Adversarial verification of the audit fixes found real gaps in them: - HIGH throw-safety: the switch worker and the encryption-restart worker set daemon_restarting_=true but reset it only on their normal/early-return paths — a throw from stop/startEmbeddedDaemon left the flag stuck true, wedging reconnect and every future switch/rescan/encryption. Both now reset it on all paths (try/catch); a throw during a switch is treated as a failed switch and triggers the revert. - HIGH residual chat leak: resetChatSession() cleared the flags but an already- posted z_exportmnemonic worker job still held wallet A's secret, and its completion callback (guarded only by isLocked(), false for an unencrypted wallet) would provision A's identity under B. Add a chat_session_generation_ epoch bumped on every wallet change; the fetch captures it and its callback discards the (previous-wallet) secret if the epoch no longer matches. - LOW vault-scope collision: the per-wallet vault tag was a lossy char-substitution (two distinct files could map to one vault). Append an 8-hex FNV-1a of the raw filename so distinct wallets never share a vault. +unit test. - LOW seed-adopt: removeVault() on adopt so the legacy wallet's PIN passphrase isn't left associated with the new seed wallet (same file name). - LOW: clear lock_unlock_in_progress_ on switch too. Deferred (documented): the 1.5s start grace can't catch a wallet that fails LATE in daemon init (the existing crash-wedge detection still applies); beginShutdown's join of the switch task can briefly freeze the UI during quit (necessary to avoid orphaning the daemon). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
275 KiB
275 KiB