fix(send): stop a fee-tier change from re-sending Max; compare affordability in satoshis
Fund-correctness audit, send path: - Flagship wrong-send: s_send_max was only cleared on a successful send, so after Max → typing a smaller amount → changing the fee tier in the confirm dialog, the amount was silently overwritten back to the maximum and Confirm sent far more than the user typed. Clear s_send_max on any manual amount edit (DRGX and USD inputs), so a later fee bump never rewrites a hand-entered amount. - A valid exact-maximum send was blocked by 1 ulp because amount+fee<=available was computed in IEEE doubles. New util::toSats/canAfford compare in int64 satoshis; wired into the Review gate, the confirm-time re-check, the Send tooltip and the amount-error banner. This only unblocks a correct send; it changes no sent amount. - Added util::coinsToZatoshis (reject non-finite / <=0 / rounds-to-0 / over-supply) and regression tests for formatAmountFixed, toSats/canAfford and coinsToZatoshis (incl. the exact failing inputs the audit found). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
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#include "../../util/address_validation.h"
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#include "../../util/i18n.h"
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#include "../../util/text_format.h"
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#include "../../util/amount_format.h" // toSats / canAfford — integer-satoshi affordability check
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#include "../notifications.h"
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#include "../layout.h"
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#include "contact_picker.h"
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@@ -916,7 +917,7 @@ void RenderSendConfirmPopup(App* app) {
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const auto& liveState = app->getWalletState();
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double liveAvail = GetAvailableBalance(app);
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if (!app->isConnected() || liveState.sync.syncing || s_amount <= 0 ||
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(s_amount + s_fee) > liveAvail) {
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!util::canAfford(s_amount, s_fee, liveAvail)) {
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s_tx_status = TR("send_cannot_send_now");
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s_status_success = false;
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s_status_timestamp = ImGui::GetTime();
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@@ -1037,7 +1038,7 @@ static void RenderActionButtons(App* app, float width, float vScale,
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is_valid_address &&
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s_amount > 0 &&
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s_from_address[0] != '\0' &&
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total <= available &&
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util::canAfford(s_amount, s_fee, available) &&
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sourceSpendable &&
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!s_sending;
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@@ -1095,7 +1096,7 @@ static void RenderActionButtons(App* app, float width, float vScale,
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material::Tooltip("%s", TR("send_tooltip_invalid_address"));
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else if (s_amount <= 0)
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material::Tooltip("%s", TR("send_tooltip_enter_amount"));
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else if (total > available)
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else if (!util::canAfford(s_amount, s_fee, available))
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material::Tooltip("%s", TR("send_tooltip_exceeds_balance"));
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else if (!sourceSpendable)
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material::Tooltip("%s", TR("send_tooltip_view_only"));
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@@ -1530,6 +1531,7 @@ void RenderSendTab(App* app)
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if (ImGui::InputDouble("##AmountUSD", &s_usd_amount, 0, 0, "$%.2f")) {
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// Normalize to 8dp (satoshi precision) so the reviewed/sent DRGX matches the preview.
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s_amount = std::round((s_usd_amount / market.price_usd) * 1e8) / 1e8;
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s_send_max = false; // a manual edit is no longer "max" — don't let a later fee bump overwrite it
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}
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// Draw DRGX equivalent inside the input field (right-aligned overlay)
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{
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@@ -1555,6 +1557,7 @@ void RenderSendTab(App* app)
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if (s_amount < 0) s_amount = 0;
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if (market.price_usd > 0)
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s_usd_amount = s_amount * market.price_usd;
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s_send_max = false; // a manual edit is no longer "max" — don't let a later fee bump overwrite it
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}
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// Draw USD equivalent inside the input field (right-aligned overlay)
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if (market.price_usd > 0 && s_amount > 0) {
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@@ -1619,7 +1622,7 @@ void RenderSendTab(App* app)
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RenderAmountBar(dl, available, colW, capFont, market.price_usd, "##f");
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// Amount error
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if (s_amount > 0 && s_amount + s_fee > available && available > 0) {
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if (s_amount > 0 && !util::canAfford(s_amount, s_fee, available) && available > 0) {
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snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), TR("send_exceeds_available"), available - s_fee);
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Type().textColored(TypeStyle::Caption, Error(), buf);
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}
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@@ -1,11 +1,32 @@
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#pragma once
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#include <string>
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#include <cstdint>
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#include <cmath>
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namespace dragonx {
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namespace util {
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std::string formatAmountFixed(double amount, int decimals = 8);
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// DRGX amounts are 8-decimal. Converting to int64 satoshis and comparing there avoids the IEEE-double
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// rounding that could block a valid exact-max send (amount+fee computed in doubles landed 1 ulp over).
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inline std::int64_t toSats(double coins) { return static_cast<std::int64_t>(std::llround(coins * 1e8)); }
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// True when amount + fee fits within available, compared in integer satoshis (not doubles).
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inline bool canAfford(double amount, double fee, double available) {
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return toSats(amount) + toSats(fee) <= toSats(available);
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}
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// Convert a coin amount to zatoshis for a send, rejecting non-finite / non-positive / rounds-to-zero /
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// over-supply values. Returns false (and leaves out untouched) on any of those.
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inline bool coinsToZatoshis(double coins, std::uint64_t& out) {
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if (!std::isfinite(coins) || coins <= 0.0) return false;
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const std::int64_t z = toSats(coins);
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if (z <= 0 || z > static_cast<std::int64_t>(21000000) * 100000000LL) return false;
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out = static_cast<std::uint64_t>(z);
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return true;
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}
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} // namespace util
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} // namespace dragonx
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+29
-4
@@ -1208,10 +1208,35 @@ void testWalletFileProbe()
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void testAmountFormatting()
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{
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EXPECT_EQ(dragonx::util::formatAmountFixed(1.0), std::string("1.00000000"));
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EXPECT_EQ(dragonx::util::formatAmountFixed(0.1), std::string("0.10000000"));
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EXPECT_EQ(dragonx::util::formatAmountFixed(0.000000019), std::string("0.00000002"));
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EXPECT_EQ(dragonx::util::formatAmountFixed(12.3456, 2), std::string("12.35"));
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using namespace dragonx::util;
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(1.0), std::string("1.00000000"));
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(0.1), std::string("0.10000000"));
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(0.000000019), std::string("0.00000002"));
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(12.3456, 2), std::string("12.35"));
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// No scientific notation / comma decimals for tiny or large amounts (the z_sendmany string).
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(1e-8), std::string("0.00000001"));
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EXPECT_EQ(formatAmountFixed(21000000.0), std::string("21000000.00000000"));
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EXPECT_TRUE(formatAmountFixed(0.00000001).find('e') == std::string::npos);
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// toSats / canAfford — the exact-max send that double addition wrongly blocked (fund-correctness audit).
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EXPECT_EQ(toSats(63.0410039), 6304100390LL);
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EXPECT_TRUE(canAfford(63.0409039, 0.0001, 63.0410039)); // true total == available; was false in doubles
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EXPECT_TRUE(canAfford(44.83756352, 0.0001, 44.83766352));
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EXPECT_TRUE(canAfford(0.4999, 0.0001, 0.5));
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EXPECT_TRUE(canAfford(0.5, 0.0, 0.5)); // exact, no fee
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EXPECT_TRUE(!canAfford(0.5, 0.0001, 0.5)); // amount+fee over available
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EXPECT_TRUE(!canAfford(0.50001, 0.0, 0.5));
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// coinsToZatoshis — rejects the values that would wrap/round wrong on the lite send path.
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std::uint64_t z = 0;
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EXPECT_TRUE(coinsToZatoshis(1.0, z) && z == 100000000ULL);
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EXPECT_TRUE(coinsToZatoshis(0.00000001, z) && z == 1ULL);
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(0.0, z));
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(-1.0, z));
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(0.000000004, z)); // sub-zatoshi rounds to 0 → rejected
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN(), z));
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(std::numeric_limits<double>::infinity(), z));
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EXPECT_TRUE(!coinsToZatoshis(21000001.0, z)); // over supply cap
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}
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void testSpendableFiltering()
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