Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8 07437fb447 perf(history): weekly safety-net full re-sweep for sent history
Persisting the sent-sweep watermark means a relaunch runs a windowed sweep,
which can't see a change made outside the GUI (a Console z_importviewingkey,
an external same-seed restore) that adds an old send below the window. This
adds a periodic full re-sweep so that case is still caught within ~7 days.

- sentSweepSafetyNetDue(now, lastFull) = lastFull > 0 && now - lastFull > 7d
  (a wallet that has never full-swept doesn't trigger one; the seeding sweep
  records the time). lastFullTime / lastFullHeight ride in the sent_sweep
  snapshot; any successful full sweep (seed, verify-mismatch or safety-net)
  resets the clock. On load, a valid watermark without a clock starts it now,
  so even watermarks seeded before this field eventually re-sweep.
- When due, the snapshot forces a full sweep for that cycle. Gated on: a
  watermark exists, a routine (non-syncing) cycle, not the Mining page, and
  not in full-sweep backoff -- so a full sweep that can't finish on a slow
  daemon backs off instead of retrying every cycle.

Degrades gracefully: ~0.4 s on a note-cache daemon; callLong(120 s) with
backoff on an old one (the deferred banding would keep each cs_main hold
short so it fits there too). Helper + persistence covered by tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 17:56:30 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8 3cda8c9e31 perf(history): persist the sent-sweep watermark (windowed relaunch)
z_listsentbyaddress re-walks the whole wallet when there's no usable
watermark, which the daemon does under cs_main for every send -- hundreds
of seconds, 400+ s and ~19 GB RSS on a large wallet. The watermark lived
only in memory, so every relaunch, reconnect or daemon restart paid for a
full sweep. This persists it so those cases run a bounded windowed sweep
([z, 0, 2, tip - W + margin]) instead (SENT-HISTORY-SWEEP Part 1).

- The watermark (W = last swept tip), its anchor (A = W - margin) and anchor
  hash (H_A = getblockhash(A)), plus the enrichment backlog and the full-
  sweep backoff, ride in the encrypted history snapshot as an optional
  `sent_sweep` object (schema stays v1; a missing/inconsistent one reads as
  "no watermark" = today's behaviour, so older builds and payloads are safe).
- Before the first windowed sweep after a load, the anchor is verified
  (getblockhash(A) == H_A). A match means any fork is inside the window; a
  mismatch (reorg deeper than the margin, different chain/datadir) or an
  inability to check drops the watermark and sweeps the whole wallet.
- The first sweep after a load uses a bigger margin (absorbs notifier lag),
  and a watermark older than 2400 blocks uses the long timeout (callLong).
- The backlog is persisted WITH W: a pure z->z send's txid lives only in a
  sweep result and would be lost if the window moved past an un-enriched one.
- Watermark changes reach disk (folded into the store signature), and every
  hard case still forces a full sweep: reorg (anchor verify), GUI rescan /
  zap / import / address change, restoreOriginalWallet, and disconnect.

Deferred (follow-ups, each only turns a correct-but-slow case faster, never a
correctness risk): the banded full sweep for seeding on a pre-note-cache
daemon, the external-import tripwire, and the weekly safety-net re-sweep.
Part 2 (the daemon's decrypt cost) is already on the daemon's
perf/sapling-note-cache branch.

Pure helpers + cache round-trip + anchor-verify/large-window covered by
tests; the getblockhash-after-sweep updates the pinned RPC sequences.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 14:47:48 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8 1416654385 perf(tx-cache): skip Argon2id for unencrypted wallets
Opening the transaction-history cache always derived its encryption key
with Argon2id, even for an unencrypted wallet. For those wallets the
passphrase is just a value derivable from the database itself, so the
~50-100 ms Argon2id stall bought no additional secrecy and ran on the
UI thread at open.

- Unencrypted wallets now derive the cache key with a cheap,
  domain-separated BLAKE2b KDF over the wallet identity, keyed by the
  per-wallet salt. The secret is derivable from the DB, so this is
  security-equivalent for the unencrypted case and avoids the stall.
- Passphrase-encrypted wallets are unchanged: they keep the Argon2id
  key derivation. The two paths use separate domain labels, so the
  fast-path key and the Argon2id key never collide for the same DB and
  salt; a cache written under one cannot be read under the other.

Tests cover the fast-path round-trip and reopen, and assert that an
Argon2id unlock of the same DB produces a different key and fails to
read the fast-path snapshot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 22:03:00 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 5.5 c0568eb930 refactor(history): make TransactionHistoryCache safe for a writer thread
The tx-history cache was only ever used from the UI thread and had no
locking. To let snapshots be written from a background thread:

- every SQL statement runs under one database mutex and the key fields
  under a second one, taken after it and never held across I/O or the
  key derivation;
- a write is a self-contained, move-only SnapshotJob holding the rows
  and a private copy of the key, which is wiped after the write or when
  a job never runs; the JSON build and encryption hold no lock;
- a job with an all-zero key is refused instead of overwriting a good
  snapshot with one nobody can read;
- the prune after a write also keeps the wallet unlocked now, so a late
  job for the previous wallet can't delete the salt of the one just
  switched to;
- keyId() gives a non-reversible tag of the installed key, so a
  passphrase change can be told from a re-unlock with the same one.

replace() stays a synchronous wrapper with the same result. A failed
INSERT is now logged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 21:09:48 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 4.8 274f7ea1af fix(storage): owner-only secret files + bound SQLite cache growth
- Write vault.dat atomically and 0600 (it holds the PIN-encrypted passphrase, so
  a world-readable copy enables an offline brute-force of the short PIN), and
  chmod the tx-history SQLite + its WAL/SHM sidecars to 0600 on open.
- The tx-history snapshot and key-salt rows are keyed on a hash of the full
  address set, which changes whenever a new address is generated — orphaning the
  prior hash's full-history blob and salt forever. pruneOtherWallets() now drops
  rows for every non-live wallet hash on each save, bounding the database.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 14:17:54 -05:00
DanS 975743f754 feat(wallet): persist history and surface pending sends
Add an encrypted SQLite transaction history cache with cached tip metadata and
per-address shielded scan progress so startup and full refreshes avoid
re-scanning every z-address while still invalidating on wallet/address/rescan
changes.

Improve wallet history loading by paging transparent transactions, preserving
cached shielded and sent rows, keeping recent/unconfirmed activity visible, and
classifying mining-address receives. Show z_sendmany opid sends immediately in
History and Overview, pin pending rows through refreshes, and apply optimistic
address/balance debits until opids resolve.

Add timestamped RPC console tracing by source/method without logging params or
results, reduce redundant refresh/RPC calls, and cache Explorer recent block
summaries in SQLite.

Expand focused tests for transaction cache encryption, scan-progress
persistence/invalidation, history preservation, operation-status parsing,
pending send visibility, and Explorer/RPC refresh behavior.
2026-05-05 03:22:14 -05:00