Files
ObsidianDragon/src/util/wallet_file_probe.h
T
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8 6ee81a5abe fix: security-audit remediation (15 findings), empty-wallet warning, and send/chat/console/shutdown UX
Security audit remediation (15 confirmed findings from the codebase audit):
- H-02: scrub+delete the decrypt-flow plaintext key export on ALL exit paths
  (RAII guard) and purge stale obsidiandecryptexport* files at startup.
- M-01/L-03/L-04/L-05/L-07: sodium_memzero the Set-PIN and encrypt-PIN worker
  passphrase/PIN copies, the RPC Basic-auth string (auth_), the exported/imported
  key buffers (App::wipeSecrets, called from ~App and before main's _Exit), and
  the first-run wizard "Skip" buffers.
- M-03/M-04/M-05/L-06: return locked COPIES from XmrigManager/EmbeddedDaemon
  getters (dedicated error_mutex_; DaemonController::lastError now by value),
  route xmrig last_error_ writes through a locked setter, and wrap
  shutdown_status_/wizard_stop_status_ in a locking GuardedStatus
  (wizard_stopping_external_ -> std::atomic).
- M-02: persist after a console send/shield/import in the lite backend.
- L-01: require the confirm click for z_shieldcoinbase/z_mergetoaddress.
- L-02: quote/escape each Windows daemon argv per the MSDN CommandLineToArgvW rules.
- L-08: pin json/tomlplusplus/libwebp FetchContent to immutable commit SHAs.
- I-01: extract updater archives from the already-verified in-memory buffer
  (no disk re-read TOCTOU).

Feature: warn once (full-node) when the active wallet loads empty while a sibling
wallet file in the datadir holds keys. A funded salvage wallet.<ts>.bak routes to
the recovery/Restore flow; a funded sibling .dat routes to the wallet manager.
Per-wallet-file dismissal; gated on synced + address-list-loaded to avoid false
positives on warm reconnect / spent-down wallets.

UX fixes:
- send: show the TOTAL balance (with a spendable "available" note) in the source
  dropdown and keep pending-change addresses visible.
- chat: insert emoji at the cursor position; restrict new-chat recipients to
  shielded (z) addresses.
- console: optional auto-focus of the command input on tab open (off by default).
- shutdown: when "stop external daemon" is on, keep the shutdown screen up until
  the external node actually exits, showing live status.

Adversarially reviewed; verified across full-node, lite, and Windows builds; tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 13:18:49 -05:00

537 lines
31 KiB
C++

// DragonX Wallet - ImGui Edition
// Copyright 2024-2026 The Hush Developers
// Released under the GPLv3
//
// wallet_file_probe.h — read light metadata off a wallet.dat WITHOUT loading it into the daemon.
//
// DragonX wallet.dat is a Berkeley DB (btree) key/value store. Only the private-key material is
// encrypted (ckey/czkey/csapzkey/chdseed); the record *keys* and non-secret metadata live in
// plaintext, so a handful of boolean facts can be recovered cheaply by (a) validating the BDB btree
// magic and (b) scanning the raw bytes for the length-prefixed record names the daemon writes
// (a std::string is serialized as CompactSize(len)+bytes, so e.g. an "mkey" record's key begins with
// the 5 bytes 0x04 'm' 'k' 'e' 'y'). This is a heuristic PRESENCE test — reliable for booleans, not
// for exact counts — with no libdb dependency and no daemon. It never reads or exposes key material.
#pragma once
#include <algorithm>
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstring>
#include <filesystem>
#include <fstream>
#include <string>
#include <system_error>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
namespace dragonx {
namespace util {
// A reserved bare-filename PREFIX for the datadir "in-place link" wallets: an out-of-datadir wallet the
// user opens gets a stable symlink/hardlink under this name in the datadir so the daemon can load it by
// bare -wallet=<name>. These are plumbing, not standalone wallet files, so wallet enumeration hides them.
// Single source of truth shared with the wallets UI (ui/windows/wallets_dialog.h).
constexpr const char* kInPlaceLinkPrefix = "wallet-ip-";
inline bool isInPlaceLinkName(const std::string& name) { return name.rfind(kInPlaceLinkPrefix, 0) == 0; }
// Enumerate the standalone wallet-bearing files in a DragonX datadir (TOP-LEVEL only): bare "wallet*.dat"
// files, excluding in-place links and (optionally) one active filename. The "wallet" prefix already excludes
// node artifacts (peers.dat / blk*.dat / asmap.dat / …). With includeSalvageBaks, also returns "wallet*.bak"
// files — the daemon's salvage backups (wallet.<ts>.bak) that hold the pre-salvage keys. Returns full paths.
// Exception-safe (error_code iteration); never descends into subdirectories. This is the lightweight
// datadir-only counterpart to the wallets dialog's richer scan (which also walks user-added external folders
// and de-dups by canonical path); the default (.dat only, no baks) matches that dialog's semantics.
inline std::vector<std::string> enumerateDatadirWalletFiles(const std::string& datadir,
const std::string& excludeActiveName = "",
bool includeSalvageBaks = false) {
namespace fs = std::filesystem;
std::vector<std::string> out;
std::error_code ec;
fs::directory_iterator it(datadir, ec), end;
if (ec) return out;
for (; it != end; it.increment(ec)) {
if (ec) break;
const fs::path p = it->path();
const std::string name = p.filename().string();
if (name.size() <= 4) continue;
const std::string ext = name.substr(name.size() - 4);
const bool isDat = (ext == ".dat");
const bool isBak = includeSalvageBaks && (ext == ".bak");
if (!isDat && !isBak) continue; // *.dat (+ *.bak) only
if (name.rfind("wallet", 0) != 0) continue; // wallet-prefixed only
if (isInPlaceLinkName(name)) continue; // hide in-place links
if (!excludeActiveName.empty() && name == excludeActiveName) continue; // skip the active wallet
std::error_code fec;
if (!fs::is_regular_file(p, fec)) continue;
out.push_back(p.string());
}
return out;
}
struct WalletFileProbe {
bool isBerkeleyDB = false; ///< file has a valid BDB btree metapage magic (looks like a real wallet.dat)
bool encrypted = false; ///< has an "mkey" master-key record → passphrase-encrypted
bool hdSeed = false; ///< has hdseed/chdseed/hdchain → HD/seed wallet (else legacy)
bool hasShielded = false; ///< has zkey/czkey/sapzkey/csapzkey → holds shielded addresses
// A found marker is always definitive; a MISSING marker is only trustworthy when the scan actually
// covered the whole file. `scanComplete` is true when we reached EOF, or early-exited having found
// everything — false only when the byte cap cut the scan short. Callers should treat negative flags
// (e.g. "legacy" = !hdSeed, or "not encrypted" = !encrypted) as reliable only when scanComplete is true.
bool scanComplete = false;
std::size_t bytesRead = 0; ///< bytes actually consumed (early-exit reads far less than the file) — for budgeting
};
// Probe a wallet.dat by header-validating it as a BDB btree then byte-scanning (bounded, streaming,
// early-exit) for record markers. `maxBytes` caps how far we read so a pathologically large file can't
// stall the caller. Returns an all-false probe (isBerkeleyDB=false) for anything that isn't a readable
// BDB btree file. Safe to call on a wallet currently open by the daemon (read-only, pattern scan only).
inline WalletFileProbe probeWalletFile(const std::string& path,
std::size_t maxBytes = 96u * 1024u * 1024u) {
WalletFileProbe out;
std::ifstream f(path, std::ios::binary);
if (!f) return out;
// --- 1) Validate the Berkeley DB btree metapage magic (offset 12, either endianness). ---
unsigned char hdr[16];
f.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(hdr), sizeof(hdr));
if (f.gcount() < static_cast<std::streamsize>(sizeof(hdr))) return out;
auto rd32 = [](const unsigned char* p, bool le) -> uint32_t {
return le ? (uint32_t)p[0] | ((uint32_t)p[1] << 8) | ((uint32_t)p[2] << 16) | ((uint32_t)p[3] << 24)
: (uint32_t)p[3] | ((uint32_t)p[2] << 8) | ((uint32_t)p[1] << 16) | ((uint32_t)p[0] << 24);
};
constexpr uint32_t kBtreeMagic = 0x00053162u; // DB_BTREEMAGIC
if (rd32(hdr + 12, true) != kBtreeMagic && rd32(hdr + 12, false) != kBtreeMagic) return out;
out.isBerkeleyDB = true;
// --- 2) Streaming byte-scan for length-prefixed record markers. ---
// group: 0 = encrypted, 1 = hd/seed, 2 = shielded.
const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int>> patterns = {
{std::string("\x04", 1) + "mkey", 0}, // master key → wallet is encrypted
{std::string("\x06", 1) + "hdseed", 1}, // plaintext HD seed
{std::string("\x07", 1) + "chdseed", 1}, // encrypted HD seed
{std::string("\x07", 1) + "hdchain", 1}, // HD chain counter (present in both HD variants)
{std::string("\x04", 1) + "zkey", 2}, // sprout shielded key
{std::string("\x05", 1) + "czkey", 2}, // encrypted sprout key
{std::string("\x07", 1) + "sapzkey", 2}, // sapling shielded key
{std::string("\x08", 1) + "csapzkey", 2}, // encrypted sapling key
};
std::size_t maxPat = 0;
for (const auto& p : patterns) maxPat = std::max(maxPat, p.first.size());
const std::size_t overlap = maxPat > 0 ? maxPat - 1 : 0; // bytes carried between chunks for split matches
f.clear();
f.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);
constexpr std::size_t kChunk = 1u << 20; // 1 MiB
std::vector<char> buf(kChunk);
std::string carry;
std::size_t readTotal = 0;
bool enc = false, hd = false, sh = false;
bool eof = false, allFound = false;
while (readTotal < maxBytes) {
const std::size_t want = std::min(kChunk, maxBytes - readTotal);
f.read(buf.data(), static_cast<std::streamsize>(want));
const std::streamsize got = f.gcount();
if (got <= 0) { eof = true; break; }
readTotal += static_cast<std::size_t>(got);
std::string window;
window.reserve(carry.size() + static_cast<std::size_t>(got));
window.assign(carry);
window.append(buf.data(), static_cast<std::size_t>(got));
for (const auto& p : patterns) {
bool& flag = (p.second == 0) ? enc : (p.second == 1) ? hd : sh;
if (!flag && window.find(p.first) != std::string::npos) flag = true;
}
if (enc && hd && sh) { allFound = true; break; } // nothing more to learn
if (window.size() > overlap) carry.assign(window.data() + window.size() - overlap, overlap);
else carry.assign(window);
if (static_cast<std::size_t>(got) < want) { eof = true; break; } // reached EOF
}
out.encrypted = enc;
out.hdSeed = hd;
out.hasShielded = sh;
out.bytesRead = readTotal;
// false only if the byte cap cut a larger file short. If we stopped because readTotal hit maxBytes on
// an exact chunk boundary, ifstream never set eofbit — peek() tells us whether the file actually ended
// there (EOF → complete) or there's more beyond the cap (a real byte → truncated).
out.scanComplete = allFound || eof;
if (!out.scanComplete && f && f.peek() == std::ifstream::traits_type::eof()) out.scanComplete = true;
return out;
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Tier 2: exact record counts by actually walking the Berkeley DB btree (still no daemon, no libdb).
//
// wallet.dat is a BDB btree: a metapage (page 0) points at a root page; internal pages point at child
// pages; leaf pages hold (key,data) item pairs. We traverse from the root, visiting only reachable
// leaves (so freed/stale pages aren't counted), and tally records by the length-prefixed type name each
// key begins with. Every offset is bounds-checked against the page/file; a visited-set + page/key caps
// make it safe on a corrupt or adversarial file. On any structural surprise it returns parsed=false and
// the caller falls back to the byte-scan probe above.
struct WalletBtreeStats {
bool parsed = false; ///< the btree walked cleanly
bool complete = false; ///< the whole file was read (not cap-truncated) → counts are exact
int transparentKeys = 0; ///< key + wkey + ckey (spendable keys, incl. change; keypool "pool" recs excluded)
int shieldedKeys = 0; ///< zkey + czkey + sapzkey + csapzkey (≈ shielded addresses)
int addressBook = 0; ///< name records (labeled/received addresses)
int txCount = 0; ///< tx records (wallet transactions)
long long createdEpoch = 0; ///< earliest keymeta nCreateTime (wallet birthday); 0 = unknown
bool encrypted = false; ///< saw an mkey record
bool hdSeed = false; ///< saw hdseed/chdseed/hdchain
// BIP39 seed-phrase detection read straight off the hdchain record's fMnemonicSeed flag (which the
// daemon keeps PLAINTEXT even in an encrypted wallet — only the seed itself is crypted):
// 0 = undecidable, 1 = mnemonic seed-phrase wallet (z_exportmnemonic works), 2 = HD/legacy, no phrase.
int mnemonicSeed = 0;
std::size_t bytesRead = 0; ///< bytes actually read (for budgeting)
int addresses() const { return transparentKeys + shieldedKeys; }
};
// Recover the BIP39-mnemonic flag from a serialized CHDChain record value (the plaintext "hdchain"
// record). The daemon serializes CHDChain in Bitcoin/Zcash little-endian byte order as:
// nVersion:int32 | seedFp:32B | nCreateTime:int64 | saplingAccountCounter:uint32
// | [nVersion>=2 (VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT)] transparentChildCounter:uint32
// | [nVersion>=3 (VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC)] fMnemonicSeed:bool(1B)
// so fMnemonicSeed sits at byte offset 52 (= 4+32+8+4+4) once nVersion>=3. Returns 1 = mnemonic,
// 2 = HD but not mnemonic (raw-entropy seed, or a pre-mnemonic v1/v2 wallet), 0 = undecidable.
inline int hdChainMnemonicFlag(const unsigned char* val, uint32_t len) {
if (!val || len < 4) return 0;
const uint32_t v = (uint32_t)val[0] | ((uint32_t)val[1] << 8) |
((uint32_t)val[2] << 16) | ((uint32_t)val[3] << 24);
const int32_t nVersion = (int32_t)v;
if (nVersion < 1 || nVersion > 100) return 0; // implausible version → treat as unreadable, not "legacy"
if (nVersion < 3) return 2; // VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC not reached → field absent → no phrase
constexpr uint32_t kMnemonicOff = 52;
if (len <= kMnemonicOff) return 0; // truncated/unexpected value → can't read the flag
return val[kMnemonicOff] ? 1 : 2;
}
inline WalletBtreeStats parseWalletBtree(const std::string& path,
std::size_t maxBytes = 256u * 1024u * 1024u) {
WalletBtreeStats st;
std::ifstream f(path, std::ios::binary);
if (!f) return st;
std::string buf;
{
f.seekg(0, std::ios::end);
std::streamoff sz = f.tellg();
if (sz < 512) return st;
const std::size_t want = std::min<std::size_t>(static_cast<std::size_t>(sz), maxBytes);
f.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);
buf.resize(want);
f.read(&buf[0], static_cast<std::streamsize>(want));
buf.resize(static_cast<std::size_t>(std::max<std::streamsize>(0, f.gcount())));
if (buf.size() < 512) return st;
st.bytesRead = buf.size();
st.complete = (buf.size() == static_cast<std::size_t>(sz)); // read the whole file, not cap-truncated
}
const unsigned char* B = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf.data());
const std::size_t N = buf.size();
// Byte order comes from the metapage magic (BDB stores fields in the creating machine's order).
auto rd32at = [&](std::size_t o, bool le) -> uint32_t {
return le ? (uint32_t)B[o] | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<8) | ((uint32_t)B[o+2]<<16) | ((uint32_t)B[o+3]<<24)
: (uint32_t)B[o+3] | ((uint32_t)B[o+2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)B[o]<<24);
};
constexpr uint32_t kBtreeMagic = 0x00053162u;
bool le;
if (rd32at(12, true) == kBtreeMagic) le = true;
else if (rd32at(12, false) == kBtreeMagic) le = false;
else return st; // not a BDB btree
auto r32 = [&](std::size_t o) { return o + 4 <= N ? rd32at(o, le) : 0u; };
auto r16 = [&](std::size_t o) -> uint32_t {
if (o + 2 > N) return 0;
return le ? (uint32_t)B[o] | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<8) : (uint32_t)B[o+1] | ((uint32_t)B[o]<<8);
};
const uint32_t pagesize = r32(20);
if (pagesize < 512 || pagesize > 65536 || (pagesize & (pagesize - 1)) != 0) return st; // must be a power of two
const uint32_t npages = static_cast<uint32_t>(N / pagesize);
const uint32_t root = r32(88);
if (npages == 0 || root == 0 || root >= npages) return st;
// Page-level checksums (DB_CHKSUM) or encryption (DB_ENCRYPT) shift the per-page offset index array
// (26 → 32 / 64), which our fixed-offset-26 reads don't account for — that would silently under-count
// rather than fail. DragonX wallets use neither, so bail to the byte-scan fallback if either is set
// (metapage encrypt_alg@24, metaflags@26 & DBMETA_CHKSUM 0x01).
if (B[24] != 0 || (B[26] & 0x01)) return st;
// BDB page layout: hdr[26] = {..., entries@20:u16, level@24:u8, type@25:u8}, then a u16 offset array.
// Items on a leaf are BKEYDATA {len@0:u16, type@2:u8, data@3}; on an internal page BINTERNAL {pgno@4}.
constexpr uint8_t P_IBTREE = 3, P_LBTREE = 5, P_BTREEMETA = 9, B_KEYDATA = 1;
constexpr std::size_t kMaxPagesVisited = 600000; // bounds a corrupt/huge file
constexpr int kMaxKeys = 4000000;
std::vector<bool> visited(npages, false);
std::size_t pagesVisited = 0;
int keys = 0;
bool aborted = false;
auto rdpgno = [&](const unsigned char* p) -> uint32_t {
return le ? (uint32_t)p[0] | ((uint32_t)p[1]<<8) | ((uint32_t)p[2]<<16) | ((uint32_t)p[3]<<24)
: (uint32_t)p[3] | ((uint32_t)p[2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)p[1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)p[0]<<24);
};
// Walk the btree rooted at `rootPg`, invoking fn(keyPtr,keyLen, dataPtr,dataLen,dataType) per leaf pair.
auto traverse = [&](uint32_t rootPg, auto&& fn) {
std::fill(visited.begin(), visited.end(), false);
std::vector<uint32_t> stack;
// Mark pages visited at PUSH time (here + at each internal child below) so every page is enqueued
// at most once. The stack then stays O(npages) — a crafted file with many internal pages all
// referencing a shared child set can't balloon it to ~npages*entries pushes (a ~0.5 GB DoS).
if (rootPg < npages && !visited[rootPg]) { visited[rootPg] = true; stack.push_back(rootPg); }
while (!stack.empty()) {
const uint32_t pg = stack.back(); stack.pop_back();
if (pg >= npages) continue;
if (++pagesVisited > kMaxPagesVisited) { aborted = true; return; }
const std::size_t base = static_cast<std::size_t>(pg) * pagesize;
if (base + 26 > N) continue;
const uint8_t type = B[base + 25];
const uint32_t entries = r16(base + 20);
if (26 + static_cast<std::size_t>(entries) * 2 > pagesize) continue; // index array must fit
if (type == P_IBTREE) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entries; ++i) {
const uint32_t off = r16(base + 26 + i * 2);
if (off + 8 > pagesize) continue;
const uint32_t child = r32(base + off + 4);
if (child > 0 && child < npages && !visited[child]) { visited[child] = true; stack.push_back(child); }
}
} else if (type == P_LBTREE) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i + 1 < entries; i += 2) { // items alternate (key, data)
if (++keys > kMaxKeys) { aborted = true; return; }
const uint32_t ko = r16(base + 26 + i * 2);
const uint32_t dO = r16(base + 26 + (i + 1) * 2);
if (ko + 3 > pagesize || dO + 3 > pagesize) continue;
if (B[base + ko + 2] != B_KEYDATA) continue; // overflow/dup key — never a type key
const uint32_t kl = r16(base + ko);
if (kl < 1 || ko + 3 + kl > pagesize) continue;
const uint8_t dtype = B[base + dO + 2];
const uint32_t dl = r16(base + dO);
const unsigned char* dp = (dO + 3 + dl <= pagesize) ? B + base + dO + 3 : nullptr;
fn(B + base + ko + 3, kl, dp, dl, dtype);
}
}
// metapage / overflow / free pages: ignored.
}
};
// wallet.dat stores its records in a NAMED sub-database ("main"): the file's root btree is a master map
// of subdb-name -> subdb meta/root pgno. Follow each mapping to the real record btree. (A plain,
// single-database BDB file has no such mapping, so we fall back to walking the file root directly.)
std::vector<uint32_t> subRoots;
traverse(root, [&](const unsigned char*, uint32_t, const unsigned char* dp, uint32_t dl, uint8_t dtype) {
if (dtype != B_KEYDATA || dl != 4 || !dp) return;
// The master-db value (the subdb's meta/root pgno) is stored BIG-ENDIAN regardless of the file's
// native order. Try big-endian first, then native, and accept whichever lands on a real subdb page.
const uint32_t cand[2] = {
(uint32_t)dp[3] | ((uint32_t)dp[2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)dp[1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)dp[0]<<24), // big-endian
rdpgno(dp), // native
};
for (const uint32_t pgno : cand) {
if (pgno == 0 || pgno >= npages) continue;
const uint8_t pt = B[static_cast<std::size_t>(pgno) * pagesize + 25];
if (pt == P_BTREEMETA) { // subdb metapage → its root is at +88
const uint32_t sr = r32(static_cast<std::size_t>(pgno) * pagesize + 88);
if (sr > 0 && sr < npages) { subRoots.push_back(sr); break; }
} else if (pt == P_LBTREE || pt == P_IBTREE) { // mapping points straight at the root
subRoots.push_back(pgno); break;
}
}
});
if (aborted) return st;
if (subRoots.empty()) subRoots.push_back(root); // single-database file
auto countRecord = [&](const unsigned char* kp, uint32_t kl,
const unsigned char* dp, uint32_t dl, uint8_t dtype) {
const uint32_t nlen = kp[0]; // CompactSize length of the type string
if (nlen < 2 || nlen > 20 || 1u + nlen > kl) return;
const char* nm = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kp + 1);
auto is = [&](const char* s) { return std::strlen(s) == nlen && std::memcmp(nm, s, nlen) == 0; };
if (is("key") || is("wkey") || is("ckey")) st.transparentKeys++;
else if (is("zkey") || is("czkey") || is("sapzkey") || is("csapzkey")) st.shieldedKeys++;
else if (is("name")) st.addressBook++;
else if (is("tx")) st.txCount++;
else if (is("mkey")) st.encrypted = true;
else if (is("hdseed") || is("chdseed")) st.hdSeed = true;
else if (is("hdchain")) {
st.hdSeed = true;
// The hdchain VALUE carries fMnemonicSeed — read it to tell a BIP39 seed-phrase wallet
// apart from a legacy/raw-entropy HD wallet (bare record presence can't). First one wins.
if (st.mnemonicSeed == 0 && dtype == B_KEYDATA && dp)
st.mnemonicSeed = hdChainMnemonicFlag(dp, dl);
}
else if (is("keymeta")) {
// CKeyMetadata data = nVersion(int32) + nCreateTime(int64) + …, all little-endian (Bitcoin
// serialization). The earliest non-zero nCreateTime is the wallet birthday (daemon's
// nTimeFirstKey). B_KEYDATA(1) only; overflow values aren't inline.
if (dtype == B_KEYDATA && dp && dl >= 12) {
long long t = 0;
for (int b = 0; b < 8; ++b) t |= static_cast<long long>(dp[4 + b]) << (8 * b);
if (t > 0 && (st.createdEpoch == 0 || t < st.createdEpoch)) st.createdEpoch = t;
}
}
};
for (const uint32_t sr : subRoots) {
traverse(sr, [&](const unsigned char* kp, uint32_t kl, const unsigned char* dp, uint32_t dl, uint8_t dt) {
countRecord(kp, kl, dp, dl, dt);
});
if (aborted) return st;
}
st.parsed = true;
return st;
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Tier 3: collect the raw (key,value) record BYTES — the read half of the offline wallet REBUILD that
// recovers a BDB-inconsistent wallet.dat (stale extent metadata: our tolerant walk reads records the
// daemon's Berkeley DB verify rejects and auto-salvages). A helper then writes these verbatim into a
// fresh, consistent BDB so the daemon loads it cleanly. Records are copied byte-for-byte — encrypted
// key material (ckey/csapzkey/mkey) passes through as opaque ciphertext, so no passphrase is needed.
// Values that live in BDB OVERFLOW pages (only large `tx` history records) are NOT captured (skipped +
// counted); they are irrelevant to funds — a rescan rebuilds transaction history. Same bounds-checked,
// subdb-aware, visited-set-capped walk as parseWalletBtree.
struct WalletRawRecords {
bool parsed = false; ///< the btree walked cleanly
bool complete = false; ///< the whole file was read (not cap-truncated)
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string>> records; ///< inline (key,value) bytes, verbatim
int keyRecords = 0; ///< fund-critical key-type records captured (key/wkey/ckey/z*/sap*/hdseed)
int skippedOverflow = 0; ///< records whose value spilled to overflow pages (tx history) — not captured
std::size_t bytesRead = 0;
};
inline WalletRawRecords extractWalletBtreeRecords(const std::string& path,
std::size_t maxBytes = 512u * 1024u * 1024u) {
WalletRawRecords out;
std::ifstream f(path, std::ios::binary);
if (!f) return out;
std::string buf;
{
f.seekg(0, std::ios::end);
std::streamoff sz = f.tellg();
if (sz < 512) return out;
const std::size_t want = std::min<std::size_t>(static_cast<std::size_t>(sz), maxBytes);
f.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);
buf.resize(want);
f.read(&buf[0], static_cast<std::streamsize>(want));
buf.resize(static_cast<std::size_t>(std::max<std::streamsize>(0, f.gcount())));
if (buf.size() < 512) return out;
out.bytesRead = buf.size();
out.complete = (buf.size() == static_cast<std::size_t>(sz));
}
const unsigned char* B = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf.data());
const std::size_t N = buf.size();
auto rd32at = [&](std::size_t o, bool le) -> uint32_t {
return le ? (uint32_t)B[o] | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<8) | ((uint32_t)B[o+2]<<16) | ((uint32_t)B[o+3]<<24)
: (uint32_t)B[o+3] | ((uint32_t)B[o+2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)B[o]<<24);
};
constexpr uint32_t kBtreeMagic = 0x00053162u;
bool le;
if (rd32at(12, true) == kBtreeMagic) le = true;
else if (rd32at(12, false) == kBtreeMagic) le = false;
else return out;
auto r32 = [&](std::size_t o) { return o + 4 <= N ? rd32at(o, le) : 0u; };
auto r16 = [&](std::size_t o) -> uint32_t {
if (o + 2 > N) return 0;
return le ? (uint32_t)B[o] | ((uint32_t)B[o+1]<<8) : (uint32_t)B[o+1] | ((uint32_t)B[o]<<8);
};
const uint32_t pagesize = r32(20);
if (pagesize < 512 || pagesize > 65536 || (pagesize & (pagesize - 1)) != 0) return out;
const uint32_t npages = static_cast<uint32_t>(N / pagesize);
const uint32_t root = r32(88);
if (npages == 0 || root == 0 || root >= npages) return out;
if (B[24] != 0 || (B[26] & 0x01)) return out; // page checksum/encryption — offsets shift; bail
constexpr uint8_t P_IBTREE = 3, P_LBTREE = 5, P_BTREEMETA = 9, B_KEYDATA = 1;
constexpr std::size_t kMaxPagesVisited = 600000;
constexpr int kMaxKeys = 4000000;
std::vector<bool> visited(npages, false);
std::size_t pagesVisited = 0;
int keys = 0;
bool aborted = false;
auto rdpgno = [&](const unsigned char* p) -> uint32_t {
return le ? (uint32_t)p[0] | ((uint32_t)p[1]<<8) | ((uint32_t)p[2]<<16) | ((uint32_t)p[3]<<24)
: (uint32_t)p[3] | ((uint32_t)p[2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)p[1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)p[0]<<24);
};
auto traverse = [&](uint32_t rootPg, auto&& fn) {
std::fill(visited.begin(), visited.end(), false);
std::vector<uint32_t> stack;
if (rootPg < npages && !visited[rootPg]) { visited[rootPg] = true; stack.push_back(rootPg); }
while (!stack.empty()) {
const uint32_t pg = stack.back(); stack.pop_back();
if (pg >= npages) continue;
if (++pagesVisited > kMaxPagesVisited) { aborted = true; return; }
const std::size_t base = static_cast<std::size_t>(pg) * pagesize;
if (base + 26 > N) continue;
const uint8_t type = B[base + 25];
const uint32_t entries = r16(base + 20);
if (26 + static_cast<std::size_t>(entries) * 2 > pagesize) continue;
if (type == P_IBTREE) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entries; ++i) {
const uint32_t off = r16(base + 26 + i * 2);
if (off + 8 > pagesize) continue;
const uint32_t child = r32(base + off + 4);
if (child > 0 && child < npages && !visited[child]) { visited[child] = true; stack.push_back(child); }
}
} else if (type == P_LBTREE) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i + 1 < entries; i += 2) {
if (++keys > kMaxKeys) { aborted = true; return; }
const uint32_t ko = r16(base + 26 + i * 2);
const uint32_t dO = r16(base + 26 + (i + 1) * 2);
if (ko + 3 > pagesize || dO + 3 > pagesize) continue;
if (B[base + ko + 2] != B_KEYDATA) continue; // overflow/dup key — never a record name
const uint32_t kl = r16(base + ko);
if (kl < 1 || ko + 3 + kl > pagesize) continue;
const uint8_t dtype = B[base + dO + 2];
const uint32_t dl = r16(base + dO);
const unsigned char* dp = (dO + 3 + dl <= pagesize) ? B + base + dO + 3 : nullptr;
fn(B + base + ko + 3, kl, dp, dl, dtype);
}
}
}
};
// Master DB: subdb-name → subdb meta/root pgno (big-endian value; native fallback), same as parseWalletBtree.
std::vector<uint32_t> subRoots;
traverse(root, [&](const unsigned char*, uint32_t, const unsigned char* dp, uint32_t dl, uint8_t dtype) {
if (dtype != B_KEYDATA || dl != 4 || !dp) return;
const uint32_t cand[2] = {
(uint32_t)dp[3] | ((uint32_t)dp[2]<<8) | ((uint32_t)dp[1]<<16) | ((uint32_t)dp[0]<<24),
rdpgno(dp),
};
for (const uint32_t pgno : cand) {
if (pgno == 0 || pgno >= npages) continue;
const uint8_t pt = B[static_cast<std::size_t>(pgno) * pagesize + 25];
if (pt == P_BTREEMETA) {
const uint32_t sr = r32(static_cast<std::size_t>(pgno) * pagesize + 88);
if (sr > 0 && sr < npages) { subRoots.push_back(sr); break; }
} else if (pt == P_LBTREE || pt == P_IBTREE) { subRoots.push_back(pgno); break; }
}
});
if (aborted) return out;
if (subRoots.empty()) subRoots.push_back(root);
auto isKeyType = [](const char* nm, uint32_t nl) {
auto is = [&](const char* s) { return std::strlen(s) == nl && std::memcmp(nm, s, nl) == 0; };
return is("key") || is("wkey") || is("ckey") || is("zkey") || is("czkey")
|| is("sapzkey") || is("csapzkey") || is("hdseed") || is("chdseed");
};
for (const uint32_t sr : subRoots) {
traverse(sr, [&](const unsigned char* kp, uint32_t kl, const unsigned char* dp, uint32_t dl, uint8_t dt) {
if (dt != B_KEYDATA || !dp) { out.skippedOverflow++; return; } // overflow value (tx history) — skip
out.records.emplace_back(std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kp), kl),
std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(dp), dl));
const uint32_t nlen = kp[0];
if (nlen >= 2 && nlen <= 20 && 1u + nlen <= kl && isKeyType(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kp + 1), nlen))
out.keyRecords++;
});
if (aborted) return out;
}
out.parsed = true;
return out;
}
} // namespace util
} // namespace dragonx