diff --git a/src/hush.h b/src/hush.h
index 4863547d7..fad5be098 100644
--- a/src/hush.h
+++ b/src/hush.h
@@ -591,6 +591,14 @@ int32_t hush_voutupdate(bool fJustCheck,int32_t *isratificationp,int32_t notaryi
             opretlen += (scriptbuf[len++] << 8);
         }
         opoffset = len;
+        // SECURITY (Finding #4): opretlen is attacker-controlled (up to 65535 via OP_PUSHDATA2)
+        // and was previously used with no bounds check. scriptbuf is a fixed DRAGON_MAXSCRIPTSIZE
+        // stack buffer in hush_connectblock, so an oversized opretlen drives out-of-bounds reads in
+        // the downstream 'K'/KV and notarization paths (persisted to disk, leaked via kvsearch RPC,
+        // reliable crash on block connect). Reject any opret claiming more bytes than actually
+        // remain in the real script; this mirrors the no-OP_RETURN fall-through so nothing valid changes.
+        if ( opretlen < 0 || opretlen > scriptlen - len )
+            return(notaryid);
         matched = 0;
         if ( SMART_CHAIN_SYMBOL[0] == 0 )
         {
@@ -933,7 +941,7 @@ int32_t hush_connectblock(bool fJustCheck, CBlockIndex *pindex,CBlock& block)
                         if ( len >= sizeof(uint32_t) && len <= sizeof(scriptbuf) )
                         {
                             memcpy(scriptbuf,(uint8_t *)&block.vtx[i].vout[j].scriptPubKey[0],len);
-                            if ( len == 35 && scriptbuf[0] == 33 && scriptbuf[34] == 0xac )
+                            if ( len == 35 && scriptbuf[0] == 33 && scriptbuf[34] == 0xac && numvalid < (int32_t)(sizeof(pubkeys)/sizeof(pubkeys[0])) )
                             {
                                 memcpy(pubkeys[numvalid++],scriptbuf+1,33);
                                 for (k=0; k<33; k++)