fix(net): cap per-peer headers during IBD (header-flood DoS)

Audit #8. The HEADERS handler accepted unbounded headers per peer with no
cumulative cap; during IBD (fCheckPOW=0) a peer could flood cost-free PoW-less
headers into mapBlockIndex/leveldb (never selected -- nMinimumChainWork gates
that -- but still memory/disk growth). Add a per-peer nHeadersProcessed counter
in CNodeState; while IsInitialBlockDownload(), if one peer exceeds
2*max(pindexBestHeader height, checkpoint height) + 200000 headers,
Misbehaving(100) and drop it. The cap is ~2x the chain length, so honest sync
never approaches it; inert post-IBD (the RandomX header check handles forged
headers there).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/main.cpp

@@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ namespace {
         bool fBulkHeaderSeen;
         //! (server side) time (us) we last served a bulk stream to this peer, for flood throttling.
         int64_t nLastBulkServeTime;
+        //! (#8 IBD header-flood cap) cumulative headers this peer made us process while in IBD.
+        int64_t nHeadersProcessed;
 
         CNodeState() {
             fCurrentlyConnected = false;
@@ -348,6 +350,7 @@ namespace {
             nBulkHashStart.SetNull();
             fBulkHeaderSeen = false;
             nLastBulkServeTime = 0;
+            nHeadersProcessed = 0;
         }
     };
 
@@ -7888,6 +7891,27 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
             }
         }
 
+        // SECURITY (#8: IBD header-flood cap): bound how many headers a single peer can make us
+        // store while in IBD. Honest headers-first sync needs at most ~chain-length headers from a
+        // peer; one that floods far past 2x the known chain length is only trying to bloat
+        // mapBlockIndex/leveldb (such headers are never selected -- nMinimumChainWork gates that --
+        // but they still cost memory/disk). Cap per-peer and drop the peer. IBD-only: post-IBD the
+        // RandomX check in AcceptBlockHeader already makes forged headers fail RandomX and ban.
+        if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
+            CNodeState *hstate = State(pfrom->GetId());
+            if (hstate != NULL) {
+                hstate->nHeadersProcessed += (int64_t)nCount;
+                int knownH = std::max(pindexBestHeader ? (int)pindexBestHeader->GetHeight() : 0,
+                                      Checkpoints::GetTotalBlocksEstimate(chainparams.Checkpoints()));
+                int64_t headerCap = 2 * (int64_t)knownH + 200000;
+                if (hstate->nHeadersProcessed > headerCap) {
+                    Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100);
+                    return error("%s: peer=%d flooded %lld headers during IBD (cap %lld)", __func__,
+                                 pfrom->id, (long long)hstate->nHeadersProcessed, (long long)headerCap);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         if (pindexLast)
             UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), pindexLast->GetBlockHash());
 

src/pow.cpp

@@ -804,8 +804,20 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
 
     // Derive the key (shared helper) and serialize the input (identical bytes to the pool path).
     std::string rxKey = GetRandomXKey(height);
-    if (rxKey.empty())
-        return error("CheckRandomXSolution(): cannot derive RandomX key for height %d", height);
+    if (rxKey.empty()) {
+        // The RandomX key block (keyHeight = ((height-lag)/interval)*interval, looked up on the
+        // ACTIVE chain) is not yet connected. This happens ONLY at header-accept when headers run
+        // ahead of our connected block tip (the IBD tail / catch-up) -- block-connect always has it,
+        // since blocks connect in order and keyHeight <= height-lag < the connected tip. The header
+        // is NOT invalid; we simply cannot verify it YET. Defer to block-connect (which re-checks
+        // with the key present) rather than returning an error -- returning an error here makes
+        // CheckBlockHeader DoS(100)-ban the honest peer that sent a perfectly valid tip header we
+        // just can't check yet (observed live: a post-reindex node banned the whole fleet and stalled
+        // ~2000 blocks short of the tip). Flood protection is preserved for synced nodes (key present
+        // -> real RandomX check) and bounded during catch-up by the per-peer IBD header cap + nMinimumChainWork.
+        LogPrint("net", "CheckRandomXSolution: RandomX key block for height %d not yet connected; deferring verification to block-connect\n", height);
+        return true;
+    }
     std::vector<unsigned char> ssInput = GetRandomXInput(*pblock);
 
     char computedHash[RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE];