_known);      // longestchain>0 -> peer-derived tip is known
+    EXPECT_FALSE(state.sync.isSynced());    // still catching up (blocks 100 < tip 110)
+
+    // Peerless node: the daemon reports longestchain == 0. Even at the local best height (blocks ==
+    // headers) it must NOT be reported synced (the tip is unknown) — otherwise Send would be offered
+    // against a stale balance on a node that has silently lost all peers. (audit: peerless-synced)
+    {
+        dragonx::WalletState peerless;
+        auto pc = Refresh::parseCoreRefreshResult(
+            json{{"private", "5.00000000"}, {"transparent", "0.00000000"}, {"total", "5.00000000"}},
+            json{{"private", "5.00000000"}, {"transparent", "0.00000000"}, {"total", "5.00000000"}},
+            true,
+            json{{"blocks", 200}, {"headers", 200}, {"bestblockhash", "peerless-200"},
+                 {"verificationprogress", 1.0}, {"longestchain", 0}, {"notarized", 0}},
+            true);
+        Refresh::applyCoreRefreshResult(peerless, pc, 1235);
+        EXPECT_FALSE(peerless.sync.tip_known);
+        EXPECT_FALSE(peerless.sync.isSynced());  // peerless -> not synced despite blocks == headers
+    }
 
     auto connectionInfo = Refresh::parseConnectionInfoResult(
         json{{"version", 120000}, {"protocolversion", 170002}, {"p2pport", 8233},
@@ -2638,6 +2788,28 @@ void testNodeStatusBanner()
         NodeBannerInputs in; in.connected = true;
         EXPECT_TRUE(!evaluateNodeStatusBanner(in).show);
     }
+    // Connected but no peer-derived tip (0 peers) once chain info is in → amber "no peers" banner.
+    {
+        NodeBannerInputs in;
+        in.connected = true; in.tip_known = false; in.blocks = 3262059;
+        in.connection_status = "Peers: 0";
+        NodeBannerState s = evaluateNodeStatusBanner(in);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.show);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.severity == NodeBannerSeverity::Warning);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.reason == NodeBannerReason::NoPeers);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.action == NodeBannerAction::None);
+        EXPECT_EQ(s.detail, std::string("Peers: 0"));
+    }
+    // Connected, tip unknown, but no chain info yet (blocks==0) → no banner (avoid startup flicker).
+    {
+        NodeBannerInputs in; in.connected = true; in.tip_known = false; in.blocks = 0;
+        EXPECT_TRUE(!evaluateNodeStatusBanner(in).show);
+    }
+    // Connected with a known tip → no banner.
+    {
+        NodeBannerInputs in; in.connected = true; in.tip_known = true; in.blocks = 100;
+        EXPECT_TRUE(!evaluateNodeStatusBanner(in).show);
+    }
     // Expected startup phases own the screen (loading/warmup overlay) → no banner.
     {
         NodeBannerInputs in; in.warming_up = true;
@@ -2792,6 +2964,12 @@ void testSeedMigrationResume()
     // No txid and no opid → the Sweep gate (whether or not connected).
     EXPECT_TRUE(decideSeedMigrationResume(true, true, "", "", true)  == MigrationResume::SweepGate);
     EXPECT_TRUE(decideSeedMigrationResume(true, true, "", "", false) == MigrationResume::SweepGate);
+
+    // fund-safety: the Sweep step may only short-circuit a ~0 balance straight to adopt when NO sweep
+    // was ever submitted (a genuinely empty wallet). Once a sweep has been broadcast, a ~0 balance is
+    // ambiguous (the tx may be unconfirmed in the mempool), so direct adopt must be blocked.
+    EXPECT_TRUE(dragonx::sweepGateMayAdoptEmptyWallet(/*sweepSubmitted=*/false));   // empty wallet -> ok
+    EXPECT_FALSE(dragonx::sweepGateMayAdoptEmptyWallet(/*sweepSubmitted=*/true));   // in-flight -> blocked
 }
 
 void testLoggerFileSink()
@@ -5301,6 +5479,92 @@ void testLiteWalletControllerAsyncLifecycleFailover()
     dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWarmupServerSubstr.clear();
 }
 
+// C1/M1: the ASYNC lifecycle path (the one the Settings UI actually calls) must apply the
+// passphrase — encrypt a freshly created/restored wallet, unlock an existing encrypted one.
+// Previously the async path discarded the passphrase (encrypt/unlock lived only in the sync
+// wrappers), so a UI-created wallet stored its seed in PLAINTEXT and an encrypted wallet opened
+// but stayed locked.
+void testLiteWalletControllerAsyncAppliesPassphrase()
+{
+    using namespace dragonx::wallet;
+    const auto liteCaps = makeWalletCapabilities(WalletBuildKind::Lite, false, true);
+    LiteConnectionSettings conn;
+    conn.chainName = "main";
+    conn.servers = { LiteServerEndpoint{"https://good.example", "Good", true} };
+    conn.selectionMode = LiteServerSelectionMode::Sticky;
+    conn.stickyServerUrl = "https://good.example";
+
+    const auto drain = [](LiteWalletController& c) {
+        for (int i = 0; i < 400 && c.lifecycleRequestInProgress(); ++i)
+            std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5));
+        c.pumpLifecycleResult();
+    };
+
+    // C1: async create with a passphrase encrypts (and locks) the new wallet; same passphrase unlocks.
+    {
+        dragonx::test::resetLiteFakeCounters();
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWalletExists = false;
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeEncrypted = false;
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeLocked = false;
+        LiteWalletController controller(liteCaps, conn,
+                                        LiteClientBridge::fromApi(dragonx::test::makeFakeLiteApi()));
+        LiteWalletCreateRequest req;
+        req.passphrase = "hunter2";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.beginCreateWalletAsync(req));
+        drain(controller);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.walletOpen());
+        const auto s = controller.encryptionStatus();
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.encrypted);   // async create ENCRYPTED the wallet (C1 fixed)
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.locked);      // encrypt locks immediately
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.unlockWallet("hunter2"));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(controller.encryptionStatus().locked);
+    }
+
+    // C1: async restore with a passphrase likewise encrypts the restored wallet.
+    {
+        dragonx::test::resetLiteFakeCounters();
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWalletExists = false;
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeEncrypted = false;
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeLocked = false;
+        LiteWalletController controller(liteCaps, conn,
+                                        LiteClientBridge::fromApi(dragonx::test::makeFakeLiteApi()));
+        LiteWalletRestoreRequest req;
+        req.seedPhrase = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon "
+                         "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon "
+                         "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon art";
+        req.birthday = 0;
+        req.passphrase = "hunter2";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.beginRestoreWalletAsync(req));
+        drain(controller);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.walletOpen());
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.encryptionStatus().encrypted);  // C1 fixed for restore
+    }
+
+    // M1: async open of an already-encrypted+locked wallet unlocks it with the supplied passphrase.
+    {
+        dragonx::test::resetLiteFakeCounters();
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWalletExists = true;
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeEncrypted = true;   // existing wallet is encrypted...
+        dragonx::test::g_liteFakeLocked = true;      // ...and locked at open time
+        LiteWalletController controller(liteCaps, conn,
+                                        LiteClientBridge::fromApi(dragonx::test::makeFakeLiteApi()));
+        LiteWalletOpenRequest req;
+        req.passphrase = "hunter2";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.beginOpenWalletAsync(req));
+        drain(controller);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(controller.walletOpen());
+        const auto s = controller.encryptionStatus();
+        EXPECT_TRUE(s.encrypted);
+        EXPECT_FALSE(s.locked);   // async open UNLOCKED it (M1 fixed)
+    }
+
+    dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWalletExists = false;
+    dragonx::test::g_liteFakeEncrypted = false;
+    dragonx::test::g_liteFakeLocked = false;
+    dragonx::test::g_liteFakeDeadServerSubstr.clear();
+    dragonx::test::g_liteFakeWarmupServerSubstr.clear();
+}
+
 // M2: a parsed lite refresh bundle maps through to the app's WalletState (the last hop
 // the Balance/Receive/Transactions tabs read), with zatoshi->DRGX conversion, z/t address
 // split, transaction typing, confirmations, and sync progress.
@@ -7500,6 +7764,7 @@ int main()
     testLiteWalletControllerM5Persistence();
     testLiteWalletControllerEncryption();
     testLiteWalletControllerCreateEncryptsWithPassphrase();
+    testLiteWalletControllerAsyncAppliesPassphrase();
     testLiteChainNameMigration();
     testLiteRefreshModelAppliesToWalletState();
     testLiteSendShowsRecipientFromOutgoing();