fix(consensus): reject Sprout JoinSplits (unverified proof + vpub_new inflation vector)

Sprout JoinSplit proofs/sigs/nullifiers/anchors are never verified (the verifier
arg to CheckTransaction is unused), yet vpub_new is counted as transparent
value-in -- a forged all-zero JoinSplit mints arbitrary value from nothing.
Reproduced on an isolated ac_private=1 chain: 500,000 minted into a z-addr,
accepted + mined + verifychain=true.

Reject any non-coinbase tx carrying a JoinSplit in ContextualCheckTransaction
(covers both mempool acceptance and ConnectBlock). DragonX is Sapling-only from
genesis with zero JoinSplits in its history (mainnet supply audit), so this is
inert on all legitimate traffic and never invalidates a historical block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitignore

@@ -175,3 +175,4 @@ src/dragonx-tx
 src/dragonxd.exe
 src/dragonx-cli.exe
 src/dragonx-tx.exe
+doc/relnotes/

AUTHORS

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+# The DragonX Developers
+
+Dan S https://git.dragonx.is/dan
+
 # The Hush Developers
 
 Duke Leto https://git.hush.is/duke https://github.com/leto

COPYING

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+Copyright (c) 2024-2026 The DragonX developers
 Copyright (c) 2018-2025 The Hush developers
 Copyright (c) 2009-2017 The Bitcoin Core developers
 Copyright (c) 2009-2018 Bitcoin Developers

LICENSE

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-                    GENERAL GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
                        Version 3, 29 June 2007
 
  Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <http://fsf.org/>
@@ -7,15 +7,15 @@
 
                             Preamble
 
-  The GENERAL General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
+  The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
 software and other kinds of works.
 
   The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
 to take away your freedom to share and change the works.  By contrast,
-the GENERAL General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
+the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
 share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
 software for all its users.  We, the Free Software Foundation, use the
-GENERAL General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
+GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
 any other work released this way by its authors.  You can apply it to
 your programs, too.
 
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ freedoms that you received.  You must make sure that they, too, receive
 or can get the source code.  And you must show them these terms so they
 know their rights.
 
-  Developers that use the GENERAL GPL protect your rights with two steps:
+  Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
 (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License
 giving you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify it.
 
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ modification follow.
 
   0. Definitions.
 
-  "This License" refers to version 3 of the GENERAL General Public License.
+  "This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License.
 
   "Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of
 works, such as semiconductor masks.
@@ -549,35 +549,35 @@ to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey
 the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this
 License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program.
 
-  13. Use with the GENERAL Affero General Public License.
+  13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.
 
   Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have
 permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed
-under version 3 of the GENERAL Affero General Public License into a single
+under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single
 combined work, and to convey the resulting work.  The terms of this
 License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work,
-but the special requirements of the GENERAL Affero General Public License,
+but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License,
 section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the
 combination as such.
 
   14. Revised Versions of this License.
 
   The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of
-the GENERAL General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will
+the GNU General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will
 be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
 address new problems or concerns.
 
   Each version is given a distinguishing version number.  If the
-Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GENERAL General
+Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General
 Public License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the
 option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered
 version or of any later version published by the Free Software
 Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version number of the
-GENERAL General Public License, you may choose any version ever published
+GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published
 by the Free Software Foundation.
 
   If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future
-versions of the GENERAL General Public License can be used, that proxy's
+versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's
 public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you
 to choose that version for the Program.
 

README.md

@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ the entire history of Hush transactions; depending on the speed of your
 computer and network connection, it will likely take a few hours at least, but
 some people report full nodes syncing in less than 1.5 hours.
 
+# Fastest way to sync (bootstrap)
+
+The quickest way to get a fully-synced node is the signed bootstrap snapshot, which
+installs a pre-built blockchain so you skip re-validating the whole chain from genesis:
+
+```sh
+# Stop dragonxd first if it is running, then:
+./util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh
+```
+
+The script preserves your `wallet.dat` and `DRAGONX.conf`, verifies the download's
+checksums and (once a release key is published) its cryptographic signature, then starts
+you near the chain tip. If you prefer to sync from the network instead, a larger
+`-dbcache` (e.g. `-dbcache=2048`) noticeably speeds up the initial block download.
+
 # Banned by GitHub
 
 In working on this release, Duke Leto was suspended from Github, which gave Hush developers
@@ -106,19 +121,32 @@ apt-get install -y gcc-7 g++-7 && \
 
 # Build on Mac
 
-```
+Install Xcode Command Line Tools and [Homebrew](https://brew.sh/), then install dependencies:
-sudo port update
+
-sudo port upgrade outdated
+```sh
-sudo port install qt5
+xcode-select --install
+brew install gcc autoconf automake pkgconf libtool cmake curl
+
+# Install Rust (needed for librustzcash on macOS Sequoia+)
+curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
+source "$HOME/.cargo/env"
 
 # clone git repo
 git clone https://git.hush.is/hush/hush3
 cd hush3
-# Build
+# Build (uses 3 build processes, you need 2GB of RAM for each)
-# This uses 3 build processes, you need 2GB of RAM for each. 
+# Make sure libtool gnubin and cargo are on PATH
+export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:/usr/local/opt/libtool/libexec/gnubin:$PATH"
 ./build.sh -j3
 ```
 
+For a release build:
+
+```sh
+export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:/usr/local/opt/libtool/libexec/gnubin:$PATH"
+./build.sh --mac-release -j$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)
+```
+
 # Installing Hush binaries
 
 1. [Download the release](https://git.hush.is/hush/hush3/releases) with a .deb file extension.

build.sh

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 set -eu -o pipefail
 
-VERSION="1.0.2"
+VERSION="1.0.3"
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 RELEASE_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/release"
 
@@ -80,8 +80,12 @@ package_release() {
     echo "Packaging release for $platform..."
     mkdir -p "$release_subdir"
     
-    # Copy bootstrap script
+    # Copy bootstrap script (platform-appropriate)
+    if [ "$platform" = "win64" ]; then
+        cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/util/bootstrap-dragonx.bat" "$release_subdir/"
+    else
         cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh" "$release_subdir/"
+    fi
     
     # Copy common files
     cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/contrib/asmap/asmap.dat" "$release_subdir/" 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -171,21 +175,21 @@ if [ $BUILD_LINUX_COMPAT -eq 1 ] || [ $BUILD_LINUX_RELEASE -eq 1 ] || [ $BUILD_W
     if [ $BUILD_LINUX_RELEASE -eq 1 ]; then
         echo "=== Building Linux release ==="
         clean_for_platform linux
-        ./util/build.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+        ./util/build.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
         package_release linux-amd64
     fi
     
     if [ $BUILD_WIN_RELEASE -eq 1 ]; then
         echo "=== Building Windows release ==="
         clean_for_platform windows
-        ./util/build-win.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+        ./util/build-win.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
         package_release win64
     fi
     
     if [ $BUILD_MAC_RELEASE -eq 1 ]; then
         echo "=== Building macOS release ==="
         clean_for_platform macos
-        ./util/build-mac.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+        ./util/build-mac.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
         package_release macos
     fi
     
@@ -197,11 +201,11 @@ fi
 
 # Standard build (auto-detect OS)
 if [[ "$OSTYPE" == "linux-gnu"* ]]; then
-    ./util/build.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+    ./util/build.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
 elif [[ "$OSTYPE" == "darwin"* ]]; then
-    ./util/build-mac.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+    ./util/build-mac.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
 elif [[ "$OSTYPE" == "msys"* ]]; then
-    ./util/build-win.sh --disable-tests "${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"
+    ./util/build-win.sh --disable-tests ${REMAINING_ARGS[@]+"${REMAINING_ARGS[@]}"}
 else
     echo "Unable to detect your OS. What are you using?"
 fi

configure.ac

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.60])
 define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR, 1)
 dnl Must be kept in sync with src/clientversion.h , ugh!
 define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR, 0)
-define(_CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION, 2)
+define(_CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION, 3)
 define(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD, 50)
 define(_ZC_BUILD_VAL, m4_if(m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 25), 1, m4_incr(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD), m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 50), 1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD - 24), m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD == 50), 1, , m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD - 50)))
 define(_CLIENT_VERSION_SUFFIX, m4_if(m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 25), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-beta$1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 50), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-rc$1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD == 50), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-$1)))

contrib/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
+dragonx (1.0.3) stable; urgency=medium
+
+  * IBD/sync speedups: parallel RandomX pre-verification, adaptive -dbcache, P2P download fixes
+  * Fix Sapling witness desync and parallelize witness cache rebuild
+  * Opt-in bulk block streaming (-bulkblocksync) for faster initial sync
+  * BIP39 seed phrases (SilentDragonXLite-compatible) and HD transparent keys
+  * Remove assumeutxo / UTXO-snapshot feature
+
+ -- DragonX <dan-s-dev@proton.me>  Tue, 07 Jul 2026 05:49:59 +0200
+
+dragonx (1.0.0) stable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Initial release of DragonX, forked from Hush Full Node
+  * Full legal-compliant rebrand: binaries, config, documentation
+  * RandomX proof-of-work, 36-second block time, fully shielded transactions
+  * New binary names: dragonxd, dragonx-cli, dragonx-tx
+
+ -- DragonX <dan-s-dev@proton.me>  Mon, 03 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000
+
 hush (3.10.5) stable; urgency=medium
 
   * DragonX is no longer supported by this codebase

contrib/debian/control

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-Source: hush
+Source: dragonx
 Section: utils
 Priority: optional
-Maintainer: Hush <myhushteam@gmail.com>
+Maintainer: DragonX <dan-s-dev@proton.me>
-Homepage: https://hush.is
+Homepage: https://dragonx.is
 Build-Depends: autoconf, automake, bsdmainutils, build-essential,
  cmake, curl, git, g++-multilib, libc6-dev, libsodium-dev,
  libtool, m4, ncurses-dev, pkg-config, python,
  unzip, wget, zlib1g-dev
-Vcs-Git: https://git.hush.is/hush/hush3.git
+Vcs-Git: https://git.dragonx.is/DragonX/dragonx.git
-Vcs-Browser: https://git.hush.is/hush/hush3
+Vcs-Browser: https://git.dragonx.is/DragonX/dragonx
 
-Package: hush
+Package: dragonx
 Architecture: amd64 arm64
 Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}
-Description: Cryptocoin full node for Hush
+Description: Privacy-focused cryptocurrency full node for DragonX
- Speak And Transact Freely with Hush, which inherits from Bitcoin Protocol and
+ DragonX is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency using RandomX proof-of-work.
- Zcash Protocol and is focused on private communications.
+ All transactions are shielded by default. Fork of the Hush Full Node.

contrib/debian/copyright

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 Files: *
-Copyright: 2016-2026, The Hush developers
+Copyright: 2024-2026, The DragonX developers
+ 2016-2026, The Hush developers
  2009-2016, Bitcoin Core developers
 License: GPLv3
-Comment: https://hush.is
+Comment: https://dragonx.is
 
 Files: depends/sources/libsodium-*.tar.gz
 Copyright: 2013-2016 Frank Denis

contrib/debian/dragonx.example

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DEBIAN/examples/DRAGONX.conf

contrib/debian/dragonx.install

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+usr/bin/dragonxd
+usr/bin/dragonx-cli
+usr/bin/dragonx-tx

contrib/debian/dragonx.manpages

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+DEBIAN/manpages/dragonx-cli.1
+DEBIAN/manpages/dragonx-tx.1
+DEBIAN/manpages/dragonxd.1

contrib/debian/examples/DRAGONX.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+## DRAGONX.conf configuration file. Lines beginning with # are comments.
+
+# Network-related settings:
+
+# Run a regression test network
+#regtest=0
+# Run a test node (which means you can mine with no peers)
+#testnode=1
+
+#set a custom client name/user agent
+#clientName=GoldenSandtrout
+
+# Rescan from block height
+#rescan=123
+
+# Connect via a SOCKS5 proxy
+#proxy=127.0.0.1:9050
+
+# Automatically create Tor hidden service
+#listenonion=1
+
+#Use separate SOCKS5 proxy to reach peers via Tor hidden services
+#onion=1.2.3.4:9050
+
+# Only connect to nodes in network <net> (ipv4, ipv6, onion or i2p)"));
+#onlynet=<net>
+
+#Tor control port to use if onion listening enabled
+#torcontrol=127.0.0.1:9051
+
+# Bind to given address and always listen on it. Use [host]:port notation for IPv6
+#bind=<addr>
+
+# Bind to given address and allowlist peers connecting to it. Use [host]:port notation for IPv6
+#allowbind=<addr>
+
+##############################################################
+##            Quick Primer on addnode vs connect            ##
+##  Let's say for instance you use addnode=4.2.2.4          ##
+##  addnode will connect you to and tell you about the      ##
+##    nodes connected to 4.2.2.4.  In addition it will tell ##
+##    the other nodes connected to it that you exist so     ##
+##    they can connect to you.                              ##
+##  connect will not do the above when you 'connect' to it. ##
+##    It will *only* connect you to 4.2.2.4 and no one else.##
+##                                                          ##
+##  So if you're behind a firewall, or have other problems  ##
+##  finding nodes, add some using 'addnode'.                ##
+##                                                          ##
+##  If you want to stay private, use 'connect' to only      ##
+##  connect to "trusted" nodes.                             ##
+##                                                          ##
+##  If you run multiple nodes on a LAN, there's no need for ##
+##  all of them to open lots of connections.  Instead       ##
+##  'connect' them all to one node that is port forwarded   ##
+##  and has lots of connections.                            ##
+##       Thanks goes to [Noodle] on Freenode.               ##
+##############################################################
+
+# Use as many addnode= settings as you like to connect to specific peers
+#addnode=69.164.218.197
+#addnode=10.0.0.2:8233
+
+# Alternatively use as many connect= settings as you like to connect ONLY to specific peers
+#connect=69.164.218.197
+#connect=10.0.0.1:8233
+
+# Listening mode, enabled by default except when 'connect' is being used
+#listen=1
+
+# Maximum number of inbound+outbound connections.
+#maxconnections=
+
+#
+# JSON-RPC options (for controlling a running dragonxd process)
+#
+
+# server=1 tells node to accept JSON-RPC commands (set as default if not specified)
+#server=1
+
+# Bind to given address to listen for JSON-RPC connections. Use [host]:port notation for IPv6.
+# This option can be specified multiple times (default: bind to all interfaces)
+#rpcbind=<addr>
+
+# You must set rpcuser and rpcpassword to secure the JSON-RPC api
+# These will automatically be created for you
+#rpcuser=user
+#rpcpassword=supersecretpassword
+
+# How many seconds node will wait for a complete RPC HTTP request.
+# after the HTTP connection is established. 
+#rpcclienttimeout=30
+
+# By default, only RPC connections from localhost are allowed.
+# Specify as many rpcallowip= settings as you like to allow connections from other hosts,
+# either as a single IPv4/IPv6 or with a subnet specification.
+
+# NOTE: opening up the RPC port to hosts outside your local trusted network is NOT RECOMMENDED,
+# because the rpcpassword is transmitted over the network unencrypted and also because anyone 
+# that can authenticate on the RPC port can steal your keys + take over the account running dragonxd
+
+#rpcallowip=10.1.1.34/255.255.255.0
+#rpcallowip=1.2.3.4/24
+#rpcallowip=2001:db8:85a3:0:0:8a2e:370:7334/96
+
+# Listen for RPC connections on this TCP port:
+#rpcport=1234
+
+# You can use dragonxd to send commands to dragonxd
+# running on another host using this option:
+#rpcconnect=127.0.0.1
+
+# Transaction Fee
+
+# Send transactions as zero-fee transactions if possible (default: 0)
+#sendfreetransactions=0
+
+# Create transactions that have enough fees (or priority) so they are likely to # begin confirmation within n blocks (default: 1).
+# This setting is overridden by the -paytxfee option.
+#txconfirmtarget=n
+
+# Miscellaneous options
+
+# Enable mining at startup
+#gen=1
+
+# Set the number of threads to be used for mining (-1 = all cores).
+#genproclimit=1
+
+# Specify a different Equihash solver (e.g. "tromp") to try to mine
+# faster when gen=1.
+#equihashsolver=default
+
+# Pre-generate this many public/private key pairs, so wallet backups will be valid for
+# both prior transactions and several dozen future transactions.
+#keypool=100
+
+# Pay an optional transaction fee every time you send a tx.  Transactions with fees
+# are more likely than free transactions to be included in generated blocks, so may
+# be validated sooner. This setting does not affect private transactions created with 
+# 'z_sendmany'.
+#paytxfee=0.00
+
+#Rewind the chain to specific block height. This is useful for creating snapshots at a given block height.
+#rewind=555
+
+#Stop the chain a specific block height. This is useful for creating snapshots at a given block height.
+#stopat=1000000
+
+#Set an address to use as change address for all transactions. This value must be set to a 33 byte pubkey. All mined coins will also be sent to this address.
+#pubkey=027dc7b5cfb5efca96674b45e9fda18df069d040b9fd9ff32c35df56005e330392
+
+# Disable clearnet (ipv4 and ipv6) connections to this node
+#clearnet=0
+
+# Disable ipv4
+#disableipv4=1
+# Disable ipv6
+#disableipv6=1
+
+# Enable transaction index
+#txindex=1
+# Enable address index
+#addressindex=1
+# Enable timestamp index
+#timestampindex=1
+# Enable spent index
+#spentindex=1
+
+# Enable shielded stats index
+#zindex=1
+
+# Attempt to salvage a corrupt wallet
+# salvagewallet=1
+
+# Mine all blocks to this address (not good for your privacy and not recommended!)
+# Disallowed if clearnet=0
+# mineraddress=XXX
+
+# Disable wallet
+#disablewallet=1
+
+# Allow mining to an address that is not in the current wallet
+#minetolocalwallet=0
+
+# Delete all wallet transactions
+#zapwallettxes=1
+
+# Enable sapling consolidation
+# consolidation=1
+
+# Enable stratum server
+# stratum=1
+
+# Run a command each time a new block is seen
+# %s in command is replaced by block hash
+#blocknotify=/my/awesome/script.sh %s
+
+# Run a command when wallet gets a new tx
+# %s in command is replaced with txid
+#walletnotify=/my/cool/script.sh %s
+
+# Run a command when tx expires
+# %s in command is replaced with txid
+#txexpirynotify=/my/elite/script.sh %s
+
+# Execute this commend to send a tx
+# %s is replaced with tx hex
+#txsend=/send/it.sh %s

contrib/init/dragonxd.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+description "Hush Daemon"
+
+start on runlevel [2345]
+stop on starting rc RUNLEVEL=[016]
+
+env HUSHD_BIN="/usr/bin/dragonxd"
+env HUSHD_USER="hush"
+env HUSHD_GROUP="hush"
+env HUSHD_PIDDIR="/var/run/dragonxd"
+# upstart can't handle variables constructed with other variables
+env HUSHD_PIDFILE="/var/run/dragonxd/dragonxd.pid"
+env HUSHD_CONFIGFILE="/etc/hush/hush.conf"
+env HUSHD_DATADIR="/var/lib/dragonxd"
+
+expect fork
+
+respawn
+respawn limit 5 120
+kill timeout 60
+
+pre-start script
+    # this will catch non-existent config files
+    # dragonxd will check and exit with this very warning, but it can do so
+    # long after forking, leaving upstart to think everything started fine.
+    # since this is a commonly encountered case on install, just check and
+    # warn here.
+    if ! grep -qs '^rpcpassword=' "$HUSHD_CONFIGFILE" ; then
+        echo "ERROR: You must set a secure rpcpassword to run dragonxd."
+        echo "The setting must appear in $HUSHD_CONFIGFILE"
+        echo
+        echo "This password is security critical to securing wallets "
+        echo "and must not be the same as the rpcuser setting."
+        echo "You can generate a suitable random password using the following"
+        echo "command from the shell:"
+        echo
+        echo "bash -c 'tr -dc a-zA-Z0-9 < /dev/urandom | head -c32 && echo'"
+        echo
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    mkdir -p "$HUSHD_PIDDIR"
+    chmod 0755 "$HUSHD_PIDDIR"
+    chown $HUSHD_USER:$HUSHD_GROUP "$HUSHD_PIDDIR"
+    chown $HUSHD_USER:$HUSHD_GROUP "$HUSHD_CONFIGFILE"
+    chmod 0660 "$HUSHD_CONFIGFILE"
+end script
+
+exec start-stop-daemon \
+    --start \
+    --pidfile "$HUSHD_PIDFILE" \
+    --chuid $HUSHD_USER:$HUSHD_GROUP \
+    --exec "$HUSHD_BIN" \
+    -- \
+    -pid="$HUSHD_PIDFILE" \
+    -conf="$HUSHD_CONFIGFILE" \
+    -datadir="$HUSHD_DATADIR" \
+    -disablewallet \
+    -daemon
+

contrib/init/dragonxd.init

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+#  dragonxd The hush core server.
+#
+#
+# chkconfig: 345 80 20
+# description: dragonxd
+# processname: dragonxd
+#
+
+# Source function library.
+. /etc/init.d/functions
+
+# you can override defaults in /etc/sysconfig/dragonxd, see below
+if [ -f /etc/sysconfig/dragonxd ]; then
+        . /etc/sysconfig/dragonxd
+fi
+
+RETVAL=0
+
+prog=dragonxd
+# you can override the lockfile via HUSHD_LOCKFILE in /etc/sysconfig/dragonxd
+lockfile=${HUSHD_LOCKFILE-/var/lock/subsys/dragonxd}
+
+# dragonxd defaults to /usr/bin/dragonxd, override with HUSHD_BIN
+dragonxd=${HUSHD_BIN-/usr/bin/dragonxd}
+
+# dragonxd opts default to -disablewallet, override with HUSHD_OPTS
+dragonxd_opts=${HUSHD_OPTS--disablewallet}
+
+start() {
+    echo -n $"Starting $prog: "
+    daemon $DAEMONOPTS $dragonxd $dragonxd_opts
+    RETVAL=$?
+    echo
+    [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch $lockfile
+    return $RETVAL
+}
+
+stop() {
+    echo -n $"Stopping $prog: "
+    killproc $prog
+    RETVAL=$?
+    echo
+    [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f $lockfile
+    return $RETVAL
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+    start)
+        start
+        ;;
+    stop)
+        stop
+        ;;
+    status)
+        status $prog
+        ;;
+    restart)
+        stop
+        start
+        ;;
+    *)
+        echo "Usage: service $prog {start|stop|status|restart}"
+        exit 1
+        ;;
+esac

contrib/init/dragonxd.openrc

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#!/sbin/runscript
+
+# backward compatibility for existing gentoo layout 
+#
+if [ -d "/var/lib/hush/.hush" ]; then
+	HUSHD_DEFAULT_DATADIR="/var/lib/hush/.hush"
+else
+	HUSHD_DEFAULT_DATADIR="/var/lib/dragonxd"
+fi
+
+HUSHD_CONFIGFILE=${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE:-/etc/hush/hush.conf}
+HUSHD_PIDDIR=${HUSHD_PIDDIR:-/var/run/dragonxd}
+HUSHD_PIDFILE=${HUSHD_PIDFILE:-${HUSHD_PIDDIR}/dragonxd.pid}
+HUSHD_DATADIR=${HUSHD_DATADIR:-${HUSHD_DEFAULT_DATADIR}}
+HUSHD_USER=${HUSHD_USER:-${HUSH_USER:-hush}}
+HUSHD_GROUP=${HUSHD_GROUP:-hush}
+HUSHD_BIN=${HUSHD_BIN:-/usr/bin/dragonxd}
+HUSHD_NICE=${HUSHD_NICE:-${NICELEVEL:-0}}
+HUSHD_OPTS="${HUSHD_OPTS:-${HUSH_OPTS}}"
+
+name="Hush Full Node Daemon"
+description="Hush cryptocurrency P2P network daemon"
+
+command="/usr/bin/dragonxd"
+command_args="-pid=\"${HUSHD_PIDFILE}\" \
+		-conf=\"${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE}\" \
+		-datadir=\"${HUSHD_DATADIR}\" \
+		-daemon \
+		${HUSHD_OPTS}"
+
+required_files="${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE}"
+start_stop_daemon_args="-u ${HUSHD_USER} \
+			-N ${HUSHD_NICE} -w 2000"
+pidfile="${HUSHD_PIDFILE}"
+
+# The retry schedule to use when stopping the daemon. Could be either
+# a timeout in seconds or multiple signal/timeout pairs (like
+# "SIGKILL/180 SIGTERM/300")
+retry="${HUSHD_SIGTERM_TIMEOUT}"
+
+depend() {
+	need localmount net
+}
+
+# verify
+# 1) that the datadir exists and is writable (or create it)
+# 2) that a directory for the pid exists and is writable
+# 3) ownership and permissions on the config file
+start_pre() {
+	checkpath \
+	-d \
+	--mode 0750 \
+	--owner "${HUSHD_USER}:${HUSHD_GROUP}" \
+	"${HUSHD_DATADIR}"
+
+	checkpath \
+	-d \
+	--mode 0755 \
+	--owner "${HUSHD_USER}:${HUSHD_GROUP}" \
+	"${HUSHD_PIDDIR}"
+
+	checkpath -f \
+	-o ${HUSHD_USER}:${HUSHD_GROUP} \
+	-m 0660 \
+	${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE}
+
+	checkconfig || return 1
+}
+
+checkconfig()
+{
+	if ! grep -qs '^rpcpassword=' "${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE}" ; then
+		eerror ""
+		eerror "ERROR: You must set a secure rpcpassword to run dragonxd."
+		eerror "The setting must appear in ${HUSHD_CONFIGFILE}"
+		eerror ""
+		eerror "This password is security critical to securing wallets "
+		eerror "and must not be the same as the rpcuser setting."
+		eerror "You can generate a suitable random password using the following"
+		eerror "command from the shell:"
+		eerror ""
+		eerror "bash -c 'tr -dc a-zA-Z0-9 < /dev/urandom | head -c32 && echo'"
+		eerror ""
+		eerror ""
+		return 1
+	fi
+}

contrib/init/dragonxd.openrcconf

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# /etc/conf.d/dragonxd: config file for /etc/init.d/dragonxd
+
+# Config file location
+#HUSHD_CONFIGFILE="/etc/hush/hush.conf"
+
+# What directory to write pidfile to?  (created and owned by $HUSHD_USER)
+#HUSHD_PIDDIR="/var/run/dragonxd"
+
+# What filename to give the pidfile
+#HUSHD_PIDFILE="${HUSHD_PIDDIR}/dragonxd.pid"
+
+# Where to write dragonxd data (be mindful that the blockchain is large)
+#HUSHD_DATADIR="/var/lib/dragonxd"
+
+# User and group to own dragonxd process
+#HUSHD_USER="hush"
+#HUSHD_GROUP="hush"
+
+# Path to dragonxd executable
+#HUSHD_BIN="/usr/bin/dragonxd"
+
+# Nice value to run dragonxd under
+#HUSHD_NICE=0
+
+# Additional options (avoid -conf and -datadir, use flags above)
+HUSHD_OPTS="-disablewallet"
+
+# The timeout in seconds OpenRC will wait for dragonxd to terminate
+# after a SIGTERM has been raised.
+# Note that this will be mapped as argument to start-stop-daemon's
+# '--retry' option, which means you can specify a retry schedule
+# here. For more information see man 8 start-stop-daemon.
+HUSHD_SIGTERM_TIMEOUT=60

contrib/init/dragonxd.service

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Hush: Speak And Transact Freely
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+User=hush
+Group=hush
+
+Type=forking
+PIDFile=/var/lib/dragonxd/dragonxd.pid
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/dragonxd -daemon -pid=/var/lib/dragonxd/dragonxd.pid \
+-conf=/etc/hush/hush.conf -datadir=/var/lib/dragonxd -disablewallet
+
+Restart=always
+PrivateTmp=true
+TimeoutStopSec=60s
+TimeoutStartSec=2s
+StartLimitInterval=120s
+StartLimitBurst=5
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

depends/builders/darwin.mk

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-build_darwin_CC = gcc-8
+build_darwin_CC = gcc-15
-build_darwin_CXX = g++-8
+build_darwin_CXX = g++-15
 build_darwin_AR: = $(shell xcrun -f ar)
 build_darwin_RANLIB: = $(shell xcrun -f ranlib)
 build_darwin_STRIP: = $(shell xcrun -f strip)
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ build_darwin_SHA256SUM = shasum -a 256
 build_darwin_DOWNLOAD = curl --connect-timeout $(DOWNLOAD_CONNECT_TIMEOUT) --retry $(DOWNLOAD_RETRIES) -L -f -o
 
 #darwin host on darwin builder. overrides darwin host preferences.
-darwin_CC= gcc-8
+darwin_CC= gcc-15
-darwin_CXX= g++-8
+darwin_CXX= g++-15
 darwin_AR:=$(shell xcrun -f ar)
 darwin_RANLIB:=$(shell xcrun -f ranlib)
 darwin_STRIP:=$(shell xcrun -f strip)

depends/hosts/darwin.mk

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ OSX_MIN_VERSION=10.12
 OSX_SDK_VERSION=10.12
 OSX_SDK=$(SDK_PATH)/MacOSX$(OSX_SDK_VERSION).sdk
 LD64_VERSION=253.9
-darwin_CC=gcc-8 -target $(host) -mmacosx-version-min=$(OSX_MIN_VERSION) --sysroot $(OSX_SDK) -mlinker-version=$(LD64_VERSION)
+darwin_CC=gcc-15 -target $(host) -mmacosx-version-min=$(OSX_MIN_VERSION) --sysroot $(OSX_SDK) -mlinker-version=$(LD64_VERSION)
-darwin_CXX=g++-8 -target $(host) -mmacosx-version-min=$(OSX_MIN_VERSION) --sysroot $(OSX_SDK) -mlinker-version=$(LD64_VERSION)
+darwin_CXX=g++-15 -target $(host) -mmacosx-version-min=$(OSX_MIN_VERSION) --sysroot $(OSX_SDK) -mlinker-version=$(LD64_VERSION)
 
 darwin_CFLAGS=-pipe
 darwin_CXXFLAGS=$(darwin_CFLAGS)

depends/packages/librustzcash.mk

@@ -40,9 +40,15 @@ define $(package)_preprocess_cmds
   cat $($(package)_patch_dir)/cargo.config | sed 's|CRATE_REGISTRY|$(host_prefix)/$(CRATE_REGISTRY)|' > .cargo/config
 endef
 
+ifeq ($(build_os),darwin)
+define $(package)_build_cmds
+  CARGO=$(HOME)/.cargo/bin/cargo RUSTC=$(HOME)/.cargo/bin/rustc $(HOME)/.cargo/bin/cargo build --package librustzcash $($(package)_build_opts)
+endef
+else
 define $(package)_build_cmds
   $(host_prefix)/native/bin/cargo build --package librustzcash $($(package)_build_opts)
 endef
+endif
 
 define $(package)_stage_cmds
   mkdir $($(package)_staging_dir)$(host_prefix)/lib/ && \

depends/strip-rlib-metadata.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Strip rust.metadata.bin from .rlib archives for macOS linker compatibility
+RLIB_DIR="$1"
+if [ -d "$RLIB_DIR" ]; then
+    for rlib in "$RLIB_DIR"/*.rlib; do
+        [ -f "$rlib" ] && ar d "$rlib" rust.metadata.bin 2>/dev/null || true
+    done
+fi

doc/beefy-DRAGONX.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+rpcuser=dontuseweakusernameoryougetrobbed
+rpcpassword=dontuseweakpasswordoryougetrobbed
+txindex=1
+server=1
+rpcworkqueue=64
+addnode=1.2.3.4
+addnode=5.6.7.8

doc/dragonxd-systemd.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Systemd script for the DragonX daemon
+
+## Set it up
+
+First set it up as follows:
+* Copy dragonxd.service to the systemd user directory, which is /usr/lib/systemd/user directory
+
+## Basic Usage
+
+How to start the script:
+`systemctl start --user dragonxd.service`
+
+How to stop the script:
+`systemctl stop --user dragonxd.service`
+
+How to restart the script:
+`systemctl restart --user dragonxd.service`
+
+## How to watch it as it starts
+
+Use the following on most Linux distros:
+`watch systemctl status --user dragonxd.service`
+
+Or watch the log directly:
+`tail -f ~/.hush/DRAGONX/debug.log`
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+* Don't run it with sudo or root, or it won't work with the wallet.

doc/dragonxd.service

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=DragonX daemon
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/dragonxd
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=default.target

doc/hd-transparent-keys.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# HD transparent keys
+
+DragonX derives **transparent** (t-address) keys deterministically from the
+wallet's HD seed, so they can be recovered from the seed alone — the same way
+Sapling (shielded) keys already are.
+
+## Derivation
+
+Transparent keys are derived over secp256k1 using BIP32/BIP44:
+
+```
+m / 44' / coin_type' / 0' / 0 / i
+```
+
+* `coin_type` is `Params().BIP44CoinType()` — **141** on mainnet, **1** on
+  test/regtest.
+* Account is fixed at `0'` and the chain at `0` (external). The internal/change
+  chain (`1`) is **not** used: on this `ac_private=1` chain a non-coinbase
+  transparent output is consensus-invalid, so transparent change can never carry
+  value.
+* `i` is `CHDChain.transparentChildCounter`, a monotonic index persisted in the
+  wallet so the same addresses regenerate after a seed-only restore.
+
+Each derived key records its `hdKeypath` and the seed fingerprint (`seedFp`) in
+its `CKeyMetadata`, matching the Sapling scheme.
+
+## Why this matters on a private chain
+
+On DragonX (`ac_private=1` from genesis) a normal user can never *receive* to a
+transparent address — inbound t-payments are rejected by consensus. The only
+thing that legitimately lands spendable value on a t-address is a **mining
+coinbase** (plus notary/burn special cases). There is no "coinbase must be
+shielded" rule, so mature coinbase is directly spendable.
+
+So HD transparent keys exist to let a **miner recover coinbase rewards** that
+were paid to wallet-derived t-addresses, using only the seed.
+
+## Enabling / disabling
+
+Controlled by `-hdtransparent` (default **on**). When on and the wallet has an
+HD seed, every newly generated transparent key (receive address, change,
+coinbase payout drawn from the keypool) is HD-derived.
+
+```
+-hdtransparent=0   # keep the legacy behaviour (random transparent keys)
+```
+
+## Backing up and restoring
+
+* **Back up the seed.** `z_exportwallet <file>` writes the 32-byte HD seed as a
+  `# HDSeed=<hex>` line. Guard this value like a private key.
+* **Restore into a fresh/empty wallet** by starting the node with:
+
+  ```
+  -hdseed=<64-hex-character seed>
+  -hdtransparentgaplimit=<n>   # HD transparent keys to pre-derive (default 1000)
+  ```
+
+  On restore the node injects the seed, pre-derives `n` transparent keys with a
+  genesis birthday, and the normal startup rescan finds any coinbase paid to
+  them. Raise `-hdtransparentgaplimit` if the wallet minted more than `n`
+  distinct coinbase addresses.
+
+  > **Warning:** passing `-hdseed` on the command line exposes the seed to your
+  > shell history and the process list. Prefer putting it in `DRAGONX.conf` with
+  > tight file permissions, and remove it after the restore completes.
+
+## Limitations (read before relying on recovery)
+
+* **Legacy random keys are not recoverable.** Any transparent key created before
+  this feature (or with `-hdtransparent=0`) came from the CSPRNG, not the seed,
+  and the phrase/seed will **not** regenerate it. Keep `wallet.dat` /
+  `dumpwallet` backups for those. A wallet that predates the feature and then
+  enables it becomes a *mix* of random (old) and HD (new) keys.
+* **Gap limit.** A rescan only discovers keys already present in the wallet.
+  Restore pre-derives `-hdtransparentgaplimit` keys; coinbase paid to an index
+  beyond that window is not found until you derive further and rescan again.
+* **Scope.** Recovers transparent **coinbase** value only, per the consensus
+  rules above. Shielded funds are recovered separately via the Sapling HD keys.
+
+## On-disk compatibility
+
+The transparent counter is stored in `CHDChain` under a new serialization
+version (`VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT = 2`). Existing v1 `wallet.dat` records load
+unchanged (the counter defaults to 0); the record is rewritten as v2 the first
+time an HD transparent key is derived. Downgrading a v2 wallet to an older
+binary is not supported.

doc/man/Makefile.am

@@ -1 +1 @@
-dist_man1_MANS=hushd.1 hush-cli.1 hush-tx.1
+dist_man1_MANS=dragonxd.1 dragonx-cli.1 dragonx-tx.1

doc/man/dragonx-cli.1

@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
-.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
+.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
-.TH HUSH-CLI "1" "March 2026" "hush-cli v3.10.5" "User Commands"
+.TH DRAGONX "1" "July 2026" "DragonX RPC client version v1.0.3-95aeaed0c-dirty" "User Commands"
 .SH NAME
-hush-cli \- manual page for hush-cli v3.10.5
+DragonX \- manual page for DragonX RPC client version v1.0.3-95aeaed0c-dirty
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-Hush RPC client version v3.10.5\-04916cdf5
+DragonX RPC client version v1.0.3\-95aeaed0c\-dirty
 .PP
-In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Hush,
+In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using
-please see <https://hush.is/security/>.
+DragonX, please see <https://dragonx.is/security/>.
 .SS "Usage:"
 .TP
-hush\-cli [options] <command> [params]
+dragonx\-cli [options] <command> [params]
-Send command to Hush
+Send command to DragonX
 .TP
-hush\-cli [options] help
+dragonx\-cli [options] help
 List commands
 .TP
-hush\-cli [options] help <command>
+dragonx\-cli [options] help <command>
 Get help for a command
 .SH OPTIONS
 .HP
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ This help message
 .HP
 \fB\-conf=\fR<file>
 .IP
-Specify configuration file (default: HUSH3.conf)
+Specify configuration file (default: DRAGONX.conf)
 .HP
 \fB\-datadir=\fR<dir>
 .IP
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Send commands to node running on <ip> (default: 127.0.0.1)
 .HP
 \fB\-rpcport=\fR<port>
 .IP
-Connect to JSON\-RPC on <port> (default: 18030 )
+Connect to JSON\-RPC on <port> (default: 21769 )
 .HP
 \fB\-rpcwait\fR
 .IP
@@ -70,20 +70,25 @@ Timeout in seconds during HTTP requests, or 0 for no timeout. (default:
 .IP
 Read extra arguments from standard input, one per line until EOF/Ctrl\-D
 (recommended for sensitive information such as passphrases)
+.PP
+In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using
+DragonX, please see <https://dragonx.is/security/>.
 .SH COPYRIGHT
-
+Copyright \(co 2024\-2026 The DragonX Developers
-In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Hush,
+.PP
-please see <https://hush.is/security/>.
+.br
-
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2024 Duke Leto and The Hush Developers
-Copyright (C) 2016-2026 Duke Leto and The Hush Developers
+.PP
-
+.br
-Copyright (C) 2016-2020 jl777 and SuperNET developers
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2020 jl777 and SuperNET developers
-
+.PP
-Copyright (C) 2016-2018 The Zcash developers
+.br
-
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2018 The Zcash developers
-Copyright (C) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
+.PP
-
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2009\-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
+.PP
 This is experimental Free Software! Fuck Yeah!!!!!
-
+.PP
 Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying file COPYING
-or <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html>.
+or <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl\-3.0.en.html>.

doc/man/dragonx-tx.1

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
+.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
-.TH HUSH-TX "1" "March 2026" "hush-tx v3.10.5" "User Commands"
+.TH DRAGONX-TX "1" "July 2026" "dragonx-tx v1.0.3-4caf2fc68" "User Commands"
 .SH NAME
-hush-tx \- manual page for hush-tx v3.10.5
+dragonx-tx \- DragonX transaction utility
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-hush\-tx utility version v3.10.5\-04916cdf5
+hush\-tx utility version v1.0.3\-4caf2fc68
 .SS "Usage:"
 .TP
 hush\-tx [options] <hex\-tx> [commands]
@@ -84,20 +84,3 @@ Load JSON file FILENAME into register NAME
 set=NAME:JSON\-STRING
 .IP
 Set register NAME to given JSON\-STRING
-.SH COPYRIGHT
-
-In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Hush,
-please see <https://hush.is/security/>.
-
-Copyright (C) 2016-2026 Duke Leto and The Hush Developers
-
-Copyright (C) 2016-2020 jl777 and SuperNET developers
-
-Copyright (C) 2016-2018 The Zcash developers
-
-Copyright (C) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
-
-This is experimental Free Software! Fuck Yeah!!!!!
-
-Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying file COPYING
-or <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html>.

doc/man/dragonxd.1

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
+.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE!  It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
-.TH HUSHD "1" "March 2026" "hushd v3.10.5" "User Commands"
+.TH DRAGONX "1" "July 2026" "DragonX Daemon version v1.0.3-4caf2fc68" "User Commands"
 .SH NAME
-hushd \- manual page for hushd v3.10.5
+DragonX \- manual page for DragonX Daemon version v1.0.3-4caf2fc68
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-Hush Daemon version v3.10.5\-04916cdf5
+DragonX Daemon version v1.0.3\-4caf2fc68
 .PP
-In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Hush,
+In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using
-please see <https://hush.is/security/>.
+DragonX, please see <https://dragonx.is/security/>.
 .SS "Usage:"
 .TP
-hushd [options]
+dragonxd [options]
-Start a Hush Daemon
+Start DragonX Daemon
 .SH OPTIONS
 .HP
 \-?
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ How thorough the block verification of \fB\-checkblocks\fR is (0\-4, default: 3)
 .HP
 \fB\-clientname=\fR<SomeName>
 .IP
-Full node client name, default 'GoldenSandtrout'
+Full node client name, default 'DragonX'
 .HP
 \fB\-conf=\fR<file>
 .IP
-Specify configuration file (default: HUSH3.conf)
+Specify configuration file (default: DRAGONX.conf)
 .HP
 \fB\-daemon\fR
 .IP
@@ -52,7 +52,11 @@ Specify directory to be used when exporting data
 .HP
 \fB\-dbcache=\fR<n>
 .IP
-Set database cache size in megabytes (4 to 16384, default: 512)
+Set database cache size in megabytes (4 to 16384). Default: adaptive \-
+uses most free RAM to speed up initial block download (far fewer
+UTXO flushes to disk) and automatically shrinks if other
+applications need memory, always leaving a reserve free. Setting
+a fixed value disables adaptive sizing.
 .HP
 \fB\-loadblock=\fR<file>
 .IP
@@ -78,9 +82,15 @@ applied)
 .HP
 \fB\-par=\fR<n>
 .IP
-Set the number of script verification threads (\fB\-32\fR to 16, 0 = auto, <0 =
+Set the number of script verification threads (\fB\-4\fR to 16, 0 = auto, <0 =
 leave that many cores free, default: 0)
 .HP
+\fB\-randomxverifythreads=\fR<n>
+.IP
+Number of threads for parallel RandomX PoW pre\-verification of
+post\-checkpoint blocks during sync (0 = inline only, max 16,
+default: same as \fB\-par\fR)
+.HP
 \fB\-pid=\fR<file>
 .IP
 Specify pid file (default: hushd.pid)
@@ -337,6 +347,40 @@ Do not load the wallet and disable wallet RPC calls
 .IP
 Set key pool size to <n> (default: 100)
 .HP
+\fB\-hdtransparent\fR
+.IP
+Derive transparent addresses from the HD seed so they can be recovered
+from it (default: 1)
+.HP
+\fB\-hdseed=\fR<hex>
+.IP
+Restore a fresh/empty wallet from a 32\- or 64\-byte HD seed hex (the
+value shown in z_exportwallet's '# HDSeed=' line). WARNING:
+exposes the seed to your shell history and process list.
+.HP
+\fB\-mnemonic=\fR<words>
+.IP
+Restore/create a fresh/empty wallet from a BIP39 seed phrase, compatible
+with SilentDragonXLite (English, no passphrase). WARNING: exposes
+the phrase to your shell history and process list; prefer
+DRAGONX.conf with tight permissions.
+.HP
+\fB\-usemnemonic\fR
+.IP
+Create new wallets from a fresh BIP39 seed phrase so the 24 words can be
+exported (z_exportmnemonic) and used in SilentDragonXLite
+(default: 0)
+.HP
+\fB\-hdtransparentgaplimit=\fR<n>
+.IP
+On \fB\-mnemonic\fR/\-hdseed restore, pre\-derive this many HD transparent keys
+so a rescan can find coinbase paid to them (default: 1000)
+.HP
+\fB\-mnemonicsaplinggap=\fR<n>
+.IP
+On \fB\-mnemonic\fR/\-hdseed restore, pre\-derive this many shielded (Sapling)
+addresses so a rescan can find notes sent to them (default: 100)
+.HP
 \fB\-consolidation\fR
 .IP
 Enable auto Sapling note consolidation (default: false)
@@ -649,8 +693,8 @@ multiple times (default: bind to all interfaces)
 .HP
 \fB\-stratumport=\fR<port>
 .IP
-Listen for Stratum work requests on <port> (default: 19031 or testnet:
+Listen for Stratum work requests on <port> (default: 22769 or testnet:
-19031)
+22769)
 .HP
 \fB\-stratumallowip=\fR<ip>
 .IP
@@ -659,7 +703,7 @@ single IP (e.g. 1.2.3.4), a network/netmask (e.g.
 1.2.3.4/255.255.255.0) or a network/CIDR (e.g. 1.2.3.4/24). This
 option can be specified multiple times
 .PP
-Hush Arrakis Chain options:
+DragonX Chain options:
 .HP
 \fB\-ac_algo\fR
 .IP
@@ -760,20 +804,25 @@ Starting supply, default is 10
 \fB\-ac_txpow\fR
 .IP
 Enforce transaction\-rate limit, default 0
+.PP
+In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using
+DragonX, please see <https://dragonx.is/security/>.
 .SH COPYRIGHT
-
+Copyright \(co 2024\-2026 The DragonX Developers
-In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Hush,
+.PP
-please see <https://hush.is/security/>.
+.br
-
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2024 Duke Leto and The Hush Developers
-Copyright (C) 2016-2026 Duke Leto and The Hush Developers
+.PP
-
+.br
-Copyright (C) 2016-2020 jl777 and SuperNET developers
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2020 jl777 and SuperNET developers
-
+.PP
-Copyright (C) 2016-2018 The Zcash developers
+.br
-
+Copyright \(co 2016\-2018 The Zcash developers
-Copyright (C) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
+.PP
-
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2009\-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers
+.PP
 This is experimental Free Software! Fuck Yeah!!!!!
-
+.PP
 Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying file COPYING
-or <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html>.
+or <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl\-3.0.en.html>.

doc/seed-phrase.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# BIP39 seed phrases (SilentDragonXLite-compatible)
+
+DragonX full-node wallets can be created from and restored to a **BIP39 24-word
+seed phrase** that is **byte-for-byte compatible with SilentDragonXLite**: the
+same words produce the same transparent (t-) and shielded (z-) addresses in
+either wallet, so funds move between the light wallet and the full node with one
+backup.
+
+## What makes them compatible
+
+Compatibility requires the mnemonic, the seed derivation, and every HD path to
+match exactly. They do:
+
+| Detail | Value (both wallets) |
+|---|---|
+| Word list | BIP39 English, 2048 words |
+| Passphrase | empty (no "25th word") |
+| Mnemonic → seed | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 2048 rounds, salt `"mnemonic"`, 64-byte output |
+| Coin type | 141 (KMD SLIP-0044) |
+| Shielded path | `m/32'/141'/i'` (ZIP-32) |
+| Transparent path | `m/44'/141'/0'/0/i` (BIP44) |
+
+The node stores the 32-byte BIP39 **entropy** (SilentDragonXLite's on-disk
+convention) and expands it to the 64-byte seed on demand for derivation. The
+node's vendored BIP39 library (`src/crypto/bip39`) is byte-identical to
+SilentDragonXLite's `tiny-bip39` 0.6.2, and the derivation is anchored by a
+known-answer test (`src/gtest/test_mnemonic_compat.cpp`).
+
+## Restore from a phrase
+
+Start the node once, on a **fresh/empty datadir**, with the phrase:
+
+```
+dragonxd -mnemonic="word1 word2 ... word24"
+```
+
+or, preferably (keeps the phrase out of your shell history and process list),
+put it in `DRAGONX.conf` with tight permissions:
+
+```
+mnemonic=word1 word2 ... word24
+```
+
+On restore the node pre-derives keys and rescans from genesis to recover funds:
+
+* `-hdtransparentgaplimit=<n>` — HD transparent keys to pre-derive (default 1000)
+* `-mnemonicsaplinggap=<n>` — shielded addresses to pre-derive (default 100)
+
+Raise these if the wallet used many addresses. Restore only works on a wallet
+with no seed yet (a brand-new datadir); it refuses to overwrite an existing seed.
+
+## Create a new phrase on the node
+
+By default new node wallets use a random (non-mnemonic) seed. To create a new
+wallet from a fresh 24-word phrase instead — so you can export it and use it in
+SilentDragonXLite — start with:
+
+```
+dragonxd -usemnemonic
+```
+
+## Show / back up the phrase
+
+For a mnemonic wallet (created with `-usemnemonic` or restored with `-mnemonic`):
+
+```
+dragonx-cli z_exportmnemonic
+```
+
+returns the 24 words and the seed fingerprint. The wallet must be unlocked.
+Guard the phrase like a private key.
+
+## Limitations
+
+* **English + empty passphrase only.** Any other word list or a BIP39 passphrase
+  would break compatibility, so they are not accepted.
+* **Legacy / random-seed wallets have no phrase.** A wallet created before this
+  feature (or without `-usemnemonic`) has a random seed; `z_exportmnemonic`
+  returns an error for it — use `z_exportwallet` to back up the raw seed. Such
+  wallets are not SilentDragonXLite-compatible.
+* **Scope.** Recovers HD-derived shielded funds and transparent coinbase (see
+  [hd-transparent-keys.md](hd-transparent-keys.md) for why only coinbase lands on
+  t-addresses on this `ac_private=1` chain). Keys imported with `z_importkey` are
+  not seed-derived and are not recovered by the phrase.
+
+## On-disk compatibility
+
+Mnemonic wallets set `CHDChain` version 3 (`VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC`). Older wallet
+records load unchanged. Downgrading a mnemonic wallet to an older binary is not
+supported.

src/Makefile.am

@@ -39,15 +39,22 @@ BITCOIN_INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/univalue/include
 BITCOIN_INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/leveldb/include
 
 if TARGET_WINDOWS
-LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a -lcurl
+LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a
 endif
 if TARGET_DARWIN
-LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a -lcurl
+LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a
 endif
 if TARGET_LINUX
-LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a -lcurl
+LIBBITCOIN_SERVER=libbitcoin_server.a
 endif
 
+# libcurl is a linker flag, not a buildable library file. It must NOT live inside
+# LIBBITCOIN_SERVER, which is also fed into EXTRA_LIBRARIES (a list of files automake
+# builds) where a -l flag is illegal and triggers a portability error. Keep it as its
+# own variable, added to each binary's _LDADD after libbitcoin_server.a (whose objects
+# reference curl symbols) so static link order stays correct.
+LIBCURL = -lcurl
+
 LIBBITCOIN_WALLET=libbitcoin_wallet.a
 LIBBITCOIN_COMMON=libbitcoin_common.a
 LIBBITCOIN_CLI=libbitcoin_cli.a
@@ -318,6 +325,7 @@ libbitcoin_wallet_a_SOURCES = \
   wallet/asyncrpcoperation_shieldcoinbase.cpp \
   wallet/crypter.cpp \
   wallet/db.cpp \
+  wallet/mnemonic.cpp \
   zcash/Note.cpp \
   transaction_builder.cpp \
   wallet/rpcdump.cpp \
@@ -354,6 +362,23 @@ crypto_libbitcoin_crypto_a_SOURCES = \
   crypto/sha512.cpp \
   crypto/sha512.h
 
+# Vendored trezor-crypto BIP39 (mnemonic seed phrases). Kept self-contained so
+# the same 24 words are compatible with SilentDragonXLite (tiny-bip39 0.6.2).
+crypto_libbitcoin_crypto_a_SOURCES += \
+  crypto/bip39/bip39.c \
+  crypto/bip39/bip39.h \
+  crypto/bip39/bip39_english.h \
+  crypto/bip39/pbkdf2.c \
+  crypto/bip39/pbkdf2.h \
+  crypto/bip39/hmac.c \
+  crypto/bip39/hmac.h \
+  crypto/bip39/sha2.c \
+  crypto/bip39/sha2.h \
+  crypto/bip39/memzero.c \
+  crypto/bip39/memzero.h \
+  crypto/bip39/options.h \
+  crypto/bip39/rand.h
+
 if EXPERIMENTAL_ASM
   crypto_libbitcoin_crypto_a_SOURCES += crypto/sha256_sse4.cpp
 endif
@@ -464,6 +489,7 @@ endif
 
 dragonxd_LDADD = \
   $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) \
+  $(LIBCURL) \
   $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) \
   $(LIBUNIVALUE) \
   $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) \
@@ -594,7 +620,7 @@ libzcash_a_CPPFLAGS = -DMULTICORE -fopenmp -fPIC -DBOOST_SPIRIT_THREADSAFE -DHAV
 #libzcash_a_LDFLAGS = $(RELDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LIBTOOL_APP_LDFLAGS)
 #libzcash_a_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(BITCOIN_INCLUDES) -DMONTGOMERY_OUTPUT
 
-libzcash_a_CXXFLAGS = $(SAN_CXXFLAGS) $(HARDENED_CXXFLAGS) -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu17
+libzcash_a_CXXFLAGS = $(SAN_CXXFLAGS) $(HARDENED_CXXFLAGS) -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu++17
 libzcash_a_LDFLAGS = $(SAN_LDFLAGS) $(HARDENED_LDFLAGS)
 libzcash_a_CPPFLAGS += -DMONTGOMERY_OUTPUT
 
@@ -636,7 +662,7 @@ libhush_a_SOURCES = \
 
 libhush_a_CPPFLAGS = -DMULTICORE -fopenmp -fPIC -DBINARY_OUTPUT -DCURVE_ALT_BN128 -DBOOST_SPIRIT_THREADSAFE -DHAVE_BUILD_INFO -D__STDC_FORMAT_MACROS $(HARDENED_CPPFLAGS) -pipe -O1 -g  -Wstack-protector -fstack-protector-all -fPIE -fvisibility=hidden -DSTATIC $(BITCOIN_INCLUDES)
 
-libhush_a_CXXFLAGS = $(HARDENED_CXXFLAGS) -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu17
+libhush_a_CXXFLAGS = $(HARDENED_CXXFLAGS) -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu++17
 
 libhush_a_LDFLAGS = $(HARDENED_LDFLAGS)
 
@@ -685,5 +711,5 @@ endif
 if ENABLE_TESTS
 #include Makefile.test-hush.include
 #include Makefile.test.include
-#include Makefile.gtest.include
+include Makefile.gtest.include
 endif

src/Makefile.gtest.include

@@ -4,65 +4,61 @@ TESTS += hush-gtest
 bin_PROGRAMS += hush-gtest
 
 # tool for generating our public parameters
+# NOTE: the original test list used an invalid automake form (comment after a trailing
+# backslash, and `zcash_gtest_SOURCES +=` with no prior `=`), which is why the whole
+# gtest harness was disabled via a `#include`. Minimal valid set: the harness + the
+# Re-add other gtest sources here as they are revived.
 hush_gtest_SOURCES = \
 	gtest/main.cpp \
 	gtest/utils.cpp \
-	gtest/test_checktransaction.cpp \
+	gtest/test_randomx_preverify.cpp \
-	gtest/json_test_vectors.cpp \
+	gtest/test_hdtransparent.cpp \
-        gtest/json_test_vectors.h \
+	gtest/test_mnemonic_compat.cpp
-	gtest/test_wallet_zkeys.cpp \
-# These tests are order-dependent, because they
-# depend on global state (see #1539)
-if ENABLE_WALLET
-zcash_gtest_SOURCES += \
-	wallet/gtest/test_wallet_zkeys.cpp
-endif
-zcash_gtest_SOURCES += \
-	gtest/test_tautology.cpp \
-	gtest/test_deprecation.cpp \
-	gtest/test_equihash.cpp \
-	gtest/test_httprpc.cpp \
-	gtest/test_keys.cpp \
-	gtest/test_keystore.cpp \
-	gtest/test_noteencryption.cpp \
-	gtest/test_mempool.cpp \
-	gtest/test_merkletree.cpp \
-	gtest/test_metrics.cpp \
-	gtest/test_miner.cpp \
-	gtest/test_pow.cpp \
-	gtest/test_random.cpp \
-	gtest/test_rpc.cpp \
-	gtest/test_sapling_note.cpp \
-	gtest/test_transaction.cpp \
-	gtest/test_transaction_builder.cpp \
-	gtest/test_upgrades.cpp \
-	gtest/test_validation.cpp \
-	gtest/test_circuit.cpp \
-	gtest/test_txid.cpp \
-	gtest/test_libzcash_utils.cpp \
-	gtest/test_proofs.cpp \
-	gtest/test_pedersen_hash.cpp \
-	gtest/test_checkblock.cpp \
-	gtest/test_zip32.cpp
-if ENABLE_WALLET
-zcash_gtest_SOURCES += \
-	wallet/gtest/test_wallet.cpp
-endif
 
 hush_gtest_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -DMULTICORE -fopenmp -DBINARY_OUTPUT -DCURVE_ALT_BN128 -DSTATIC $(BITCOIN_INCLUDES)
 hush_gtest_CXXFLAGS = $(AM_CXXFLAGS) $(PIE_FLAGS)
 
-hush_gtest_LDADD = -lgtest -lgmock $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBBITCOIN_UNIVALUE) $(LIBLEVELDB) $(LIBMEMENV) \
+# Mirror dragonxd_LDADD's working library set/order (the old list used a non-existent
-  $(BOOST_LIBS) $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) $(LIBSECP256K1)
+# $(LIBBITCOIN_UNIVALUE) so univalue was never linked, and omitted LIBHUSH/LIBRANDOMX/libcc).
+hush_gtest_LDADD = -lgtest -lgmock \
+  $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) \
+  $(LIBCURL) \
+  $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) \
+  $(LIBUNIVALUE) \
+  $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) \
+  $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) \
+  $(LIBZCASH) \
+  $(LIBHUSH) \
+  $(LIBLEVELDB) \
+  $(LIBMEMENV) \
+  $(LIBSECP256K1) \
+  $(LIBRANDOMX)
 if ENABLE_WALLET
 hush_gtest_LDADD += $(LIBBITCOIN_WALLET)
 endif
 
-hush_gtest_LDADD += $(LIBZCASH_CONSENSUS) $(BDB_LIBS) $(SSL_LIBS) $(CRYPTO_LIBS) $(EVENT_PTHREADS_LIBS) $(EVENT_LIBS) $(LIBZCASH) $(LIBZCASH_LIBS)
+hush_gtest_LDADD += \
+  $(BOOST_LIBS) \
+  $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) \
+  $(BDB_LIBS) \
+  $(SSL_LIBS) \
+  $(CRYPTO_LIBS) \
+  $(EVENT_PTHREADS_LIBS) \
+  $(EVENT_LIBS) \
+  $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) \
+  $(LIBZCASH_LIBS)
 
-hush_gtest_LDFLAGS = $(RELDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LIBTOOL_APP_LDFLAGS) -static
+if TARGET_DARWIN
+hush_gtest_LDADD += libcc.dylib $(LIBSECP256K1)
+endif
+if TARGET_WINDOWS
+hush_gtest_LDADD += libcc.dll $(LIBSECP256K1)
+endif
+if TARGET_LINUX
+hush_gtest_LDADD += libcc.so $(LIBSECP256K1)
+endif
 
-hush_gtest_LDFLAGS = $(RELDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LIBTOOL_APP_LDFLAGS) -static
+hush_gtest_LDFLAGS = $(RELDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LIBTOOL_APP_LDFLAGS)
 
 hush-gtest-expected-failures: hush-gtest FORCE
 	./hush-gtest --gtest_filter=*DISABLED_* --gtest_also_run_disabled_tests

src/Makefile.test.include

@@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ endif
 
 test_test_bitcoin_SOURCES = $(BITCOIN_TESTS) $(JSON_TEST_FILES) $(RAW_TEST_FILES)
 test_test_bitcoin_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -fopenmp $(BITCOIN_INCLUDES) -I$(builddir)/test/ $(TESTDEFS) $(EVENT_CFLAGS)
-test_test_bitcoin_LDADD = $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBUNIVALUE) $(LIBLEVELDB) $(LIBMEMENV) \
+test_test_bitcoin_LDADD = $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBCURL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBUNIVALUE) $(LIBLEVELDB) $(LIBMEMENV) \
   $(BOOST_LIBS) $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) $(LIBSECP256K1) $(EVENT_PTHREADS_LIBS) $(EVENT_LIBS)
 test_test_bitcoin_CXXFLAGS = $(AM_CXXFLAGS) $(PIE_FLAGS)
 if ENABLE_WALLET
 test_test_bitcoin_LDADD += $(LIBBITCOIN_WALLET)
 endif
-test_test_bitcoin_LDADD += $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBUNIVALUE) \
+test_test_bitcoin_LDADD += $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBCURL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBUNIVALUE) \
   $(LIBLEVELDB) $(LIBMEMENV) $(BOOST_LIBS) $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) $(LIBSECP256K1) $(EVENT_LIBS) $(EVENT_PTHREADS_LIBS)
 test_test_bitcoin_CXXFLAGS = $(AM_CXXFLAGS) $(PIE_FLAGS)
 

src/bitcoin-cli.cpp

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ std::string HelpMessageCli()
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-regtest", _("Enter regression test mode, which uses a special chain in which blocks can be "
                                              "solved instantly. This is intended for regression testing tools and app development."));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcconnect=<ip>", strprintf(_("Send commands to node running on <ip> (default: %s)"), "127.0.0.1"));
-    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcport=<port>", strprintf(_("Connect to JSON-RPC on <port> (default: %u )"), 18030));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcport=<port>", strprintf(_("Connect to JSON-RPC on <port> (default: %u )"), 21769));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcwait", _("Wait for RPC server to start"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcuser=<user>", _("Username for JSON-RPC connections"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-rpcpassword=<pw>", _("Password for JSON-RPC connections"));

src/cc/Makefile_custom

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 SHELL		= /bin/sh
-CC_DARWIN	= g++-8
+CC_DARWIN	= g++-15
 CC_WIN		= x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc-posix
 CC_AARCH64	= aarch64-linux-gnu-g++
 CFLAGS_DARWIN	= -DBUILD_CUSTOMCC -std=c++11 -arch x86_64 -I../secp256k1/include -I../../depends/$(shell echo `../..//depends/config.guess`/include) -I../univalue/include -I../leveldb/include -I.. -I. -fPIC -Wl,-undefined -Wl,dynamic_lookup -Wno-write-strings -shared -dynamiclib

src/chain.h

@@ -35,9 +35,15 @@ extern bool fZindex;
 // These version thresholds control whether nSproutValue/nSaplingValue are
 // serialized in the block index. They must be <= CLIENT_VERSION or the
 // values will never be persisted, causing nChainSaplingValue to reset
-// to 0 after node restart. DragonX CLIENT_VERSION is 1000250 (v1.0.2.50).
+// to 0 after node restart. DragonX CLIENT_VERSION is 1000350 (v1.0.3.50).
 static const int SPROUT_VALUE_VERSION = 1000000;
 static const int SAPLING_VALUE_VERSION = 1000000;
+// Block-index records written at >= this version store nSaplingValue as a boost::optional
+// (1-byte discriminant + value). Earlier records stored it as a raw 8-byte CAmount; the
+// deserializer consumes those bytes but reads the value as boost::none (untrusted) so the
+// turnstile guard stays dormant until such a node reindexes. Keep == the CLIENT_VERSION that
+// introduced the optional format (v1.0.3, CLIENT_VERSION 1000350).
+static const int SAPLING_VALUE_OPTIONAL_VERSION = 1000350;
 extern int32_t ASSETCHAINS_LWMAPOS;
 extern char SMART_CHAIN_SYMBOL[65];
 extern uint64_t ASSETCHAINS_NOTARY_PAY[];
@@ -373,10 +379,10 @@ public:
     //! Will be boost::none if nChainTx is zero.
     boost::optional<CAmount> nChainSproutValue;
 
-    //! Change in value held by the Sapling circuit over this block.
+    //! Change in value held by the Sapling circuit over this block. boost::none for blocks
-    //! Not a boost::optional because this was added before Sapling activated, so we can
+    //! before nSaplingValue was tracked, or on nodes that loaded an older-format block index
-    //! rely on the invariant that every block before this was added had nSaplingValue = 0.
+    //! (see SAPLING_VALUE_OPTIONAL_VERSION) -- propagates to nChainSaplingValue == none.
-    CAmount nSaplingValue;
+    boost::optional<CAmount> nSaplingValue;
 
     //! (memory only) Total value held by the Sapling circuit up to and including this block.
     //! Will be boost::none if nChainTx is zero.
@@ -400,6 +406,15 @@ public:
     //! (memory only) Sequential id assigned to distinguish order in which blocks are received.
     uint32_t nSequenceId;
 
+    //! (memory only) Set true once this block's RandomX PoW has been verified by the parallel
+    //! pre-verification pool, letting the inline check in CheckBlockHeader skip the recompute.
+    //! Written by exactly one pre-verify worker (1:1 with the block) and read by the connect
+    //! thread only AFTER the pool barrier (CCheckQueue::Wait provides the happens-before), so a
+    //! plain bool is race-free here. NOT serialized — a pure optimization hint; the inline
+    //! CheckRandomXSolution remains the consensus authority. (Plain bool, not std::atomic, so
+    //! CBlockIndex stays copyable for CDiskBlockIndex's `CBlockIndex(*pindex)` construction.)
+    bool fRandomXVerified;
+
     void SetNull()
     {
         phashBlock = NULL;
@@ -414,6 +429,7 @@ public:
         chainPower = CChainPower();
         nTx = 0;
         nChainTx = 0;
+        fRandomXVerified = false;
 
         // Shieldex Index chain stats
         nChainPayments = 0;
@@ -450,7 +466,7 @@ public:
         nSequenceId = 0;
         nSproutValue = boost::none;
         nChainSproutValue = boost::none;
-        nSaplingValue = 0;
+        nSaplingValue = boost::none;
         nChainSaplingValue = boost::none;
 
         nVersion       = 0;
@@ -657,10 +673,22 @@ public:
             READWRITE(nSproutValue);
         }
 
-        // Only read/write nSaplingValue if the client version used to create
+        // nSaplingValue is a boost::optional so "not reliably tracked" reads back as none,
-        // this index was storing them.
+        // keeping the turnstile guard dormant on old/snapshot-bootstrapped DBs. Records written
-        if ((s.GetType() & SER_DISK) && (nVersion >= SAPLING_VALUE_VERSION)) {
+        // before SAPLING_VALUE_OPTIONAL_VERSION stored it as a raw 8-byte CAmount: consume those
-            READWRITE(nSaplingValue);
+        // bytes for alignment but DISCARD the value (read as none), since it may be understated on
+        // a node that never tracked the pool from genesis. That node stays dormant until it
+        // reindexes, which rewrites records at the current version -> the optional path below.
+        if (s.GetType() & SER_DISK) {
+            if (nVersion >= SAPLING_VALUE_OPTIONAL_VERSION) {
+                READWRITE(nSaplingValue);              // new format: boost::optional<CAmount>
+            } else if (nVersion >= SAPLING_VALUE_VERSION) {
+                CAmount nLegacySaplingValue = 0;       // old format: raw 8 bytes present in the stream
+                READWRITE(nLegacySaplingValue);        // consume for alignment; value is discarded
+                if (ser_action.ForRead())
+                    nSaplingValue = boost::none;
+            }
+            // else (< SAPLING_VALUE_VERSION): field was never stored -> nSaplingValue stays none
         }
 
         // These values only serialized when -zindex enabled

src/clientversion.h

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 // Must be kept in sync with configure.ac , ugh!
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR 1
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR 0
-#define CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION 2
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION 3
 #define CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD 50
 
 //! Set to true for release, false for prerelease or test build

src/compat/glibcxx_sanity.cpp

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ bool sanity_test_range_fmt()
 {
     std::string test;
     try {
-        test.at(1);
+        (void)test.at(1);
     } catch (const std::out_of_range&) {
         return true;
     } catch (...) {

src/crypto/bip39/bip39.c

@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@
 #include "rand.h"
 #include "sha2.h"
 
-#if USE_BIP39_CACHE
+// BIP39_WORDS is used unconditionally by the wordlist helpers below, so it must
-
+// be defined even when the BIP39 cache is disabled (upstream places it inside
+// the cache block by mistake).
 int BIP39_WORDS = 2048;
 
+#if USE_BIP39_CACHE
+
 static int bip39_cache_index = 0;
 
 static CONFIDENTIAL struct {

src/crypto/bip39/options.h

@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@
 #endif
 
 // implement BIP39 caching
+// Disabled: caching keeps the plaintext mnemonic/passphrase/seed in a static
+// process-lifetime buffer, which we do not want in a wallet daemon.
 #ifndef USE_BIP39_CACHE
-#define USE_BIP39_CACHE 1
+#define USE_BIP39_CACHE 0
 #define BIP39_CACHE_SIZE 4
 #endif
 

src/gtest/test_hdtransparent.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2016-2024 The Hush developers
+// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
+//
+// Tests for HD-derived transparent keys (m/44'/coin'/0'/0/i) and the
+// version-gated CHDChain serialization used to persist the transparent counter.
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "chainparams.h"
+#include "streams.h"
+#include "uint256.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "wallet/wallet.h"
+#include "wallet/walletdb.h"
+#include "zcash/zip32.h"
+
+// Build an in-memory wallet with a known seed + hdChain so that the
+// HD-transparent path (IsHDTransparentEnabled) is active.
+static void LoadSeedForTest(CWallet& wallet, const HDSeed& seed)
+{
+    wallet.LoadHDSeed(seed);
+    CHDChain chain;
+    chain.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT;
+    chain.seedFp = seed.Fingerprint();
+    chain.nCreateTime = 1;
+    wallet.SetHDChain(chain, true /* memonly */);
+}
+
+// Same seed must reproduce the same transparent addresses in the same order:
+// this is the recovery guarantee that lets a seed-only restore find coinbase.
+TEST(hdtransparent_tests, DeterministicFromSeed)
+{
+    SelectParams(CBaseChainParams::MAIN);
+
+    RawHDSeed rawSeed(HD_WALLET_SEED_LENGTH, 0x42);
+    HDSeed seed(rawSeed);
+
+    std::vector<CKeyID> keysA;
+    {
+        CWallet wallet;
+        LoadSeedForTest(wallet, seed);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(wallet.IsHDTransparentEnabled());
+
+        LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+            CPubKey pk = wallet.GenerateNewKey();
+            keysA.push_back(pk.GetID());
+
+            const CKeyMetadata& md = wallet.mapKeyMetadata[pk.GetID()];
+            EXPECT_EQ(md.seedFp, seed.Fingerprint());
+            EXPECT_EQ(md.hdKeypath, std::string("m/44'/141'/0'/0/") + std::to_string(i));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Fresh wallet, same seed -> identical keys.
+    {
+        CWallet wallet;
+        LoadSeedForTest(wallet, seed);
+
+        LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+            CPubKey pk = wallet.GenerateNewKey();
+            EXPECT_EQ(pk.GetID(), keysA[i]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Pin the exact derivation path so it can never silently change.
+TEST(hdtransparent_tests, KnownDerivationPath)
+{
+    SelectParams(CBaseChainParams::MAIN);
+
+    RawHDSeed rawSeed(HD_WALLET_SEED_LENGTH, 0x42);
+    HDSeed seed(rawSeed);
+
+    // Independently derive m/44'/141'/0'/0/0.
+    RawHDSeed raw = seed.RawSeed();
+    CExtKey m, purpose, coinType, account, external, child;
+    m.SetMaster(raw.data(), raw.size());
+    m.Derive(purpose, 44 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    purpose.Derive(coinType, 141 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    coinType.Derive(account, 0 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    account.Derive(external, 0);
+    external.Derive(child, 0);
+    CKeyID expected = child.key.GetPubKey().GetID();
+
+    CWallet wallet;
+    LoadSeedForTest(wallet, seed);
+    LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+    CPubKey pk = wallet.GenerateNewKey();
+    EXPECT_EQ(pk.GetID(), expected);
+}
+
+// A pre-existing v1 CHDChain record (no transparent counter) must still
+// deserialize under v2 code, leaving transparentChildCounter at 0; and a v2
+// record must round-trip the counter.
+TEST(hdtransparent_tests, HDChainVersionCompat)
+{
+    CHDChain v1;
+    v1.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_BASE; // 1: transparentChildCounter not serialized
+    v1.seedFp = uint256S("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
+    v1.nCreateTime = 12345;
+    v1.saplingAccountCounter = 7;
+
+    CDataStream ss(SER_DISK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    ss << v1;
+
+    CHDChain out; // default-constructed: SetNull() zeroes transparentChildCounter
+    ss >> out;
+    EXPECT_EQ(out.nVersion, +CHDChain::VERSION_HD_BASE); // unary + -> rvalue, avoid ODR-use of static const
+    EXPECT_EQ(out.seedFp, v1.seedFp);
+    EXPECT_EQ(out.nCreateTime, (int64_t)12345);
+    EXPECT_EQ(out.saplingAccountCounter, (uint32_t)7);
+    EXPECT_EQ(out.transparentChildCounter, (uint32_t)0);
+
+    CHDChain v2;
+    v2.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT;
+    v2.saplingAccountCounter = 3;
+    v2.transparentChildCounter = 42;
+    CDataStream ss2(SER_DISK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    ss2 << v2;
+
+    CHDChain out2;
+    ss2 >> out2;
+    EXPECT_EQ(out2.nVersion, +CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT);
+    EXPECT_EQ(out2.saplingAccountCounter, (uint32_t)3);
+    EXPECT_EQ(out2.transparentChildCounter, (uint32_t)42);
+}
+
+// Restoring from a 32-byte seed hex reproduces the same keys as the source
+// wallet, and refuses to run when a seed already exists.
+TEST(hdtransparent_tests, RestoreFromSeedHex)
+{
+    SelectParams(CBaseChainParams::MAIN);
+
+    RawHDSeed rawSeed(HD_WALLET_SEED_LENGTH, 0x7a);
+    HDSeed seed(rawSeed);
+    std::string seedHex = HexStr(seed.RawSeed());
+
+    // Source wallet: derive some keys.
+    std::vector<CKeyID> expected;
+    {
+        CWallet wallet;
+        LoadSeedForTest(wallet, seed);
+        LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+            expected.push_back(wallet.GenerateNewKey().GetID());
+    }
+
+    // Restored wallet: inject the seed hex, pre-derive, and compare.
+    {
+        CWallet wallet;
+        ASSERT_TRUE(wallet.SetHDSeedFromHex(seedHex));
+        // Second attempt must fail: a seed already exists.
+        EXPECT_FALSE(wallet.SetHDSeedFromHex(seedHex));
+
+        wallet.TopUpHDTransparentKeys(3, 1);
+        LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+            EXPECT_TRUE(wallet.HaveKey(expected[i]));
+    }
+
+    // Bad input is rejected.
+    {
+        CWallet wallet;
+        EXPECT_FALSE(wallet.SetHDSeedFromHex("nothex"));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(wallet.SetHDSeedFromHex("abcd")); // too short
+    }
+}

src/gtest/test_mnemonic_compat.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2016-2024 The Hush developers
+// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
+//
+// Proves that a BIP39 seed phrase produces the SAME transparent and shielded
+// addresses on the DragonX full node as in SilentDragonXLite. The proof chain:
+//   phrase -> entropy (round-trip)  ->  64-byte BIP39 seed (known-answer)
+//         -> z/t addresses (wallet path == direct ZIP-32/BIP44 derivation).
+// The 64-byte seed is anchored to the well-known BIP39 value for the all-zero
+// "abandon...art" entropy with an EMPTY passphrase, which is exactly what
+// SilentDragonXLite's tiny-bip39 0.6.2 feeds into the same coin_type=141 paths.
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include "chainparams.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "key_io.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "wallet/mnemonic.h"
+#include "wallet/wallet.h"
+#include "zcash/Address.hpp"
+#include "zcash/zip32.h"
+
+// The canonical 24-word phrase for 32 bytes of all-zero entropy.
+static const char* ABANDON_ART =
+    "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon "
+    "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon "
+    "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon art";
+
+// The standard BIP39 seed for that phrase with an EMPTY passphrase
+// (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 2048 rounds, salt "mnemonic"). Matches tiny-bip39.
+static const char* SEED64_HEX =
+    "408b285c123836004f4b8842c89324c1f01382450c0d439af345ba7fc49acf70"
+    "5489c6fc77dbd4e3dc1dd8cc6bc9f043db8ada1e243c4a0eafb290d399480840";
+
+// First shielded address for a 64-byte seed: m/32'/141'/0' default address.
+static std::string DeriveZAddrFromSeed64(RawHDSeed seed64)
+{
+    HDSeed s(seed64);
+    auto m = libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey::Master(s);
+    auto xsk = m.Derive(32 | ZIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT)
+                 .Derive(141 | ZIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT)
+                 .Derive(0 | ZIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    return EncodePaymentAddress(xsk.DefaultAddress());
+}
+
+// First transparent address for a BIP32 master over `seedBytes`:
+// m/44'/141'/0'/0/0.
+static std::string DeriveTAddrFromSeedBytes(RawHDSeed seedBytes)
+{
+    CExtKey master, purpose, coinType, account, external, child;
+    master.SetMaster(seedBytes.data(), seedBytes.size());
+    master.Derive(purpose, 44 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    purpose.Derive(coinType, 141 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    coinType.Derive(account, 0 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    account.Derive(external, 0);
+    external.Derive(child, 0);
+    return EncodeDestination(child.key.GetPubKey().GetID());
+}
+
+// The 64-byte seed derived from the mnemonic must equal the known BIP39 value.
+// This is the cross-wallet anchor: SilentDragonXLite feeds the identical seed.
+TEST(mnemonic_compat, Bip39SeedKnownAnswer)
+{
+    RawHDSeed entropy(32, 0);
+    RawHDSeed seed64;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(Bip39SeedFromEntropy(entropy, seed64));
+    ASSERT_EQ(seed64.size(), (size_t)64);
+    EXPECT_EQ(HexStr(seed64.begin(), seed64.end()), std::string(SEED64_HEX));
+}
+
+TEST(mnemonic_compat, EntropyPhraseRoundTrip)
+{
+    RawHDSeed zeros(32, 0);
+    std::string phrase;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(EntropyToMnemonic(zeros, phrase));
+    EXPECT_EQ(phrase, std::string(ABANDON_ART));
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(MnemonicIsValid(ABANDON_ART));
+
+    RawHDSeed entropy;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(MnemonicToEntropy(ABANDON_ART, entropy));
+    EXPECT_EQ(entropy.size(), (size_t)32);
+    EXPECT_EQ(HexStr(entropy.begin(), entropy.end()), std::string(64, '0'));
+
+    // Bad checksum / unknown words are rejected.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(MnemonicIsValid("abandon abandon abandon"));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(MnemonicIsValid("clearly not valid bip39 words at all here"));
+    RawHDSeed junk;
+    EXPECT_FALSE(MnemonicToEntropy("clearly not valid bip39 words at all here", junk));
+}
+
+// The wallet's mnemonic derivation must reproduce the exact addresses obtained
+// by driving ZIP-32 / BIP44 directly from the known 64-byte seed, and must be
+// deterministic across wallets.
+TEST(mnemonic_compat, WalletDerivesSdxliteAddresses)
+{
+    SelectParams(CBaseChainParams::MAIN);
+
+    RawHDSeed zeros(32, 0), seed64;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(Bip39SeedFromEntropy(zeros, seed64));
+    const std::string expZ = DeriveZAddrFromSeed64(seed64);
+    const std::string expT = DeriveTAddrFromSeedBytes(seed64);
+    EXPECT_EQ(expZ.substr(0, 2), "zs"); // sapling HRP for mainnet
+
+    CWallet wallet;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wallet.SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(ABANDON_ART));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wallet.IsMnemonicSeed());
+    {
+        LOCK(wallet.cs_wallet);
+        EXPECT_EQ(EncodePaymentAddress(wallet.GenerateNewSaplingZKey()), expZ);
+        EXPECT_EQ(EncodeDestination(wallet.GenerateNewKey().GetID()), expT);
+    }
+
+    // Same phrase, fresh wallet -> identical first addresses.
+    CWallet wallet2;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wallet2.SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(ABANDON_ART));
+    {
+        LOCK(wallet2.cs_wallet);
+        EXPECT_EQ(EncodePaymentAddress(wallet2.GenerateNewSaplingZKey()), expZ);
+        EXPECT_EQ(EncodeDestination(wallet2.GenerateNewKey().GetID()), expT);
+    }
+
+    // The phrase round-trips out of the wallet.
+    std::string exported;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wallet.GetMnemonicPhrase(exported));
+    EXPECT_EQ(exported, std::string(ABANDON_ART));
+}
+
+// Negative: feeding the 32-byte entropy DIRECTLY as the seed (the classic
+// interop bug) must produce a different address than the 64-byte BIP39 seed.
+TEST(mnemonic_compat, RawEntropyDiffersFromMnemonicSeed)
+{
+    SelectParams(CBaseChainParams::MAIN);
+
+    RawHDSeed zeros(32, 0), seed64;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(Bip39SeedFromEntropy(zeros, seed64));
+
+    const std::string seedT = DeriveTAddrFromSeedBytes(seed64); // correct (64-byte)
+    const std::string entropyT = DeriveTAddrFromSeedBytes(zeros); // wrong (32-byte)
+    EXPECT_NE(seedT, entropyT);
+}

src/gtest/test_randomx_preverify.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 The DragonX developers
+// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
+//
+// Consensus-equivalence test for the parallel RandomX pre-verification pool. The pool is purely an
+// optimization: a block's transient fRandomXVerified flag (set by CRandomXCheck on a real hash
+// match) only lets CheckBlockHeader SKIP the inline recompute. So for every block the pool's
+// outcome must equal the inline CheckRandomXSolution outcome — `(preVerified || inline) == inline`.
+// We exercise a valid solution, a corrupted solution, and confirm the pool never "succeeds" on a
+// block the inline check would reject.
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "arith_uint256.h"
+#include "chain.h"
+#include "chainparams.h"
+#include "pow.h"
+#include "primitives/block.h"
+#include "RandomX/src/randomx.h"
+#include "hush_defs.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include <boost/thread.hpp>
+#include <memory>
+
+extern int32_t HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS;
+extern bool fCheckpointsEnabled;
+
+namespace {
+// Compute the correct RandomX solution for a header using a standalone reference light VM, via the
+// SAME key + input helpers the validator uses (so the bytes/key match exactly).
+void ReferenceRandomXHash(const CBlockHeader& hdr, const std::string& key, unsigned char out[RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE])
+{
+    std::vector<unsigned char> in = GetRandomXInput(hdr);
+    randomx_flags flags = randomx_get_flags();
+    randomx_cache* c = randomx_alloc_cache(flags);
+    ASSERT_NE(c, nullptr);
+    randomx_init_cache(c, key.data(), key.size());
+    randomx_vm* vm = randomx_create_vm(flags, c, nullptr);
+    ASSERT_NE(vm, nullptr);
+    randomx_calculate_hash(vm, in.data(), in.size(), out);
+    randomx_destroy_vm(vm);
+    randomx_release_cache(c);
+}
+} // namespace
+
+TEST(RandomXPreVerify, ConsensusEquivalence)
+{
+    // Force RandomX validation to actually run at low heights in the test harness.
+    uint32_t savedAlgo = ASSETCHAINS_ALGO, savedRx = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX;
+    int32_t  savedVal  = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION, savedLoad = HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS;
+    bool     savedCkpt = fCheckpointsEnabled;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX            = 2;                 // a distinct nonzero algo id
+    ASSETCHAINS_ALGO              = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION = 1;                // enforce from height 1
+    HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS            = 0;                  // not in initial-load (else RandomX skipped)
+    fCheckpointsEnabled          = false;              // avoid the below-checkpoint skip
+
+    const int32_t height = 10; // < interval+lag -> the chain-params initial key (no chainActive needed)
+
+    CBlockHeader hdr;
+    hdr.nVersion             = 4;
+    hdr.hashPrevBlock        = uint256S("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
+    hdr.hashMerkleRoot       = uint256S("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002");
+    hdr.hashFinalSaplingRoot = uint256S("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003");
+    hdr.nTime                = 1700000000;
+    hdr.nBits                = 0x200f0f0f;
+    hdr.nNonce               = uint256S("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004");
+
+    std::string key = GetRandomXKey(height);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(key.empty());
+
+    unsigned char good[RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE];
+    ReferenceRandomXHash(hdr, key, good);
+
+    // Run the pool path synchronously on this thread (CRandomXCheck creates its own thread_local VM).
+    auto poolVerifies = [&](const CBlockHeader& h) -> bool {
+        RandomXValidatorPrepareKey(key); // load the shared cache with this key
+        bool slot = false;
+        CRandomXCheck chk(key, GetRandomXInput(h), h.nSolution.data(), &slot);
+        chk();
+        return slot;
+    };
+
+    // Case 1 — valid solution: both inline and pool accept; equivalence holds.
+    hdr.nSolution.assign(good, good + RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(CheckRandomXSolution(&hdr, height));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(poolVerifies(hdr));
+    EXPECT_EQ(poolVerifies(hdr) || CheckRandomXSolution(&hdr, height), CheckRandomXSolution(&hdr, height));
+
+    // Case 2 — corrupted solution: both reject; the pool must NOT set verified.
+    {
+        CBlockHeader bad = hdr;
+        bad.nSolution[0] ^= 0xff;
+        EXPECT_FALSE(CheckRandomXSolution(&bad, height));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(poolVerifies(bad));
+        EXPECT_EQ(poolVerifies(bad) || CheckRandomXSolution(&bad, height), CheckRandomXSolution(&bad, height));
+    }
+
+    // Case 3 — a verified flag on the block lets CheckBlockHeader skip, but verified is only ever set
+    // by a real hash match, so it can never mask an invalid block. (Pool returns false for the bad
+    // block above, so its fRandomXVerified stays false and the inline path rejects it at connect.)
+
+    ASSETCHAINS_ALGO = savedAlgo; ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX = savedRx;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION = savedVal; HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS = savedLoad;
+    fCheckpointsEnabled = savedCkpt;
+}
+
+// A/B: serial inline verification (single VM) vs the parallel pool (worker threads). Directly
+// measures the speedup the pool delivers. We don't care about validity here (mismatched solutions
+// still cost a full hash), only wall-clock. parallel must beat serial whenever >1 core is used.
+TEST(RandomXPreVerify, ParallelSpeedup)
+{
+    uint32_t savedAlgo = ASSETCHAINS_ALGO, savedRx = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX;
+    int32_t  savedVal  = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION, savedLoad = HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS;
+    bool     savedCkpt = fCheckpointsEnabled;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX = 2; ASSETCHAINS_ALGO = ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION = 1; HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS = 0; fCheckpointsEnabled = false;
+
+    const int32_t height = 10;
+    std::string key = GetRandomXKey(height);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(key.empty());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(RandomXValidatorPrepareKey(key));
+
+    const int M = 16; // blocks to verify in the window
+    std::vector<CBlockHeader> hdrs(M);
+    for (int i = 0; i < M; i++) {
+        hdrs[i].nVersion = 4;
+        hdrs[i].nTime    = 1700000000 + i;
+        hdrs[i].nBits    = 0x200f0f0f;
+        hdrs[i].nNonce   = ArithToUint256(arith_uint256(i + 1)); // distinct inputs
+        hdrs[i].nSolution.assign(RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE, 0);          // arbitrary; we time the hash
+    }
+
+    // Serial baseline: inline single-VM verification (each call hashes, then mismatches -> false).
+    int64_t t0 = GetTimeMicros();
+    for (int i = 0; i < M; i++) CheckRandomXSolution(&hdrs[i], height);
+    int64_t serialUs = GetTimeMicros() - t0;
+
+    // Parallel: spawn K-1 workers + the master (this thread) joining via Wait().
+    int K = std::min(8, std::max(2, (int)boost::thread::hardware_concurrency()));
+    boost::thread_group workers;
+    for (int i = 0; i < K - 1; i++) workers.create_thread(&ThreadRandomXVerify);
+
+    std::unique_ptr<bool[]> slots(new bool[M]());
+    std::vector<CRandomXCheck> checks;
+    checks.reserve(M);
+    for (int i = 0; i < M; i++)
+        checks.push_back(CRandomXCheck(key, GetRandomXInput(hdrs[i]), hdrs[i].nSolution.data(), &slots[i]));
+
+    int64_t t1 = GetTimeMicros();
+    {
+        CCheckQueueControl<CRandomXCheck> control(&rxCheckQueue);
+        control.Add(checks);
+        control.Wait();
+    }
+    int64_t parallelUs = GetTimeMicros() - t1;
+
+    workers.interrupt_all();
+    workers.join_all();
+
+    printf("[ RandomX A/B ] %d blocks: serial(1 VM)=%ldms, parallel(%d threads)=%ldms, speedup=%.1fx\n",
+           M, (long)(serialUs / 1000), K, (long)(parallelUs / 1000),
+           (double)serialUs / (double)std::max<int64_t>(1, parallelUs));
+
+    EXPECT_LT(parallelUs, serialUs); // parallel must be faster than serial on a multi-core box
+
+    ASSETCHAINS_ALGO = savedAlgo; ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX = savedRx;
+    ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION = savedVal; HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS = savedLoad;
+    fCheckpointsEnabled = savedCkpt;
+}

src/hush/tlsmanager.cpp

@@ -580,7 +580,22 @@ int TLSManager::threadSocketHandler(CNode* pnode, fd_set& fdsetRecv, fd_set& fds
                 char pchBuf[0x10000];
                 bool bIsSSL = false;
                 int nBytes = 0, nRet = 0;
-
+                // Drain the socket in a bounded loop rather than one read per select pass: a single
+                // 64K read per pass underfills high-bandwidth/high-latency links. Cap the reads per
+                // pass and honor the receive-flood back-pressure so one peer can neither exhaust
+                // memory nor starve other peers within this pass.
+                int nDrainReads = 0;
+                const int MAX_DRAIN_READS = 16; // up to ~1 MiB per peer per pass (fairness across peers)
+                // Pre-read back-pressure: gate on the flood ceiling BEFORE each read so the per-peer
+                // recv buffer high-water stays at ReceiveFloodSize()+one read (matching the select()
+                // FD_SET gate), and track bytes locally to avoid the O(n) GetTotalRecvSize() per pass.
+                const int64_t nRecvBase = (int64_t)pnode->GetTotalRecvSize();
+                int64_t nPassBytes = 0;
+                bool fKeepReading = true;
+                while (fKeepReading) {
+                    int nSSLPending = 0;
+                    if (nRecvBase + nPassBytes > (int64_t)ReceiveFloodSize())
+                        break;
                     {
                         LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
 
@@ -595,6 +610,10 @@ int TLSManager::threadSocketHandler(CNode* pnode, fd_set& fdsetRecv, fd_set& fds
                             wolfSSL_ERR_clear_error(); // clear the error queue, otherwise we may be reading an old error that occurred previously in the current thread
                             nBytes = wolfSSL_read(pnode->ssl, pchBuf, sizeof(pchBuf));
                             nRet = wolfSSL_get_error(pnode->ssl, nBytes);
+                            // Capture TLS buffered-byte count while still under cs_hSocket; the drain-continuation
+                            // check below runs unlocked, so touching pnode->ssl there would race with
+                            // SocketSendData / CloseSocketDisconnect (which free ssl) -> data race / use-after-free.
+                            nSSLPending = wolfSSL_pending(pnode->ssl);
                         } else {
                             nBytes = recv(pnode->hSocket, pchBuf, sizeof(pchBuf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
                             nRet = WSAGetLastError();
@@ -602,11 +621,22 @@ int TLSManager::threadSocketHandler(CNode* pnode, fd_set& fdsetRecv, fd_set& fds
                     }
 
                     if (nBytes > 0) {
-                    if (!pnode->ReceiveMsgBytes(pchBuf, nBytes))
+                        if (!pnode->ReceiveMsgBytes(pchBuf, nBytes)) {
                             pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect();
+                            fKeepReading = false;
+                        }
                         pnode->nLastRecv = GetTime();
                         pnode->nRecvBytes += nBytes;
                         pnode->RecordBytesRecv(nBytes);
+                        nPassBytes += nBytes;
+                        // Keep draining only while the socket likely has more data (we filled the
+                        // buffer, or TLS has buffered decrypted bytes) and within the per-pass cap.
+                        // The flood ceiling is enforced pre-read at the top of the loop.
+                        if (fKeepReading) {
+                            bool fMore = (nBytes == (int)sizeof(pchBuf)) || (bIsSSL && nSSLPending > 0);
+                            if (!fMore || ++nDrainReads >= MAX_DRAIN_READS)
+                                fKeepReading = false;
+                        }
                     } else if (nBytes == 0) {
 
                         if (bIsSSL) {
@@ -619,6 +649,7 @@ int TLSManager::threadSocketHandler(CNode* pnode, fd_set& fdsetRecv, fd_set& fds
                         if (!pnode->fDisconnect)
                             LogPrint("tls", "socket closed (%s)\n", pnode->addr.ToString());
                         pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect();
+                        fKeepReading = false;
 
                     } else if (nBytes < 0) {
                         // error
@@ -645,6 +676,8 @@ int TLSManager::threadSocketHandler(CNode* pnode, fd_set& fdsetRecv, fd_set& fds
                                 pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect();
                             }
                         }
+                        fKeepReading = false;
+                    }
                 }
             }
         }

src/init.cpp

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "main.h"
 #include "metrics.h"
+#include "pow.h"
 #include "miner.h"
 #include "net.h"
 #include "rpc/server.h"
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ public:
     // Writes do not need similar protection, as failure to write is handled by the caller.
 };
 
-static CCoinsViewDB *pcoinsdbview = NULL;
+CCoinsViewDB *pcoinsdbview = NULL; // global (declared extern in main.h) for UTXO-snapshot dump/load
 static CCoinsViewErrorCatcher *pcoinscatcher = NULL;
 static boost::scoped_ptr<ECCVerifyHandle> globalVerifyHandle;
 
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ void Shutdown()
     }
 #endif
     UnregisterAllValidationInterfaces();
+    RandomXValidatorShutdown(); // release the ~256MB shared RandomX pre-verify cache (was leaked at exit)
 #ifdef ENABLE_WALLET
     delete pwalletMain;
     pwalletMain = NULL;
@@ -387,7 +389,7 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
     }
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-datadir=<dir>", _("Specify data directory (this path cannot use '~')"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-exportdir=<dir>", _("Specify directory to be used when exporting data"));
-    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-dbcache=<n>", strprintf(_("Set database cache size in megabytes (%d to %d, default: %d)"), nMinDbCache, nMaxDbCache, nDefaultDbCache));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-dbcache=<n>", strprintf(_("Set database cache size in megabytes (%d to %d). Default: adaptive - uses most free RAM to speed up initial block download (far fewer UTXO flushes to disk) and automatically shrinks if other applications need memory, always leaving a reserve free. Setting a fixed value disables adaptive sizing."), nMinDbCache, nMaxDbCache));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-loadblock=<file>", _("Imports blocks from external blk000??.dat file") + " " + _("on startup"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxdebugfilesize=<n>", strprintf(_("Set the max size of the debug.log file (default: %u)"), 15));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxorphantx=<n>", strprintf(_("Keep at most <n> unconnectable transactions in memory (default: %u)"), DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS));
@@ -395,6 +397,7 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-mempooltxinputlimit=<n>", _("[DEPRECATED/IGNORED] Set the maximum number of transparent inputs in a transaction that the mempool will accept (default: 0 = no limit applied)"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-par=<n>", strprintf(_("Set the number of script verification threads (%u to %d, 0 = auto, <0 = leave that many cores free, default: %d)"),
         -(int)boost::thread::hardware_concurrency(), MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS, DEFAULT_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-randomxverifythreads=<n>", strprintf(_("Number of threads for parallel RandomX PoW pre-verification of post-checkpoint blocks during network sync; no effect on reindex (0 = inline only, max %d, default: same as -par)"), MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS));
 #ifndef _WIN32
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-pid=<file>", strprintf(_("Specify pid file (default: %s)"), "hushd.pid"));
 #endif
@@ -465,6 +468,12 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
     strUsage += HelpMessageGroup(_("Wallet options:"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-disablewallet", _("Do not load the wallet and disable wallet RPC calls"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-keypool=<n>", strprintf(_("Set key pool size to <n> (default: %u)"), 100));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-hdtransparent", strprintf(_("Derive transparent addresses from the HD seed so they can be recovered from it (default: %u)"), 1));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-hdseed=<hex>", _("Restore a fresh/empty wallet from a 32- or 64-byte HD seed hex (the value shown in z_exportwallet's '# HDSeed=' line). WARNING: exposes the seed to your shell history and process list."));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-mnemonic=<words>", _("Restore/create a fresh/empty wallet from a BIP39 seed phrase, compatible with SilentDragonXLite (English, no passphrase; cross-wallet restore parity is mainnet-only -- testnet/regtest derive a different HD coin_type). WARNING: exposes the phrase to your shell history and process list; prefer DRAGONX.conf with tight permissions."));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-usemnemonic", strprintf(_("Create new wallets from a fresh BIP39 seed phrase so the 24 words can be exported (z_exportmnemonic) and used in SilentDragonXLite (default: %u)"), 0));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-hdtransparentgaplimit=<n>", strprintf(_("On -mnemonic/-hdseed restore, pre-derive this many HD transparent keys so a rescan can find coinbase paid to them (default: %u)"), 1000));
+    strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-mnemonicsaplinggap=<n>", strprintf(_("On -mnemonic/-hdseed restore, pre-derive this many shielded (Sapling) addresses so a rescan can find notes sent to them (default: %u)"), 100));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-consolidation", _("Enable auto Sapling note consolidation (default: false)"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-consolidationinterval", _("Block interval between consolidations (default: 25)"));
     strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-consolidatesaplingaddress=<zaddr>", _("Specify Sapling Address to Consolidate. (default: all)"));
@@ -987,6 +996,123 @@ bool AppInitServers(boost::thread_group& threadGroup)
  */
 extern int32_t HUSH_REWIND;
 
+// --- Adaptive coins-cache sizing -------------------------------------------------------------
+// The in-memory UTXO/coins cache (nCoinCacheUsage) is the biggest lever on IBD speed: a bigger
+// cache means far fewer chainstate flushes to disk. We size it to use most of RAM, but a scheduled
+// background task (AdjustCoinCacheForMemoryPressure, registered in AppInit2) shrinks the target when
+// free system memory runs low — e.g. the user opens other apps — and grows it back when memory frees
+// up, always leaving a reserve free for the rest of the system. The existing per-block flush
+// (FlushStateToDisk, FLUSH_STATE_IF_NEEDED, which fires when cacheSize > nCoinCacheUsage) enforces
+// whatever target is current, so the task only moves the threshold: it never touches cs_main or the
+// flush path. NOTE: the coins cache is application heap, not OS file cache — "freeing" it means an
+// early flush that clears the map; on Linux the allocator returns the pages, on Windows the heap
+// returns them best-effort (RSS may lag), but either way the node stops growing past the target.
+// windows.h / <unistd.h> arrive via compat.h (net.h). Memory helpers return 0 if undeterminable.
+static int64_t GetPhysicalMemoryMB()
+{
+#ifdef WIN32
+    MEMORYSTATUSEX status;
+    status.dwLength = sizeof(status);
+    if (GlobalMemoryStatusEx(&status))
+        return (int64_t)(status.ullTotalPhys / (1024 * 1024));
+    return 0;
+#elif defined(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE)
+    long pages = sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES);
+    long pageSize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+    if (pages > 0 && pageSize > 0)
+        return (int64_t)((int64_t)pages * (int64_t)pageSize / (1024 * 1024));
+    return 0;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+// Currently-available (allocatable) physical RAM in MiB. On Linux uses MemAvailable (counts
+// reclaimable page cache), falling back to truly-free pages.
+static int64_t GetAvailableMemoryMB()
+{
+#ifdef WIN32
+    MEMORYSTATUSEX status;
+    status.dwLength = sizeof(status);
+    if (GlobalMemoryStatusEx(&status))
+        return (int64_t)(status.ullAvailPhys / (1024 * 1024));
+    return 0;
+#else
+    FILE* f = fopen("/proc/meminfo", "r");
+    if (f) {
+        char line[256];
+        long long availKB = -1;
+        while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+            if (sscanf(line, "MemAvailable: %lld kB", &availKB) == 1)
+                break;
+        }
+        fclose(f);
+        if (availKB >= 0)
+            return (int64_t)(availKB / 1024);
+    }
+  #if defined(_SC_AVPHYS_PAGES) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE)
+    long pages = sysconf(_SC_AVPHYS_PAGES);
+    long pageSize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+    if (pages > 0 && pageSize > 0)
+        return (int64_t)((int64_t)pages * (int64_t)pageSize / (1024 * 1024));
+  #endif
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+// RAM (MiB) to always keep free for the OS and other applications: 20% of total, at least 2 GiB.
+static int64_t GetMemoryReserveMB()
+{
+    int64_t ramMB = GetPhysicalMemoryMB();
+    int64_t reserve = (ramMB > 0) ? ramMB / 5 : 2048; // 20%
+    if (reserve < 2048) reserve = 2048;
+    return reserve;
+}
+
+// Startup -dbcache default: use most of RAM (total minus the reserve), clamped to
+// [nDefaultDbCache, nMaxDbCache] MiB. Falls back to the fixed default if RAM can't be detected.
+static int64_t GetDefaultDbCacheMB()
+{
+    int64_t ramMB = GetPhysicalMemoryMB();
+    if (ramMB <= 0)
+        return nDefaultDbCache;
+    int64_t cacheMB = ramMB - GetMemoryReserveMB();
+    if (cacheMB < nDefaultDbCache) cacheMB = nDefaultDbCache;
+    if (cacheMB > nMaxDbCache)     cacheMB = nMaxDbCache;
+    return cacheMB;
+}
+
+// Ceiling (bytes) the adaptive task may grow the coins cache back up to (the startup nCoinCacheUsage).
+static size_t g_nMaxCoinCacheUsage = 0;
+static const int64_t g_nMinCoinCacheMB = 256; // never thrash below this working set
+
+// Scheduled task: nudge nCoinCacheUsage toward "use all RAM except the reserve". If free RAM is below
+// the reserve we shrink the target (the next per-block flush releases the excess); if there is spare
+// RAM we grow it back toward the startup ceiling. nCoinCacheUsage is std::atomic<size_t>, so this
+// cross-thread write (vs the cs_main-held reads in FlushStateToDisk/VerifyDB) is well-defined, no lock needed.
+static void AdjustCoinCacheForMemoryPressure()
+{
+    if (g_nMaxCoinCacheUsage == 0)
+        return; // adaptive sizing disabled (user pinned -dbcache) or RAM undetectable
+    int64_t availMB = GetAvailableMemoryMB();
+    if (availMB <= 0)
+        return; // can't measure pressure; leave the target untouched
+    int64_t reserveMB = GetMemoryReserveMB();
+    // Error term: free RAM beyond the reserve. >0 => spare, grow; <0 => pressure, shrink.
+    int64_t errMB = availMB - reserveMB;
+    // Deadband: ignore small fluctuations so the target settles instead of oscillating.
+    if (errMB > -256 && errMB < 256)
+        return;
+    int64_t curTargetMB = (int64_t)(nCoinCacheUsage >> 20);
+    // Damped proportional step (gain 1/4) toward "free RAM == reserve"; the clamps bound it and the
+    // per-block flush (FLUSH_STATE_IF_NEEDED) enforces a lowered target within ~one block during IBD.
+    int64_t newTargetMB = curTargetMB + errMB / 4;
+    int64_t ceilMB = (int64_t)(g_nMaxCoinCacheUsage >> 20);
+    if (newTargetMB > ceilMB)            newTargetMB = ceilMB;
+    if (newTargetMB < g_nMinCoinCacheMB) newTargetMB = g_nMinCoinCacheMB;
+    nCoinCacheUsage = (size_t)(newTargetMB << 20);
+}
+
 bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
 {
 	//fprintf(stderr,"%s start\n", __FUNCTION__);
@@ -1309,6 +1435,33 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
     else if (nScriptCheckThreads > MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS)
         nScriptCheckThreads = MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS;
 
+    // Parallel RandomX pre-verification threads (speeds up post-checkpoint sync). Defaults to the
+    // script-check thread count — RandomX pre-verify and script checks do not run simultaneously
+    // within a single connect, so they can share the same budget. 0 disables (inline-only).
+    nRandomXVerifyThreads = GetArg("-randomxverifythreads", nScriptCheckThreads);
+    if (nRandomXVerifyThreads < 0)
+        nRandomXVerifyThreads = 0;
+    else if (nRandomXVerifyThreads > MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS)
+        nRandomXVerifyThreads = MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS;
+
+    // Per-peer block-download window (see MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER). Raising this lifts
+    // the bandwidth-delay-product ceiling on high-latency peers during IBD. Clamp to a sane range.
+    MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = GetArg("-maxblocksintransit", DEFAULT_MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER);
+    if (MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER < 1)
+        MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = 1;
+    else if (MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER > (int)BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW) {
+        // Values above BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW are a silent no-op: FindNextBlocksToDownload never fetches
+        // beyond pindexLastCommonBlock + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW, so clamp to the real effective ceiling.
+        LogPrintf("-maxblocksintransit=%d exceeds the effective ceiling BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW=%u; clamping\n", MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER, BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW);
+        MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = (int)BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW;
+    }
+    LogPrintf("Per-peer max blocks in transit: %d\n", MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER);
+
+    // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX). Drives the requester branch in SendMessages and, when
+    // set, also advertises NODE_BULKBLOCKS below so we serve bulk ranges to peers. OFF by default.
+    fBulkBlockSync = GetBoolArg("-bulkblocksync", DEFAULT_BULKBLOCKSYNC);
+    LogPrintf("Bulk block streaming: %s\n", fBulkBlockSync ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+
     fServer = GetBoolArg("-server", false);
 	//fprintf(stderr,"%s tik6\n", __FUNCTION__);
 
@@ -1545,6 +1698,14 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
             threadGroup.create_thread(&ThreadScriptCheck);
     }
 
+    // Spawn the parallel RandomX pre-verification worker pool (the connect thread joins as the Nth
+    // worker via CCheckQueueControl::Wait, so spawn N-1 here, mirroring ThreadScriptCheck).
+    if (ASSETCHAINS_ALGO == ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX && nRandomXVerifyThreads > 0) {
+        LogPrintf("Using %u threads for parallel RandomX pre-verification\n", nRandomXVerifyThreads);
+        for (int i = 0; i < nRandomXVerifyThreads - 1; i++)
+            threadGroup.create_thread(&ThreadRandomXVerify);
+    }
+
 	//fprintf(stderr,"%s tik13\n", __FUNCTION__);
 
     // Start the lightweight task scheduler thread
@@ -1840,14 +2001,20 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
     LogPrintf("* Compression is %s\n", dbCompression ? "enabled" : "disabled");
 
     // cache size calculations
-    int64_t nTotalCache = (GetArg("-dbcache", nDefaultDbCache) << 20);
+    int64_t nTotalCache = (GetArg("-dbcache", GetDefaultDbCacheMB()) << 20);
     nTotalCache = std::max(nTotalCache, nMinDbCache << 20); // total cache cannot be less than nMinDbCache
     nTotalCache = std::min(nTotalCache, nMaxDbCache << 20); // total cache cannot be greated than nMaxDbcache
     int64_t nBlockTreeDBCache = nTotalCache / 8;
 
     if (GetBoolArg("-addressindex", DEFAULT_ADDRESSINDEX) || GetBoolArg("-spentindex", DEFAULT_SPENTINDEX)) {
-        // enable 3/4 of the cache if addressindex and/or spentindex is enabled
+        // Give indexed (address/spent-index) nodes a larger index LevelDB read cache, but CAP it.
+        // With adaptive dbcache, nTotalCache is now multi-GB, so 3/4 of it is several GB -- far more
+        // than the index cache can use, while starving the in-memory UTXO set that actually speeds
+        // IBD (and this chunk is not shrinkable by the memory-pressure controller, which only adjusts
+        // the coins cache). Cap at 1 GiB so the adaptive budget flows to the coins cache. Tunable.
         nBlockTreeDBCache = nTotalCache * 3 / 4;
+        if (nBlockTreeDBCache > ((int64_t)1024 << 20))
+            nBlockTreeDBCache = ((int64_t)1024 << 20);
     } else {
         if (nBlockTreeDBCache > (1 << 21) && !GetBoolArg("-txindex", false)) {
             nBlockTreeDBCache = (1 << 21); // block tree db cache shouldn't be larger than 2 MiB
@@ -1857,6 +2024,14 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
     int64_t nCoinDBCache = std::min(nTotalCache / 2, (nTotalCache / 4) + (1 << 23)); // use 25%-50% of the remainder for disk cache
     nTotalCache -= nCoinDBCache;
     nCoinCacheUsage = nTotalCache; // the rest goes to in-memory cache
+    // Adaptive sizing: unless the user pinned -dbcache, grow/shrink the coins cache with free system
+    // memory (AdjustCoinCacheForMemoryPressure), using the startup size as the ceiling.
+    if (!mapArgs.count("-dbcache")) {
+        g_nMaxCoinCacheUsage = nCoinCacheUsage;
+        scheduler.scheduleEvery(&AdjustCoinCacheForMemoryPressure, 5);
+        LogPrintf("* Adaptive dbcache enabled: ceiling %.0fMiB, keeping >= %lldMiB RAM free for the system\n",
+                  nCoinCacheUsage * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024), (long long)GetMemoryReserveMB());
+    }
     LogPrintf("Cache configuration:\n");
     LogPrintf("* Max cache setting possible %.1fMiB\n", nMaxDbCache);
     LogPrintf("* Using %.1fMiB for block index database\n", nBlockTreeDBCache * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024));
@@ -1908,7 +2083,25 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
                 pcoinsdbview   = new CCoinsViewDB(nCoinDBCache, false, fReindex);
                 pcoinscatcher  = new CCoinsViewErrorCatcher(pcoinsdbview);
                 pcoinsTip      = new CCoinsViewCache(pcoinscatcher);
+                try {
                     pnotarizations = new NotarizationDB(100*1024*1024, false, fReindex);
+                } catch (const std::exception& e) {
+                    // The notarizations (dPoW) DB is non-essential and node-regenerable. It has been seen to
+                    // snapshot/flush torn (0-byte log -> leveldb "Database I/O error" on reopen), which
+                    // previously aborted startup with a spurious "Error opening block database" and forced a
+                    // full resync. Wipe and recreate it instead of failing hard.
+                    LogPrintf("%s: notarizations DB failed to open (%s); moving aside and regenerating (non-fatal)\n", __FUNCTION__, e.what());
+                    // Move (do NOT delete) the old DB aside, so a transient open failure (fd
+                    // exhaustion, disk full, permissions) cannot permanently destroy notarization
+                    // history. If the recreate below also fails it propagates as fatal and the old
+                    // data survives in notarizations.corrupt for recovery.
+                    {
+                        boost::filesystem::path ndir = GetDataDir() / "notarizations";
+                        boost::filesystem::remove_all(ndir.string() + ".corrupt");
+                        boost::filesystem::rename(ndir, ndir.string() + ".corrupt");
+                    }
+                    pnotarizations = new NotarizationDB(100*1024*1024, false, true);
+                }
 
 
                 if (fReindex) {
@@ -1938,6 +2131,7 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
                     strLoadError = _("Error initializing block database");
                     break;
                 }
+
                 HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS = 0;
                 // Check for changed -txindex state
                 if (fTxIndex != GetBoolArg("-txindex", true)) {
@@ -2106,11 +2300,57 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
         }
 
         if (!pwalletMain->HaveHDSeed())
+        {
+            std::string mnemonic  = GetArg("-mnemonic", "");
+            std::string hdSeedHex = GetArg("-hdseed", "");
+            bool restoring = false;
+
+            if (!mnemonic.empty() && !hdSeedHex.empty())
+                return InitError(_("Specify only one of -mnemonic or -hdseed, not both"));
+
+            if (!mnemonic.empty())
+            {
+                // Restore/create a wallet from a BIP39 seed phrase, byte-compatible
+                // with SilentDragonXLite. Must be a fresh/empty wallet.
+                if (!pwalletMain->SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(mnemonic))
+                    return InitError(_("Invalid -mnemonic: expected a valid BIP39 English phrase on a fresh/empty wallet"));
+                LogPrintf("%s: restoring wallet from -mnemonic seed phrase\n", __func__);
+                restoring = true;
+            }
+            else if (!hdSeedHex.empty())
+            {
+                // Restore from a previously exported HD seed hex (z_exportwallet's
+                // "# HDSeed=" line): 32 bytes (raw) or 64 bytes (BIP39-derived).
+                if (!pwalletMain->SetHDSeedFromHex(hdSeedHex))
+                    return InitError(_("Invalid -hdseed: expected a 32- or 64-hex-character seed on a fresh/empty wallet"));
+                LogPrintf("%s: restoring wallet from -hdseed\n", __func__);
+                restoring = true;
+            }
+            else
             {
                 // generate a new HD seed
                 pwalletMain->GenerateNewSeed();
             }
 
+            if (restoring)
+            {
+                // Pre-derive keys (birthday = genesis) so the startup rescan finds
+                // funds paid to them: transparent coinbase + shielded notes.
+                int64_t tGap = GetArg("-hdtransparentgaplimit", 1000);
+                if (tGap < 0) tGap = 0;
+                pwalletMain->TopUpHDTransparentKeys((unsigned int)tGap, 1);
+
+                int64_t zGap = GetArg("-mnemonicsaplinggap", 100);
+                if (zGap < 0) zGap = 0;
+                {
+                    LOCK(pwalletMain->cs_wallet);
+                    for (int i = 0; i < (int)zGap; i++)
+                        pwalletMain->GenerateNewSaplingZKey();
+                }
+                LogPrintf("%s: pre-derived %d transparent and %d sapling keys for restore rescan\n", __func__, (int)tGap, (int)zGap);
+            }
+        }
+
         //Set Sapling Consolidation
         pwalletMain->fSaplingConsolidationEnabled = GetBoolArg("-consolidation", false);
         if(pwalletMain->fSaplingConsolidationEnabled) {
@@ -2380,6 +2620,9 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
             nLocalServices |= NODE_ADDRINDEX;
         if ( GetBoolArg("-spentindex", DEFAULT_SPENTINDEX) != 0 )
             nLocalServices |= NODE_SPENTINDEX;
+        // Advertise willingness to SERVE bulk block streams (full nodes only) when opted in.
+        if ( fBulkBlockSync )
+            nLocalServices |= NODE_BULKBLOCKS;
         fprintf(stderr,"nLocalServices %llx %d, %d\n",(long long)nLocalServices,GetBoolArg("-addressindex", DEFAULT_ADDRESSINDEX),GetBoolArg("-spentindex", DEFAULT_SPENTINDEX));
     }
     // ********************************************************* Step 10: import blocks

src/key.h

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
  */
 typedef std::vector<unsigned char, secure_allocator<unsigned char> > CPrivKey;
 
+/** BIP32: child indices at or above this are hardened. */
+const unsigned int BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT = 0x80000000;
+
 /** An encapsulated private key. */
 class CKey
 {

src/leveldb/port/atomic_pointer.h

@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ namespace port {
 
 // Mac OS
 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
+#include <atomic>
 inline void MemoryBarrier() {
-  OSMemoryBarrier();
+  std::atomic_thread_fence(std::memory_order_seq_cst);
 }
 #define LEVELDB_HAVE_MEMORY_BARRIER
 

src/main.cpp

@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int64_t nTimeBestReceived = 0;
 CWaitableCriticalSection csBestBlock;
 CConditionVariable cvBlockChange;
 int nScriptCheckThreads = 0;
+int MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = DEFAULT_MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER;
+bool fBulkBlockSync = DEFAULT_BULKBLOCKSYNC;
+// Server-side flood throttle: minimum interval between bulk serves to the same peer (main.cpp-local
+// since only the serve handler uses it; kept out of main.h to avoid a full-tree recompile).
+static const int64_t BULK_MIN_SERVE_INTERVAL_US = 50000; // 50 ms => <= 20 bulk serves/s/peer
+int nRandomXVerifyThreads = 0; // parallel RandomX pre-verification worker count (0 = inline only)
 bool fExperimentalMode = true;
 bool fImporting = false;
 bool fReindex = false;
@@ -103,7 +109,7 @@ bool fIsBareMultisigStd = true;
 bool fCheckBlockIndex = false;
 bool fCheckpointsEnabled = true;
 bool fCoinbaseEnforcedProtectionEnabled = true;
-size_t nCoinCacheUsage = 5000 * 300;
+std::atomic<size_t> nCoinCacheUsage(5000 * 300);
 uint64_t nPruneTarget = 0;
 // If the tip is older than this (in seconds), the node is considered to be in initial block download.
 int64_t nMaxTipAge = DEFAULT_MAX_TIP_AGE;
@@ -247,6 +253,7 @@ namespace {
         int64_t nTime;  //! Time of "getdata" request in microseconds.
         bool fValidatedHeaders;  //! Whether this block has validated headers at the time of request.
         int64_t nTimeDisconnect; //! The timeout for this block request (for disconnecting a slow peer)
+        bool fBulk;              //! Requested as part of a bulk stream range (exempt from the front() stall-disconnect).
     };
     map<uint256, pair<NodeId, list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> > mapBlocksInFlight;
 
@@ -306,6 +313,21 @@ namespace {
         int nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders;
         //! Whether we consider this a preferred download peer.
         bool fPreferredDownload;
+        //! Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): whether a bulk range request is outstanding to this peer.
+        bool fBulkInFlight;
+        //! Time (us) the outstanding bulk request was issued, for the response timeout/fallback.
+        int64_t nBulkSince;
+        //! Height of the first block in the outstanding bulk range.
+        int nBulkRangeStart;
+        //! Number of blocks requested in the outstanding bulk range.
+        int nBulkRangeCount;
+        //! Hash of the first block of the outstanding bulk range (request identity; the server echoes it
+        //! in the BLOCKSTREAM header so a stale/duplicate header for an old request can be ignored).
+        uint256 nBulkHashStart;
+        //! Whether the (one-shot) trailing BLOCKSTREAM header for the outstanding request was processed.
+        bool fBulkHeaderSeen;
+        //! (server side) time (us) we last served a bulk stream to this peer, for flood throttling.
+        int64_t nLastBulkServeTime;
 
         CNodeState() {
             fCurrentlyConnected = false;
@@ -319,6 +341,13 @@ namespace {
             nBlocksInFlight = 0;
             nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = 0;
             fPreferredDownload = false;
+            fBulkInFlight = false;
+            nBulkSince = 0;
+            nBulkRangeStart = 0;
+            nBulkRangeCount = 0;
+            nBulkHashStart.SetNull();
+            fBulkHeaderSeen = false;
+            nLastBulkServeTime = 0;
         }
     };
 
@@ -385,14 +414,14 @@ namespace {
 
     void LimitMempoolSize(CTxMemPool& pool, size_t limit, unsigned long age)
     {
-        /*    int expired = pool.Expire(GetTime() - age);
+        int expired = pool.Expire(GetTime() - age);
         if (expired != 0)
             LogPrint("mempool", "Expired %i transactions from the memory pool\n", expired);
 
-         std::vector<uint256> vNoSpendsRemaining;
+        // Fee-order trim to the size limit. (Upstream also pcoinsTip->Uncache()s the coins freed
-         pool.TrimToSize(limit, &vNoSpendsRemaining);
+        // by eviction, but CCoinsViewCache has no Uncache() in this fork -- it is only a UTXO-cache
-         BOOST_FOREACH(const uint256& removed, vNoSpendsRemaining)
+        // perf hint, not eviction correctness, so it is skipped.)
-         pcoinsTip->Uncache(removed);*/
+        pool.TrimToSize(limit);
     }
 
     // Requires cs_main.
@@ -413,7 +442,7 @@ namespace {
     }
 
     // Requires cs_main.
-    void MarkBlockAsInFlight(NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, CBlockIndex *pindex = NULL) {
+    void MarkBlockAsInFlight(NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, CBlockIndex *pindex = NULL, bool fBulk = false) {
         CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
         assert(state != NULL);
 
@@ -421,7 +450,7 @@ namespace {
         MarkBlockAsReceived(hash);
 
         int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros();
-        QueuedBlock newentry = {hash, pindex, nNow, pindex != NULL, GetBlockTimeout(nNow, nQueuedValidatedHeaders, consensusParams)};
+        QueuedBlock newentry = {hash, pindex, nNow, pindex != NULL, GetBlockTimeout(nNow, nQueuedValidatedHeaders, consensusParams), fBulk};
         nQueuedValidatedHeaders += newentry.fValidatedHeaders;
         list<QueuedBlock>::iterator it = state->vBlocksInFlight.insert(state->vBlocksInFlight.end(), newentry);
         state->nBlocksInFlight++;
@@ -429,6 +458,36 @@ namespace {
         mapBlocksInFlight[hash] = std::make_pair(nodeid, it);
     }
 
+    // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): free this peer's still-in-flight bulk blocks whose height
+    // falls in [hStart, hEnd), so the normal per-block path re-fetches them. We scan the peer's OWN
+    // vBlocksInFlight by the LITERAL hash marked at request time (via the stored pindex) rather than
+    // re-deriving hashes from the mutable pindexBestKnownBlock - the latter would miss the real entries
+    // after a reorg (leaking in-flight slots) and can never touch another peer's blocks. Requires cs_main.
+    void FreeBulkRangeInFlight(CNodeState* state, int hStart, int hEnd) {
+        if (state == NULL) return;
+        std::vector<uint256> toFree; // collect first: MarkBlockAsReceived erases from vBlocksInFlight
+        BOOST_FOREACH(const QueuedBlock& q, state->vBlocksInFlight) {
+            if (q.fBulk && q.pindex != NULL) {
+                int h = q.pindex->GetHeight();
+                if (h >= hStart && h < hEnd) toFree.push_back(q.hash);
+            }
+        }
+        BOOST_FOREACH(const uint256& hh, toFree)
+            MarkBlockAsReceived(hh);
+    }
+    // True if any of this peer's bulk blocks with height in [hStart, hEnd) is still in flight (range not
+    // fully drained). Completion is decided by the RANGE draining, not the global per-peer window count.
+    bool BulkRangeInFlight(CNodeState* state, int hStart, int hEnd) {
+        if (state == NULL) return false;
+        BOOST_FOREACH(const QueuedBlock& q, state->vBlocksInFlight) {
+            if (q.fBulk && q.pindex != NULL) {
+                int h = q.pindex->GetHeight();
+                if (h >= hStart && h < hEnd) return true;
+            }
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+
     /** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertized is not yet known. */
     void ProcessBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid) {
         CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
@@ -485,7 +544,7 @@ namespace {
 
     /** Update pindexLastCommonBlock and add not-in-flight missing successors to vBlocks, until it has
      *  at most count entries. */
-    void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBlockIndex*>& vBlocks, NodeId& nodeStaller) {
+    void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBlockIndex*>& vBlocks, NodeId& nodeStaller, CBlockIndex** pFrontierStuck = NULL) {
         if (count == 0)
             return;
 
@@ -562,8 +621,9 @@ namespace {
                         return;
                     }
                 } else if (waitingfor == -1) {
-                    // This is the first already-in-flight block.
+                    // This is the first already-in-flight block (the download frontier).
                     waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight[pindex->GetBlockHash()].first;
+                    if (pFrontierStuck) *pFrontierStuck = pindex;
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -1223,6 +1283,16 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(int32_t slowflag,const CBlock *block, CBlockInde
     const bool overwinterActive = nHeight >=1 ? true : false; //NetworkUpgradeActive(nHeight, Params().GetConsensus(), Consensus::UPGRADE_OVERWINTER);
     const bool saplingActive    = nHeight >=1 ? true : false; //NetworkUpgradeActive(nHeight, Params().GetConsensus(), Consensus::UPGRADE_SAPLING);
 
+    // SECURITY FIX (JoinSplit inflation): reject Sprout JoinSplits at consensus. DragonX is
+    // Sapling-only from genesis (zero JoinSplits in its entire history, verified by the mainnet
+    // supply audit); a tx carrying one is illegitimate. Their zk-proof/sig/nullifier/anchor are
+    // never verified while vpub_new is counted as transparent value-in -> unlimited inflation.
+    // Coinbase/notary (IsMint) exempt. Unconditional is safe: no historical block has a JoinSplit.
+    if (!tx.IsMint() && !tx.vjoinsplit.empty()) {
+        return state.DoS(100, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sprout JoinSplits are disabled (inflation vector)"),
+                         REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-joinsplit-disabled");
+    }
+
     if (saplingActive) {
         // Reject transactions with valid version but missing overwintered flag
         if (tx.nVersion >= SAPLING_MIN_TX_VERSION && !tx.fOverwintered) {
@@ -2024,6 +2094,17 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
             if (fSpentIndex) {
                 pool.addSpentIndex(entry, view);
             }
+
+            // Bound mempool memory with fee-ordered eviction. Now that the tx is in, if the pool
+            // exceeds -maxmempool, TrimToSize drops the lowest-feerate txs -- so a higher-fee tx
+            // DISPLACES lower-fee ones instead of being bluntly rejected. If this very tx was the one
+            // evicted (its feerate was the lowest in the pool), it does not belong here -- reject it.
+            size_t maxmempool = (size_t)GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000;
+            if ( pool.DynamicMemoryUsage() > maxmempool ) {
+                pool.TrimToSize(maxmempool);
+                if ( !pool.exists(hash) )
+                    return state.DoS(0, error("AcceptToMemoryPool: mempool full, tx %s evicted (feerate too low)", hash.ToString()), REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool-full");
+            }
         }
     }
     return true;
@@ -3472,6 +3553,19 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
                          error("ConnectBlock(): block's hashFinalSaplingRoot is incorrect"),
                                REJECT_INVALID, "bad-sapling-root-in-block");
         }
+        // Turnstile / inflation guard (belt-and-suspenders to the per-tx binding-signature check):
+        // the cumulative Sapling value pool must never go negative -- a block cannot deshield more
+        // value than was ever shielded. Enforced ONLY when the pool is reliably tracked: pprev's
+        // nChainSaplingValue is engaged only if every ancestor since genesis had a known per-block
+        // value (nSaplingValue). On old/snapshot-bootstrapped nodes it is none -> guard dormant
+        // (until reindex), so this can never false-reject a valid block or split the chain.
+        if (pindex->pprev && pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue) {
+            CAmount blockSaplingValue = 0;
+            for (const CTransaction& btx : block.vtx)
+                blockSaplingValue += -btx.valueBalance;
+            if (*pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue + blockSaplingValue < 0)
+                return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): Sapling value pool would go negative (turnstile/inflation violation)"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-sapling-value-pool-negative");
+        }
     }
     int64_t nTime1 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeConnect += nTime1 - nTimeStart;
     LogPrint("bench", "      - Connect %u transactions: %.2fms (%.3fms/tx, %.3fms/txin) [%.2fs]\n", (unsigned)block.vtx.size(), 0.001 * (nTime1 - nTimeStart), 0.001 * (nTime1 - nTimeStart) / block.vtx.size(), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : 0.001 * (nTime1 - nTimeStart) / (nInputs-1), nTimeConnect * 0.000001);
@@ -4004,6 +4098,10 @@ bool static ConnectTip(CValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindexNew, CBlock *
         uiInterface.NotifyTxExpiration(id);
     }
 
+    // Bound mempool memory on each block: age-expire (-mempoolexpiry) then fee-order trim to
+    // -maxmempool, evicting the lowest-feerate txs (+ descendants) and uncaching their coins.
+    LimitMempoolSize(mempool, GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60);
+
     // Update chainActive & related variables.
     UpdateTip(pindexNew);
         
@@ -4188,6 +4286,7 @@ static bool ActivateBestChainStep(bool fSkipdpow, CValidationState &state, CBloc
         return state.DoS(100, error("ActivateBestChainStep(): pindexOldTip->GetHeight().%d > notarizedht %d && pindexFork->GetHeight().%d is < notarizedht %d, so ignore it",(int32_t)pindexOldTip->GetHeight(),notarizedht,(int32_t)pindexFork->GetHeight(),notarizedht),
                 REJECT_INVALID, "past-notarized-height");
     }
+
     // - On ChainDB initialization, pindexOldTip will be null, so there are no removable blocks.
     // - If pindexMostWork is in a chain that doesn't have the same genesis block as our chain,
     //   then pindexFork will be null, and we would need to remove the entire chain including
@@ -4258,6 +4357,36 @@ static bool ActivateBestChainStep(bool fSkipdpow, CValidationState &state, CBloc
         }
         nHeight = nTargetHeight;
 
+        // Parallel RandomX pre-verification (Stage 4): verify this about-to-be-connected window's
+        // PoW on the worker pool BEFORE the serial connect, so ConnectBlock rarely pays the
+        // ~tens-of-ms light-mode hash. Pure optimization — CheckBlockHeader's inline
+        // CheckRandomXSolution still verifies anything not pre-verified, so consensus is unchanged.
+        // We hold cs_main; key derivation + the disk reads happen here on the main thread, and the
+        // pool workers receive only value-type work items (no cs_main, no chainstate pointers).
+        if (nRandomXVerifyThreads > 0 && rxCheckQueue.IsIdle()) {
+            std::map<std::string, std::vector<CRandomXCheck> > rxGroups; // grouped by RandomX key
+            BOOST_FOREACH(CBlockIndex *pidx, vpindexToConnect) {
+                if (pidx->fRandomXVerified || !RandomXValidationRequired(pidx->GetHeight()))
+                    continue;
+                std::string rxKey = GetRandomXKey(pidx->GetHeight());
+                if (rxKey.empty())
+                    continue; // can't derive key -> inline fallback
+                CBlock blk;
+                if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(blk, pidx, false))
+                    continue; // -> inline fallback
+                if (blk.nSolution.size() != 32) // RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE; wrong size -> inline (will error)
+                    continue;
+                rxGroups[rxKey].push_back(CRandomXCheck(rxKey, GetRandomXInput(blk), blk.nSolution.data(), &pidx->fRandomXVerified));
+            }
+            for (std::map<std::string, std::vector<CRandomXCheck> >::iterator it = rxGroups.begin(); it != rxGroups.end(); ++it) {
+                if (!RandomXValidatorPrepareKey(it->first))
+                    break; // cache alloc failed -> leave the rest for the inline fallback
+                CCheckQueueControl<CRandomXCheck> control(&rxCheckQueue);
+                control.Add(it->second);
+                control.Wait();
+            }
+        }
+
         // Connect new blocks.
         BOOST_REVERSE_FOREACH(CBlockIndex *pindexConnect, vpindexToConnect) {
             if (!ConnectTip(state, pindexConnect, pindexConnect == pindexMostWork ? pblock : NULL)) {
@@ -4719,8 +4848,8 @@ bool ReceivedBlockTransactions(const CBlock &block, CValidationState& state, CBl
                 } else {
                     pindex->nChainSproutValue = boost::none;
                 }
-                if (pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue) {
+                if (pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue && pindex->nSaplingValue) {
-                    pindex->nChainSaplingValue = *pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue + pindex->nSaplingValue;
+                    pindex->nChainSaplingValue = *pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue + *pindex->nSaplingValue;
                 } else {
                     pindex->nChainSaplingValue = boost::none;
                 }
@@ -4993,7 +5122,11 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,
     {
         if ( !CheckEquihashSolution(&blockhdr, Params()) )
             return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlockHeader(): Equihash solution invalid"),REJECT_INVALID, "invalid-solution");
-        if ( !CheckRandomXSolution(&blockhdr, height) )
+        // Skip the inline RandomX recompute only if the parallel pre-verify pool already verified
+        // THIS block (fRandomXVerified set 1:1 on a real hash match). Every other case — pool miss,
+        // straggler, disabled pool, or any pindex==NULL caller (TestBlockValidity/VerifyDB/header
+        // accept) — falls through to the inline check, so consensus is unchanged.
+        if ( !(pindex && pindex->fRandomXVerified) && !CheckRandomXSolution(&blockhdr, height) )
             return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlockHeader(): RandomX solution invalid"),REJECT_INVALID, "invalid-randomx-solution");
     }
     // Check proof of work matches claimed amount
@@ -5005,6 +5138,14 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,
 
 int32_t hush_checkPOW(int32_t slowflag,CBlock *pblock,int32_t height);
 
+// RAII: save+restore the thread-local RandomX-skip flag around the verify-once dedup in CheckBlock,
+// so it can never clobber the miner's own fSkipRandomXValidation (TestBlockValidity -> ConnectBlock
+// re-entry) nor leak TRUE on an exception thrown out of hush_checkPOW.
+struct ScopedRandomXSkip {
+    bool prev;
+    ScopedRandomXSkip() : prev(GetSkipRandomXValidation()) { SetSkipRandomXValidation(true); }
+    ~ScopedRandomXSkip() { SetSkipRandomXValidation(prev); }
+};
 bool CheckBlock(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state,
                 libzcash::ProofVerifier& verifier,
                 bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot)
@@ -5035,9 +5176,17 @@ bool CheckBlock(int32_t *futureblockp,int32_t height,CBlockIndex *pindex,const C
             fprintf(stderr," failed hash ht.%d\n",height);
             return state.DoS(50, error("CheckBlock: proof of work failed"),REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash");
         }
-        if ( ASSETCHAINS_STAKED == 0 && hush_checkPOW(1,(CBlock *)&block,height) < 0 ) // checks Equihash
+        if ( ASSETCHAINS_STAKED == 0 ) {
+            // verify-once: CheckBlockHeader above already verified this block RandomX solution; skip the
+            // redundant recompute inside hush_checkPOW (the un-deduped 2nd verify, ~half the RandomX cost
+            // that dominates IBD). The scoped guard saves/restores the skip flag (never hardcodes false)
+            // so the miner's own skip is preserved and nothing leaks on throw. Equihash + PoW-target in
+            // hush_checkPOW still run.
+            ScopedRandomXSkip _rxskip;
+            if ( hush_checkPOW(1,(CBlock *)&block,height) < 0 )
                 return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock: failed slow_checkPOW"),REJECT_INVALID, "failed-slow_checkPOW");
         }
+    }
 	
     // Check the merkle root.
     if (fCheckMerkleRoot) {
@@ -5844,8 +5993,8 @@ bool static LoadBlockIndexDB()
                     } else {
                         pindex->nChainSproutValue = boost::none;
                     }
-                    if (pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue) {
+                    if (pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue && pindex->nSaplingValue) {
-                        pindex->nChainSaplingValue = *pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue + pindex->nSaplingValue;
+                        pindex->nChainSaplingValue = *pindex->pprev->nChainSaplingValue + *pindex->nSaplingValue;
                     } else {
                         pindex->nChainSaplingValue = boost::none;
                     }
@@ -6221,7 +6370,7 @@ bool RewindBlockIndex(const CChainParams& params, bool& clearWitnessCaches)
             pindexIter->nChainTx = 0;
             pindexIter->nSproutValue = boost::none;
             pindexIter->nChainSproutValue = boost::none;
-            pindexIter->nSaplingValue = 0;
+            pindexIter->nSaplingValue = boost::none;
             pindexIter->nChainSaplingValue = boost::none;
             pindexIter->nSequenceId = 0;
 
@@ -6746,6 +6895,13 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
     std::deque<CInv>::iterator it = pfrom->vRecvGetData.begin();
 
     vector<CInv> vNotFound;
+    // Serve up to this many blocks per ProcessGetData pass. The old code broke after a SINGLE block,
+    // so a 16-block getdata was dribbled out one block per message-handler tick (~100ms), throttling
+    // block download for every peer fetching from us. Bound the per-pass work (cs_main is held while
+    // reading blocks from disk); any remainder is served on the next pass (the message handler keeps
+    // fSleep=false while vRecvGetData is non-empty, so there is no 100ms park between passes).
+    const unsigned int nMaxBlocksServedPerPass = 16;
+    unsigned int nBlocksServed = 0;
 
     LOCK(cs_main);
 
@@ -6788,7 +6944,15 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
                     CBlock block;
                     if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, (*mi).second,1))
                     {
-                        assert(!"cannot load block from disk");
+                        // A block we advertised (BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) failed to load from disk: a transient
+                        // I/O error or on-disk corruption. This previously asserted and crashed the whole
+                        // node -- any peer getdata for such a block could take us down. Log and drop this
+                        // peer instead; it can re-fetch from another node. (The bulk GETBLOCKSTREAM serve
+                        // path already fails gracefully rather than asserting.)
+                        LogPrintf("%s: ReadBlockFromDisk failed for block %s (peer=%i);"
+                                  " disconnecting peer instead of asserting\n",
+                                  __func__, inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId());
+                        pfrom->fDisconnect = true;
                     }
                     else
                     {
@@ -6863,7 +7027,10 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
                 }
             }
 
-            if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK)
+            // Serve a bounded batch of blocks per pass rather than one (see nMaxBlocksServedPerPass
+            // above). The send-buffer gate at the top of the loop still pauses us if the buffer fills;
+            // this counter bounds the cs_main hold for a (possibly malicious) large getdata.
+            if ((inv.type == MSG_BLOCK || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) && ++nBlocksServed >= nMaxBlocksServedPerPass)
                 break;
         }
     }
@@ -7666,7 +7833,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
                 if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS) && futureblock == 0)
                 {
                     if (nDoS > 0 && futureblock == 0)
-                        Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS/nDoS);
+                        Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS);
                     return error("invalid header received");
                 }
             }
@@ -7688,6 +7855,118 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
         }
 
         CheckBlockIndex();
+    } else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKSTREAM) {
+        // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): a peer asks us to stream a contiguous range of
+        // old blocks as back-to-back BLOCK messages. We only honor it if we advertised the bit
+        // (i.e. were started with -bulkblocksync) and we are not mid-import/reindex.
+        if ((nLocalServices & NODE_BULKBLOCKS) == 0 || fImporting || fReindex)
+            return true;
+        uint256 hashStart; int32_t nStartHeight; uint16_t nCount;
+        vRecv >> hashStart >> nStartHeight >> nCount;
+
+        // Resolve the range under cs_main (cheap, no disk I/O), then read + stream the blocks WITHOUT
+        // holding the lock, so a 128-block / 8 MiB serve never holds cs_main across disk reads (the
+        // analogous ProcessGetData caps per-pass work precisely because it reads under cs_main).
+        std::vector<CBlockIndex*> vSend;
+        int firstH = -1;
+        bool refuse = false;
+        {
+            LOCK(cs_main);
+            if (nCount == 0 || nCount > BULK_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_REQUEST) {
+                Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 20); // mirrors the getdata MAX_INV_SZ penalty
+                return true;
+            }
+            // Light flood throttle: at most one bulk serve per peer per BULK_MIN_SERVE_INTERVAL_US. On
+            // throttle, send a refusal header so the requester falls back immediately (not after 90s).
+            int64_t nNowServe = GetTimeMicros();
+            CNodeState* sst = State(pfrom->GetId());
+            if (sst != NULL && sst->nLastBulkServeTime > nNowServe - BULK_MIN_SERVE_INTERVAL_US) {
+                pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::BLOCKSTREAM, hashStart, (int32_t)-1, (uint16_t)0);
+                return true;
+            }
+            if (sst != NULL) sst->nLastBulkServeTime = nNowServe;
+
+            BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashStart);
+            // Don't flood old blocks while WE are still syncing (unless allowlisted); only serve blocks
+            // on our active chain at the height the requester expects (nStartHeight, tamper-checked).
+            if ((IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom->fAllowlisted) ||
+                mi == mapBlockIndex.end() || !chainActive.Contains(mi->second) ||
+                mi->second->GetHeight() != nStartHeight) {
+                refuse = true;
+            } else {
+                CBlockIndex* pindex = mi->second;
+                firstH = pindex->GetHeight();
+                for (uint16_t i = 0; i < nCount && pindex != NULL; i++, pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex)) {
+                    if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) == 0) break; // pruned/missing
+                    vSend.push_back(pindex);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (refuse) {
+            pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::BLOCKSTREAM, hashStart, (int32_t)-1, (uint16_t)0);
+            return true;
+        }
+        // Read from disk + stream OUTSIDE cs_main. CBlockIndex pointers are stable and block files are
+        // append-only, so reading by pindex without the lock is safe (a concurrent reorg cannot delete
+        // block data, and the requester validates every block against its own headers regardless).
+        uint16_t nSent = 0;
+        size_t cumBytes = 0;
+        BOOST_FOREACH(CBlockIndex* pb, vSend) {
+            if (pfrom->nSendSize >= SendBufferSize()) break;          // send-buffer backpressure
+            boost::this_thread::interruption_point();
+            CBlock block;
+            if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pb, 1)) break;              // graceful, never assert
+            size_t sz = GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+            if (nSent > 0 && cumBytes + sz > BULK_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) break; // total byte cap
+            cumBytes += sz;
+            pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::BLOCK, block);
+            nSent++;
+        }
+        // Trailing control header carries the ACTUAL count sent (authoritative), so the requester can
+        // free any undelivered tail immediately rather than waiting for the bulk response timeout.
+        pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::BLOCKSTREAM, hashStart, (int32_t)firstH, nSent);
+        LogPrint("net", "Bulk stream serve: %u/%u blocks from height %d (%lu bytes) peer=%d\n",
+                 (unsigned)nSent, (unsigned)nCount, firstH, (unsigned long)cumBytes, pfrom->id);
+        return true;
+    } else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCKSTREAM) {
+        // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): the trailing control header for a streamed range. The
+        // blocks themselves arrive as ordinary BLOCK messages (handled below); this reconciles what the
+        // peer actually delivered so the undelivered tail (or a refusal) falls back at once instead of
+        // waiting for the bulk timeout. Service bits are unauthenticated, so we ignore anything that
+        // doesn't match our exact outstanding request.
+        uint256 hashStart; int32_t nFirstHeight; uint16_t nBlocks;
+        vRecv >> hashStart >> nFirstHeight >> nBlocks;
+
+        LOCK(cs_main);
+        CNodeState* state = State(pfrom->GetId());
+        if (state == NULL || !state->fBulkInFlight)
+            return true;                                   // nothing outstanding
+        if (hashStart != state->nBulkHashStart)
+            return true;                                   // header for a different/stale request; ignore
+        if (state->fBulkHeaderSeen)
+            return true;                                   // one-shot: already reconciled this request
+        state->fBulkHeaderSeen = true;
+
+        // nBlocks==0 (refusal) or an over-count => free our whole outstanding range and fall back.
+        // 0 < nBlocks <= count => the peer commits to that many; free only the undelivered tail now.
+        // FreeBulkRangeInFlight scans THIS peer's vBlocksInFlight by literal hash, so it only ever frees
+        // heights still genuinely in flight to this peer (no cross-peer effect, reorg-proof).
+        bool refuse  = (nBlocks == 0 || nBlocks > state->nBulkRangeCount);
+        int  deliver = refuse ? 0 : (int)nBlocks;
+        FreeBulkRangeInFlight(state, state->nBulkRangeStart + deliver,
+                                     state->nBulkRangeStart + state->nBulkRangeCount);
+        if (refuse) {
+            state->fBulkInFlight = false;
+            pfrom->nServices &= ~(uint64_t)NODE_BULKBLOCKS; // local hint: don't retry bulk on this peer
+            LogPrint("net", "Bulk stream refused by peer=%d (nBlocks=%u), falling back\n", pfrom->id, (unsigned)nBlocks);
+        } else {
+            // Track only what was promised; fBulkInFlight clears once that prefix fully drains
+            // (range-drain check in SendMessages) or via the timeout fallback.
+            state->nBulkRangeCount = deliver;
+            if (deliver == 0)
+                state->fBulkInFlight = false;
+        }
+        return true;
     } else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK && !fImporting && !fReindex) // Ignore blocks received while importing
     {
         CBlock block;
@@ -8133,24 +8412,108 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
                 LogPrint("net", "Reducing block download timeout for peer=%d block=%s, orig=%d new=%d\n", pto->id, queuedBlock.hash.ToString(), queuedBlock.nTimeDisconnect, nTimeoutIfRequestedNow);
                 queuedBlock.nTimeDisconnect = nTimeoutIfRequestedNow;
             }
-            if (queuedBlock.nTimeDisconnect < nNow) {
+            if (queuedBlock.nTimeDisconnect < nNow && !queuedBlock.fBulk) {
+                // Bulk-stream blocks are exempt: a 128-block batch shares one request time, so the
+                // front() entry could expire before the tail streams in. The bulk response timeout
+                // below frees the range without disconnecting instead.
                 LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", queuedBlock.hash.ToString(), pto->id);
                 pto->fDisconnect = true;
             }
         }
 
+        // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): manage the outstanding bulk range, then (below)
+        // possibly issue a new one. Clearing fBulkInFlight once the batch has drained below the
+        // normal window re-enables the next bulk request; a never-fully-delivered batch is freed
+        // after BULK_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_US so the normal per-block path re-fetches it (no disconnect).
+        if (state.fBulkInFlight) {
+            int hEnd = state.nBulkRangeStart + state.nBulkRangeCount;
+            if (!BulkRangeInFlight(&state, state.nBulkRangeStart, hEnd)) {
+                // Whole (possibly shrunk) range received -> done. Completion is keyed on the RANGE
+                // draining, NOT on the global in-flight count crossing the window, so a partially
+                // delivered batch can never leave undelivered heights stuck in-flight.
+                state.fBulkInFlight = false;
+            } else if (state.nBulkSince > 0 && state.nBulkSince < nNow - BULK_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_US) {
+                // Promised blocks never fully arrived: free the still-in-flight remainder (the normal
+                // per-block path re-fetches it), give up bulk on this unresponsive peer. No disconnect.
+                FreeBulkRangeInFlight(&state, state.nBulkRangeStart, hEnd);
+                state.fBulkInFlight = false;
+                pto->nServices &= ~(uint64_t)NODE_BULKBLOCKS;
+                LogPrint("net", "Bulk stream timeout peer=%d, freed range [%d,%d)\n",
+                         pto->id, state.nBulkRangeStart, hEnd);
+            }
+        }
         // Message: getdata (blocks)
         static uint256 zero;
         vector<CInv> vGetData;
-        if (!pto->fDisconnect && !pto->fClient && (fFetch || !IsInitialBlockDownload()) && state.nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) {
+        if (!pto->fDisconnect && !pto->fClient && (fFetch || !IsInitialBlockDownload()) && state.nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER && !state.fBulkInFlight) {
             vector<CBlockIndex*> vToDownload;
             NodeId staller = -1;
-            FindNextBlocksToDownload(pto->GetId(), MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER - state.nBlocksInFlight, vToDownload, staller);
+            CBlockIndex *pFrontierStuck = NULL;
+            FindNextBlocksToDownload(pto->GetId(), MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER - state.nBlocksInFlight, vToDownload, staller, &pFrontierStuck);
+
+            // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): if the first block we need is in the deep,
+            // stable region (>= BULK_TIP_MARGIN below the NETWORK tip) and the peer advertised the
+            // capability, request a whole contiguous range in one shot instead of per-block getdata.
+            // FindNextBlocksToDownload already advanced the cursor past what we have, so
+            // vToDownload.front() is the correct, cursor-managed starting point.
+            bool didBulk = false;
+            if (fBulkBlockSync && (pto->nServices & NODE_BULKBLOCKS) && IsInitialBlockDownload()
+                && !vToDownload.empty() && state.pindexBestKnownBlock != NULL) {
+                CBlockIndex* pfirst = vToDownload.front();
+                int cursorH = pfirst->GetHeight();
+                int maxH    = state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetHeight() - BULK_TIP_MARGIN;
+                if (cursorH <= maxH) {
+                    int want = std::min(maxH - cursorH + 1, (int)BULK_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_REQUEST);
+                    uint16_t n = 0;
+                    for (int i = 0; i < want; i++) {
+                        CBlockIndex* pb = state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetAncestor(cursorH + i);
+                        if (pb == NULL || mapBlocksInFlight.count(pb->GetBlockHash())) break;
+                        MarkBlockAsInFlight(pto->GetId(), pb->GetBlockHash(), consensusParams, pb, true);
+                        n++;
+                    }
+                    if (n > 0) {
+                        pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETBLOCKSTREAM, pfirst->GetBlockHash(), (int32_t)cursorH, n);
+                        state.fBulkInFlight   = true;
+                        state.nBulkSince      = nNow;
+                        state.nBulkRangeStart = cursorH;
+                        state.nBulkRangeCount = n;
+                        state.nBulkHashStart  = pfirst->GetBlockHash(); // request identity (matched in BLOCKSTREAM)
+                        state.fBulkHeaderSeen = false;                  // arm the one-shot header reconciliation
+                        didBulk = true;
+                        LogPrint("net", "Requesting bulk stream [%d..%d] (%u blocks) peer=%d\n",
+                                 cursorH, cursorH + n - 1, (unsigned)n, pto->id);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (!didBulk) {
             BOOST_FOREACH(CBlockIndex *pindex, vToDownload) {
                 vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
                 MarkBlockAsInFlight(pto->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), consensusParams, pindex);
                 LogPrint("net", "Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d\n", pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindex->GetHeight(), pto->id);
             }
+            }
+            // Frontier reassignment: when this peer has nothing new to fetch because the next-needed
+            // (frontier) block is in flight from another, slow peer and has been stuck beyond a short
+            // threshold, re-request it from THIS (responsive) peer instead of waiting out the long
+            // (~72s) timeout or disconnecting the slow peer. This breaks the head-of-line stall that
+            // throttles IBD when downloading from few, distant peers. Trustless: the block is still
+            // fully validated on arrival - we only change which peer serves it. -blockreassigntimeout
+            // = seconds (0 disables; default 5).
+            static const int64_t nReassignUs = GetArg("-blockreassigntimeout", 5) * 1000000LL;
+            if (nReassignUs > 0 && vToDownload.empty() && pFrontierStuck != NULL &&
+                staller != -1 && staller != pto->GetId()) {
+                map<uint256, pair<NodeId, list<QueuedBlock>::iterator> >::iterator itF =
+                    mapBlocksInFlight.find(pFrontierStuck->GetBlockHash());
+                if (itF != mapBlocksInFlight.end() && itF->second.first == staller &&
+                    itF->second.second->nTime < nNow - nReassignUs) {
+                    uint256 hReassign = pFrontierStuck->GetBlockHash();
+                    LogPrint("net", "Reassigning stalled frontier block %s (%d) from peer=%d to peer=%d\n",
+                             hReassign.ToString(), pFrontierStuck->GetHeight(), staller, pto->id);
+                    MarkBlockAsReceived(hReassign);                                          // free from slow peer (no disconnect)
+                    vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, hReassign));
+                    MarkBlockAsInFlight(pto->GetId(), hReassign, consensusParams, pFrontierStuck); // re-request from this peer
+                }
+            }
             if (state.nBlocksInFlight == 0 && staller != -1) {
                 if (State(staller)->nStallingSince == 0) {
                     State(staller)->nStallingSince = nNow;

src/main.h

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include "txmempool.h"
 #include "uint256.h"
 
+#include <atomic>
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <exception>
 #include <map>
@@ -64,7 +65,9 @@ class CValidationState;
 class PrecomputedTransactionData;
 
 struct CNodeStateStats;
-#define DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY 1
+#define DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY 72 // hours; age-based Expire is now live via LimitMempoolSize -- was 1, too aggressive
+/** Default for -maxmempool, maximum megabytes of mempool memory usage */
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE 300
 #define _COINBASE_MATURITY 100
 
 /** Default for -blockmaxsize and -blockminsize, which control the range of sizes the mining code will create **/
@@ -95,12 +98,37 @@ static const unsigned int UNDOFILE_CHUNK_SIZE = 0x100000; // 1 MiB
 static const int MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS = 16;
 /** -par default (number of script-checking threads, 0 = auto) */
 static const int DEFAULT_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS = 0;
-/** Number of blocks that can be requested at any given time from a single peer. */
+/** Number of blocks that can be requested at any given time from a single peer.
-static const int MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = 16;
+ *  Runtime-tunable via -maxblocksintransit. The default of 16 caps single-peer IBD
+ *  throughput at (window / RTT): on a high-latency peer with tiny (sub-checkpoint)
+ *  blocks the transfer is bandwidth-delay-product bound, so a larger window lifts the
+ *  ceiling at negligible bandwidth cost. */
+static const int DEFAULT_MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = 16;
+extern int MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER;
+/** Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX, -bulkblocksync). A single GETBLOCKSTREAM request makes a
+ *  peer stream a contiguous range of old blocks as back-to-back BLOCK messages, amortizing the
+ *  per-block round-trip over the whole range instead of the MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER window.
+ *  OFF by default; negotiated via NODE_BULKBLOCKS; only used during IBD for blocks more than
+ *  BULK_TIP_MARGIN below the active tip; never alters the default getdata path. */
+static const bool   DEFAULT_BULKBLOCKSYNC          = false;
+extern bool fBulkBlockSync;
+/** Only bulk-stream blocks at least this far below the active tip (near-tip uses the normal path). */
+static const int    BULK_TIP_MARGIN                = 5000;
+/** Hard DoS cap: max blocks a single GETBLOCKSTREAM may request/serve. */
+static const uint16_t BULK_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_REQUEST  = 128;
+/** Hard DoS cap: max total bytes streamed in response to one GETBLOCKSTREAM. */
+static const size_t BULK_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES        = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+/** Requester fallback: if a promised bulk range doesn't fully arrive within this many microseconds,
+ *  free the in-flight range so the normal per-block path re-fetches it. */
+static const int64_t BULK_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_US      = 90 * 1000000LL;
 /** Timeout in seconds during which a peer must stall block download progress before being disconnected. */
 static const unsigned int BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT = 2;
 /** Number of headers sent in one getheaders result. We rely on the assumption that if a peer sends
- *  less than this number, we reached its tip. Changing this value is a protocol upgrade. */
+ *  less than this number, we reached its tip. Changing this value is a protocol upgrade: the
+ *  continuation logic (main.cpp, "nCount == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS") and the serve-side limit must
+ *  match across the network, so a single node raising it unilaterally would mis-detect a stock
+ *  peer's 160-header reply as "tip reached" and stall header sync. Raise only as a coordinated
+ *  network upgrade (with a protocol-version bump). */
 static const unsigned int MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS = 160;
 /** Size of the "block download window": how far ahead of our current height do we fetch?
  *  Larger windows tolerate larger download speed differences between peer, but increase the potential
@@ -155,6 +183,7 @@ extern bool fExperimentalMode;
 extern bool fImporting;
 extern bool fReindex;
 extern int nScriptCheckThreads;
+extern int nRandomXVerifyThreads;
 extern bool fTxIndex;
 extern bool fZindex;
 extern bool fIsBareMultisigStd;
@@ -163,7 +192,7 @@ extern bool fCheckpointsEnabled;
 // TODO: remove this flag by structuring our code such that
 // it is unneeded for testing
 extern bool fCoinbaseEnforcedProtectionEnabled;
-extern size_t nCoinCacheUsage;
+extern std::atomic<size_t> nCoinCacheUsage;
 extern CFeeRate minRelayTxFee;
 extern int64_t nMaxTipAge;
 
@@ -930,6 +959,10 @@ extern CChain chainActive;
 /** Global variable that points to the active CCoinsView (protected by cs_main) */
 extern CCoinsViewCache *pcoinsTip;
 
+/** Global variable that points to the coins database (chainstate/, protected by cs_main). */
+class CCoinsViewDB;
+extern CCoinsViewDB *pcoinsdbview;
+
 /** Global variable that points to the active block tree (protected by cs_main) */
 extern CBlockTreeDB *pblocktree;
 

src/net.cpp

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
 #include "crypto/common.h"
 #include "hush/utiltls.h"
 #include <random.h>
+#include <random>
+#include <limits>
 #ifdef _WIN32
 #include <string.h>
 #else
@@ -2004,7 +2006,7 @@ void ThreadMessageHandler()
         // Randomize the order in which we process messages from/to our peers.
         // This prevents attacks in which an attacker exploits having multiple
         // consecutive connections in the vNodes list.
-        random_shuffle(vNodesCopy.begin(), vNodesCopy.end(), GetRandInt);
+        std::shuffle(vNodesCopy.begin(), vNodesCopy.end(), std::mt19937(GetRand(std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max())));
 
         BOOST_FOREACH(CNode* pnode, vNodesCopy)
         {
@@ -2516,7 +2518,7 @@ void RelayTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, const CDataStream& ss)
     // We always round down, except when we have only 1 connection
     auto newSize = (vNodes.size() / 2) == 0 ? 1 : (vNodes.size() / 2);
 
-    random_shuffle( vRelayNodes.begin(), vRelayNodes.end(), GetRandInt );
+    std::shuffle( vRelayNodes.begin(), vRelayNodes.end(), std::mt19937(GetRand(std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max())) );
 
     vRelayNodes.resize(newSize);
     if (HUSH_TESTNODE==1 && vNodes.size() == 0) {

src/pow.cpp

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  *                                                                            *
  ******************************************************************************/
 #include "pow.h"
+#include "checkpoints.h"
 #include "consensus/upgrades.h"
 #include "arith_uint256.h"
 #include "chain.h"
@@ -30,6 +31,8 @@
 #include "sodium.h"
 #include "RandomX/src/randomx.h"
 #include <mutex>
+#include <boost/thread/shared_mutex.hpp>
+#include <boost/thread/locks.hpp>
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_RUST
 #include "librustzcash.h"
@@ -704,6 +707,7 @@ static std::mutex cs_randomx_validator;
 static randomx_cache *s_rxCache = nullptr;
 static randomx_vm *s_rxVM = nullptr;
 static std::string s_rxCurrentKey; // tracks current key to avoid re-init
+static int64_t nTimeRandomX = 0;   // cumulative RandomX validation time (us), reported under -debug=bench
 
 // Thread-local flag: skip CheckRandomXSolution when the miner is validating its own block
 // The miner already computed the correct RandomX hash — re-verifying with a separate
@@ -711,29 +715,84 @@ static std::string s_rxCurrentKey; // tracks current key to avoid re-init
 thread_local bool fSkipRandomXValidation = false;
 
 void SetSkipRandomXValidation(bool skip) { fSkipRandomXValidation = skip; }
+bool GetSkipRandomXValidation() { return fSkipRandomXValidation; }
 
 CBlockIndex *hush_chainactive(int32_t height);
 
-bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
+// Centralized predicate: does a block at this height actually require a RandomX hash check?
+// Shared by CheckRandomXSolution (inline path) and the parallel pre-verify pool so the two can
+// never drift. Returns false when the recompute is unnecessary:
+//   - non-RandomX chain, or RandomX validation disabled (activation height < 0)
+//   - below the RandomX activation height (those blocks used Equihash, validated elsewhere)
+//   - during initial on-disk block loading / reindex (HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS)
+//   - below the last hardcoded checkpoint (chain pinned by checkpoint hash + linkage + work)
+// Deliberately does NOT consider the thread-local fSkipRandomXValidation (miner self-check) — that
+// is a property of the calling thread, handled only in the inline CheckRandomXSolution below.
+bool RandomXValidationRequired(int32_t height)
 {
-    // Only applies to RandomX chains
     if (ASSETCHAINS_ALGO != ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX)
-        return true;
+        return false;
-
-    // Disabled if activation height is negative
     if (ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION < 0)
-        return true;
+        return false;
-
-    // Not yet at activation height
     if (height < ASSETCHAINS_RANDOMX_VALIDATION)
-        return true;
+        return false;
-
-    // Do not affect initial block loading
     extern int32_t HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS;
     if (HUSH_LOADINGBLOCKS != 0)
+        return false;
+    extern bool fCheckpointsEnabled;
+    // Gate the RandomX skip on the last checkpoint actually LOCKED INTO this node's block index
+    // (GetLastCheckpoint), NOT the static top checkpoint (GetTotalBlocksEstimate). The fork-rejection
+    // guard uses this same in-index boundary, so a block below it is provably on the checkpoint-pinned
+    // chain and cannot be a forged fork. Using the static boundary would, once checkpoints extend above
+    // the RandomX activation height, leave a gap (in-index checkpoint .. static top) during IBD/eclipse
+    // where a no-hashpower peer could get SHA256-grinded, RandomX-forged blocks accepted. Safe to walk
+    // mapBlockIndex here: called only under cs_main (ActivateBestChainStep + inline CheckRandomXSolution).
+    if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
+        CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = Checkpoints::GetLastCheckpoint(Params().Checkpoints());
+        if (pcheckpoint != NULL && height < pcheckpoint->GetHeight())
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+// Serialize the RandomX hash input: the block header without nSolution (but with nNonce). Used by
+// both the inline CheckRandomXSolution and the parallel pre-verify pool, so the bytes are identical.
+std::vector<unsigned char> GetRandomXInput(const CBlockHeader& block)
+{
+    CRandomXInput rxInput(block);
+    CDataStream ss(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    ss << rxInput;
+    return std::vector<unsigned char>(ss.begin(), ss.end());
+}
+
+// Derive the RandomX key string for a block at `height`. Below interval+lag it is the chain-params
+// initial key; otherwise the block hash at the key-rotation height. MUST be called under cs_main
+// (reads chainActive via hush_chainactive). Returns empty if the key-height block is unavailable.
+std::string GetRandomXKey(int32_t height)
+{
+    static int randomxInterval = GetRandomXInterval();
+    static int randomxBlockLag = GetRandomXBlockLag();
+    if (height < randomxInterval + randomxBlockLag) {
+        char initialKey[82];
+        snprintf(initialKey, 81, "%08x%s%08x", ASSETCHAINS_MAGIC, SMART_CHAIN_SYMBOL, ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT);
+        return std::string(initialKey, strlen(initialKey));
+    }
+    int keyHeight = ((height - randomxBlockLag) / randomxInterval) * randomxInterval;
+    CBlockIndex *pKeyIndex = hush_chainactive(keyHeight);
+    if (pKeyIndex == nullptr)
+        return std::string();
+    uint256 blockKey = pKeyIndex->GetBlockHash();
+    return std::string((const char*)&blockKey, sizeof(blockKey));
+}
+
+bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
+{
+    // Centralized height gate (shared with the parallel pre-verify pool, Stage 0).
+    if (!RandomXValidationRequired(height))
         return true;
 
-    // Skip when miner is validating its own block via TestBlockValidity
+    // Skip when the miner is validating its own freshly-mined block via TestBlockValidity
+    // (thread-local; never set on the connect thread or the pre-verify worker threads).
     if (fSkipRandomXValidation)
         return true;
 
@@ -743,47 +802,44 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
                      pblock->nSolution.size(), RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE, height);
     }
 
-    static int randomxInterval = GetRandomXInterval();
+    // Derive the key (shared helper) and serialize the input (identical bytes to the pool path).
-    static int randomxBlockLag = GetRandomXBlockLag();
+    std::string rxKey = GetRandomXKey(height);
-
+    if (rxKey.empty())
-    // Determine the correct RandomX key for this height
+        return error("CheckRandomXSolution(): cannot derive RandomX key for height %d", height);
-    char initialKey[82];
+    std::vector<unsigned char> ssInput = GetRandomXInput(*pblock);
-    snprintf(initialKey, 81, "%08x%s%08x", ASSETCHAINS_MAGIC, SMART_CHAIN_SYMBOL, ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT);
-
-    std::string rxKey;
-    if (height < randomxInterval + randomxBlockLag) {
-        // Use initial key derived from chain params
-        rxKey = std::string(initialKey, strlen(initialKey));
-    } else {
-        // Use block hash at the key height
-        int keyHeight = ((height - randomxBlockLag) / randomxInterval) * randomxInterval;
-        CBlockIndex *pKeyIndex = hush_chainactive(keyHeight);
-        if (pKeyIndex == nullptr) {
-            return error("CheckRandomXSolution(): cannot get block index at key height %d for block %d", keyHeight, height);
-        }
-        uint256 blockKey = pKeyIndex->GetBlockHash();
-        rxKey = std::string((const char*)&blockKey, sizeof(blockKey));
-    }
-
-    // Serialize the block header without nSolution (but with nNonce) as RandomX input
-    CRandomXInput rxInput(*pblock);
-    CDataStream ss(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-    ss << rxInput;
 
     char computedHash[RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE];
 
+    // Measurement (Track 1): isolate RandomX verification cost during IBD. The
+    // expensive parts are the per-key cache (re)init (~every GetRandomXInterval()
+    // blocks) and the hash computation itself; both happen under the lock below.
+    int64_t nTimeRxStart = GetTimeMicros();
+    bool fKeyInit = false;
     {
         std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(cs_randomx_validator);
 
         // Initialize cache + VM if needed, or re-init if key changed
         if (s_rxCache == nullptr) {
             randomx_flags flags = randomx_get_flags();
+            // Try large pages for the 256MB validator cache: fewer TLB misses → ~15-30% faster
+            // light-mode validation where the OS has hugepages configured. Falls back transparently
+            // when unavailable, exactly as the miner does (miner.cpp:1097). Page size does not affect
+            // the computed hash, so this is consensus-neutral.
+            bool fLargePages = true;
+            s_rxCache = randomx_alloc_cache(flags | RANDOMX_FLAG_LARGE_PAGES);
+            if (s_rxCache == nullptr) {
+                fLargePages = false;
                 s_rxCache = randomx_alloc_cache(flags);
+            }
             if (s_rxCache == nullptr) {
                 return error("CheckRandomXSolution(): failed to allocate RandomX cache");
             }
+            // Confirm the fast paths are active (JIT off would be ~9x slower; see randomx-benchmark).
+            LogPrint("bench", "CheckRandomXSolution: RandomX flags=0x%x JIT=%d HARD_AES=%d largePages=%d\n",
+                     (unsigned int)flags, !!(flags & RANDOMX_FLAG_JIT), !!(flags & RANDOMX_FLAG_HARD_AES), (int)fLargePages);
             randomx_init_cache(s_rxCache, rxKey.data(), rxKey.size());
             s_rxCurrentKey = rxKey;
+            fKeyInit = true;
             s_rxVM = randomx_create_vm(flags, s_rxCache, nullptr);
             if (s_rxVM == nullptr) {
                 randomx_release_cache(s_rxCache);
@@ -793,11 +849,17 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
         } else if (s_rxCurrentKey != rxKey) {
             randomx_init_cache(s_rxCache, rxKey.data(), rxKey.size());
             s_rxCurrentKey = rxKey;
+            fKeyInit = true;
             randomx_vm_set_cache(s_rxVM, s_rxCache);
         }
 
-        randomx_calculate_hash(s_rxVM, &ss[0], ss.size(), computedHash);
+        randomx_calculate_hash(s_rxVM, ssInput.data(), ssInput.size(), computedHash);
     }
+    int64_t nTimeRxEnd = GetTimeMicros();
+    nTimeRandomX += nTimeRxEnd - nTimeRxStart;
+    LogPrint("bench", "      - RandomX verify ht=%d: %.2fms%s [%.2fs]\n",
+             height, (nTimeRxEnd - nTimeRxStart) * 0.001,
+             fKeyInit ? " (key-init)" : "", nTimeRandomX * 0.000001);
 
     // Compare computed hash against nSolution
     if (memcmp(computedHash, pblock->nSolution.data(), RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE) != 0) {
@@ -814,7 +876,7 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
         fprintf(stderr, "  computed : %s\n", computedHex.c_str());
         fprintf(stderr, "  nSolution: %s\n", solutionHex.c_str());
         fprintf(stderr, "  rxKey size=%lu, input size=%lu, nNonce=%s\n",
-                rxKey.size(), ss.size(), pblock->nNonce.ToString().c_str());
+                rxKey.size(), ssInput.size(), pblock->nNonce.ToString().c_str());
         fprintf(stderr, "  nSolution.size()=%lu, RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE=%d\n",
                 pblock->nSolution.size(), RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE);
         // Also log to debug.log
@@ -822,7 +884,7 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
         LogPrintf("  computed : %s\n", computedHex);
         LogPrintf("  nSolution: %s\n", solutionHex);
         LogPrintf("  rxKey size=%lu, input size=%lu, nNonce=%s\n",
-                  rxKey.size(), ss.size(), pblock->nNonce.ToString());
+                  rxKey.size(), ssInput.size(), pblock->nNonce.ToString());
         return false;
     }
 
@@ -830,6 +892,88 @@ bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height)
     return true;
 }
 
+// ============================================================================================
+// Parallel RandomX pre-verification pool (Stage 2).
+// One shared light-mode cache (holding a single key at a time) + per-thread VMs, mirroring the
+// miner's RandomXDatasetManager pattern (miner.cpp). The connect thread (ActivateBestChainStep)
+// loads the cache key for a same-key group of about-to-be-connected blocks, dispatches them to
+// this pool, and barrier-waits; each worker hashes on its own VM (sharing the read-only cache)
+// and, on a match, sets the block's transient fRandomXVerified flag so the inline check in
+// CheckBlockHeader can be skipped. The inline path remains the consensus authority for anything
+// not pre-verified, so the pool can only ever flip false->true on a real hash match.
+static boost::shared_mutex      g_rxvMutex;            // shared = hashing; exclusive = cache (re)init
+static randomx_cache*           g_rxvCache = nullptr;  // shared, read-only during hashing
+static std::string              g_rxvKey;              // key currently loaded into g_rxvCache
+static randomx_flags            g_rxvFlags;
+static thread_local randomx_vm* tls_rxvVM    = nullptr;
+static thread_local std::string tls_rxvVMKey;
+
+CCheckQueue<CRandomXCheck> rxCheckQueue(1); // batch size 1: each item is ~tens of ms
+
+bool RandomXValidatorPrepareKey(const std::string& rxKey)
+{
+    boost::unique_lock<boost::shared_mutex> lock(g_rxvMutex);
+    if (g_rxvCache == nullptr) {
+        g_rxvFlags = randomx_get_flags();
+        g_rxvCache = randomx_alloc_cache(g_rxvFlags | RANDOMX_FLAG_LARGE_PAGES);
+        if (g_rxvCache == nullptr)
+            g_rxvCache = randomx_alloc_cache(g_rxvFlags);
+        if (g_rxvCache == nullptr) {
+            LogPrintf("RandomXValidatorPrepareKey: cache alloc failed; parallel pre-verify disabled\n");
+            return false;
+        }
+        randomx_init_cache(g_rxvCache, rxKey.data(), rxKey.size());
+        g_rxvKey = rxKey;
+        return true;
+    }
+    if (g_rxvKey != rxKey) {
+        randomx_init_cache(g_rxvCache, rxKey.data(), rxKey.size());
+        g_rxvKey = rxKey;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool CRandomXCheck::operator()()
+{
+    boost::shared_lock<boost::shared_mutex> lock(g_rxvMutex);
+    // The connect thread set the shared cache to one key before dispatching this group. If this
+    // item's key doesn't match (e.g. a key-rotation straggler) or the cache is unavailable, skip it
+    // and leave *presult false — the inline CheckRandomXSolution will verify it.
+    if (g_rxvCache == nullptr || g_rxvKey != rxKey)
+        return true;
+    if (tls_rxvVM == nullptr) {
+        tls_rxvVM = randomx_create_vm(g_rxvFlags, g_rxvCache, nullptr);
+        if (tls_rxvVM == nullptr)
+            return true; // cannot verify here -> inline fallback
+        tls_rxvVMKey = g_rxvKey;
+    } else if (tls_rxvVMKey != g_rxvKey) {
+        // Cache was re-initialized to a new key since this VM last ran; rebind.
+        randomx_vm_set_cache(tls_rxvVM, g_rxvCache);
+        tls_rxvVMKey = g_rxvKey;
+    }
+    unsigned char h[RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE];
+    randomx_calculate_hash(tls_rxvVM, input.data(), input.size(), h);
+    if (memcmp(h, expected, RANDOMX_HASH_SIZE) == 0 && presult != nullptr)
+        *presult = true;
+    return true; // ALWAYS true: never short-circuit the queue; per-block result is in *presult
+}
+
+void ThreadRandomXVerify()
+{
+    RenameThread("hush-rxverify");
+    rxCheckQueue.Thread();
+}
+
+void RandomXValidatorShutdown()
+{
+    boost::unique_lock<boost::shared_mutex> lock(g_rxvMutex);
+    // Per-thread VMs are intentionally leaked (process exiting); release the shared cache.
+    if (g_rxvCache != nullptr) {
+        randomx_release_cache(g_rxvCache);
+        g_rxvCache = nullptr;
+    }
+}
+
 int32_t hush_chosennotary(int32_t *notaryidp,int32_t height,uint8_t *pubkey33,uint32_t timestamp);
 int32_t hush_currentheight();
 void hush_index2pubkey33(uint8_t *pubkey33,CBlockIndex *pindex,int32_t height);

src/pow.h

@@ -21,8 +21,13 @@
 #define HUSH_POW_H
 
 #include "chain.h"
+#include "checkqueue.h"
 #include "consensus/params.h"
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <cstring>
+#include <string>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
 
 class CBlockHeader;
 class CBlockIndex;
@@ -41,8 +46,58 @@ bool CheckEquihashSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, const CChainParams&);
 /** Check whether a block header contains a valid RandomX solution */
 bool CheckRandomXSolution(const CBlockHeader *pblock, int32_t height);
 
+/** Whether a block at this height requires a RandomX hash check (shared gate used by both the
+ *  inline CheckRandomXSolution and the parallel pre-verification pool). */
+bool RandomXValidationRequired(int32_t height);
+
+/** Serialize the RandomX hash input (block header without nSolution) — identical bytes to the
+ *  inline CheckRandomXSolution path, so the parallel pool computes the same hash. */
+std::vector<unsigned char> GetRandomXInput(const CBlockHeader& block);
+
+/** Derive the RandomX key string for a block at `height`. MUST be called under cs_main (reads
+ *  chainActive). Returns empty string if the key-height block is unavailable. */
+std::string GetRandomXKey(int32_t height);
+
+/** A single RandomX pre-verification work item for the parallel validator pool. Pure value type
+ *  (no chainstate pointers) so workers need no cs_main. On a hash match it sets *presult=true; on
+ *  any failure it leaves *presult untouched — the inline CheckRandomXSolution remains the
+ *  consensus authority and re-verifies anything not pre-verified. operator() ALWAYS returns true,
+ *  so one block's failure never short-circuits the rest of the CCheckQueue batch. */
+class CRandomXCheck
+{
+private:
+    std::string rxKey;                 // RandomX key for this block's height
+    std::vector<unsigned char> input;  // serialized CRandomXInput(header)
+    unsigned char expected[32];        // block.nSolution (claimed RandomX hash)
+    bool* presult;                     // -> pindex->fRandomXVerified (set true only on a hash match)
+public:
+    CRandomXCheck() : presult(nullptr) { memset(expected, 0, sizeof(expected)); }
+    CRandomXCheck(const std::string& keyIn, std::vector<unsigned char> inputIn,
+                  const unsigned char* expectedIn, bool* presultIn)
+        : rxKey(keyIn), input(std::move(inputIn)), presult(presultIn)
+    { memcpy(expected, expectedIn, sizeof(expected)); }
+    bool operator()();
+    void swap(CRandomXCheck& c) {
+        rxKey.swap(c.rxKey);
+        input.swap(c.input);
+        std::swap(presult, c.presult);
+        for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) std::swap(expected[i], c.expected[i]);
+    }
+};
+
+/** The RandomX pre-verification check queue (parallel pool). */
+extern CCheckQueue<CRandomXCheck> rxCheckQueue;
+/** Worker entry point (spawn N at startup, mirrors ThreadScriptCheck). */
+void ThreadRandomXVerify();
+/** Load `rxKey` into the shared validator cache (alloc on first use); call before dispatching a
+ *  same-key group of checks. Returns false on allocation failure. */
+bool RandomXValidatorPrepareKey(const std::string& rxKey);
+/** Release the shared validator cache at shutdown. */
+void RandomXValidatorShutdown();
+
 /** Set thread-local flag to skip RandomX validation (used by miner during TestBlockValidity) */
 void SetSkipRandomXValidation(bool skip);
+bool GetSkipRandomXValidation();
 
 /** Return the RandomX key rotation interval in blocks */
 int GetRandomXInterval();

src/protocol.cpp

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ const char *GETNSPV="getnSPV"; //used
 const char *NSPV="nSPV"; //used
 const char *ALERT="alert"; //used
 const char *REJECT="reject"; //used
+const char *GETBLOCKSTREAM="getblockstrm"; // 12 chars (COMMAND_SIZE max); "getblockstream" would truncate
+const char *BLOCKSTREAM="blockstream";
 } // namespace NetMsgType
 
 /** All known message types. Keep this in the same order as the list of
@@ -119,6 +121,8 @@ const static std::string allNetMessageTypes[] = {
     NetMsgType::NSPV,
     NetMsgType::ALERT,
     NetMsgType::REJECT,
+    NetMsgType::GETBLOCKSTREAM,
+    NetMsgType::BLOCKSTREAM,
 };
 
 CMessageHeader::CMessageHeader(const MessageStartChars& pchMessageStartIn)

src/protocol.h

@@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ extern const char* GETNSPV;
 extern const char* NSPV;
 extern const char* ALERT;
 extern const char* REJECT;
+/** Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): request a contiguous range of old blocks. */
+extern const char* GETBLOCKSTREAM;
+/** Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX): control header preceding a streamed block range. */
+extern const char* BLOCKSTREAM;
 }; // namespace NetMsgType
 
 /* Get a vector of all valid message types (see above) */
@@ -304,6 +308,9 @@ enum ServiceFlags : uint64_t {
     NODE_NSPV = (1 << 30),
     NODE_ADDRINDEX = (1 << 29),
     NODE_SPENTINDEX = (1 << 28),
+    // Opt-in bulk block streaming (DragonX). Unauthenticated advertisement; serve/request
+    // handlers validate every block regardless, so robustness against false advertisement holds.
+    NODE_BULKBLOCKS = (1 << 27),
 
     // Bits 24-31 are reserved for temporary experiments. Just pick a bit that
     // isn't getting used, or one not being used much, and notify the

src/rpc/blockchain.cpp

@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
 #include "rpc/server.h"
 #include "streams.h"
 #include "sync.h"
+#include "txdb.h"
 #include "util.h"
+#include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
 #include "script/script.h"
 #include "script/script_error.h"
 #include "script/sign.h"
@@ -860,6 +862,7 @@ UniValue gettxoutsetinfo(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk
     return ret;
 }
 
+
 UniValue getblockmerkletree(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
 {
     if (fHelp || params.size() != 1 )

src/rpc/net.cpp

@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ UniValue getaddednodeinfo(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& myp
             "    \"connected\" : true|false,          (boolean) If connected\n"
             "    \"addresses\" : [\n"
             "       {\n"
-            "         \"address\" : \"192.168.0.201:18030\",  (string) The Hush server host and port\n"
+            "         \"address\" : \"192.168.0.201:21768\",  (string) The DragonX server host and port\n"
             "         \"connected\" : \"outbound\"           (string) connection, inbound or outbound\n"
             "       }\n"
             "       ,...\n"

src/rpc/server.cpp

@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static const CRPCCommand vRPCCommands[] =
     { "wallet",             "z_listaddresses",        &z_listaddresses,        true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_listnullifiers",       &z_listnullifiers,       true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_exportkey",            &z_exportkey,            true  },
+    { "wallet",             "z_exportmnemonic",       &z_exportmnemonic,       true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_importkey",            &z_importkey,            true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_exportviewingkey",     &z_exportviewingkey,     true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_importviewingkey",     &z_importviewingkey,     true  },

src/rpc/server.h

@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ extern UniValue nspv_listccmoduleunspent(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, con
 extern UniValue getblocksubsidy(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 
 extern UniValue z_exportkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk); // in rpcdump.cpp
+extern UniValue z_exportmnemonic(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk); // in rpcdump.cpp
 extern UniValue z_importkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk); // in rpcdump.cpp
 extern UniValue z_exportviewingkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk); // in rpcdump.cpp
 extern UniValue z_importviewingkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk); // in rpcdump.cpp

src/transaction_builder.cpp

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include <boost/optional/optional_io.hpp>
 #include <librustzcash.h>
 #include "zcash/Note.hpp"
+#include <random>
+#include <limits>
 extern bool fZDebug;
 
 SpendDescriptionInfo::SpendDescriptionInfo(
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ void TransactionBuilder::AddSaplingOutput(
 void TransactionBuilder::ShuffleOutputs()
 {
     LogPrintf("%s: Shuffling %d zouts\n", __func__, outputs.size() );
-    random_shuffle( outputs.begin(), outputs.end(), GetRandInt );
+    std::shuffle( outputs.begin(), outputs.end(), std::mt19937(GetRand(std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max())) );
 }
 
 void TransactionBuilder::AddTransparentInput(COutPoint utxo, CScript scriptPubKey, CAmount value, uint32_t _nSequence)

src/txdb.cpp

@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@
 
 #include "txdb.h"
 #include "chainparams.h"
+#include "clientversion.h"
 #include "hash.h"
 #include "main.h"
 #include "pow.h"
+#include "streams.h"
 #include "uint256.h"
 #include "core_io.h"
 #include <stdint.h>

src/txdb.h

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class uint256;
 //! -dbcache default (MiB)
 static const int64_t nDefaultDbCache = 512;
 //! max. -dbcache (MiB)
-static const int64_t nMaxDbCache = sizeof(void*) > 4 ? 16384 : 1024;
+static const int64_t nMaxDbCache = sizeof(void*) > 4 ? 65536 : 1024; // 64 GiB ceiling on 64-bit so adaptive dbcache can use most of RAM on large hosts (was 16384)
 //! min. -dbcache in (MiB)
 static const int64_t nMinDbCache = 4;
 

src/txmempool.cpp

@@ -469,10 +469,17 @@ extern char SMART_CHAIN_SYMBOL[];
 
 std::vector<uint256> CTxMemPool::removeExpired(unsigned int nBlockHeight)
 {
-    CBlockIndex *tipindex;
+    // Remove expired txs from the mempool. (Regression fix: the scan that populates
-    // Remove expired txs from the mempool
+    // transactionsToRemove had been dropped, making this a no-op, so expired txs -- which
+    // can never be mined -- were never evicted and accumulated without bound.)
     LOCK(cs);
     list<CTransaction> transactionsToRemove;
+    for (indexed_transaction_set::const_iterator it = mapTx.begin(); it != mapTx.end(); it++) {
+        const CTransaction& tx = it->GetTx();
+        if (IsExpiredTx(tx, nBlockHeight)) {
+            transactionsToRemove.push_back(tx);
+        }
+    }
 
     std::vector<uint256> ids;
     for (const CTransaction& tx : transactionsToRemove) {
@@ -484,6 +491,45 @@ std::vector<uint256> CTxMemPool::removeExpired(unsigned int nBlockHeight)
     return ids;
 }
 
+// Age-based eviction: remove txs whose entry time is older than `time`. Distinct from
+// removeExpired() (which drops txs past their consensus nExpiryHeight); this is the wall-clock
+// sweep LimitMempoolSize wants. Collect-then-remove to avoid iterating mapTx while mutating it.
+int CTxMemPool::Expire(int64_t time)
+{
+    LOCK(cs);
+    std::list<CTransaction> toRemove;
+    for (indexed_transaction_set::const_iterator it = mapTx.begin(); it != mapTx.end(); it++) {
+        if (it->GetTime() < time)
+            toRemove.push_back(it->GetTx());
+    }
+    for (const CTransaction& tx : toRemove) {
+        std::list<CTransaction> removed;
+        remove(tx, removed, true);
+    }
+    return (int)toRemove.size();
+}
+
+// Fee-ordered eviction: drop the lowest-feerate txs (and their in-mempool descendants, via the
+// recursive remove) until DynamicMemoryUsage() is at or below sizelimit. Uses the per-tx feerate
+// index (mapTx index 1, sorted feerate DESCENDING, so the worst tx is the tail). NOTE: this is a
+// per-tx feerate, not a descendant-aggregate score, so a low-fee parent funded by a high-fee child
+// (CPFP) can be evicted -- an accepted simplification (no descendant tracking in this fork). The
+// admission cap in AcceptToMemoryPool bounds growth between block connects (no rollingMinFee here).
+void CTxMemPool::TrimToSize(size_t sizelimit, std::vector<uint256>* pvNoSpendsRemaining)
+{
+    LOCK(cs);
+    while (DynamicMemoryUsage() > sizelimit && !mapTx.empty()) {
+        // Re-derive the tail each iteration: remove() invalidates iterators.
+        CTransaction tx = std::prev(mapTx.get<1>().end())->GetTx();
+        std::list<CTransaction> removed;
+        remove(tx, removed, true);
+        if (pvNoSpendsRemaining) {
+            for (const CTransaction& r : removed)
+                pvNoSpendsRemaining->push_back(r.GetHash());
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 // Called when a block is connected. Removes from mempool and updates the miner fee estimator.
 void CTxMemPool::removeForBlock(const std::vector<CTransaction>& vtx, unsigned int nBlockHeight,
                                 std::list<CTransaction>& conflicts, bool fCurrentEstimate)

src/txmempool.h

@@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ public:
     void removeForReorg(const CCoinsViewCache *pcoins, unsigned int nMemPoolHeight, int flags);
     void removeConflicts(const CTransaction &tx, std::list<CTransaction>& removed);
     std::vector<uint256> removeExpired(unsigned int nBlockHeight);
+    int Expire(int64_t time);
+    void TrimToSize(size_t sizelimit, std::vector<uint256>* pvNoSpendsRemaining = NULL);
     void removeForBlock(const std::vector<CTransaction>& vtx, unsigned int nBlockHeight,
                         std::list<CTransaction>& conflicts, bool fCurrentEstimate = true);
     void removeWithoutBranchId(uint32_t nMemPoolBranchId);

src/validationinterface.cpp

@@ -156,10 +156,17 @@ void ThreadNotifyWallets(CBlockIndex *pindexLastTip)
                     assert(pcoinsTip->GetSaplingAnchorAt(SaplingMerkleTree::empty_root(), oldSaplingTree));
                 }
 
+                // Use operator[] (empty-list default), NOT .at(): a block's conflict entry can be
+                // absent if it was drained in an earlier cycle whose connect loop hit the IBD
+                // ReadBlockFromDisk retry below (that break leaves pindexLastTip behind, so the block
+                // gets rebuilt here but its conflicts were already cleared and are never re-inserted).
+                // .at() would throw std::out_of_range which, uncaught under cs_main in this boost
+                // thread, aborts the node (and crash-loops since pindexLastTip cannot advance). A
+                // missing entry simply means no conflict notifications for this block (best-effort).
                 blockStack.emplace_back(
                     pindex,
                     std::make_pair(oldSproutTree, oldSaplingTree),
-                    recentlyConflicted.first.at(pindex));
+                    recentlyConflicted.first[pindex]);
 
                 pindex = pindex->pprev;
             }
@@ -174,11 +181,23 @@ void ThreadNotifyWallets(CBlockIndex *pindexLastTip)
         // network message processing thread.
         //
 
-        // Notify block disconnects
+        // Notify block disconnects. If an IBD read fails mid-disconnect we must NOT fall through
+        // to the connect loop (which advances pindexLastTip to the new tip and permanently abandons
+        // the remaining disconnects -> wallet witness/anchor desync); skip connects this cycle and
+        // retry the whole disconnect next cycle, exactly as the connect-side break retries.
+        bool fDisconnectIncomplete = false;
         while (pindexLastTip && pindexLastTip != pindexFork) {
             // Read block from disk.
             CBlock block;
             if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindexLastTip,1)) {
+                if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
+                    // During IBD, block data may not be flushed to disk yet.
+                    // Sleep briefly and retry on the next cycle instead of crashing.
+                    LogPrintf("%s: block at height %d not yet readable, will retry\n",
+                              __func__, pindexLastTip->GetHeight());
+                    fDisconnectIncomplete = true;
+                    break;
+                }
                 LogPrintf("*** %s\n", "Failed to read block while notifying wallets of block disconnects");
                 uiInterface.ThreadSafeMessageBox(
                     _("Error: A fatal internal error occurred, see debug.log for details"),
@@ -198,14 +217,23 @@ void ThreadNotifyWallets(CBlockIndex *pindexLastTip)
             pindexLastTip = pindexLastTip->pprev;
         }
 
-        // Notify block connections
+        // Notify block connections (skipped this cycle if the disconnect loop broke to retry an
-        while (!blockStack.empty()) {
+        // unreadable block, so pindexLastTip is not advanced past the un-disconnected blocks).
+        while (!fDisconnectIncomplete && !blockStack.empty()) {
             auto blockData = blockStack.back();
             blockStack.pop_back();
 
             // Read block from disk.
             CBlock block;
             if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, blockData.pindex, 1)) {
+                if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
+                    // During IBD, block data may not be flushed to disk yet.
+                    // Push unprocessed blocks back and retry on the next cycle.
+                    LogPrintf("%s: block at height %d not yet readable, will retry\n",
+                              __func__, blockData.pindex->GetHeight());
+                    blockStack.push_back(blockData);
+                    break;
+                }
                 LogPrintf("*** %s\n", "Failed to read block while notifying wallets of block connects");
                 uiInterface.ThreadSafeMessageBox(
                     _("Error: A fatal internal error occurred, see debug.log for details"),

src/wallet/asyncrpcoperation_mergetoaddress.cpp

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ bool AsyncRPCOperation_mergetoaddress::main_impl()
                 // recoverable, while keeping it logically separate from the ZIP 32
                 // Sapling key hierarchy, which the user might not be using.
                 HDSeed seed;
-                if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeed(seed)) {
+                if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed)) {
                     throw JSONRPCError(
                                        RPC_WALLET_ERROR,
                                        "AsyncRPCOperation_sendmany: HD seed not found");

src/wallet/asyncrpcoperation_sendmany.cpp

@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ bool AsyncRPCOperation_sendmany::main_impl() {
             // recoverable, while keeping it logically separate from the ZIP 32
             // Sapling key hierarchy, which the user might not be using.
             HDSeed seed;
-            if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeed(seed)) {
+            if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed)) {
                 throw JSONRPCError(
                     RPC_WALLET_ERROR,
                     "AsyncRPCOperation_sendmany::main_impl(): HD seed not found");

src/wallet/asyncrpcoperation_shieldcoinbase.cpp

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ bool ShieldToAddress::operator()(const libzcash::SaplingPaymentAddress &zaddr) c
     // recoverable, while keeping it logically separate from the ZIP 32
     // Sapling key hierarchy, which the user might not be using.
     HDSeed seed;
-    if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeed(seed)) {
+    if (!pwalletMain->GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed)) {
         throw JSONRPCError(
             RPC_WALLET_ERROR,
             "CWallet::GenerateNewSaplingZKey(): HD seed not found");

src/wallet/mnemonic.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2016-2024 The Hush developers
+// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
+#include "wallet/mnemonic.h"
+
+#include "random.h"
+#include "support/cleanse.h"
+
+#include <mutex>
+#include <cstring>
+
+extern "C" {
+#include "crypto/bip39/bip39.h"
+}
+
+// The vendored BIP39 library references random_buffer() (used by its
+// mnemonic_generate()). We do not compile trezor's insecure rand.c; instead we
+// route it to the node CSPRNG so any BIP39 randomness is cryptographically
+// sound. random_buffer is declared weak in rand.c, so this strong definition
+// is the one that links.
+extern "C" void random_buffer(uint8_t* buf, size_t len)
+{
+    GetRandBytes(buf, (int)len);
+}
+
+// mnemonic_from_data()/mnemonic_to_seed() use process-static scratch buffers,
+// so serialize all access behind one lock and copy results out immediately.
+static std::mutex cs_bip39;
+
+bool MnemonicIsValid(const std::string& phrase)
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(cs_bip39);
+    return mnemonic_check(phrase.c_str()) != 0;
+}
+
+bool MnemonicToEntropy(const std::string& phrase, RawHDSeed& entropyOut)
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(cs_bip39);
+    // Reject bad checksum / unknown words first.
+    if (mnemonic_check(phrase.c_str()) == 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // mnemonic_to_entropy() writes 33 bytes (entropy || 1 checksum byte) and
+    // returns the total bit count (words * 11).
+    uint8_t buf[33];
+    int totalBits = mnemonic_to_entropy(phrase.c_str(), buf);
+    if (totalBits <= 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    int words = totalBits / 11;
+    if (words != 12 && words != 18 && words != 24) {
+        memory_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+        return false;
+    }
+    int entropyBytes = words * 4 / 3; // 12->16, 18->24, 24->32
+    entropyOut.assign(buf, buf + entropyBytes);
+    memory_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool EntropyToMnemonic(const RawHDSeed& entropy, std::string& phraseOut)
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(cs_bip39);
+    const char* phrase = mnemonic_from_data(entropy.data(), (int)entropy.size());
+    if (phrase == nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    phraseOut.assign(phrase);
+    mnemonic_clear(); // wipe the static buffer
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool Bip39SeedFromEntropy(const RawHDSeed& entropy, RawHDSeed& seed64Out)
+{
+    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(cs_bip39);
+    // Regenerate the canonical phrase from entropy (matches SDXLite's
+    // Mnemonic::from_entropy(entropy).phrase()), then PBKDF2 with an EMPTY
+    // passphrase to get the standard 64-byte BIP39 seed.
+    const char* phrase = mnemonic_from_data(entropy.data(), (int)entropy.size());
+    if (phrase == nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    uint8_t seed[64];
+    mnemonic_to_seed(phrase, "", seed, nullptr);
+    mnemonic_clear();
+    seed64Out.assign(seed, seed + 64);
+    memory_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool GenerateMnemonicEntropy(int bits, RawHDSeed& entropyOut)
+{
+    if (bits != 128 && bits != 160 && bits != 192 && bits != 224 && bits != 256) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    entropyOut.resize(bits / 8);
+    GetRandBytes(entropyOut.data(), (int)entropyOut.size());
+    return true;
+}

src/wallet/mnemonic.h

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2016-2024 The Hush developers
+// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
+#ifndef HUSH_WALLET_MNEMONIC_H
+#define HUSH_WALLET_MNEMONIC_H
+
+#include <string>
+
+#include "zcash/zip32.h" // RawHDSeed
+
+// Thin, thread-safe C++ wrapper over the vendored BIP39 (trezor-crypto) library.
+// It reproduces SilentDragonXLite's tiny-bip39 0.6.2 conventions EXACTLY so the
+// same 24 words yield the same addresses in both wallets:
+//   - English wordlist only (byte-identical to tiny-bip39's english.txt)
+//   - empty BIP39 passphrase (no "25th word")
+//   - PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 2048 rounds, 64-byte seed
+//   - the seed is derived from the CANONICAL phrase regenerated from entropy,
+//     matching SDXLite's Mnemonic::from_entropy(entropy).phrase() round-trip.
+
+//! True if `phrase` is a valid BIP39 mnemonic (word list + checksum).
+bool MnemonicIsValid(const std::string& phrase);
+
+//! Parse `phrase` into its BIP39 entropy (16/20/24/28/32 bytes). Validates the
+//! checksum first. Returns false on any invalid input.
+bool MnemonicToEntropy(const std::string& phrase, RawHDSeed& entropyOut);
+
+//! Regenerate the canonical English mnemonic phrase from `entropy`.
+bool EntropyToMnemonic(const RawHDSeed& entropy, std::string& phraseOut);
+
+//! Derive the 64-byte BIP39 seed used for HD derivation from `entropy`, exactly
+//! as SilentDragonXLite does: canonical phrase from entropy, then PBKDF2 with an
+//! empty passphrase.
+bool Bip39SeedFromEntropy(const RawHDSeed& entropy, RawHDSeed& seed64Out);
+
+//! Generate fresh BIP39 entropy of `bits` (128/160/192/224/256) from the node
+//! CSPRNG, for creating a new mnemonic wallet.
+bool GenerateMnemonicEntropy(int bits, RawHDSeed& entropyOut);
+
+#endif // HUSH_WALLET_MNEMONIC_H

src/wallet/rpcdump.cpp

@@ -742,7 +742,9 @@ UniValue dumpwallet_impl(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, bool fDumpZKeys)
     file << strprintf("#   mined on %s\n", EncodeDumpTime(chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockTime()));
     {
         HDSeed hdSeed;
-        pwalletMain->GetHDSeed(hdSeed);
+        // Dump the 64-byte derivation seed (for mnemonic wallets this is the
+        // expanded BIP39 seed), so re-importing the hex reproduces the same keys.
+        pwalletMain->GetHDSeedForDerivation(hdSeed);
         auto rawSeed = hdSeed.RawSeed();
         file << strprintf("# HDSeed=%s fingerprint=%s", HexStr(rawSeed.begin(), rawSeed.end()), hdSeed.Fingerprint().GetHex());
         file << "\n";
@@ -1026,6 +1028,50 @@ UniValue z_exportkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
     return EncodeSpendingKey(sk.get());
 }
 
+UniValue z_exportmnemonic(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
+{
+    if (!EnsureWalletIsAvailable(fHelp))
+        return NullUniValue;
+
+    if (fHelp || params.size() != 0)
+        throw runtime_error(
+            "z_exportmnemonic\n"
+            "\nReveal the wallet's BIP39 seed phrase (24 words).\n"
+            "The phrase is byte-compatible with SilentDragonXLite: the same words\n"
+            "restore the same transparent and shielded addresses in either wallet.\n"
+            "Only works for wallets created or restored from a mnemonic (see the\n"
+            "-mnemonic and -usemnemonic options). Requires the wallet be unlocked.\n"
+            "\nResult:\n"
+            "{\n"
+            "  \"mnemonic\" : \"word1 ... word24\",   (string) the BIP39 seed phrase\n"
+            "  \"seedfp\" : \"hex\"                    (string) the HD seed fingerprint\n"
+            "}\n"
+            "\nExamples:\n"
+            + HelpExampleCli("z_exportmnemonic", "")
+            + HelpExampleRpc("z_exportmnemonic", "")
+        );
+
+    LOCK2(cs_main, pwalletMain->cs_wallet);
+
+    EnsureWalletIsUnlocked();
+
+    if (!pwalletMain->IsMnemonicSeed()) {
+        throw JSONRPCError(RPC_WALLET_ERROR,
+            "This wallet's seed was not derived from a mnemonic, so no seed phrase is available. "
+            "Use z_exportwallet to back up the raw HD seed instead.");
+    }
+
+    std::string phrase;
+    if (!pwalletMain->GetMnemonicPhrase(phrase)) {
+        throw JSONRPCError(RPC_WALLET_ERROR, "Could not retrieve the seed phrase (is the wallet unlocked?)");
+    }
+
+    UniValue ret(UniValue::VOBJ);
+    ret.push_back(Pair("mnemonic", phrase));
+    ret.push_back(Pair("seedfp", pwalletMain->GetHDChain().seedFp.GetHex()));
+    return ret;
+}
+
 UniValue z_exportviewingkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
 {
     if (!EnsureWalletIsAvailable(fHelp))

src/wallet/rpchushwallet.cpp

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ void zsTxSendsToJSON(const CWalletTx& wtx, UniValue& sends, CAmount& totalSends,
       //Decrypt sapling outgoing t to z transaction using HDseed
       if (wtx.vShieldedSpend.size()==0) {
         HDSeed seed;
-        if (pwalletMain->GetHDSeed(seed)) {
+        if (pwalletMain->GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed)) {
           auto opt = libzcash::SaplingOutgoingPlaintext::decrypt(
                   outputDesc.outCiphertext,ovkForShieldingFromTaddr(seed),outputDesc.cv,outputDesc.cm,outputDesc.ephemeralKey);
 

src/wallet/rpcwallet.cpp

@@ -6272,6 +6272,7 @@ extern UniValue importaddress(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey&
 extern UniValue dumpwallet(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 extern UniValue importwallet(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 extern UniValue z_exportkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
+extern UniValue z_exportmnemonic(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 extern UniValue z_importkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 extern UniValue z_exportviewingkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
 extern UniValue z_importviewingkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk);
@@ -6351,6 +6352,7 @@ static const CRPCCommand commands[] =
     { "wallet",             "z_getnewaddress",          &z_getnewaddress,          true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_listaddresses",          &z_listaddresses,          true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_exportkey",              &z_exportkey,              true  },
+    { "wallet",             "z_exportmnemonic",         &z_exportmnemonic,         true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_importkey",              &z_importkey,              true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_exportviewingkey",       &z_exportviewingkey,       true  },
     { "wallet",             "z_importviewingkey",       &z_importviewingkey,       true  },

src/wallet/wallet.cpp

@@ -36,9 +36,15 @@
 #include "utilmoneystr.h"
 #include "zcash/Note.hpp"
 #include "crypter.h"
+#include "wallet/mnemonic.h"
 #include "coins.h"
 #include "wallet/asyncrpcoperation_saplingconsolidation.h"
 #include "wallet/asyncrpcoperation_sweep.h"
+#include <random>
+#include <limits>
+#include <thread>
+#include <atomic>
+#include <mutex>
 #include "zcash/zip32.h"
 #include "cc/CCinclude.h"
 #include <assert.h>
@@ -126,7 +132,7 @@ SaplingPaymentAddress CWallet::GenerateNewSaplingZKey(bool addToWallet)
 
     // Try to get the seed
     HDSeed seed;
-    if (!GetHDSeed(seed))
+    if (!GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed))
         throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GenerateNewSaplingZKey(): HD seed not found");
 
     auto m = libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey::Master(seed);
@@ -217,7 +223,20 @@ CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
     bool fCompressed = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY); // default to compressed public keys if we want 0.6.0 wallets
 
     CKey secret;
+
+    // Create new metadata
+    int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
+    CKeyMetadata metadata(nCreationTime);
+
+    // Derive the transparent key deterministically from the HD seed when the
+    // feature is enabled, so it can be recovered from the seed alone. Otherwise
+    // fall back to a random key (e.g. legacy wallets that have no HD seed).
+    if (IsHDTransparentEnabled()) {
+        DeriveNewChildKey(metadata, secret);
+        fCompressed = true; // BIP32-derived keys are always compressed
+    } else {
         secret.MakeNewKey(fCompressed);
+    }
 
     // Compressed public keys were introduced in version 0.6.0
     if (fCompressed)
@@ -226,9 +245,7 @@ CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
     CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
     assert(secret.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
 
-    // Create new metadata
+    mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = metadata;
-    int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
-    mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = CKeyMetadata(nCreationTime);
     if (!nTimeFirstKey || nCreationTime < nTimeFirstKey)
         nTimeFirstKey = nCreationTime;
 
@@ -237,6 +254,57 @@ CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
     return pubkey;
 }
 
+// Derive a new transparent key from the HD seed along the BIP44 external chain
+// m/44'/coin_type'/0'/0/i. The child index is taken from (and advances)
+// hdChain.transparentChildCounter, which is persisted so the same keys can be
+// regenerated after a seed-only restore. Mirrors GenerateNewSaplingZKey.
+void CWallet::DeriveNewChildKey(CKeyMetadata& metadata, CKey& secretRet)
+{
+    AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata / hdChain
+
+    HDSeed seed;
+    if (!GetHDSeedForDerivation(seed))
+        throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::DeriveNewChildKey(): HD seed not found");
+
+    RawHDSeed rawSeed = seed.RawSeed();
+
+    CExtKey masterKey;        // m
+    CExtKey purposeKey;       // m/44'
+    CExtKey coinTypeKey;      // m/44'/coin_type'
+    CExtKey accountKey;       // m/44'/coin_type'/0'
+    CExtKey externalChainKey; // m/44'/coin_type'/0'/0
+    CExtKey childKey;         // m/44'/coin_type'/0'/0/i
+
+    masterKey.SetMaster(rawSeed.data(), rawSeed.size());
+
+    uint32_t bip44CoinType = Params().BIP44CoinType();
+
+    // BIP44 path, single account (0'), external chain (0). On this ac_private=1
+    // chain the internal/change chain can never hold value, so it is unused.
+    masterKey.Derive(purposeKey, 44 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    purposeKey.Derive(coinTypeKey, bip44CoinType | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    coinTypeKey.Derive(accountKey, 0 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
+    accountKey.Derive(externalChainKey, 0);
+
+    // Derive the next child index, skipping any key already in the wallet.
+    do {
+        externalChainKey.Derive(childKey, hdChain.transparentChildCounter);
+        metadata.hdKeypath = "m/44'/" + std::to_string(bip44CoinType) + "'/0'/0/" + std::to_string(hdChain.transparentChildCounter);
+        metadata.seedFp = hdChain.seedFp;
+        hdChain.transparentChildCounter++;
+    } while (HaveKey(childKey.key.GetPubKey().GetID()));
+
+    secretRet = childKey.key;
+
+    // Bump a legacy v1 chain to v2 so the transparent counter gets persisted.
+    if (hdChain.nVersion < CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT)
+        hdChain.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT;
+
+    // Persist the advanced counter so restarts / restores don't reuse indices.
+    if (fFileBacked && !CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteHDChain(hdChain))
+        throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::DeriveNewChildKey(): Writing HD chain model failed");
+}
+
 bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
 {
     AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
@@ -988,11 +1056,22 @@ void CWallet::DecrementNoteWitnesses(const CBlockIndex* pindex)
             if (nd->nullifier && pwalletMain->GetSaplingSpendDepth(*item.second.nullifier) <= WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE) {
                 // Only decrement witnesses that are not above the current height
                 if (nd->witnessHeight <= pindex->GetHeight()) {
+                    //PART B1: a rolled-back note must re-validate on reconnect (flag is in-memory only).
+                    nd->witnessRootValidated = false;
                     if (nd->witnesses.size() > 1) {
                         // indexHeight is the height of the block being removed, so
                         // the new witness cache height is one below it.
                         nd->witnesses.pop_front();
                         nd->witnessHeight = pindex->GetHeight() - 1;
+                    } else {
+                        //PART B1: with only the base witness left we cannot pop_front without emptying
+                        //the cache, but we must NOT leave witnessHeight stranded above the disconnected
+                        //tip (that high-height/stale-witness state is the desync originator). Force a
+                        //clean reseed on reconnect instead of lying about the height. (Inlined because
+                        //ClearSingleNoteWitnessCache is defined later in this file.)
+                        nd->witnesses.clear();
+                        nd->witnessHeight = -1;
+                        nd->witnessRootValidated = false;
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -1058,11 +1137,24 @@ int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessO
             continue;
           }
 
-          //Skip Validation when witness height is greater that block height
+          //PART A: a witness whose height is at/above the build height must NOT be blindly trusted.
+          //Validate its root against the canonical sapling root at witnessHeight when that block is
+          //on the active chain. Match -> safe to skip. Mismatch (witnessHeight advanced past the real
+          //witness state = the desync signature) -> fall through to ClearSingleNoteWitnessCache + reseed.
           if (nd->witnessHeight > pindex->GetHeight() - 1) {
+            CBlockIndex* whIndex = chainActive[nd->witnessHeight];
+            if (whIndex == NULL) {
+              //witnessHeight strictly above the active chain (transient catch-up): cannot validate yet
               nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
               continue;
             }
+            if (nd->witnesses.front().root() == whIndex->hashFinalSaplingRoot) {
+              nd->witnessRootValidated = true;
+              nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
+              continue;
+            }
+            //root mismatch on the active chain -> desynced; fall through to rebuild below
+          }
 
           //Validate the witness at the witness height
           witnessRoot = nd->witnesses.front().root();
@@ -1137,80 +1229,226 @@ void CWallet::BuildWitnessCache(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessOnly)
 
   LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
 
+  // The Phase-1 loop below walks the ACTIVE chain (chainActive.Next) and sizes blockCms from
+  // pindex->GetHeight(), terminating only on pbi==pindex. If pindex was reorged OFF the active
+  // chain (a reorg landed while ThreadNotifyWallets drained its connect backlog with cs_main
+  // released), the loop never reaches pindex and, once the active tip passes pindex's height, it
+  // writes blockCms[h-startHeight] out of bounds -> heap overflow. Rebuilding witnesses for an
+  // abandoned block is meaningless; the ChainTip for the new active tip re-drives this. cs_main is
+  // held for the whole function, so this check cannot race the loop below.
+  if (pindex != chainActive[pindex->GetHeight()]) {
+    if (fZdebug)
+      LogPrintf("%s: pindex height=%d not on active chain (reorg); skipping witness rebuild\n",
+                __func__, pindex->GetHeight());
+    return;
+  }
+
   int startHeight = VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(pindex, witnessOnly) + 1;
 
   if (startHeight > pindex->GetHeight() || witnessOnly) {
     return;
   }
 
-  uint256 saplingRoot;
-  CBlockIndex* pblockindex = chainActive[startHeight];
-  int height = chainActive.Height();
   if(fZdebug)
-    LogPrintf("%s: height=%d, startHeight=%d\n", __func__, height, startHeight);
+    LogPrintf("%s: startHeight=%d, tip=%d\n", __func__, startHeight, chainActive.Height());
 
-  while (pblockindex) {
+  // Tier 1 optimization: build the set of notes that still need extension ONCE instead of
+  // rescanning all of mapWallet for every block. A note's gate conditions (nullifier present,
+  // spend depth <= WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE, tx confirmed) are invariant across this loop (the active
+  // chain is fixed under cs_main), so they are evaluated once here rather than per block. A note
+  // becomes "active" at the block where witnessHeight == GetHeight()-1 (exactly the original
+  // per-block gate) and is then extended every subsequent block, so the produced witnesses are
+  // byte-for-byte identical to the original full-rescan implementation -- only the bookkeeping
+  // cost changes from O(blocks * walletSize) to O(blocks + activeNotes).
+  struct PendingNote { int startWitnessHeight; SaplingNoteData* nd; };
+  std::vector<PendingNote> pending;
+  for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& wtxItem : mapWallet) {
+    if (wtxItem.second.mapSaplingNoteData.empty())
+      continue;
+    if (wtxItem.second.GetDepthInMainChain() <= 0)
+      continue;
+    for (mapSaplingNoteData_t::value_type& item : wtxItem.second.mapSaplingNoteData) {
+      SaplingNoteData* nd = &(item.second);
+      if (!nd->nullifier)
+        continue;
+      if (nd->witnesses.empty())   // cannot extend (front() would be UB); the original gate also never matched these in practice
+        continue;
+      if (GetSaplingSpendDepth(*nd->nullifier) > WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE)
+        continue;
+      // Only notes that still lag the build target need extension. The lowest such witnessHeight
+      // is exactly startHeight-1 (startHeight = nMinimumHeight+1 from SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight).
+      if (nd->witnessHeight >= startHeight - 1 && nd->witnessHeight <= pindex->GetHeight() - 1)
+        pending.push_back({ nd->witnessHeight, nd });
+    }
+  }
+  std::sort(pending.begin(), pending.end(),
+            [](const PendingNote& a, const PendingNote& b) { return a.startWitnessHeight < b.startWitnessHeight; });
+
+  // Phase 1 (serial, main thread under cs_main/cs_wallet): extract the per-block Sapling
+  // commitments for [startHeight, tip] into memory. This is the only part touching chain/disk;
+  // profiling showed it is ~1% of rebuild time. ~9MB for a full-chain range.
+  const int tipHeight = pindex->GetHeight();
+  const int rangeLen = tipHeight - startHeight + 1;
+  std::vector<std::vector<uint256>> blockCms(rangeLen > 0 ? rangeLen : 0);
+  int64_t tRead = 0;
+  {
+    int64_t r0 = GetTimeMicros();
+    CBlockIndex* pbi = chainActive[startHeight];
+    while (pbi) {
       if (ShutdownRequested()) {
-        LogPrintf("%s: shutdown requested, aborting building witnesses\n", __func__);
+        LogPrintf("%s: shutdown requested, aborting witness rebuild\n", __func__);
-        break;
+        return;
       }
       if (pwalletMain->fAbortRescan) {
-        LogPrintf("%s: rescan aborted at block %d, stopping witness building\n", pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
+        LogPrintf("%s: rescan aborted during witness rebuild\n", __func__);
         pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
         return;
       }
-
+      int h = pbi->GetHeight();
-    if (pblockindex->GetHeight() % 100 == 0 && pblockindex->GetHeight() < height - 5) {
+      if (h % 5000 == 0 && h < tipHeight - 5)
-      LogPrintf("Building Witnesses for block %i %.4f complete, %d remaining\n", pblockindex->GetHeight(), pblockindex->GetHeight() / double(height), height - pblockindex->GetHeight() );
+        LogPrintf("Reading blocks for witness rebuild: %d / %d\n", h - startHeight, rangeLen);
-    }
-
-    SaplingMerkleTree saplingTree;
-    saplingRoot = pblockindex->pprev->hashFinalSaplingRoot;
-    pcoinsTip->GetSaplingAnchorAt(saplingRoot, saplingTree);
-
-    //Cycle through blocks and transactions building sapling tree until the commitment needed is reached
       CBlock block;
-    if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pblockindex, 1)) {
+      if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pbi, 1)) {
-        throw std::runtime_error(
+        throw std::runtime_error(strprintf("Cannot read block height %d from disk", h));
-           strprintf("Cannot read block height %d (%s) from disk", pindex->GetHeight(), pindex->GetBlockHash().GetHex()));
+      }
+      std::vector<uint256>& cms = blockCms[h - startHeight];
+      for (const CTransaction& tx : block.vtx)
+        for (uint32_t i = 0; i < tx.vShieldedOutput.size(); i++)
+          cms.push_back(tx.vShieldedOutput[i].cm);
+      if (pbi == pindex) break;
+      pbi = chainActive.Next(pbi);
+    }
+    tRead = GetTimeMicros() - r0;
   }
 
-    for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& wtxItem : mapWallet) {
+  // Phase 2 (parallel): each note's witness extension is independent, so partition the lagging
+  // notes across worker threads. Workers touch ONLY their own notes' witness lists plus the
+  // read-only commitment cache -- no locks, no chain access -- while the main thread keeps
+  // cs_main/cs_wallet held throughout. Round-robin assignment over the start-sorted `pending`
+  // spreads the long (low-start) notes across threads. Produces witnesses byte-identical to the
+  // serial path: every note is extended over exactly its [witnessHeight+1, tip] block range, in
+  // order, appending each block's commitments.
+  std::vector<SaplingNoteData*> work;
+  work.reserve(pending.size());
+  for (const PendingNote& p : pending) work.push_back(p.nd);
 
-      if (wtxItem.second.mapSaplingNoteData.empty())
+  // Only a substantial bulk rebuild (e.g. a one-time post-upgrade repair) is worth parallelizing
+  // and logging; routine 1-block tip extension runs serially to avoid per-block thread-spawn
+  // overhead and log spam.
+  const bool bulkRebuild = (rangeLen > 100);
+
+  int nPar = (int)GetArg("-witnessbuildthreads", 0);
+  if (nPar <= 0) nPar = (int)std::thread::hardware_concurrency();
+  if (nPar <= 0) nPar = 1;
+  if (nPar > (int)work.size()) nPar = (int)work.size();
+  if (nPar < 1) nPar = 1;
+  if (!bulkRebuild) nPar = 1;
+
+  std::atomic<bool> failed(false);
+  std::mutex failMtx;
+  std::string failMsg;
+
+  const int CACHE = (int)WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE;
+  // Tier 2b: advance one witness in place for the deep part (no per-block heap clone), then
+  // materialize only the final CACHE snapshots. -witnessfastrebuild=0 forces the reference
+  // clone-every-block path for A/B verification.
+  bool fastRebuild = GetBoolArg("-witnessfastrebuild", true);
+
+  auto worker = [&](int tid) {
+    try {
+      for (size_t k = (size_t)tid; k < work.size(); k += (size_t)nPar) {
+        SaplingNoteData* nd = work[k];
+        int startH = nd->witnessHeight;
+        int nBlocks = tipHeight - startH;
+        if (nBlocks <= 0)
           continue;
 
-      if (wtxItem.second.GetDepthInMainChain() > 0) {
+        if (!fastRebuild || nBlocks <= CACHE) {
-
+          // Reference / shallow path: clone every block (preserves pre-existing older snapshots).
-        //Sapling
+          for (int h = startH + 1; h <= tipHeight; h++) {
-        for (mapSaplingNoteData_t::value_type& item : wtxItem.second.mapSaplingNoteData) {
-          auto* nd = &(item.second);
-          if (nd->nullifier && nd->witnessHeight == pblockindex->GetHeight() - 1
-              && GetSaplingSpendDepth(*item.second.nullifier) <= WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE) {
-
             nd->witnesses.push_front(nd->witnesses.front());
-            while (nd->witnesses.size() > WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE) {
+            while ((int)nd->witnesses.size() > CACHE)
               nd->witnesses.pop_back();
+            const std::vector<uint256>& cms = blockCms[h - startHeight];
+            for (size_t c = 0; c < cms.size(); c++)
+              nd->witnesses.front().append(cms[c]);
+            nd->witnessHeight = h;
           }
+        } else {
+          // Deep fast path: advance ONE witness in place through [startH+1, tipHeight-CACHE]
+          // with no per-block clone, then build only the final CACHE snapshots. The reference
+          // loop pops all but the last CACHE snapshots, so the resulting deque is identical
+          // ([W@tip .. W@(tip-CACHE+1)]), but with ~CACHE heap allocations instead of ~nBlocks.
+          int deepEnd = tipHeight - CACHE;
+          {
+            SaplingWitness& w = nd->witnesses.front();
+            for (int h = startH + 1; h <= deepEnd; h++) {
+              const std::vector<uint256>& cms = blockCms[h - startHeight];
+              for (size_t c = 0; c < cms.size(); c++)
+                w.append(cms[c]);
+            }
+          }
+          // Drop pre-existing older snapshots; keep only the advanced front (W@deepEnd).
+          while (nd->witnesses.size() > 1)
+            nd->witnesses.pop_back();
+          // Materialize the last CACHE snapshots (heights deepEnd+1 .. tip).
+          for (int h = deepEnd + 1; h <= tipHeight; h++) {
+            nd->witnesses.push_front(nd->witnesses.front());
+            const std::vector<uint256>& cms = blockCms[h - startHeight];
+            for (size_t c = 0; c < cms.size(); c++)
+              nd->witnesses.front().append(cms[c]);
+          }
+          while ((int)nd->witnesses.size() > CACHE)
+            nd->witnesses.pop_back();
+          nd->witnessHeight = tipHeight;
+        }
+      }
+    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
+      std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lk(failMtx);
+      if (failMsg.empty()) failMsg = e.what();
+      failed = true;
+    } catch (...) {
+      failed = true;
+    }
+  };
 
-            for (const CTransaction& tx : block.vtx) {
+  int64_t e0 = GetTimeMicros();
-              for (uint32_t i = 0; i < tx.vShieldedOutput.size(); i++) {
+  if (nPar <= 1) {
-                const uint256& note_commitment = tx.vShieldedOutput[i].cm;
+    worker(0);
-                nd->witnesses.front().append(note_commitment);
+  } else {
-              }
+    std::vector<std::thread> threads;
-            }
+    threads.reserve(nPar);
-            nd->witnessHeight = pblockindex->GetHeight();
+    for (int t = 0; t < nPar; t++) threads.emplace_back(worker, t);
-          }
+    for (std::thread& th : threads) th.join();
   }
+  int64_t tExtend = GetTimeMicros() - e0;
 
+  if (failed)
+    throw std::runtime_error(std::string("Witness rebuild worker failed: ") + (failMsg.empty() ? "unknown" : failMsg));
+
+  // Latch the rebuilt notes as validated so they are not re-validated and reseeded on every
+  // subsequent block connect. Without this, any note whose witness cannot be reconstructed to
+  // the canonical anchor (e.g. legacy corruption) would be reseeded and fully replayed on every
+  // block forever. A note whose rebuilt root still disagrees with the canonical finalsaplingroot
+  // is unrecoverable here: it is left flagged (the GetSaplingNoteWitnesses majority-anchor guard
+  // skips it for spends) and reported, rather than spun on indefinitely. witnessRootValidated is
+  // in-memory only, so a fresh validation pass still runs on each restart and after any reorg
+  // (DecrementNoteWitnesses clears it), keeping the heal self-correcting.
+  if (!work.empty()) {
+    const uint256& canonicalRoot = pindex->hashFinalSaplingRoot;
+    int nUnrecoverable = 0;
+    for (SaplingNoteData* nd : work) {
+      if (nd->witnesses.empty() || nd->witnesses.front().root() != canonicalRoot)
+        nUnrecoverable++;
+      nd->witnessRootValidated = true;
     }
+    if (bulkRebuild) {
+      LogPrintf("%s: rebuilt %u note witness cache(s) to height %d in %ldms using %d thread(s)%s\n",
+                __func__, (unsigned)work.size(), tipHeight, (long)((tRead + tExtend) / 1000), nPar,
+                nUnrecoverable
+                  ? strprintf(" [WARNING: %d note(s) could not be rebuilt to the canonical anchor and were skipped]", nUnrecoverable).c_str()
+                  : "");
     }
-
-    if (pblockindex == pindex)
-      break;
-
-    pblockindex = chainActive.Next(pblockindex);
-
   }
 
 }
@@ -1591,9 +1829,12 @@ bool CWallet::UpdatedNoteData(const CWalletTx& wtxIn, CWalletTx& wtx)
             if (tmp.count(nd.first) && nd.second.witnesses.size() > 0) {
                 tmp.at(nd.first).witnesses.assign(
                         nd.second.witnesses.cbegin(), nd.second.witnesses.cend());
-            }
+                //PART B2: only carry over witnessHeight TOGETHER with the witnesses it describes.
+                //Copying it unconditionally (when witnesses are NOT copied) advances the height past
+                //the actual witness state for a whole tx's notes at once = the batch desync originator.
                 tmp.at(nd.first).witnessHeight = nd.second.witnessHeight;
             }
+        }
 
         // Now copy over the updated note data
         wtx.mapSaplingNoteData = tmp;
@@ -1831,37 +2072,54 @@ void CWallet::GetSaplingNoteWitnesses(std::vector<SaplingOutPoint> notes,
                                       uint256 &final_anchor)
 {
     LOCK(cs_wallet);
+    witnesses.clear();
     witnesses.resize(notes.size());
-    boost::optional<uint256> rt;
+
-    int i = 0;
+    // Pass 1: collect each note's most-recent cached witness and tally roots. Use find() so we do
-    for (SaplingOutPoint note : notes) {
+    // NOT default-construct mapWallet / mapSaplingNoteData entries (the original indexed
-        //fprintf(stderr,"%s: i=%d\n", __func__,i);
+    // mapWallet[note.hash] BEFORE its own count() guard, silently inserting empty entries).
-        auto noteData   = mapWallet[note.hash].mapSaplingNoteData;
+    std::vector<boost::optional<SaplingWitness>> cand(notes.size());
-        auto nWitnesses = noteData[note].witnesses.size();
+    std::map<uint256, int> rootVotes;
-        if (mapWallet.count(note.hash) && noteData.count(note) && nWitnesses > 0) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < notes.size(); i++) {
-            fprintf(stderr,"%s: Found %lu witnesses for note %s...\n", __func__, nWitnesses, note.hash.ToString().substr(0,8).c_str() );
+        const SaplingOutPoint& note = notes[i];
-            witnesses[i] = noteData[note].witnesses.front();
+        auto wi = mapWallet.find(note.hash);
-            if (!rt) {
+        if (wi == mapWallet.end())
-                //fprintf(stderr,"%s: Setting witness root\n",__func__);
+            continue;
-                rt = witnesses[i]->root();
+        const mapSaplingNoteData_t& noteData = wi->second.mapSaplingNoteData;
-            } else {
+        auto ni = noteData.find(note);
-                if(*rt == witnesses[i]->root()) {
+        if (ni == noteData.end() || ni->second.witnesses.empty())
-                } else {
+            continue;
-                    // Something is fucky
+        cand[i] = ni->second.witnesses.front();
-                    std::string err = string("CWallet::GetSaplingNoteWitnesses: Invalid witness root! rt=") + rt.get().ToString();
+        rootVotes[cand[i]->root()]++;
-                    err            += string("\n!= witness[i]->root()=") + witnesses[i]->root().ToString();
-                    fprintf(stderr,"%s: IGNORING %s\n", __func__,err.c_str());
     }
 
+    // Choose the anchor that the most witnesses agree on (robust even when the FIRST note is the
+    // desynced one - the original code blindly took the first note's root as the anchor).
+    boost::optional<uint256> anchor;
+    int bestVotes = 0;
+    for (const std::pair<uint256, int>& rv : rootVotes) {
+        if (rv.second > bestVotes) { bestVotes = rv.second; anchor = rv.first; }
+    }
+
+    // Pass 2: only emit witnesses whose root matches the common anchor. A desynced witness is left
+    // as boost::none rather than returned: handing the spend prover a witness whose root disagrees
+    // with the anchor guarantees a "Failed to build transaction". Note selection / callers skip
+    // notes that have no usable witness (see asyncrpcoperation_*: "Missing witness for Sapling note").
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < notes.size(); i++) {
+        if (cand[i] && anchor && cand[i]->root() == *anchor) {
+            witnesses[i] = cand[i];
+        } else {
+            if (cand[i])
+                LogPrintf("%s: note %s has a desynced witness (root=%s != anchor=%s); skipping it\n",
+                          __func__, notes[i].hash.ToString().substr(0, 16).c_str(),
+                          cand[i]->root().ToString().c_str(),
+                          anchor ? anchor->ToString().c_str() : "none");
+            witnesses[i] = boost::none;
         }
     }
-        i++;
+
-    }
+    if (anchor)
-    // All returned witnesses have the same anchor
+        final_anchor = *anchor;
-    if (rt) {
-        final_anchor = *rt;
-        //fprintf(stderr,"%s: final_anchor=%s\n", __func__, rt.get().ToString().c_str() );
-    }
 }
 
 isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxIn &txin) const
@@ -2109,18 +2367,39 @@ CAmount CWallet::GetChange(const CTransaction& tx) const
 
 bool CWallet::IsHDFullyEnabled() const
 {
-    // Only Sapling addresses are HD for now
+    // Both Sapling and transparent addresses are HD when transparent HD is on.
-    return false;
+    return IsHDTransparentEnabled();
+}
+
+bool CWallet::IsHDTransparentEnabled() const
+{
+    // Transparent keys are HD-derived when the wallet has an HD seed and the
+    // feature is enabled (default on). Legacy wallets keep any pre-existing
+    // random t-keys; only newly generated keys become HD (and those old random
+    // keys are NOT seed-recoverable, so wallet.dat backups remain necessary).
+    return !hdChain.seedFp.IsNull() && GetBoolArg("-hdtransparent", true);
 }
 
 void CWallet::GenerateNewSeed()
 {
     LOCK(cs_wallet);
 
-    auto seed = HDSeed::Random(HD_WALLET_SEED_LENGTH);
-
     int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
 
+    // Opt-in: create the wallet from a fresh BIP39 mnemonic so its 24 words can
+    // be exported (z_exportmnemonic) and used in SilentDragonXLite.
+    if (GetBoolArg("-usemnemonic", false)) {
+        RawHDSeed entropy;
+        if (GenerateMnemonicEntropy(256, entropy)) {
+            HDSeed seed(entropy);
+            if (InstallHDSeed(seed, true, nCreationTime))
+                return;
+        }
+        LogPrintf("%s: -usemnemonic seed generation failed, falling back to a random seed\n", __func__);
+    }
+
+    auto seed = HDSeed::Random(HD_WALLET_SEED_LENGTH);
+
     // If the wallet is encrypted and locked, this will fail.
     if (!SetHDSeed(seed))
         throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": SetHDSeed failed");
@@ -2129,7 +2408,7 @@ void CWallet::GenerateNewSeed()
     // the child index counter in the database
     // as a hdchain object
     CHDChain newHdChain;
-    newHdChain.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_BASE;
+    newHdChain.nVersion = CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT;
     newHdChain.seedFp = seed.Fingerprint();
     newHdChain.nCreateTime = nCreationTime;
     SetHDChain(newHdChain, false);
@@ -2193,6 +2472,122 @@ bool CWallet::LoadCryptedHDSeed(const uint256& seedFp, const std::vector<unsigne
     return CCryptoKeyStore::SetCryptedHDSeed(seedFp, seed);
 }
 
+bool CWallet::InstallHDSeed(const HDSeed& seed, bool fMnemonic, int64_t nCreateTime)
+{
+    AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
+
+    if (!SetHDSeed(seed))
+        return false;
+
+    CHDChain newHdChain;
+    newHdChain.nVersion = fMnemonic ? CHDChain::VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC
+                                    : CHDChain::VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT;
+    newHdChain.seedFp = seed.Fingerprint();
+    newHdChain.nCreateTime = nCreateTime;
+    newHdChain.fMnemonicSeed = fMnemonic;
+    SetHDChain(newHdChain, false);
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool CWallet::SetHDSeedFromHex(const std::string& seedHex)
+{
+    LOCK(cs_wallet);
+
+    // Refuse to clobber an existing seed (the keystore refuses too); restore
+    // must run on a fresh/empty wallet.
+    if (HaveHDSeed())
+        return false;
+
+    if (!IsHex(seedHex))
+        return false;
+    std::vector<unsigned char> raw = ParseHex(seedHex);
+    // 32 = legacy raw seed; 64 = BIP39-derived seed (as exported by a mnemonic
+    // wallet). Either is used directly for derivation (fMnemonicSeed = false).
+    if (raw.size() != 32 && raw.size() != 64)
+        return false;
+
+    RawHDSeed rawSeed(raw.begin(), raw.end());
+    HDSeed seed(rawSeed);
+
+    return InstallHDSeed(seed, false, 1); // birthday = genesis for a restore
+}
+
+bool CWallet::SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(const std::string& phrase)
+{
+    LOCK(cs_wallet);
+
+    if (HaveHDSeed())
+        return false;
+
+    RawHDSeed entropy;
+    if (!MnemonicToEntropy(phrase, entropy))
+        return false;
+
+    // Store the BIP39 entropy as the HDSeed (SilentDragonXLite's on-disk
+    // convention); the 64-byte seed is expanded from it on demand.
+    HDSeed seed(entropy);
+    return InstallHDSeed(seed, true, 1); // birthday = genesis for a restore
+}
+
+bool CWallet::GetHDSeedForDerivation(HDSeed& seedOut) const
+{
+    HDSeed stored;
+    if (!GetHDSeed(stored))
+        return false;
+
+    if (!hdChain.fMnemonicSeed) {
+        seedOut = stored; // legacy / hex seed: fed to derivation directly
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Mnemonic wallet: the stored seed is the 32-byte BIP39 entropy. Expand it
+    // to the 64-byte BIP39 seed exactly as SilentDragonXLite does.
+    RawHDSeed seed64;
+    if (!Bip39SeedFromEntropy(stored.RawSeed(), seed64))
+        return false;
+    seedOut = HDSeed(seed64);
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool CWallet::GetMnemonicPhrase(std::string& phraseOut) const
+{
+    if (!hdChain.fMnemonicSeed)
+        return false;
+
+    HDSeed stored;
+    if (!GetHDSeed(stored)) // fails on an encrypted+locked wallet
+        return false;
+
+    return EntropyToMnemonic(stored.RawSeed(), phraseOut);
+}
+
+void CWallet::TopUpHDTransparentKeys(unsigned int count, int64_t nBirthday)
+{
+    LOCK(cs_wallet);
+
+    if (!IsHDTransparentEnabled())
+        return;
+
+    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        CKey secret;
+        CKeyMetadata metadata(nBirthday);
+        DeriveNewChildKey(metadata, secret);
+
+        CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
+        assert(secret.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
+
+        mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = metadata;
+        // Keep the birthday floor at nBirthday so the rescan is not clipped
+        // (derived keys are stamped nBirthday, not "now", precisely for this).
+        if (!nTimeFirstKey || nBirthday < nTimeFirstKey)
+            nTimeFirstKey = nBirthday;
+
+        if (!AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
+            throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::TopUpHDTransparentKeys(): AddKeyPubKey failed");
+    }
+}
+
 void CWalletTx::SetSaplingNoteData(mapSaplingNoteData_t &noteData)
 {
     mapSaplingNoteData.clear();
@@ -3416,7 +3811,7 @@ bool CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf(const CAmount& nTargetValue, int nConfMine, int
     vector<pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > > vValue;
     CAmount nTotalLower = 0;
 
-    random_shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), GetRandInt);
+    std::shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), std::mt19937(GetRand(std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max())));
 
     BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput &output, vCoins)
     {

src/wallet/wallet.h

@@ -311,7 +311,9 @@ public:
     boost::optional<uint256> nullifier;
 
     //In Memory Only
-    bool witnessRootValidated;
+    // Never serialized (see SerializationOp): must default false so a garbage value can't
+    // read true and short-circuit the witness self-heal in VerifyAndSetInitialWitness.
+    bool witnessRootValidated = false;
 
     ADD_SERIALIZE_METHODS;
 
@@ -1061,6 +1063,9 @@ public:
      * Generate a new key
      */
     CPubKey GenerateNewKey();
+    //! Derive a new transparent key from the HD seed along the BIP44 external
+    //! chain m/44'/coin_type'/0'/0/i, advancing hdChain.transparentChildCounter.
+    void DeriveNewChildKey(CKeyMetadata& metadata, CKey& secretRet);
     //! Adds a key to the store, and saves it to disk.
     bool AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& key, const CPubKey &pubkey);
     //! Adds a key to the store, without saving it to disk (used by LoadWallet)
@@ -1292,6 +1297,10 @@ public:
     /* Returns true if HD is enabled for all address types, false if only for Sapling */
     bool IsHDFullyEnabled() const;
 
+    /* Returns true if transparent keys should be HD-derived from the seed.
+       Requires an HD seed and the -hdtransparent option (default on). */
+    bool IsHDTransparentEnabled() const;
+
     /* Generates a new HD seed (will reset the chain child index counters)
        Sets the seed's version based on the current wallet version (so the
        caller must ensure the current wallet version is correct before calling
@@ -1301,6 +1310,41 @@ public:
     bool SetHDSeed(const HDSeed& seed);
     bool SetCryptedHDSeed(const uint256& seedFp, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret);
 
+    /* Restore a wallet's HD seed from a hex string (as exported in the
+       z_exportwallet "# HDSeed=" comment): 32 bytes for a legacy raw seed, or
+       64 bytes for a BIP39-derived seed. Only succeeds on a wallet that has no
+       seed yet. Sets the chain birthday to genesis so a rescan finds all
+       historical (coinbase) funds. Returns false on bad input or existing seed. */
+    bool SetHDSeedFromHex(const std::string& seedHex);
+
+    /* Restore/create a wallet from a BIP39 mnemonic phrase, byte-compatible with
+       SilentDragonXLite: stores the 32-byte entropy, marks the chain mnemonic,
+       and derives the 64-byte BIP39 seed on demand. Only succeeds on a wallet
+       with no seed yet. Returns false on an invalid phrase or existing seed. */
+    bool SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(const std::string& phrase);
+
+    /* Return the wallet's 24-word BIP39 recovery phrase, if this is a mnemonic
+       wallet and the seed is available (unlocked). Returns false otherwise. */
+    bool GetMnemonicPhrase(std::string& phraseOut) const;
+
+    /* True if the HD seed was derived from a BIP39 mnemonic (stored as entropy). */
+    bool IsMnemonicSeed() const { return hdChain.fMnemonicSeed; }
+
+    /* Return the seed to feed into HD derivation. For mnemonic wallets this
+       expands the stored 32-byte entropy into the 64-byte BIP39 seed; for legacy
+       wallets it is the stored seed unchanged. Use this everywhere keys/OVKs are
+       derived so behaviour matches SilentDragonXLite. */
+    bool GetHDSeedForDerivation(HDSeed& seedOut) const;
+
+    /* Shared tail of the seed-install paths: stores `seed` and a fresh CHDChain
+       (mnemonic vs raw) with the given birthday. Caller must hold cs_wallet. */
+    bool InstallHDSeed(const HDSeed& seed, bool fMnemonic, int64_t nCreateTime);
+
+    /* Pre-derive `count` HD transparent keys (external chain) into the keystore,
+       stamped with creation time `nBirthday`, so a subsequent rescan can find
+       funds paid to them after a seed-only restore. */
+    void TopUpHDTransparentKeys(unsigned int count, int64_t nBirthday);
+
     /* Set the HD chain model (chain child index counters) */
     void SetHDChain(const CHDChain& chain, bool memonly);
     const CHDChain& GetHDChain() const { return hdChain; }

src/wallet/walletdb.h

@@ -62,11 +62,24 @@ class CHDChain
 {
 public:
     static const int VERSION_HD_BASE = 1;
-    static const int CURRENT_VERSION = VERSION_HD_BASE;
+    // Version 2 adds the transparent (secp256k1/BIP44) external-chain counter.
+    static const int VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT = 2;
+    // Version 3 marks a seed derived from a BIP39 mnemonic: the stored HDSeed is
+    // the 32-byte BIP39 entropy, expanded to the 64-byte seed for derivation
+    // (matches SilentDragonXLite's on-disk convention).
+    static const int VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC = 3;
+    static const int CURRENT_VERSION = VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC;
     int nVersion;
     uint256 seedFp;
     int64_t nCreateTime; // 0 means unknown
     uint32_t saplingAccountCounter;
+    // Next index on the HD transparent external chain m/44'/coin'/0'/0/i.
+    // Only serialized/consulted when nVersion >= VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT.
+    uint32_t transparentChildCounter;
+    // True when the stored HDSeed is BIP39 entropy that must be expanded to the
+    // 64-byte BIP39 seed before HD derivation. Only serialized when
+    // nVersion >= VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC (false for all pre-existing wallets).
+    bool fMnemonicSeed;
 
     CHDChain() { SetNull(); }
 
@@ -79,6 +92,14 @@ public:
         READWRITE(seedFp);
         READWRITE(nCreateTime);
         READWRITE(saplingAccountCounter);
+        // Version-gated so pre-existing v1 wallet.dat records still deserialize
+        // (they simply leave the newer fields at their SetNull defaults).
+        if (this->nVersion >= VERSION_HD_TRANSPARENT) {
+            READWRITE(transparentChildCounter);
+        }
+        if (this->nVersion >= VERSION_HD_MNEMONIC) {
+            READWRITE(fMnemonicSeed);
+        }
     }
 
     void SetNull()
@@ -87,6 +108,8 @@ public:
         seedFp.SetNull();
         nCreateTime = 0;
         saplingAccountCounter = 0;
+        transparentChildCounter = 0;
+        fMnemonicSeed = false;
     }
 };
 

util/bootstrap-dragonx.bat

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+@echo off
+REM Copyright 2024 The Hush Developers
+REM Copyright 2024 The DragonX Developers
+REM Released under the GPLv3
+REM
+REM Download and apply a DRAGONX blockchain bootstrap on Windows.
+REM Safely preserves wallet.dat and configuration files.
+
+setlocal enabledelayedexpansion
+
+set "BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL=https://bootstrap.dragonx.is"
+set "BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL=https://bootstrap2.dragonx.is"
+set "BOOTSTRAP_FILE=DRAGONX.zip"
+set "CHAIN_NAME=DRAGONX"
+
+REM Data directory on Windows
+set "DATADIR=%APPDATA%\Hush\%CHAIN_NAME%"
+
+REM Find dragonx-cli relative to this script
+set "CLI="
+set "SCRIPT_DIR=%~dp0"
+if exist "%SCRIPT_DIR%dragonx-cli.exe" (
+    set "CLI=%SCRIPT_DIR%dragonx-cli.exe"
+)
+
+echo ============================================
+echo   DragonX Bootstrap Installer
+echo ============================================
+echo.
+echo [INFO] Data directory: %DATADIR%
+echo.
+
+REM Step 1: Stop daemon if running
+call :stop_daemon
+if errorlevel 1 goto :error_exit
+
+REM Step 2: Clean old chain data
+call :clean_chain_data
+if errorlevel 1 goto :error_exit
+
+REM Step 3: Download bootstrap
+call :download_bootstrap
+if errorlevel 1 goto :error_exit
+
+REM Step 4: Extract bootstrap
+call :extract_bootstrap
+if errorlevel 1 goto :error_exit
+
+echo.
+echo [INFO] Bootstrap installation complete!
+echo [INFO] You can now start DragonX with: dragonxd.exe
+echo.
+goto :EOF
+
+REM ============================================
+REM  Stop daemon if running
+REM ============================================
+:stop_daemon
+if "%CLI%"=="" (
+    echo [WARN] dragonx-cli.exe not found next to this script.
+    echo [WARN] Please make sure the DragonX daemon is stopped before continuing.
+    set /p "ANSWER=Is the DragonX daemon stopped? (y/N): "
+    if /i not "!ANSWER!"=="y" (
+        echo [ERROR] Please stop the daemon first and run this script again.
+        exit /b 1
+    )
+    exit /b 0
+)
+
+"%CLI%" getinfo >nul 2>&1
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo [INFO] Daemon is not running.
+    exit /b 0
+)
+
+echo [INFO] Stopping DragonX daemon...
+"%CLI%" stop >nul 2>&1
+
+set "TRIES=0"
+:wait_loop
+"%CLI%" getinfo >nul 2>&1
+if errorlevel 1 goto :daemon_stopped
+timeout /t 2 /nobreak >nul
+set /a TRIES+=1
+if %TRIES% geq 60 (
+    echo [ERROR] Daemon did not stop after 120 seconds. Please stop it manually and retry.
+    exit /b 1
+)
+goto :wait_loop
+
+:daemon_stopped
+echo [INFO] Daemon stopped.
+exit /b 0
+
+REM ============================================
+REM  Clean blockchain data, preserving wallet and config
+REM ============================================
+:clean_chain_data
+if not exist "%DATADIR%" (
+    echo [INFO] Data directory does not exist yet, creating it.
+    mkdir "%DATADIR%"
+    exit /b 0
+)
+
+echo [INFO] Cleaning blockchain data from %DATADIR% ...
+
+REM Preserve wallet.dat and config
+set "TMPDIR=%TEMP%\dragonx-bootstrap-%RANDOM%"
+mkdir "%TMPDIR%" 2>nul
+
+for %%F in (wallet.dat DRAGONX.conf peers.dat) do (
+    if exist "%DATADIR%\%%F" (
+        copy /y "%DATADIR%\%%F" "%TMPDIR%\%%F" >nul
+    )
+)
+
+REM Remove blockchain directories and files
+for %%D in (blocks chainstate notarizations komodo) do (
+    if exist "%DATADIR%\%%D" (
+        rmdir /s /q "%DATADIR%\%%D" 2>nul
+    )
+)
+for %%F in (db.log debug.log fee_estimates.dat banlist.dat) do (
+    if exist "%DATADIR%\%%F" (
+        del /f /q "%DATADIR%\%%F" 2>nul
+    )
+)
+
+REM Restore preserved files
+for %%F in (wallet.dat DRAGONX.conf peers.dat) do (
+    if exist "%TMPDIR%\%%F" (
+        copy /y "%TMPDIR%\%%F" "%DATADIR%\%%F" >nul
+    )
+)
+rmdir /s /q "%TMPDIR%" 2>nul
+
+echo [INFO] Blockchain data cleaned.
+exit /b 0
+
+REM ============================================
+REM  Download bootstrap (with fallback)
+REM ============================================
+:download_bootstrap
+echo [INFO] Downloading bootstrap from %BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL% ...
+echo [INFO] This may take a while depending on your connection speed.
+
+REM Try primary URL
+call :do_download "%BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL%"
+if not errorlevel 1 goto :download_verify
+
+echo [WARN] Primary download failed, trying fallback %BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL% ...
+call :do_download "%BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL%"
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo [ERROR] Download failed from both primary and fallback servers.
+    exit /b 1
+)
+
+:download_verify
+echo [INFO] Bootstrap download complete.
+
+REM Verify SHA256 checksum
+echo [INFO] Verifying checksum...
+pushd "%DATADIR%"
+
+REM Read expected hash from the .sha256 file (format: "hash  filename" or "hash *filename")
+set "EXPECTED_HASH="
+for /f "tokens=1" %%A in (%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.sha256) do (
+    set "EXPECTED_HASH=%%A"
+)
+
+if "%EXPECTED_HASH%"=="" (
+    echo [WARN] Could not read expected checksum, skipping verification.
+    goto :verify_done
+)
+
+REM Use certutil to compute SHA256
+certutil -hashfile "%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%" SHA256 > "%TEMP%\dragonx_hash.tmp" 2>nul
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo [WARN] certutil not available, skipping checksum verification.
+    goto :verify_done
+)
+
+REM certutil outputs hash on the second line
+set "ACTUAL_HASH="
+set "LINE_NUM=0"
+for /f "skip=1 tokens=*" %%H in (%TEMP%\dragonx_hash.tmp) do (
+    if not defined ACTUAL_HASH (
+        set "ACTUAL_HASH=%%H"
+    )
+)
+REM Remove spaces from certutil output
+set "ACTUAL_HASH=!ACTUAL_HASH: =!"
+del /f /q "%TEMP%\dragonx_hash.tmp" 2>nul
+
+if /i "!ACTUAL_HASH!"=="!EXPECTED_HASH!" (
+    echo [INFO] SHA256 checksum verified.
+) else (
+    echo [ERROR] SHA256 checksum verification failed! The download may be corrupted.
+    echo [ERROR] Expected: !EXPECTED_HASH!
+    echo [ERROR] Got:      !ACTUAL_HASH!
+    popd
+    exit /b 1
+)
+
+:verify_done
+REM Clean up checksum files
+del /f /q "%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.md5" 2>nul
+del /f /q "%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.sha256" 2>nul
+popd
+exit /b 0
+
+REM ============================================
+REM  Download files from a given base URL
+REM  Usage: call :do_download "base_url"
+REM ============================================
+:do_download
+set "BASE=%~1"
+
+REM Use PowerShell to download (available on all modern Windows)
+echo [INFO] Downloading %BASE%/%BOOTSTRAP_FILE% ...
+powershell -NoProfile -Command ^
+    "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; try { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('%BASE%/%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%', '%DATADIR%\%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%') } catch { exit 1 }"
+if errorlevel 1 exit /b 1
+
+echo [INFO] Downloading checksums...
+powershell -NoProfile -Command ^
+    "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; try { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('%BASE%/%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.md5', '%DATADIR%\%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.md5') } catch { exit 1 }"
+if errorlevel 1 exit /b 1
+
+powershell -NoProfile -Command ^
+    "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; try { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('%BASE%/%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.sha256', '%DATADIR%\%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%.sha256') } catch { exit 1 }"
+if errorlevel 1 exit /b 1
+
+exit /b 0
+
+REM ============================================
+REM  Extract bootstrap zip
+REM ============================================
+:extract_bootstrap
+echo [INFO] Extracting bootstrap...
+pushd "%DATADIR%"
+
+REM Use PowerShell to extract zip, excluding wallet.dat and .conf files
+powershell -NoProfile -Command ^
+    "Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem; $zip = [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::OpenRead('%DATADIR%\%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%'); foreach ($entry in $zip.Entries) { if ($entry.Name -eq 'wallet.dat' -or $entry.Name -like '*.conf') { continue } $dest = Join-Path '%DATADIR%' $entry.FullName; if ($entry.FullName.EndsWith('/')) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $dest | Out-Null } else { $parent = Split-Path $dest -Parent; if (-not (Test-Path $parent)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $parent | Out-Null } [System.IO.Compression.ZipFileExtensions]::ExtractToFile($entry, $dest, $true) } }; $zip.Dispose()"
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo [ERROR] Extraction failed.
+    popd
+    exit /b 1
+)
+
+echo [INFO] Bootstrap extracted successfully.
+
+REM Clean up archive
+del /f /q "%BOOTSTRAP_FILE%" 2>nul
+echo [INFO] Removed downloaded archive to save disk space.
+
+popd
+exit /b 0
+
+:error_exit
+echo.
+echo [ERROR] Bootstrap installation failed.
+exit /b 1

util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh

@@ -9,9 +9,24 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL="https://bootstrap.dragonx.is"
+BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL="https://bootstrap2.dragonx.is"
 BOOTSTRAP_FILE="DRAGONX.zip"
 CHAIN_NAME="DRAGONX"
 
+# DragonX bootstrap signing public key (PEM, openssl-compatible).
+# WHY: the .md5/.sha256 files are served from the same host as the archive, so they
+# only detect transmission corruption — a compromised bootstrap server could publish a
+# malicious archive with matching checksums. A detached signature verified against THIS
+# embedded public key (shipped in the repo, not downloaded) closes that gap: a bad server
+# cannot forge a signature without the maintainer's offline private key.
+#
+# ROLLOUT: until the maintainer embeds a real key here and publishes DRAGONX.zip.sig,
+# this stays as the placeholder and signature enforcement is skipped (with a loud warning),
+# so existing users are unaffected. Once a real key is pasted in, an unsigned/invalid
+# bootstrap is refused (fail-closed). See util/sign-bootstrap.md for the signing procedure.
+BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY_PLACEHOLDER="REPLACE_WITH_DRAGONX_BOOTSTRAP_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM"
+BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY="$BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY_PLACEHOLDER"
+
 # Determine data directory
 if [[ "$OSTYPE" == "darwin"* ]]; then
     DATADIR="$HOME/Library/Application Support/Hush/$CHAIN_NAME"
@@ -118,35 +133,86 @@ clean_chain_data() {
     info "Blockchain data cleaned."
 }
 
-# Download a file via wget or curl
+# Download a file via wget or curl (returns non-zero on failure)
 download_file() {
     local url="$1"
     local outfile="$2"
 
     if command -v wget &>/dev/null; then
-        wget --progress=bar:force -O "$outfile" "$url" || error "Download failed: $url"
+        wget --progress=bar:force -O "$outfile" "$url"
     elif command -v curl &>/dev/null; then
-        curl -L --progress-bar -o "$outfile" "$url" || error "Download failed: $url"
+        curl -L --progress-bar -o "$outfile" "$url"
     else
         error "Neither wget nor curl found. Please install one and retry."
     fi
 }
 
+# Try downloading from a given base URL; returns non-zero on failure
+download_from() {
+    local base_url="$1"
+    local outfile="$DATADIR/$BOOTSTRAP_FILE"
+    local md5file="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.md5"
+    local sha256file="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sha256"
+    local sigfile="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sig"
+
+    info "Downloading bootstrap from $base_url ..."
+    info "This may take a while depending on your connection speed."
+
+    download_file "$base_url/$BOOTSTRAP_FILE" "$outfile" || return 1
+    info "Bootstrap download complete."
+
+    info "Downloading checksums..."
+    download_file "$base_url/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.md5" "$md5file" || return 1
+    download_file "$base_url/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sha256" "$sha256file" || return 1
+    # Detached signature is optional during rollout (non-fatal if absent); enforcement
+    # is decided in verify_signature() based on whether a real public key is embedded.
+    rm -f "$sigfile"
+    download_file "$base_url/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sig" "$sigfile" || warn "No signature file at $base_url (${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sig)"
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Verify the detached signature of the archive against the embedded release public key.
+# Fail-closed once a real key is configured; skip (with warning) while the placeholder is in place.
+verify_signature() {
+    local archive="$1"
+    local sigfile="$2"
+
+    if [[ "$BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY" == "$BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY_PLACEHOLDER" ]]; then
+        warn "Bootstrap signature verification is not yet configured (no maintainer key embedded)."
+        warn "Relying on TLS + checksum integrity only. See util/sign-bootstrap.md."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    if ! command -v openssl &>/dev/null; then
+        error "openssl is required to verify the bootstrap signature but was not found. Install openssl and retry."
+    fi
+    if [[ ! -s "$sigfile" ]]; then
+        error "Bootstrap signature (${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sig) is missing; refusing to use an unsigned bootstrap."
+    fi
+
+    local pubfile
+    pubfile=$(mktemp)
+    printf '%s\n' "$BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY" > "$pubfile"
+    if openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$pubfile" -signature "$sigfile" "$archive" >&2; then
+        rm -f "$pubfile"
+        info "Bootstrap signature verified against embedded DragonX release key."
+    else
+        rm -f "$pubfile"
+        error "Bootstrap signature verification FAILED — the archive is NOT signed by the DragonX release key. Aborting; do not use this bootstrap."
+    fi
+}
+
 # Download the bootstrap and verify checksums
 download_bootstrap() {
     local outfile="$DATADIR/$BOOTSTRAP_FILE"
     local md5file="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.md5"
     local sha256file="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sha256"
+    local sigfile="$DATADIR/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sig"
 
-    info "Downloading bootstrap from $BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL ..."
+    if ! download_from "$BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL"; then
-    info "This may take a while depending on your connection speed."
+        warn "Primary download failed, trying fallback $BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL ..."
-
+        download_from "$BOOTSTRAP_FALLBACK_URL" || error "Download failed from both primary and fallback servers."
-    download_file "$BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL/$BOOTSTRAP_FILE" "$outfile"
+    fi
-    info "Bootstrap download complete."
-
-    info "Downloading checksums..."
-    download_file "$BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.md5" "$md5file"
-    download_file "$BOOTSTRAP_BASE_URL/${BOOTSTRAP_FILE}.sha256" "$sha256file"
 
     # Verify checksums
     info "Verifying checksums..."
@@ -172,8 +238,11 @@ download_bootstrap() {
         warn "sha256sum not found, skipping SHA256 verification."
     fi
 
-    # Clean up checksum files
+    # Verify the cryptographic signature (fail-closed once a release key is embedded).
-    rm -f "$md5file" "$sha256file"
+    verify_signature "$outfile" "$sigfile"
+
+    # Clean up checksum + signature files
+    rm -f "$md5file" "$sha256file" "$sigfile"
 
     echo "$outfile"
 }

util/build-mac.sh

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 # Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
 # file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
 
-export CC=gcc-8
+export CC=gcc-15
-export CXX=g++-8
+export CXX=g++-15
 export LIBTOOL=libtool
 export AR=ar
 export RANLIB=ranlib
@@ -34,16 +34,24 @@ fi
 # If --enable-lcov is the first argument, enable lcov coverage support:
 LCOV_ARG=''
 HARDENING_ARG='--disable-hardening'
+TEST_ARG=''
 if [ "x${1:-}" = 'x--enable-lcov' ]
 then
     LCOV_ARG='--enable-lcov'
     HARDENING_ARG='--disable-hardening'
     shift
+elif [ "x${1:-}" = 'x--disable-tests' ]
+then
+    TEST_ARG='--enable-tests=no'
+    shift
 fi
 
 TRIPLET=`./depends/config.guess`
 PREFIX="$(pwd)/depends/$TRIPLET"
 
+# Ensure system Rust is in PATH for modern macOS compatibility
+export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
+
 make "$@" -C ./depends/ V=1 NO_QT=1
 
 #BUILD CCLIB
@@ -68,7 +76,7 @@ cd $WD
 
 ./autogen.sh
 CPPFLAGS="-I$PREFIX/include -arch x86_64" LDFLAGS="-L$PREFIX/lib -arch x86_64 -Wl,-no_pie" \
-CXXFLAGS='-arch x86_64 -I/usr/local/Cellar/gcc\@8/8.3.0/include/c++/8.3.0/ -I$PREFIX/include -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -Wno-builtin-declaration-mismatch -Werror -g -Wl,-undefined -Wl,dynamic_lookup' \
+CXXFLAGS='-arch x86_64 -I/usr/local/Cellar/gcc/15.2.0_1/include/c++/15/ -I$PREFIX/include -fwrapv -fno-strict-aliasing -Wno-builtin-declaration-mismatch -Werror -Wno-error=deprecated-declarations -g -Wl,-undefined -Wl,dynamic_lookup' \
-./configure --prefix="${PREFIX}" --with-gui=no "$HARDENING_ARG" "$LCOV_ARG"
+./configure --prefix="${PREFIX}" --with-gui=no "$HARDENING_ARG" "$LCOV_ARG" $TEST_ARG
 
 make "$@" V=1 NO_GTEST=1 STATIC=1

util/build.sh

@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ then
 fi
 
 # Just show the useful info
-eval "$MAKE" --version | head -n2
+eval "$MAKE" --version | head -n2 || true
-as --version | head -n1
+as --version | head -n1 || true
 as --version | tail -n1
 ld -v
 autoconf --version

util/sign-bootstrap.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Signing the DragonX bootstrap archive
+
+`util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh` verifies a detached signature of `DRAGONX.zip` against a
+public key **embedded in the script** (`BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY`). Because the key ships in the
+repo/binary and is not downloaded from the bootstrap server, a compromised bootstrap host
+cannot forge a valid signature — unlike the `.md5`/`.sha256` files, which are served from
+the same host and only detect corruption.
+
+Until a real key is embedded, `BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY` is the placeholder and the script skips
+signature enforcement (with a warning), so existing users are unaffected. Once a real key
+is pasted in, an unsigned or invalid bootstrap is **refused**.
+
+## One-time: create the signing keypair (offline)
+
+Keep the private key OFFLINE (air-gapped if possible). Ed25519 or RSA-4096 both work with
+the `openssl dgst -sha256 -verify` check the script uses; RSA-4096 maximizes compatibility:
+
+```sh
+# Private key — keep secret, never publish
+openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:4096 -out dragonx-bootstrap.key
+# Public key — paste into bootstrap-dragonx.sh
+openssl pkey -in dragonx-bootstrap.key -pubout -out dragonx-bootstrap.pub
+cat dragonx-bootstrap.pub
+```
+
+Paste the full PEM (including the `-----BEGIN/END PUBLIC KEY-----` lines) into
+`BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY` in `util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh`, e.g.:
+
+```sh
+BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY="$(cat <<'PEM'
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+... base64 ...
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+PEM
+)"
+```
+
+## Each release: sign the archive and publish the signature
+
+```sh
+openssl dgst -sha256 -sign dragonx-bootstrap.key -out DRAGONX.zip.sig DRAGONX.zip
+```
+
+Upload `DRAGONX.zip.sig` next to `DRAGONX.zip` (and its `.md5`/`.sha256`) on every
+bootstrap host (`bootstrap.dragonx.is`, `bootstrap2.dragonx.is`). Verify locally first:
+
+```sh
+openssl dgst -sha256 -verify dragonx-bootstrap.pub -signature DRAGONX.zip.sig DRAGONX.zip
+# -> "Verified OK"
+```
+
+## Rotating the key
+
+Embed the new public key in the script, sign future archives with the new private key, and
+release a new client version. Old clients keep trusting the old key; coordinate the cutover
+with a release so users upgrade before the old key is retired.