A failed wallet unlock was always treated as a wrong guess: the lockout
counter was bumped and the back-off curve armed no matter why the RPC
failed. A busy or warming-up node, a transport timeout, or a wallet that
is not actually encrypted would all eat an attempt and could push a user
into a lockout without a single mistyped passphrase.
The failed call is now classified before it is acted on:
- Only the daemon's "passphrase incorrect" error counts as a wrong
guess and advances the lockout.
- A warming-up or unreachable node, a reply timeout, or a full queue is
reported as a transient busy-node condition with no attempt charged.
- A "wallet is not encrypted" reply refreshes the local encryption state
instead of penalising the user.
- Any unknown error surfaces its message without touching the counter.
The PIN path got the same treatment: when the vault decrypts correctly
but the unlock RPC then fails for a non-credential reason, the attempt
is no longer counted.
Tests cover the classification of each failure kind.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8
63a422a615