F8 (security). Two related fixes to how the wallet decides whether an RPC target is
safe to send Basic-auth credentials to:
- isLocalHost() was matching any host that merely *starts* "127." via
rfind("127.",0)==0, so "127.evil.com" (and "127.0.0.1.attacker", "127.300.0.1",
"1270.0.0.1") were misclassified as loopback and treated as local. It now uses a
strict isExactIPv4Loopback() parser: exactly four 0-255 dot-separated octets with
the first == 127. localhost / ::1 / [::1] handling is unchanged.
- A remote rpchost over plain HTTP (no rpctls=1) previously only produced a
dismissible warning and then sent rpcuser:rpcpassword in cleartext, where a
local-network MITM could capture them. tryConnect() now REFUSES that connection
(clear status line + one-time notification, no creds sent) unless the user opts in
explicitly with rpcallowplaintext=1 in DRAGONX.conf (new
ConnectionConfig::allow_plaintext_remote, parsed in parseConfFile; policy in the
new allowsPlaintextRemote()). Local/embedded daemons and rpctls=1 remotes are
unaffected.
BREAKING: a wallet configured for remote plaintext RPC will stop connecting until
rpcallowplaintext=1 (or rpctls=1) is added to DRAGONX.conf. Must be called out in the
release notes. The Settings-toggle UI is deferred (the conf-key opt-in is the recovery
path; see docs/daemon-startup-hardening.md).
Adds testIsLocalHost and testAllowsPlaintextRemote to test_phase4.cpp; one i18n key
(English) added to i18n.cpp.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DanS
efb271cb9a