- UpdatedNoteData now keeps the incoming plaintext when it keeps the
wallet's own entries. When it returns "unchanged" (equal note data,
or SaplingNoteDataIdentical), any entry lacking a plaintext takes the
incoming one, for the same outpoint and ivk only. The startup rescan
replays loaded txs with FindMySaplingNotes' freshly decrypted data;
that plaintext was thrown away, so the warm-up decrypted those notes a
second time. The cache is outside every comparison, so the function
still returns false and nothing is rewritten.
- -checknotecache is read once at init into fCheckNoteCache, instead of
a mapArgs lookup on every GetFilteredNotes call. Its help text and
comment now say what it checks: every note the walk considers, before
the address filter, so a corrupt cached address can't drop a note
unchecked.
- GetFilteredNotes pre-sizes its result only when there's no address
filter, so a one-address call no longer reserves room for the whole
wallet.
- WarmSaplingNoteCache returns its counts (notes, filled, no such
output, undecryptable), and FillSaplingNoteCache records the threads
it used, so tests can tell the cases apart.
- WarmSaplingNoteCache's comment no longer claims nothing can wait on
cs_wallet while it runs: the RPCs allowed during warmup can.
Tests:
- ReplayWithPlaintextIsNoUpdate pins the rule that the plaintext cache
stays out of the "did this tx change?" decision. A rescan replays a
witnessed note loaded without plaintext, using FindMySaplingNotes'
data that carries one. That must be no update: no rewrite, and the
witness and nullifier are kept. The stored entry then gains the
plaintext. Checked by mutation: with cache presence added to
SaplingNoteDataIdentical, this test fails and every other test still
passes.
- ParallelFillMatchesSerial uses 460 notes and asserts the thread count.
So the 7-thread case really runs 7 threads, with uneven shards
(460 % 7 != 0). Before, it was capped at 4 and repeated the 4-thread
case.
- ColdParallelFillMatchesLegacy: a cold GetFilteredNotes over ~270
candidates fills on 4 threads and matches the 69bb035e7 loop entry
for entry.
- WarmUpSkipsBadNotes asserts the warm-up's separate counts (1 no such
output, 2 undecryptable), so removing the out-of-range guard is now
caught.
- CachedPlaintextMatchesFreshDecrypt checks exact counts.
CheckNoteCacheRepairsADifference also tampers with a memo, and looks
entries up by outpoint. The meaningless GetHash check is dropped.
- A ScopedArg / ScopedCheckNoteCache RAII helper restores -args and
fCheckNoteCache even when an assertion returns early.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plaintext cache is in memory only, so a restart empties it. Without
a warm-up, the first balance call after a restart decrypts the whole
wallet under LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet): ~6s for a 12k-note wallet. That
is the observed failure: restart, the GUI connects, and the node looks
stuck.
CWallet::WarmSaplingNoteCache decrypts every note whose plaintext isn't
cached, spent ones included, because z_listreceivedbyaddress
(ignoreSpent=false) is called once per address by the GUI's history
scan.
init runs it at the end of the wallet block, just before
SetBroadcastTransactions. At that point RPC is still in warmup (it
shows "Decrypting wallet notes...") and the wallet notification
thread, whose startup witness rebuild can hold cs_wallet for a long
time, has not started yet. It takes cs_wallet only. -notecachewarmup=0
(debug help) skips it, which leaves the lazy fill in GetFilteredNotes
to do the work.
Unlike GetFilteredNotes, the warm-up never asserts. A note that doesn't
decrypt under its ivk, or names an output its tx lacks, is counted in
the summary line and listed under -debug=zrpcunsafe. A corrupt note
therefore can't stop the node from starting, or from serving the
key-export RPCs allowed during warmup; GetFilteredNotes still asserts
on it, as before.
Tests:
- WarmUpFillsEveryNote: spent, locked, unconfirmed and stale-block
notes included; walks afterwards decrypt nothing.
- WarmUpSkipsBadNotes: undecryptable and out-of-range notes are skipped
without aborting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GetFilteredNotes, the walk behind every balance and note-listing RPC,
sweep, consolidation, z_sendmany and z_mergetoaddress, decrypted every
note it looked at on every call: ~0.5ms of Jubjub arithmetic per note,
under LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet). A note's plaintext is fixed by its
output (the txid commits to the ciphertext) and the ivk that decrypts
it, so it never needs to be decrypted twice.
SaplingNoteData gains an in-memory-only
boost::optional<SaplingNoteCache> {note, memo}; the address is the
note's (d, pk_d). It follows the witnessRootValidated precedent:
- never serialized, and left out of operator== and
SaplingNoteDataIdentical, so filling it never makes a tx look changed
and get rewritten (the replay rewrite storm 69bb035e7 removed);
- FindMySaplingNotes fills it from the decryption that found the note
(both the spending-key and the viewing-key-only loop);
- UpdatedNoteData's replace branch keeps a plaintext the wallet already
had, for the same outpoint and ivk only;
- GetFilteredNotes now runs in two passes: pass 1 applies the tx,
spent and locked filters and collects the notes that pass; whatever
lacks a plaintext (everything after a restart, until the startup
warm-up in a later commit) is decrypted once via the new
FillSaplingNoteCache; pass 2 applies the address and spending-key
filters and emits entries in the same order as before.
Spentness, spendability, lock state and depth are still decided on every
call; only the plaintext is cached.
The A0 equivalence test passes unchanged (warm). New tests:
- ColdCacheMatchesLegacy: the same grid with the cache dropped before
every call;
- CachedPlaintextMatchesFreshDecrypt: eager and lazy fills;
- WarmPassDoesNotDecrypt: a fill counter shows a warm walk decrypts
nothing, and spent or locked notes only when the caller asks for
them;
- CacheNeverSerialized: byte-identical SER_DISK/NETWORK/GETHASH output,
empty after a load;
- UpdatedNoteDataAndTheCache: no rewrite on a cache-only difference,
carried on replace, never across another ivk;
- SpendabilityNotCached;
- FindMySaplingNotesFillsCache.
Memory: ~616 bytes per note (the memo is 512), ~8MB for a 13k-note
wallet, next to ~100KB per note of cached witnesses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
For minDepth > 1, GetFilteredNotes located each wallet tx's block with
tx_height(), which calls GetTransaction and re-reads the tx from disk
through the txindex. It did this once per wallet tx, transparent ones
included, while holding LOCK2. z_listunspent and z_listreceivedbyaddress
did it once more per returned note. Without -txindex, GetTransaction can
only find a tx that still has unspent transparent outputs. tx_height()
then returned 0 for every fully shielded tx, and the tx was skipped. So
on a -txindex=0 node, sweep and consolidation (minDepth 11) and any
minconf >= 2 call never saw those notes.
The wallet already has the depth, and for an active-chain tx
GetDepthInMainChain is chainActive.Height() - height + 1. The new
HeightFromDepth() inverts that (0 when unconfirmed or off the active
chain) and replaces tx_height() at all three sites. The height only
feeds the == 0 skip and hush_dpowconfs. Both sides hold cs_main for the
whole call, so the tip can't move between the walk and the RPC tail.
On a -txindex node the results are identical: the txindex block and
wtx.hashBlock are the same block. The extended equivalence test now
also covers minDepth 2/11/12/22. On -txindex=0 nodes, fully shielded
notes now show up for minDepth > 1. With -zsweep or -consolidation
enabled, those notes will now be swept and consolidated, so init logs
that once. MinDepthAboveOneUsesWalletHeight pins the new behaviour and
shows that the old path returned nothing without a txindex.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A note found through an incoming viewing key only (z_importviewingkey)
has no full viewing key behind it. UpdateSaplingNullifierNoteMapWithTx
skips such notes, so they never get a nullifier. VerifyAndSetInitialWitness
treated "no nullifier" as "witness needs reseeding" on every call: it
cleared the note's witness, re-read the block from disk, reseeded it,
and then dereferenced the nullifier that never came. dragonxd aborted
in the txnotify thread (boost::optional "is_initialized" assert) on the
first block confirming a note to such an address, and again after every
restart, before the block index was flushed.
Such a note can't be spent, so it needs no witness. Skip it there; if
its spending key is imported later, it has a full viewing key and the
existing no-nullifier rule seeds it then. SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight
now takes the optional nullifier. A note without one is never extended
by BuildWitnessCache (its pending-note gate requires one), so it must
not lower the rebuild's start height. Every call site that worked before
passes a set nullifier and behaves as before.
The deref came in with the 2020 witness rework (6c48397cf). The new
gtest ViewingKeyOnlyNoteIsNotWitnessed fails on the old code (the note
reaches the reseed path).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A v1.3.0 node with a ~13.6k-note wallet (-dbcache=4084) looked hung for hours:
every start replayed ~62k blocks from a chainstate 26 days stale, then ran a
47-60 min all-core witness rebuild holding LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet) (RPC answered
HTTP 500 "Work queue depth exceeded", peers timed out), the GUI killed it before
anything was flushed, and the next start did it all again. Even after escaping,
each new block cost ~30s under LOCK2, so the node fell behind a 36s chain.
D1 BuildWitnessCache: the post-rebuild latch computed witnesses.front().root()
(~2.4ms) for every pending note on every block, only to feed a log line that
is printed for bulk rebuilds alone. The anchor check now runs on the Phase-2
workers and only for a bulk rebuild; the per-block path just sets the latch.
Phase 2 also runs in parallel whenever the job is big (notes x commitments
>= 2000), not only for a bulk range, so busy blocks no longer extend every
note serially. If the OS refuses a worker thread, the remaining shards run
inline instead of unwinding past joinable threads (std::terminate).
D2 FlushStateToDisk: the coins cache was only flushed on shutdown, gettxoutsetinfo
or after 24h; on this chain it stays a few MiB, so the size triggers never
fire and a node that never reached 24h uptime or a clean stop kept its
chainstate (and block index) weeks behind. Flush at least hourly and every
DATABASE_FLUSH_BLOCKS (5000) connected blocks -- the latter also inside one
long ActivateBestChain -- and right after the startup ActivateBestChain when
it moved the tip.
D3 UpdatedNoteData: a replayed or rescanned tx arrives with FindMySaplingNotes
data (no nullifier). Witnesses and witnessHeight were carried over but the
nullifier was dropped, so VerifyAndSetInitialWitness cleared and reseeded the
witnesses on the next block -- the replay above rewrote 3,750 txs and forced
the full rebuild. Carry the nullifier with the witnesses, unless the tx was
re-mined in a different block (its notes moved; reseed as before). When the
merged data is identical, don't rewrite the tx; just clear the in-memory
witnessRootValidated so the next block re-checks the kept roots once (a
rescan still finds and reseeds a witness that went bad, without rebuilding
the healthy ones). The carry loop no longer deep-copies every note.
SetBestChain: with hourly coin flushes the wallet locator must not run ahead
of the async notifier, or a crash permanently skips the blocks it had not yet
delivered. Stamp the block the wallet's state reflects (pindexWalletTip,
seeded in init before ThreadNotifyWallets starts -- at the startup rescan's
checkpoint if that rescan was interrupted -- and advanced contiguously by
ChainTip), like zcashd's ChainTipAdded. ThreadNotifyWallets no longer hands
the wallet an empty block after a fatal block-read failure.
Tests: new gtest test_wallet_notedata.cpp (5 tests); 23/23 gtests pass, and the
two core D3 tests fail with D3 reverted. Regtest A/B against master with a
1,008-note wallet: notify-thread CPU per block 1,780ms -> 3ms; worst LOCK2 RPC
stall 1.6-2.9s -> 10-15ms on ordinary blocks and 4.6-7.1s -> ~1.6s on a block
carrying a 40-output self-send; a z_importkey rescan went from 35 reseeds plus a
bulk rebuild (10.6s) to 0 reseeds, same balance; after kill -9 at 150 blocks a
build with a 100-block flush threshold restarted at 100, master at 0. Two
adversarial review rounds; every confirmed finding is addressed here.
Not covered: the hourly SetBestChain/flush paths were reviewed, not exercised
(GetTimeMicros ignores mocktime); no run yet against a copy of a real large wallet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two independent fund-visibility bugs on the rescan path, both pre-existing.
1. AN INTERRUPTED RESCAN RECORDED ITSELF AS COMPLETE.
ScanForWalletTransactions returns a bare `int ret` (a found-tx count) on both its
abort and shutdown bail-outs, so the caller could not tell "finished" from
"stopped at block H". init.cpp then ran, unconditionally:
pwalletMain->ScanForWalletTransactions(pindexRescan, true);
pwalletMain->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator()); // TIP locator
An interrupted scan therefore stamped the wallet as scanned all the way to the
chain tip. On the next start, the `chainActive.Tip() != pindexRescan` guard just
above sees no work to do and skips the rescan entirely, so every transaction in
the never-scanned range stays out of mapWallet -- permanently invisible to
getbalance and unspendable. That is exactly the case `-rescan` exists for: a key
import, right after ClearNoteWitnessCache has run.
Adds CWallet::fLastRescanCompleted, set false at scan entry and true only on the
normal exit, and gates the init.cpp locator write on it. Deliberately NOT
overloading the int return, which callers already use as a tx count.
2. fAbortRescan WAS NEVER RESET.
wallet.h declares it, AbortRescan() sets it true, and nothing in src/ ever sets
it false. The abortrescan RPC is live. After one call, for the remaining lifetime
of the process:
- every ScanForWalletTransactions returns immediately, so re-running an import
silently no-ops while the RPC still reports success;
- BuildWitnessCache bails on the same flag on EVERY call, including the routine
per-block extension from ChainTip.
Witness heights then diverge across notes while the chain advances, and
GetSaplingNoteWitnesses elects the majority root as the anchor and returns
boost::none for every note that disagrees. Those notes still show in the balance
but cannot be spent. Cleared at scan entry and consumed in the abort branch.
Also in BuildWitnessCache's abort branch: stop clearing fRescanning. A witness
rebuild is not a rescan and must not touch a flag ScanForWalletTransactions owns.
3. Both bail-out log lines had two format specifiers and one argument:
LogPrintf("%s: Rescan aborted at block %d\n", pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
tinyformat's "too many conversion specifiers" guard is disabled in this tree
(tinyformat.h: `if(*fmt != '\0' && 0 ) // disabled due to complaints`), so this
does not throw -- verified by compiling the exact call against this tree's
tinyformat.h. It emits "3841207: Rescan aborted at block " with the height in the
__func__ slot, the real height dropped, and the trailing newline swallowed so the
next log line concatenates onto it. On the one path an operator has to diagnose
an interrupted rescan, the only record was corrupt. Fixed at both sites, and the
state updates moved above the log call.
4. Makes SetBestChainINTERNAL report whether the atomic write committed, so a
checkpointing caller can tell (six failure paths returned void). Adds
SetBestChainNoFlush, which opens the wallet DB with fFlushOnClose=false: the
default ctor makes ~CDB run a full BDB txn_checkpoint over the whole cache, which
is fine hourly but not from inside a scan -- the same flush wallet.cpp already
documents avoiding elsewhere "for performance reasons". Nothing calls it yet.
5. SetBestChainINTERNAL took each CWalletTx by value, deep-copying every note's
witness deque (WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE entries) per transaction per call, purely to
serialize it. Now by const reference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
A wallet.dat repaired by v1.0.3-or-earlier -salvagewallet could not be opened by
this build at all. Those builds' IsKeyType has no "hdchain" case, so salvage
dropped the record; LoadWallet then returned DB_CORRUPT and told the user to
restore from a seed phrase. There is no such recovery path: the node aborts
before the RPC server exists, -usemnemonic defaulted to 0 in v1.0.3 so many of
these wallets never had a phrase, and SetHDSeedFromMnemonic refuses a non-empty
wallet, so "move wallet.dat aside" discards every non-HD key salvage preserved.
The guard itself was right to refuse to DERIVE -- a missing hdchain falls back to
SetNull defaults, clearing fMnemonicSeed and switching derivation from the
64-byte BIP39 seed to the raw 32-byte entropy, an entirely different key tree.
It was wrong to refuse to OPEN. Split the two:
- "hdchain" record ABSENT (the salvage signature, tracked by a new
wss.fHDChainSeen set before any parse attempt) -> open DEGRADED.
- "hdchain" record PRESENT but unreadable -> still DB_CORRUPT; that signals
wider file damage.
Degraded means the wallet spends, receives and rescans normally but refuses to
derive any new HD key. Gated at the single choke point GetHDSeedForDerivation
rather than at the two generators, so z_getnewaddress/sendmany/shieldcoinbase
raise a clean error and autoshield skips. hdChain.seedFp is deliberately left
null, which keeps IsHDTransparentEnabled false so getnewaddress falls back to the
legacy random-key path -- gating it instead would break TopUpKeyPool, change
addresses and block templates. -rescan is soft-set because an old salvage also
dropped defaultkey and bestblock, which would otherwise look like a first run and
skip the rescan, leaving a permanently zero balance.
NEW DETECTOR, covering strictly more damage than the guard beside it. A wallet
salvaged by v1.0.3 and then USED on v1.0.3 persists a SetNull-derived hdchain
carrying seedFp=null. On this build fHDChainRead is then true, the guard never
fires, the node starts perfectly clean -- and derives into the wrong key tree
forever, silently. That state is unforgeable by any legitimate writer, since
InstallHDSeed always stores seedFp = seed.Fingerprint(), so compare the loaded
chain's seedFp against the fingerprint taken from the hdseed/chdseed record KEY
(which works while an encrypted wallet is locked) and degrade on mismatch.
Also:
- init.cpp: abort in the DB_CORRUPT branch itself, as DB_NEED_REWRITE already
does. Falling through ran several hundred more lines against a wallet just
declared corrupt, including SetHDSeedOrigin(), which WRITES to it. Error text
no longer advises -mnemonic (wrong twice over, see above).
- rpcdump.cpp: z_exportwallet discarded GetHDSeedForDerivation's return and
emitted the line regardless, so a failure wrote a blank seed next to a
legitimate-looking BLAKE2b-of-empty fingerprint -- a backup that looks valid
and restores nothing.
- Corrected the guard's comment: the saplingAccountCounter half was overstated.
Both generators loop while(Have...Key(...)), so a low counter walks forward
past existing accounts rather than colliding with them.
qa/r4-salvaged-wallet-harness.sh builds the victim wallets with the on-disk
v1.0.1 release binary and asserts the behaviour end to end. It REFUSES to run
outside a network namespace and re-checks getconnectioncount==0, because those
old binaries predate the regtest seed-injection fix and would otherwise dial the
live network. 11/11 pass:
C healthy wallet opens and is NOT flagged (no false positives)
A salvaged wallet opens, flagged, persists no hdchain, z_getnewaddress refused,
getnewaddress still works, z_exportwallet emits no bogus HDSeed line
B poisoned wallet opens and the seedFp detector fires
Note the harness asserts "no hdchain synthesised", NOT "wallet.dat unchanged":
a control run showed normal startup rewrites wallet.dat for healthy wallets too.
This is the access/detection half. Proving fMnemonicSeed by re-deriving against
held keys, and repairing the record, is deliberately left out: it requires a
write, and the affected population is unmeasured. dev's own salvage already
preserves hdchain, so the class is closed going forward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
Second phase of the code-hygiene remediation, covering the items the
DragonX team introduced or the rebrand missed. No consensus behavior
changes; validated on a local self-mining node.
Log cruft:
- chainparams: route the startup ">>>>>>>>>>" banner and the port line
through LogPrintf/LogPrint("net") instead of fprintf(stderr).
- pow: drop the fprintf(stderr) hash-mismatch dump that duplicated the
LogPrintf copy verbatim.
- miner: gate the RandomXDatasetManager per-alloc/per-VM address dumps and
MemDiag /proc reads behind LogPrint("randomx"); keep a one-line
"allocated shared dataset (N GB)" summary at default verbosity.
Named constants (single source of truth in wallet.h):
- DEFAULT_AUTOSHIELD_FEE/INTERVAL, MIN_AUTOSHIELD_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_AUTOSHIELD_MIN_UTXOS, AUTOSHIELD_MIN/MAX_FEE for the autoshield
option parsing and help text (were bare 10000/25/5 literals repeated
across init.cpp and wallet.h).
- AUTO_OP_TARGET_HEIGHT_OFFSET replaces the three copy-pasted
`blockHeight + 5` async-op scheduling offsets.
- AUTO_OP_EXPIRY_DELTA replaces the three per-file *_EXPIRY_DELTA=15
constants (sweep/consolidation/autoshield) with one shared value.
- Move DEFAULT_AUTOSHIELD_FEE out of the op header into wallet.h so it no
longer collides when both headers are included.
Error surfacing:
- init: report clamped/out-of-range -autoshieldinterval/-autoshieldfee via
InitWarning() (surfaces to GUI/log) instead of fprintf(stderr).
Rebrand / dead foreign-chain code (approved removals):
- server: drop the HUSH3 special-cases in stop() and HelpExampleCli; the
cli example now shows "dragonx-cli" instead of "hush-cli".
- getinfo (misc): remove the stale dPoW notarization block (notarized,
prevMoMheight, notarizedhash, notarizedtxid, notarizedtxid_height,
HUSHnotarized_height, notarized_confirms) — DragonX is a private chain
from genesis with no active dPoW. Also fixes the hardcoded "HUSH3" that
made getinfo query a foreign chain's notarization.
- delete the dead Komodo notary RPCs getera/getdragonjson/
getnotarysendmany/geterablockheights (getera returned 0;
getnotarysendmany was marked "this is broke") and their registrations.
- remove the dead ASSETCHAINS_EQUIHASH reporting branches in getinfo and
getmininginfo — DragonX is RandomX-only.
chainparams: document why the upstream Equihash params and the literal
Bitcoin genesis are retained under RandomX (do not "fix" them).
Deferred: the hdSeedOrigin int->string switch in z_autoshieldstatus
(no shared helper exists to reuse; low value).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up nits surfaced by the multi-agent review of the dragonx..dev delta;
none are correctness/consensus bugs, all are defensive/consistency tidy-ups.
Builds clean; the diff was reviewed across concurrency, scheduler, and
tx-building lenses.
- wallet: default CWallet::fAutoShieldEnabled to false. init.cpp always
recomputes it (ON only for CREATED/RESTORED seed provenance) before any
ChainTip round, so this is behaviour-neutral in the normal path and stops a
CWallet that skips that init from auto-enabling for provenance the gate would
reject.
- wallet: clamp a loaded hdSeedOrigin to UNKNOWN when out of enum range, so a
corrupt/hand-edited wallet.dat cannot claim a known-recoverable seed and flip
autoshield ON.
- wallet: key the sweep and consolidation ops' NU-straddle guard, transaction
builder height, and expiry off execution-time tipHeight instead of the stale
enqueue-time targetHeight_ -- matching the autoshield op (65130c312) so the
builder's consensus-branch selection agrees with the height the tx is signed
for. (Sweep previously built at targetHeight_ but expired at the live tip.)
- wallet: on the sweep NU-straddle skip, set sweepComplete_ so the round backs
nextSweep off one interval instead of re-dispatching a fresh sweep op every
block through the activation window.
- init: clamp -autoshieldinterval below 5 up to the documented minimum of 5,
rather than silently resetting it to the default 25.
- chainparams: make the ClearSeeds guard an exact "DRAGONX" match instead of a
7-char prefix, so DRAGONX-prefixed assetchains (e.g. DRAGONX2) no longer
inherit DragonX's seeds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UtvyqQQSqR64DNEjUEuTmb
Wires the key store secret to the database records: load and store paths on
CWallet, the two ReadKeyValue arms, and the export path.
GetMnemonicPhrase now prefers the entropy record and verifies it before printing:
a phrase is only returned if expanding it reproduces the seed derivation actually
uses. It falls back to the existing fMnemonicSeed path, so wallets that store the
entropy AS the seed keep working unchanged.
IsMnemonicSeed() now means "a phrase is available" rather than "the seed is the
entropy", which is what every caller actually wants.
Still a no-op on every existing wallet: nothing creates an entropy record yet, so
GetMnemonicEntropy returns false and the old code path is taken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Autoshield sends mined coinbase to a seed-derived z-address, so the records that
decide how the seed derives keys become fund-safety critical. Three of them were
not treated that way.
InstallHDSeed wrote the seed record before the chain record, non-transactionally.
A crash between the two left a wallet holding a seed with no hdchain: on the next
load hdChain silently reverts to defaults, clearing fMnemonicSeed -- which
switches the derivation input from the expanded BIP39 seed to the raw entropy --
and resetting saplingAccountCounter. Write the chain first; the opposite torn
state is harmless and self-heals, because HaveHDSeed() is then false and init
installs again.
The hdchain record was read as a bare deserialise inside a catch-all with strErr
never set, and it is not a key type, so a corrupt record was downgraded to a
non-critical error and the node booted into the wrong key tree. Report it, track
whether it was read, and refuse to load a wallet that holds a seed but no
readable hdchain. Also preserve hdchain through a keys-only salvage, which would
otherwise drop it and produce exactly the state we now refuse.
GenerateNewSeed silently fell back to a random seed when BIP39 generation failed,
producing a wallet that looks mnemonic-capable but whose words can never be
exported and which no seed phrase can restore. A user who asked for -usemnemonic
now gets that or a hard failure.
Finally, record how the seed came to exist -- created on an empty wallet,
restored from -mnemonic/-hdseed, retrofitted onto a pre-existing seedless wallet,
or predating this record. A retrofitted seed is in no backup the user already
holds, so a feature that moves funds into addresses only that seed can re-derive
must not enable itself there by default. Nothing consumes this yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The zaddr-sweep op cleared fSweepRunning/nextSweep only on the sweepComplete
success path (inside main_impl), so a cancelled or throwing sweep left
fSweepRunning stuck true. Since fSweepRunning now also gates consolidation and
the default-on autoshield, a persistently failing sweep (e.g. a corrupt-witness
note) would wedge all three background ops for the session.
Move the scheduler bookkeeping into main() so it runs on every terminal state
(success/failure/exception/cancel), guarded by op id. Preserve the intended
"keep draining every block until swept" model: on a successful-but-incomplete
round the flag stays set and nextSweep is not advanced; on completion OR on
failure/exception the flag is released and nextSweep backs off one interval, so
a failing sweep no longer retries every block or wedges the other ops.
Also fix RunSaplingSweep to take cs_wallet itself (was AssertLockHeld, a no-op
in release builds) since ChainTip does not hold it there and the driver mutates
scheduler state + enqueues -- matching RunSaplingConsolidation and
RunAutoShieldCoinbase.
sweepComplete is recorded via a new member; saplingSweepOperationId made public.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Sapling auto-consolidation scheduler never advanced nextConsolidation after
init and never set fConsolidationRunning, so once the tip passed the init
threshold `-consolidation` dispatched a consolidation op every block instead of
once per -consolidationinterval, and every guard that reads fConsolidationRunning
(in RunSaplingSweep, and in the new autoshield driver) was dead.
Mirror the intended scheduler model:
- RunSaplingConsolidation sets fConsolidationRunning=true before dispatch and
self-guards with `if (fConsolidationRunning) return;`.
- The consolidation op advances nextConsolidation = consolidationInterval +
tipHeight and clears fConsolidationRunning on every terminal state
(success/failure/exception/cancel), guarded by op id so only the current op
mutates scheduler state.
- saplingConsolidationOperationId moved to public so the op can read it.
Restores the documented once-per-interval cadence and makes the
sweep/consolidation/autoshield mutual-exclusion guards effective.
Note: the sweep op has the same latent wedge (fSweepRunning/nextSweep are
cleared only on the sweepComplete success path, so a cancelled or throwing
sweep leaves fSweepRunning stuck true) - left for a follow-up; this commit is
the template to port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On this ac_private=1 chain miners accumulate one transparent coinbase UTXO per
block (the only transparent output the chain permits). It had to be shielded
manually via z_shieldcoinbase, and left unshielded it is the sole persistent
metadata leak on the chain and the source of miner UTXO-fragmentation send
failures.
Add AsyncRPCOperation_autoshieldcoinbase: a periodic, default-on wallet op
driven from CWallet::ChainTip alongside sweep/consolidation, draining matured
coinbase into a wallet-owned Sapling z-address in size-bounded batches.
- Enqueue-only driver (RunAutoShieldCoinbase): takes only cs_wallet in the
notify context; all gathering runs on the async worker under LOCK2(cs_main,
cs_wallet).
- Dedicated op (not a reuse of z_shieldcoinbase) so it never toggles mining.
- Default-ON but conditional: silent no-op on -disablewallet, external
-mineraddress, non-mining, or locked wallets (explicit IsLocked() guard).
- Destination is reuse-then-create; -autoshieldaddress override is
spend-key-validated at init so funds cannot be stranded.
- Sweep-model bookkeeping: advances nextAutoShield and clears the running flag
on every terminal state; an op-id guard stops a stale op clobbering scheduler
state; a self-guard stops cancel/re-enqueue churn.
- Sietch-padded output shape matches manual z_shieldcoinbase txns.
Config: -autoshield (default true), -autoshieldinterval, -autoshieldaddress,
-autoshieldfee (range-validated), -autoshieldminutxos.
Incorporates fixes from an 8-angle code review: CAmount fee type with init-time
range validation, op-id-guarded flag bookkeeping, driver self-guard, and a
tipHeight-consistent NU-activation guard.
Note: the fConsolidationRunning / nextConsolidation consolidation-scheduler
wedge is a pre-existing bug, left for a separate change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Derive transparent (t-addr) keys from the HD seed and add BIP39 mnemonic seed
phrases that are byte-for-byte compatible with SilentDragonXLite, so the same
24 words recover the same shielded and transparent addresses in either wallet.
HD transparent keys:
- Derive t-keys from the seed at m/44'/coin'/0'/0/i (were random CKeys).
- CHDChain gains a version-gated transparent counter; existing wallets load
unchanged. GenerateNewKey routes through DeriveNewChildKey when enabled
(-hdtransparent, default on).
- Restore from a seed hex via -hdseed with gap-limit pre-derivation; birthday
pinned to genesis so the rescan is not clipped.
BIP39 seed phrases:
- Wire the vendored trezor BIP39 lib (src/crypto/bip39) into the build, fix its
BIP39_WORDS guard, and disable the insecure mnemonic cache.
- Match SDXLite exactly: English wordlist, empty passphrase, PBKDF2 64-byte
seed, coin type 141, ZIP-32 m/32'/141'/i' and BIP44 m/44'/141'/0'/0/i. Store
the 32-byte entropy and expand to the 64-byte seed on demand.
- Restore via -mnemonic, create via -usemnemonic, reveal via z_exportmnemonic.
Verified by gtests including a known-answer BIP39 seed vector and z/t address
derivation checks (src/gtest/test_hdtransparent.cpp, test_mnemonic_compat.cpp).
Docs in doc/hd-transparent-keys.md and doc/seed-phrase.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wallets upgraded across the 1.0.1->1.0.2 network transition could end up
with note witnesses stuck at a stale height, causing z_sendmany /
z_mergetoaddress to fail to build a valid spend. Root cause was a trio of
issues that let a desynced witnessHeight perpetuate instead of self-healing:
- DecrementNoteWitnesses left witnessRootValidated and the witness deque in
an asymmetric state on the size<=1 path.
- VerifyAndSetInitialWitness blindly trusted witnessHeight instead of
validating the cached root against the chain, so a bad height survived.
- UpdatedNoteData copied witnessHeight even when no witnesses were present.
- witnessRootValidated was uninitialized and never serialized, so a garbage
true value could short-circuit the self-heal.
Fixes:
- Default witnessRootValidated to false (in-memory only; never serialized).
- VerifyAndSetInitialWitness now validates the cached witness root against
the block's hashFinalSaplingRoot and reseeds on mismatch.
- Symmetric reset of witness state in DecrementNoteWitnesses.
- Guard the witnessHeight copy in UpdatedNoteData behind a non-empty
witnesses check.
- Defensive majority-root guard in GetSaplingNoteWitnesses.
Also rewrites BuildWitnessCache to rebuild the witness cache in parallel
(per-block commitment extraction + worker pool), cutting a full repair from
~28 min to ~2 min. Tunable via -witnessbuildthreads and -witnessfastrebuild;
output verified byte-identical to the serial path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Any projects which want to use Hush code from now on will need to be licensed as
GPLv3 or we will send the lawyers: https://www.softwarefreedom.org/
Notably, Komodo (KMD) is licensed as GPLv2 and is no longer compatible to receive
code changes, without causing legal issues. MIT projects, such as Zcash, also cannot pull
in changes from the Hush Full Node without permission from The Hush Developers,
which may in some circumstances grant an MIT license on a case-by-case basis.
DanSandClaude Opus 5.5