Resilience audit, highest-value finding: a z_sendmany (full node) or lite broadcast whose REPLY is
lost — a transport timeout / connection cut AFTER the request already left us — was reported as an
ordinary "Transaction failed". The user then retries and can broadcast the same payment twice, because
the daemon may already hold the operation (z_sendmany returns an opid and runs async).
Classify the ambiguous case and surface it distinctly, without touching the send itself:
- New pure helpers in rpc/rpc_failure.h: sendReplyMayBeLost() (an RpcTransportError that was requestSent
with no HTTP status and a non-OK curl code — reply-timeout / got-nothing / our-own-abort; definitive
rejections and any HTTP status are excluded), liteSendErrorMayBeInFlight() (a transport-style gRPC text
heuristic, vetoing connect-phase and server-rejection text), and a readable-English marker tag.
- app_network.cpp: the z_sendmany catch records the flag; the failure branch (non-background only) tags
the callback text and forces a wallet re-read so a committed send shows in History. onDisconnected()
tags already-pending send callbacks the same way (they exist only after an opid was returned).
- Lite UserSend (app.cpp): a transport-style broadcast error is tagged identically.
- Send tab: a tagged outcome shows a non-success warning pointing at History and clears the compose form
so any resend must be retyped deliberately; it is NOT presented as a retryable failure.
The actual rpc_->call("z_sendmany", {from, recipients, 1, fee}), the lite send/broadcast call, and all
amounts/fees/recipients/memo bytes are byte-identical; only result-handling and presentation change.
Pure classifier/marker regression tests added (testSendMaybeInFlight).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
08a4427e31