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fix(lite-backend): never hang or panic a sync on malformed server data

Browse Source 
The lightwalletd server controls the compact ciphertext length, the
block, prev-block and tx hash lengths, and (through the chain) the full
txs' epks. Each of these could wedge or poison a sync:

- try_sapling_compact_note_decryption asserts a 52-byte ciphertext. A
  shorter (or full 580-byte) one panicked a pool job in
  scan_output_internal while the original sender stayed alive, so the
  collector waited forever with sync_lock, txs.write() and a wallet read
  guard held.
- scan_taddress_txids kept its own sender alive too: one panicking
  t-address job (scan_full_tx) left crx.iter().take(n) blocked forever.
- CompactBlock::hash()/prev_hash() assert 32 bytes when no header is
  sent, and every vtx hash is copied into a [u8; 32], one of them under
  txs.write(): a 31-byte tx hash poisoned the wallet for good, and a bad
  hash in the block's txid list panicked after the witnesses had moved.
- scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx unwrapped as_prime_order() on
  the epk. Consensus rejects only a small-order epk, so a mixed-order
  one can be mined: an own tx then failed every sync, and the mempool
  receiver thread died silently.

Changes:
- append_leaf(node: Node, ..) commits a leaf to the existing, block and
  new witnesses and the tree; the epk-error path, the new
  short-ciphertext path and the normal path all use it (a
  behaviour-neutral extraction).
- A compact ciphertext under 52 bytes is skipped with its cmu still
  committed; a longer one is truncated to 52 bytes, which is exact (the
  compact plaintext is those bytes and the cmu re-check validates it).
- Each decryption job catches a panic and sends exactly one message;
  drop(tx) after the dispatch, and the collector logs a vanished or
  panicked job and treats the output as not ours.
- scan_taddress_txids runs through the private seam
  scan_taddress_txids_with(job): catch_unwind per job, drop(ctx), and a
  count check, so a dead job is an error, never a hang or a silent
  partial success.
- scan_block_with_pool checks the block, prev-block and vtx hash lengths
  right after the parse and returns Err(-1), as for an unparsable block,
  before any change (Err(height) would refetch the same block forever
  under sync_lock).
- scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx skip an output whose epk is not
  in the prime-order subgroup (one check per output, used by every
  decryption and the outgoing recovery).
- The mempool receiver thread catches a panic of scan_full_mempool_tx.

Flagged behaviour changes:
- a compact ciphertext under 52 bytes is skipped (its cmu is still
  committed); one over 52 bytes is truncated;
- pool-job panics are reported (logged; the output is treated as not
  ours, which a rescan repairs) instead of hanging the sync;
- bad hash lengths return Err(-1) before any change;
- outputs with a non-prime-order epk are skipped;
- the mempool thread survives a bad tx.
Wallet format v9 is unchanged; no ABI or symbol change. Honest data
takes the same path as before (an old-vs-new run over generated honest
chains is byte-identical).

Tests (each on its own thread under a 15 s watchdog):
0/51/52/53/580-byte ciphertexts in one block on the inline and deferred
witness paths (the 51-byte notes are skipped, the 53- and 580-byte notes
are found, the tree and every witness match the reference); a 31-byte tx
hash, an empty block hash, a 31-byte prev hash and a 33-byte foreign tx
hash each return Err(-1) with the txs lock usable and
last_scanned_height, trees and witnesses unchanged; a mixed-order epk in
scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx does not panic and decrypts
nothing while the real epk still decrypts; a t-address job panicking for
1 of 3 addresses is an Err. The oracle generator gains short
(0..=51-byte) and full (580-byte) ciphertext outputs without an extra
random draw, so each seed keeps its sequence of blocks, values and
keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DanS
2026-10-12 13:22:00 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 55431cd606
commit a5db2e9a3d
5 changed files with 450 additions and 82 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightclient.rs
Vendored
+80 -21
View File
@@ -1171,7 +1171,13 @@ pub fn start_mempool_monitor(lc: Arc<LightClient>) -> Result<(), String> {
&rtx.data[..])
{
let light_wallet_clone = lc.wallet.clone();
light_wallet_clone.read().unwrap().scan_full_mempool_tx(&tx, rtx.height as i32, 0, true);
// One bad mempool tx must not end this thread: the mempool monitor would stop silently.
let scanned = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
light_wallet_clone.read().unwrap().scan_full_mempool_tx(&tx, rtx.height as i32, 0, true);
}));
if scanned.is_err() {
error!("Scanning mempool tx {} panicked; skipped it", tx.txid());
}
}
}
});
@@ -1631,26 +1637,14 @@ pub fn start_mempool_monitor(lc: Arc<LightClient>) -> Result<(), String> {
end_height: u64,
no_cert: bool
) -> Result<Vec<()>, String> {
let addresses = self.wallet.read()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read wallet: {:?}", e))?
.get_all_taddresses().iter()
.cloned()
.collect::<Vec<String>>();
let (ctx, crx) = channel();
let num_addresses = addresses.len();
for address in addresses {
let address_clone = address.clone();
// The per-address job: fetch the address's txids and full-scan each tx (scan_full_tx).
self.scan_taddress_txids_with(pool, {
let wallet = self.wallet.clone();
let pool = pool.clone();
let server_uri = self.get_server_uri();
let ctx = ctx.clone();
let block_times = block_times.clone();
pool.execute(move || {
let r = fetch_transparent_txids(
move |address: String| -> Result<(), String> {
let wallet = wallet.clone();
let block_times = block_times.clone();
fetch_transparent_txids(
&server_uri,
address,
start_height,
@@ -1687,16 +1681,49 @@ pub fn start_mempool_monitor(lc: Arc<LightClient>) -> Result<(), String> {
},
}
}
);
)
}
})
}
// The t-address collector; `job` is the per-address work (a private seam, so a test can make a job panic). Every
// job sends exactly one result, a panicking one included, and only the jobs hold senders: the collector can
// neither wait forever on a job that died (with sync_lock held) nor report a partial scan as success.
fn scan_taddress_txids_with<F>(&self, pool: &ThreadPool, job: F) -> Result<Vec<()>, String>
where F: Fn(String) -> Result<(), String> + Send + Sync + 'static
{
let addresses = self.wallet.read()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read wallet: {:?}", e))?
.get_all_taddresses().iter()
.cloned()
.collect::<Vec<String>>();
let job = Arc::new(job);
let (ctx, crx) = channel();
let num_addresses = addresses.len();
for address in addresses {
let address_clone = address.clone();
let ctx = ctx.clone();
let job = job.clone();
pool.execute(move || {
let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| (*job)(address)))
.unwrap_or_else(|_| Err("t-address scan job panicked".to_string()));
match ctx.send(r) {
Ok(_) => info!("Successfully sent data for address: {}", address_clone),
Err(e) => error!("Failed to send data for address: {}: {:?}", address_clone, e),
}
});
}
drop(ctx);
crx.iter().take(num_addresses).collect()
// Ends once every job has sent its result and dropped its sender.
let results: Vec<Result<(), String>> = crx.iter().collect();
if results.len() != num_addresses {
return Err(format!("t-address scan: {} of {} jobs reported", results.len(), num_addresses));
}
results.into_iter().collect()
}
@@ -2088,4 +2115,36 @@ pub fn test_bad_import() {
assert_eq!(lc.do_seed_phrase().unwrap()["seed"], TEST_SEED.to_string());
}
// C245 Fix 2 (s2-D6a seam). A t-address job that panicked left the collector waiting forever, with sync_lock
// held, for a result that never came: the original sender stayed alive. Each job now reports exactly once (a
// panic is an Err) and the collector counts the reports. Runs under the 15 s watchdog.
#[test]
pub fn test_taddress_scan_job_panic_is_error() {
let (n, all_ok, one_err, one_panic) = crate::lightwallet::tests::within_watchdog("t-address scan", || {
let tmp = TempDir::new("lctest").unwrap();
let lc = LightClient::new(&main_config(&tmp), 0).unwrap();
lc.do_new_address("R").unwrap();
lc.do_new_address("R").unwrap();
let addrs = lc.wallet.read().unwrap().get_all_taddresses();
let pool = threadpool::ThreadPool::new(2);
let all_ok = lc.scan_taddress_txids_with(&pool, |_a: String| -> Result<(), String> { Ok(()) });
let a1 = addrs[1].clone();
let one_err = lc.scan_taddress_txids_with(&pool, move |a: String| -> Result<(), String> {
if a == a1 { Err("injected error".to_string()) } else { Ok(()) }
});
let a1 = addrs[1].clone();
let one_panic = lc.scan_taddress_txids_with(&pool, move |a: String| -> Result<(), String> {
if a == a1 {
panic!("injected t-address job panic");
}
Ok(())
});
(addrs.len(), all_ok, one_err, one_panic)
});
assert_eq!(n, 3);
assert_eq!(all_ok, Ok(vec![(); 3]));
assert_eq!(one_err, Err("injected error".to_string()));
assert_eq!(one_panic, Err("t-address scan job panicked".to_string()));
}
}
third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet.rs
Vendored
+89 -48
View File
@@ -1544,6 +1544,15 @@ pub fn scan_full_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, datetime: u64) {
}
// Scan shielded sapling outputs to see if anyone of them is us, and if it is, extract the memo
for output in tx.shielded_outputs.iter() {
// The epk is chain data. Sapling consensus rejects only a small-order epk, so one outside the prime-order
// subgroup can be mined; it is never ours (the compact scan skips it too). Skip the output, never panic.
let epk_prime = match output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB) {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
warn!("Output in tx {} has a non-prime-order epk; skipping it", tx.txid());
continue;
}
};
let ivks: Vec<_> = self.zkeys.read().unwrap().iter()
.map(|zk| zk.extfvk.fvk.vk.ivk()
).collect();
@@ -1551,7 +1560,6 @@ pub fn scan_full_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, datetime: u64) {
let ct = output.enc_ciphertext;
// Search all of our keys
for ivk in ivks {
let epk_prime = output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).unwrap();
let (note, _to, memo) = match try_sapling_note_decryption(&ivk, &epk_prime, &cmu, &ct) {
Some(ret) => ret,
None => continue,
@@ -1593,7 +1601,7 @@ pub fn scan_full_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, datetime: u64) {
&ovk,
&output.cv,
&output.cmu,
&output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).unwrap(),
&epk_prime,
&output.enc_ciphertext,
&output.out_ciphertext) {
Some((note, payment_address, memo)) => {
@@ -1603,7 +1611,6 @@ pub fn scan_full_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, datetime: u64) {
// Check if this output belongs to our wallet using IVK decryption.
// This correctly detects change sent to diversified addresses,
// not just the wallet's default z-address.
let epk_prime = output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).unwrap();
let is_to_self = ivks_for_change.iter().any(|ivk| {
try_sapling_note_decryption(ivk, &epk_prime, &output.cmu, &output.enc_ciphertext).is_some()
});
@@ -1678,6 +1685,14 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
}
for output in tx.shielded_outputs.iter() {
// As in scan_full_tx: an epk outside the prime-order subgroup is never ours. Skip the output, never panic.
let epk_prime = match output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB) {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
warn!("Mempool tx {} has an output with a non-prime-order epk; skipping it", tx.txid());
continue;
}
};
let ivks: Vec<_> = self.zkeys.read().unwrap().iter()
.map(|zk| zk.extfvk.fvk.vk.ivk())
.collect();
@@ -1687,7 +1702,6 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
// Search all of our keys
for ivk in ivks {
let epk_prime = output.ephemeral_key.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).unwrap();
let (note, _to, memo) = match try_sapling_note_decryption(&ivk, &epk_prime, &cmu, &ct) {
Some(ret) => ret,
None => continue,
@@ -1997,6 +2011,29 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
});
}
/// Commit one leaf (an output's cmu): to the existing notes' witnesses (or the deferred list), to the witnesses of
/// this block's and this tx's earlier outputs, and to the tree. Every output whose cmu parses is a leaf, whether
/// or not it can be trial-decrypted; a skipped leaf makes every later anchor diverge from consensus.
fn append_leaf(node: Node, tree: &mut CommitmentTree<Node>, defer_existing: bool, deferred_nodes: &mut Vec<Node>,
existing_witnesses: &mut [&mut IncrementalWitness<Node>],
block_witnesses: &mut [&mut IncrementalWitness<Node>],
new_witnesses: &mut [&mut IncrementalWitness<Node>]) {
if defer_existing {
deferred_nodes.push(node);
} else {
for witness in existing_witnesses.iter_mut() {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
}
for witness in block_witnesses.iter_mut() {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
for witness in new_witnesses.iter_mut() {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
tree.append(node).unwrap();
}
/// Scans a [`CompactOutput`] with a set of [`ExtendedFullViewingKey`]s.
///
/// Returns a [`WalletShieldedOutput`] and corresponding [`IncrementalWitness`] if this
@@ -2037,25 +2074,23 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
Ok(epk) => epk,
Err(_) => {
error!("Failed to parse epk for output index {} — committing cmu to tree, skipping decryption", index);
let node = Node::new(cmu.into());
if defer_existing {
deferred_nodes.push(node);
} else {
for witness in existing_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
}
for witness in block_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
for witness in new_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
tree.append(node).unwrap();
LightWallet::append_leaf(Node::new(cmu.into()), tree, defer_existing, deferred_nodes,
existing_witnesses, block_witnesses, new_witnesses);
return None;
}
};
// The server controls the ciphertext length, and try_sapling_compact_note_decryption asserts 52 bytes
// (COMPACT_NOTE_SIZE). Longer: the compact plaintext is exactly the first 52 bytes (the cmu re-check validates
// it), so truncate. Shorter: undecryptable; commit the cmu like any other leaf and skip decryption.
let ct = output.ciphertext;
if ct.len() < 52 {
error!("Output index {} has a {}-byte compact ciphertext (expected 52) — committing cmu to tree, skipping decryption",
index, ct.len());
LightWallet::append_leaf(Node::new(cmu.into()), tree, defer_existing, deferred_nodes,
existing_witnesses, block_witnesses, new_witnesses);
return None;
}
let ct = if ct.len() > 52 { ct[..52].to_vec() } else { ct };
let (tx, rx) = channel();
ivks.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(account, ivk)| {
@@ -2066,48 +2101,45 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
let tx = tx.clone();
pool.execute(move || {
let m = try_sapling_compact_note_decryption(&ivk, &epk, &cmu, &ct);
let r = match m {
Some((note, to)) => {
tx.send(Some(Some((note, to, account))))
},
None => {
tx.send(Some(None))
}
// Exactly one message per job: a panic is caught and sent as None, so the collector below never
// waits for a result that cannot come.
let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
try_sapling_compact_note_decryption(&ivk, &epk, &cmu, &ct)
}));
let msg = match r {
Ok(Some((note, to))) => Some(Some((note, to, account))),
Ok(None) => Some(None),
Err(_) => None,
};
match r {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(e) => println!("Send error {:?}", e)
if let Err(e) = tx.send(msg) {
error!("Compact decryption result lost: {:?}", e);
}
});
});
// Only the jobs hold senders now: a job that ends without a message makes recv() below fail, not block.
drop(tx);
// Increment tree and witnesses
let node = Node::new(cmu.into());
if defer_existing {
deferred_nodes.push(node);
} else {
for witness in existing_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
}
for witness in block_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
for witness in new_witnesses {
witness.append(node).unwrap();
}
tree.append(node).unwrap();
LightWallet::append_leaf(Node::new(cmu.into()), tree, defer_existing, deferred_nodes,
existing_witnesses, block_witnesses, new_witnesses);
// Collect all the RXs and fine if there was a valid result somewhere
let mut wsos = vec![];
for _i in 0..ivks.len() {
let n = rx.recv().unwrap();
let n = match rx.recv() {
Ok(n) => n,
Err(_) => {
error!("A compact decryption job for output index {} ended without a result", index);
None
}
};
let epk = epk.clone();
let wso = match n {
None => panic!("Got a none!"),
None => {
error!("Compact decryption failed (panic) for output index {}; treating it as not ours", index);
None
},
Some(None) => None,
Some(Some((note, to, account))) => {
// A note is marked as "change" if the account that received it
@@ -2287,6 +2319,15 @@ pub fn scan_full_mempool_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: i32, _datetime: u64
}
};
// CompactBlock::hash()/prev_hash() assert 32 bytes when no header is sent, and every vtx hash is copied into a
// [u8; 32] (one of them under txs.write()). Malformed server data is an error before any change, never a panic.
// Err(-1) as for an unparsable block: Err(height) would refetch the same block forever under sync_lock.
if (block.header().is_none() && (block.hash.len() != 32 || block.prevHash.len() != 32))
|| block.vtx.iter().any(|t| t.hash.len() != 32) {
error!("Malformed CompactBlock at height {} (bad hash length)", block.height);
return Err(-1);
}
// Scanned blocks MUST be height-sequential.
let height = block.get_height() as i32;
if height == self.last_scanned_height() {
third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/oracle_tests.rs
Vendored
+57 -10
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
//! A seeded generator builds random fake compact chains and feeds them to a `LightWallet`
//! through its public entry points (`scan_block_with_pool`, `invalidate_block`, `read`/`write`,
//! `send_to_address`, `scan_full_tx`). It covers receives to HD, diversified, imported-sk,
//! view-only and foreign keys, zero-value and dust notes, outputs with an unparseable epk,
//! view-only and foreign keys, zero-value and dust notes, outputs with an unparseable epk or a
//! malformed compact ciphertext (0..=51 bytes: skipped; the full 580 bytes: truncated to 52),
//! compact spends with change, real `send_to_address` sends that are mined later (or never),
//! reorgs of 1..=100 blocks (in one call or block by block, with spends re-mined on the new
//! branch), and save/reload.
@@ -358,6 +359,18 @@ enum SendKind {
Real,
}
/// How `make_output` encodes an output's compact form. Every kind has a parseable cmu, i.e. is a leaf.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
enum OutKind {
Good,
/// A 31-byte (unparseable) epk: never decrypted.
BadEpk,
/// A 0..=51-byte ciphertext (C245): never decrypted.
ShortCt,
/// The full 580-byte ciphertext (C245): the compact plaintext is its first 52 bytes, so the note is found.
FullCt,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct Stats {
blocks: usize,
@@ -374,6 +387,9 @@ struct Stats {
requeued: usize,
remined: usize,
full_checks: usize,
/// Generated outputs with a short (0..=51-byte) / the full (580-byte) compact ciphertext.
short_ct: usize,
full_ct: usize,
/// Reorgs while a note is pending, by `at`: above the sent tip, across it (anchor kept),
/// popping the anchor block.
pending_reorgs: [usize; 3],
@@ -566,7 +582,9 @@ impl Sim {
}
}
fn make_output(&mut self, ovk: OutgoingViewingKey, to: &PaymentAddress<Bls12>, value: u64, bad_epk: bool)
/// BadEpk and ShortCt draw the same 31 random bytes (the epk, or what sets the ciphertext length), so the
/// generator's stream does not depend on the kind: every seed generates the same chain as before ShortCt existed.
fn make_output(&mut self, ovk: OutgoingViewingKey, to: &PaymentAddress<Bls12>, value: u64, kind: OutKind)
-> (CompactOutput, Note<Bls12>) {
let note = Note {
g_d: to.diversifier.g_d::<Bls12>(&JUBJUB).unwrap(),
@@ -577,19 +595,36 @@ impl Sim {
let enc = SaplingNoteEncryption::new(ovk, note.clone(), to.clone(), Memo::default(), &mut self.rng);
let mut cmu = vec![];
note.cm(&JUBJUB).into_repr().write_le(&mut cmu).unwrap();
let mut junk = vec![];
if kind == OutKind::BadEpk || kind == OutKind::ShortCt {
junk.resize(31, 0);
self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut junk);
}
let mut epk = vec![];
if bad_epk {
if kind == OutKind::BadEpk {
// Unparseable epk: the wallet must still append the cmu to the tree.
epk.resize(31, 0);
self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut epk);
epk = junk.clone();
} else {
enc.epk().write(&mut epk).unwrap();
}
let ct = enc.encrypt_note_plaintext();
let ct = match kind {
// Undecryptable: the wallet must skip it (no hang, no panic) and still append the cmu to the tree.
OutKind::ShortCt => {
self.stats.short_ct += 1;
ct[..junk[0] as usize % 52].to_vec()
}
// The wallet must truncate it to 52 bytes and find a note of ours.
OutKind::FullCt => {
self.stats.full_ct += 1;
ct.to_vec()
}
_ => ct[..52].to_vec(),
};
let mut co = CompactOutput::new();
co.set_cmu(cmu);
co.set_epk(epk);
co.set_ciphertext(ct[..52].to_vec());
co.set_ciphertext(ct);
(co, note)
}
@@ -604,7 +639,9 @@ impl Sim {
} else {
fvk.default_address().unwrap().1
};
let (co, note) = self.make_output(fvk.fvk.ovk, &to, value, false);
// Value 7 mod 16 (no extra draw): the full 580-byte ciphertext.
let kind = if value % 16 == 7 { OutKind::FullCt } else { OutKind::Good };
let (co, note) = self.make_output(fvk.fvk.ovk, &to, value, kind);
(co, Owned { account, note, to })
}
@@ -695,7 +732,15 @@ impl Sim {
let (ovk, to) = self.foreign[self.rng.gen_range(0, self.foreign.len())].clone();
let v = self.gen_value();
let bad = self.rng.gen_bool(0.04);
let (co, _) = self.make_output(ovk, &to, v, bad);
// A bad output has an unparseable epk (even value) or a short ciphertext (odd value); a good one with
// value 7 mod 16 carries the full ciphertext. No extra draw: the generator's stream is unchanged.
let kind = match (bad, v % 2, v % 16) {
(true, 0, _) => OutKind::BadEpk,
(true, _, _) => OutKind::ShortCt,
(false, _, 7) => OutKind::FullCt,
_ => OutKind::Good,
};
let (co, _) = self.make_output(ovk, &to, v, kind);
ctx.outputs.push(co);
ours.push(None);
}
@@ -1581,11 +1626,13 @@ impl Sim {
fn summary(&self) -> String {
let s = &self.stats;
format!("seed {:#x}: {} blocks, {} outputs ({} ours, {} notes), {} compact spends, {} reorgs (max {}), \
format!("seed {:#x}: {} blocks, {} outputs ({} ours, {} notes; {} short-ct, {} full-ct), {} compact spends, \
{} reorgs (max {}), \
{} reloads, {} probes, {} sends ({} mined), {} insufficient, {} requeued/{} re-mined, \
{} full checks, max {} cleared lists, {} keys; time gen {:.1}s scan {:.1}s ref {:.1}s \
check {:.1}s send {:.1}s reorg {:.1}s reload {:.1}s periodic {:.1}s; {}",
self.seed, s.blocks, s.outputs, s.ours, self.notes.len(), s.spends, s.reorgs, s.max_depth,
self.seed, s.blocks, s.outputs, s.ours, self.notes.len(), s.short_ct, s.full_ct, s.spends, s.reorgs,
s.max_depth,
s.reloads, s.probes, s.sends, s.mined_sends, s.insufficient, s.requeued, s.remined,
s.full_checks, self.cleared_seen.get(), self.w.zkeys.read().unwrap().len(),
s.t_gen, s.t_scan, s.t_ref, s.t_check, s.t_send, s.t_reorg, s.t_reload, s.t_full,
third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/tests.rs
Vendored
+97
View File
@@ -3696,3 +3696,100 @@ fn test_seed_phrase_empty_when_encrypted_seed_is_zero() {
wallet.seed = [0u8; 32];
assert_eq!(wallet.get_seed_phrase(), "");
}
/// Runs `f` on its own thread and returns its result, failing when there is none within 15 s: a scan that hangs (the
/// C245 failure mode) fails its test instead of wedging the suite. A panic in `f` is re-raised here.
pub(crate) fn within_watchdog<T: Send + 'static, F: FnOnce() -> T + Send + 'static>(what: &str, f: F) -> T {
use std::sync::mpsc::{channel, RecvTimeoutError};
let (tx, rx) = channel();
let t = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = tx.send(f());
});
match rx.recv_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15)) {
Ok(v) => {
let _ = t.join();
v
}
Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => panic!("{}: no result within the 15 s watchdog (hang)", what),
Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => match t.join() {
Err(p) => std::panic::resume_unwind(p),
Ok(()) => panic!("{}: the test thread ended without a result", what),
},
}
}
#[test]
fn test_scan_full_tx_mixed_order_epk_no_panic() {
// C245 Fix 4. A full tx's epk is chain data: Sapling consensus rejects only a small-order epk, so an epk plus a
// point of order 2 can be mined. scan_full_tx and scan_full_mempool_tx unwrapped as_prime_order() and panicked
// (an own tx failed every sync; the mempool thread died). The output is skipped now; with its real epk the same
// output still decrypts.
within_watchdog("mixed-order epk", || {
use pairing::bls12_381::Fr;
use std::panic::{catch_unwind, AssertUnwindSafe};
use zcash_primitives::jubjub::{edwards, Unknown};
use zcash_primitives::transaction::components::{OutputDescription, GROTH_PROOF_SIZE};
let mut rng = OsRng;
let wallet = LightWallet::new(None, &get_test_config(), 0, 0).unwrap();
let extfvk = wallet.zkeys.read().unwrap()[0].extfvk.clone();
let to = extfvk.default_address().unwrap().1;
let note = Note {
g_d: to.diversifier.g_d::<Bls12>(&JUBJUB).unwrap(),
pk_d: to.pk_d.clone(),
value: 50_000,
r: Fs::random(&mut rng),
};
let memo = Memo::from_bytes(b"C245 mixed-order epk").unwrap();
let enc = SaplingNoteEncryption::new(extfvk.fvk.ovk, note.clone(), to.clone(), memo.clone(), &mut rng);
let cmu = note.cm(&JUBJUB);
let cv: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> =
edwards::Point::<Bls12, Unknown>::rand(&mut rng, &JUBJUB).mul_by_cofactor(&JUBJUB).into();
let epk: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = enc.epk().clone().into();
// (0, -1) has order 2: epk + (0, -1) is on the curve but outside the prime-order subgroup.
let mut minus_one = Fr::one();
minus_one.negate();
let t2 = edwards::Point::<Bls12, Unknown>::get_for_y(minus_one, false, &JUBJUB).unwrap();
assert!(t2 != edwards::Point::zero() && t2.double(&JUBJUB) == edwards::Point::zero());
let mixed = epk.add(&t2, &JUBJUB);
assert!(epk.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).is_some() && mixed.as_prime_order(&JUBJUB).is_none());
let mut txid = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut txid);
let tx_with_epk = |e: &edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown>| {
let mut data = TransactionData::new();
data.shielded_outputs.push(OutputDescription {
cv: cv.clone(),
cmu,
ephemeral_key: e.clone(),
enc_ciphertext: enc.encrypt_note_plaintext(),
out_ciphertext: enc.encrypt_outgoing_plaintext(&cv, &cmu),
zkproof: [0u8; GROTH_PROOF_SIZE],
});
Transaction { txid: TxId(txid), data }
};
let honest = tx_with_epk(&epk);
let bad = tx_with_epk(&mixed);
// The wallet holds the note (compact scan of the honest tx), without its memo yet.
let mut cb = FakeCompactBlock::new(0, BlockHash([0; 32]));
cb.add_tx(&honest);
wallet.scan_block(&cb.as_bytes()).unwrap();
let memo_of = |w: &LightWallet| w.txs.read().unwrap()[&TxId(txid)].notes[0].memo.clone();
assert!(memo_of(&wallet).is_none());
let r = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| wallet.scan_full_tx(&bad, 0, 0)));
assert!(r.is_ok(), "scan_full_tx panicked on a mixed-order epk");
assert!(memo_of(&wallet).is_none(), "an output with a mixed-order epk was decrypted");
let r = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| wallet.scan_full_mempool_tx(&bad, 1, 0, true)));
assert!(r.is_ok(), "scan_full_mempool_tx panicked on a mixed-order epk");
assert!(wallet.incoming_mempool_txs.read().unwrap().is_empty());
// Control: the same output with its real epk is ours, in both scans.
wallet.scan_full_tx(&honest, 0, 0);
assert!(memo_of(&wallet) == Some(memo.clone()), "the honest output did not decrypt");
wallet.scan_full_mempool_tx(&honest, 1, 0, true);
assert!(wallet.incoming_mempool_txs.read().unwrap().contains_key(&TxId(txid)));
});
}
third_party/silentdragonxlite/silentdragonxlite-cli/lib/src/lightwallet/witness_tests.rs
Vendored
+125 -1
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ use zcash_primitives::{
};
use super::data::SaplingNoteData;
use super::tests::within_watchdog;
use super::{LightWallet, MAX_REORG};
use crate::lightclient::LightClientConfig;
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@ fn foreign() -> ExtendedFullViewingKey {
/// An output paying `value` to the default address of `fvk` (the body of tests.rs add_tx_paying_to).
fn out_to(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64) -> CompactOutput {
out_to_ct(fvk, value, 52)
}
/// out_to whose compact ciphertext is the first `ct_len` bytes of the full 580-byte note ciphertext (out_to: 52).
fn out_to_ct(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64, ct_len: usize) -> CompactOutput {
let mut rng = OsRng;
let to = fvk.default_address().unwrap().1;
let note = Note {
@@ -94,7 +100,7 @@ fn out_to(fvk: &ExtendedFullViewingKey, value: u64) -> CompactOutput {
let mut cout = CompactOutput::new();
cout.set_cmu(cmu);
cout.set_epk(epk);
cout.set_ciphertext(enc_ciphertext[..52].to_vec());
cout.set_ciphertext(enc_ciphertext[..ct_len].to_vec());
cout
}
@@ -794,3 +800,121 @@ fn deferred_append_path_with_bad_outputs() {
deferred_case(17);
deferred_case(3);
}
// C245: malformed server data. Each test runs on its own thread under a 15 s watchdog (within_watchdog), so the old
// failure mode, a scan waiting forever for a pool job that died, fails the test instead of wedging the suite.
/// A block at the chain's next height on its tip, carrying `txs`. Not applied to the model.
fn raw_block(c: &Chain, txs: Vec<CompactTx>) -> CompactBlock {
let mut cb = CompactBlock::new();
cb.set_height(c.next as u64);
cb.hash = random_hash().to_vec();
cb.prevHash = c.prev.0.to_vec();
for (i, mut t) in txs.into_iter().enumerate() {
t.set_index(i as u64);
cb.vtx.push(t);
}
cb
}
/// K notes, then one block whose outputs carry compact ciphertexts of 0, 51, 52, 53 and 580 bytes. The server controls
/// that length, and try_sapling_compact_note_decryption asserts 52. Shorter: the output cannot be trial-decrypted and
/// is skipped, even when it pays us, but its cmu is a leaf like any other. Longer (53, or the full 580 bytes from a
/// server that sends full ciphertexts): the compact plaintext is the first 52 bytes, so the note is found. The model is
/// the reference: it appends every parseable cmu whatever the ciphertext, i.e. exactly what a wallet fed 52-byte
/// ciphertexts in those slots commits. K = 3 takes the inline witness path, K = 17 the deferred one.
fn bad_ciphertext_case(k: usize) {
let mut c = Chain::new();
for _ in 0..k {
let g = c.pay_us(10_000);
c.mine(vec![g]);
}
let ctx = format!("bad ciphertext K={}", k);
let f = foreign();
let ours = c.ours();
// tx1: our note; our note with a 51-byte ciphertext (skipped); a foreign note
let (t1, id1) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 1_111), out_to_ct(&ours, 9_999, 51), out_to(&f, 1)], vec![]);
// tx2: a foreign 51-byte ciphertext; our note with the full 580-byte ciphertext (found)
let (t2, id2) = tx_with(vec![out_to_ct(&f, 2, 51), out_to_ct(&ours, 2_222, 580)], vec![]);
// tx3: our note with a 53-byte ciphertext (found); a foreign empty ciphertext
let (t3, id3) = tx_with(vec![out_to_ct(&ours, 3_333, 53), out_to_ct(&f, 3, 0)], vec![]);
let size_before = c.model.tree.size();
c.mine(vec![
GenTx { ctx: t1, txid: id1, ours: Some(0), spends: vec![] },
GenTx { ctx: t2, txid: id2, ours: Some(1), spends: vec![] },
GenTx { ctx: t3, txid: id3, ours: Some(0), spends: vec![] },
]);
assert_eq!(c.model.tree.size() - size_before, 7, "{}: every output is a leaf", ctx);
c.compare(true, &ctx);
{
let txs = c.wallet.txs.read().unwrap();
let values = |id: &TxId| txs[id].notes.iter().map(|nd| nd.note.value).collect::<Vec<u64>>();
assert_eq!(values(&id1), vec![1_111], "{}: the 51-byte note must be skipped", ctx);
assert_eq!(values(&id2), vec![2_222], "{}: the 580-byte note must be found", ctx);
assert_eq!(values(&id3), vec![3_333], "{}: the 53-byte note must be found", ctx);
}
let root = c.wallet.blocks.read().unwrap().last().unwrap().tree.root();
assert!(root == c.model.tree.root(), "{}: tip root differs from the reference", ctx);
assert!(check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, &ctx) >= k + 3, "{}: every live note is checked", ctx);
// One more block: every note, including the three from the bad-ciphertext block, advances.
let g = c.pay_foreign(2);
c.mine(vec![g]);
c.compare(true, &ctx);
check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, &ctx);
}
#[test]
fn bad_compact_ciphertext_is_skipped_or_truncated() {
within_watchdog("bad compact ciphertext", || {
bad_ciphertext_case(3);
bad_ciphertext_case(17);
});
}
/// Hash lengths are server data too. CompactBlock::hash()/prev_hash() assert 32 bytes when no header is sent, and every
/// tx hash was copied into a [u8; 32]: for a tx of ours under txs.write() (the panic poisoned the wallet for good), and
/// for the block's txid list after the witnesses had moved. Each is Err(-1) now, before any change: the lock is usable,
/// last_scanned_height and every tree and witness are unchanged, and the next good block scans.
#[test]
fn malformed_hashes_are_an_error_before_any_change() {
within_watchdog("malformed hashes", || {
let mut c = Chain::new();
for _ in 0..3 {
let g = c.pay_us(10_000);
c.mine(vec![g]);
}
let ours = c.ours();
let mut cases: Vec<(&str, CompactBlock)> = vec![];
let (mut t, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
t.hash.truncate(31);
cases.push(("our tx with a 31-byte hash", raw_block(&c, vec![t])));
let (t, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
let mut b = raw_block(&c, vec![t]);
b.hash = vec![];
cases.push(("an empty block hash and no header", b));
let mut b = raw_block(&c, vec![]);
b.prevHash.truncate(31);
cases.push(("a 31-byte prev hash and no header", b));
let (t1, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&ours, 5_000)], vec![]);
let (mut t2, _) = tx_with(vec![out_to(&foreign(), 1)], vec![]);
t2.hash.push(0);
cases.push(("our tx and a foreign tx with a 33-byte hash", raw_block(&c, vec![t1, t2])));
let h = c.wallet.last_scanned_height();
for (name, b) in cases {
let bytes = b.write_to_bytes().unwrap();
let w = &c.wallet;
let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| w.scan_block(&bytes)));
assert!(r.is_ok(), "{}: scan_block panicked", name);
assert_eq!(r.unwrap(), Err(-1), "{}", name);
assert!(c.wallet.txs.read().is_ok(), "{}: the txs lock is poisoned", name);
assert_eq!(c.wallet.last_scanned_height(), h, "{}: last_scanned_height moved", name);
c.compare(true, name);
}
let g = c.pay_us(7_000);
c.mine(vec![g]);
c.compare(true, "after the malformed blocks");
check_anchor_alignment(&c.wallet, "after the malformed blocks");
});
}