fix(pow): only dedup RandomX when CheckBlockHeader verified it; drop fake git id

Brings onto dev the two fixes that until now existed only on release/1.0.4, so
nothing is stranded on a branch we are not shipping from.

1. GUARDED VERIFY-ONCE (main.cpp)

4e67e687d arms the RandomX dedup unconditionally whenever fCheckPOW is set. But
CheckBlockHeader returns early -- BEFORE reaching its RandomX check -- for a
block whose timestamp is >60s in the future (*futureblockp==1), and CheckBlock
deliberately continues on that path. There, hush_checkPOW is the ONLY RandomX
verification the block gets, so suppressing it leaves the block unverified.

Not a chain-acceptance hole: ConnectBlock rejects futureblock != 0, so such a
block never joins the chain. But it silently weakens DoS banning -- an invalid
future block gets rejected for its timestamp instead of for bad PoW, which is a
regression against the un-deduped behaviour it replaced.

ScopedRandomXSkip now takes an `arm` flag and CheckBlock passes fHeaderChecked,
so the dedup applies only where the header check actually completed and did the
verification. Strictly a tightening: it can only cause MORE verification than
before, never less.

2. NO FAKE GIT IDENTITY (clientversion.cpp)

A hardcoded `#define GIT_ARCHIVE 1` with GIT_COMMIT_ID "a86845f3dc", dated Feb
2018, is reached whenever build.h supplies no BUILD_DESC -- i.e. any build
without git metadata, which is exactly the tarball/CI release case. Such
binaries reported themselves as that Komodo commit regardless of content; a
build here did precisely that before this was found. The archive substitution
placeholders are kept, so a real git-archive export still works; a git-less
build now reports "-unk", which is honest and greppable.

Both syntax-clean. Rebuild and re-validation on EPYC follows; the earlier
validated binary (md5 fe83d70fec5b50c38bf65ea6c733ffa9) predates these.

release/1.0.4 is parked, not deleted -- its commit records why the v1.0.2
lineage cannot ship (block-index format incompatibility with dev-written
chainstate).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-21 16:58:29 -05:00
parent 7dc904c96f
commit fbcf160478
2 changed files with 22 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@@ -62,11 +62,15 @@ const std::string CLIENT_NAME = GetArg("-clientname", "DragonX");
#endif
//TODO: clean up this stuff
//! git will put "#define GIT_ARCHIVE 1" on the next line inside archives.
#define GIT_ARCHIVE 1
//! git archives get "#define GIT_ARCHIVE 1" substituted on the next line by export-subst.
//! Do NOT hardcode it: the BUILD_DESC chain below falls back to GIT_COMMIT_ID whenever
//! build.h carries no BUILD_DESC -- any build without git metadata, e.g. from a tarball --
//! so a hardcoded id makes those binaries claim an identity that is not theirs. Until
//! 2026-08-21 this asserted Komodo commit a86845f3dc, dated Feb 2018, on every such build.
//! With it gone that case reports "-unk", which is honest and greppable.
#ifdef GIT_ARCHIVE
#define GIT_COMMIT_ID "a86845f3dc"
#define GIT_COMMIT_DATE "Wed, 21 Feb 2018 16:15:11 +0200"
#define GIT_COMMIT_ID "$Format:%h$"
#define GIT_COMMIT_DATE "$Format:%cD$"
#endif
#define RENDER_BETA_STRING(num) "-beta" DO_STRINGIZE(num)

View File

@@ -5155,10 +5155,15 @@ int32_t hush_checkPOW(int32_t slowflag,CBlock *pblock,int32_t height);
// RAII: save+restore the thread-local RandomX-skip flag around the verify-once dedup in CheckBlock,
// so it can never clobber the miner's own fSkipRandomXValidation (TestBlockValidity -> ConnectBlock
// re-entry) nor leak TRUE on an exception thrown out of hush_checkPOW.
// `arm` is false on paths where CheckBlockHeader did NOT reach its own RandomX check, so the
// dedup can never suppress the only verification a block gets.
struct ScopedRandomXSkip {
bool prev;
ScopedRandomXSkip() : prev(GetSkipRandomXValidation()) { SetSkipRandomXValidation(true); }
~ScopedRandomXSkip() { SetSkipRandomXValidation(prev); }
bool armed;
explicit ScopedRandomXSkip(bool arm) : prev(GetSkipRandomXValidation()), armed(arm) {
if (armed) SetSkipRandomXValidation(true);
}
~ScopedRandomXSkip() { if (armed) SetSkipRandomXValidation(prev); }
};
bool CheckBlock(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state,
libzcash::ProofVerifier& verifier,
@@ -5168,7 +5173,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,const C
// These are checks that are independent of context.
hash = block.GetHash();
// Check that the header is valid (particularly PoW). This is mostly redundant with the call in AcceptBlockHeader.
if (!CheckBlockHeader(futureblockp,height,pindex,block,state,fCheckPOW))
const bool fHeaderChecked = CheckBlockHeader(futureblockp,height,pindex,block,state,fCheckPOW);
if (!fHeaderChecked)
{
if ( *futureblockp == 0 )
{
@@ -5196,7 +5202,11 @@ bool CheckBlock(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,const C
// that dominates IBD). The scoped guard saves/restores the skip flag (never hardcodes false)
// so the miner's own skip is preserved and nothing leaks on throw. Equihash + PoW-target in
// hush_checkPOW still run.
ScopedRandomXSkip _rxskip;
// ARMED ONLY IF fHeaderChecked: CheckBlockHeader returns early -- BEFORE its RandomX
// check -- for a future-timestamped block (*futureblockp==1), and CheckBlock keeps
// going on that path. There hush_checkPOW is the ONLY RandomX verification, so
// arming unconditionally drops the check for that class of block.
ScopedRandomXSkip _rxskip(fHeaderChecked);
if ( hush_checkPOW(1,(CBlock *)&block,height) < 0 )
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock: failed slow_checkPOW"),REJECT_INVALID, "failed-slow_checkPOW");
}