Adds 127.0.0.1:9050 for the .onion proxy if we can succesfully connect
to the control port.
Natural followup to creating hidden services automatically.
bip65-cltv.py is based on the earlier BIP66 soft-fork RPC test
implemented by Pieter Wuille's 819bcf9b99
bip65-cltv-p2p.py is based on the earlier BIP66 P2P test by Suhas
Daftuar's d76412b068
Rebased-From: 308257856099e82e91881ba97f741d840184727c
Transactions that fail CLTV verification will be rejected from the
mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing
"invalid" CLTV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not*
the soft-fork required to actually enable CLTV for production use.
Rebased-From: ffd75adce01a78b3461b3ff05bcc2b530a9ce994
<nLockTime> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY -> <nLockTime>
Fails if tx.nLockTime < nLockTime, allowing the funds in a txout to be
locked until some block height or block time in the future is reached.
Only the logic and unittests are implemented; this commit does not have
any actual soft-fork logic in it.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for rebase.
Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for the suggestion of comparing the
argument against the transaction nLockTime rather than the current
time/blockheight directly.
Rebased-From: bc60b2b4b401f0adff5b8b9678903ff8feb5867b
While the existing numeric opcodes are all limited to 4-byte bignum
arguments, new opcodes will need different limits.
Rebased-From: 99088d60d8a7747c6d1a7fd5d8cd388be1b3e138
Nodes can have divergent policies on which transactions they will accept
and relay. This can cause you to repeatedly request and reject the same
tx after its inved to you from various peers which have accepted it.
Here we add rolling bloom filter to keep track of such rejections,
clearing the filter every time the chain tip changes.
Credit goes to Alex Morcos, who created the patch that this code is
based on.
Original code by Peter Todd. Refactored to not construct the
filter at startup time by Pieter Wuille.
(cherry picked from commit 0847d9cb5fcd2fdd5a21bde699944d966cf5add9)
While CBloomFilter is usually used with an explicitly set nTweak,
CRollingBloomFilter is only used internally. Requiring every caller to
set nTweak is error-prone and redundant; better to have the class handle
that for you with a high-quality randomness source.
Additionally when clearing the filter it makes sense to change nTweak as
well to recover from a bad setting, e.g. due to insufficient randomness
at initialization, so the clear() method is replaced by a reset() method
that sets a new, random, nTweak value.
(cherry picked from commit d2d7ee0e863b286e1c9f9c54659d494fb0a7712d)
Previously due to an off-by-one error the wallet ignored
nLockTime-by-height transactions that would be valid in the next block
even though they are accepted into the mempool. The transactions
wouldn't show up until confirmed, nor would they be included in the
unconfirmed balance. Similar to the mempool behavior fix in 665bdd3b,
the wallet code was calling IsFinalTx() directly without taking into
account the fact that doing so tells you if the transaction could have
been mined in the *current* block, rather than the next block.
To fix this we strip IsFinalTx() of non-consensus-critical
functionality, removing the default arguments, and add CheckFinalTx() to
check if a transaction will be final in the next block.
Github-Pull: #6183
Rebased-From: 28bf06236d3b385e95fe26a7a742395b30efd6ee
Makes it possible to compactly provide a delibrately invalid signature
for use with CHECK(MULTI)SIG. For instance with BIP19 if m != n invalid
signatures need to be provided in the scriptSig; prior to this change
those invalid signatures would need to be large DER-encoded signatures.
Note that we may want to further expand on this change in the future by
saying that only OP_0 is a "valid" invalid signature; BIP19 even with
this change is inherently malleable as the invalid signatures can be any
validly encoded DER signature.
Previous behavior with IsFinalTx() being an IsStandard() rule was rather
confusing and interferred with testing of protocols that depended on
nLockTime.
Previously an empty script wouldn't be hashed, and CScriptID would be
assigned the incorrect value of 0 instead. This bug can be seen in the
RPC decodescript command:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "31h1vYVSYuKP6AhS86fbRdMw9XHieotbST"
}
Correct output:
$ btc decodescript ""
{
"asm" : "",
"type" : "nonstandard",
"p2sh" : "3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"
}
OP_CODESEPARATOR is an actual executed instruction, not a declarative
thing, so if it's wrapped in an OP_IF it can be turned off.
Using this to implement Rivest's Paywords is left as an exercise for the
reader.
NOP1 to NOP10 are reserved for future soft-fork upgrades. In the event
of an upgrade such NOPs have *VERIFY behavior, meaning that if their
arguments are not correct the script fails. Discouraging these NOPs by
rejecting transactions containing them from the mempool ensures that
we'll never accept transactions, nor mine blocks, with scripts that are
now invalid according to the majority of hashing power even if we're not
yet upgraded. Previously this wasn't an issue as the IsStandard() rules
didn't allow upgradable NOPs anyway, but 7f3b4e95 relaxed the
IsStandard() rules for P2SH redemptions allowing any redeemScript to be
spent.
We *do* allow upgradable NOPs in scripts so long as they are not
executed. This is harmless as there is no opportunity for the script to
be invalid post-upgrade.
Previously transactions were only tested again the
STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS prior to mempool acceptance, so any bugs in
those flags that allowed actually-invalid transactions to pass would
result in allowing invalid transactions into the mempool. Fortunately
there is a second check in CreateNewBlock() that would prevent those
transactions from being mined, resulting in an invalid block, however
this could still be exploited as a DoS attack.
Lots of people read the Bitcoin Core codebase to learn more about
crypto; better to warn about flaws explicitly so they don't blindly copy
the code for other uses and create broken systems.
redeemScripts >520bytes can't be spent due to the
MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE limit; previously the addmultisigaddress and
createmultisig RPC calls would let you violate that limit unknowingly.
Also made the wallet code itself check the redeemScript prior to adding
it to the wallet, which in the (rare) instance that a user has added an
invalid oversized redeemScript to their wallet causes an error on
startup. The affected key isn't added to the wallet; other keys are
unaffected.
Removes the limits on number of pubkeys for P2SH CHECKMULTISIG outputs.
Previously with the 500 byte scriptSig limit there were odd restrictions
where even a 1-of-12 P2SH could be spent in a standard transaction(1),
yet multisig scriptPubKey's requiring more signatures quickly ran out of
scriptSig space.
From a "stuff-data-in-the-blockchain" point of view not much has changed
as with the prior commit now only allowing the dummy value to be null
the newly allowed scriptSig space can only be used for signatures. In
any case, just using more outputs is trivial and doesn't cost much.
1) See 779b519480d8c5346de6e635119c7ee772e97ec872240c45e558f582a37b4b73
Mined by BTC Guild.
This is a source of transaction mutability as the dummy value was
previously not checked and could be modified to something other than the
usual OP_0 value.
Previously CreateNewBlock() didn't take into account the fact that
IsFinalTx() without any arguments tests if the transaction is considered
final in the *current* block, when both those functions really needed to
know if the transaction would be final in the *next* block.
Additionally the UI had a similar misunderstanding.
Also adds some basic tests to check that CreateNewBlock() is in fact
mining nLockTime-using transactions correctly.
Thanks to Wladimir J. van der Laan for rebase.
Previously bitcoin-qt's -debug transaction info was showing CTxOut([error])
It is valid for a scriptPubKey to be any size, for example simply
OP_RETURN is valid and can be used to destroy a TXOUT to mining fees.
Seems it was forgotten about when IsPushOnly() and the unittests were
written. A particular oddity is that OP_RESERVED doesn't count towards
the >201 opcode limit unlike every other named opcode.
Previously when a transaction was set to lock at a specific block the
calculation was reversed, returning a negative number. This broke the UI
and caused it to display %n in place of the actual number.
In addition the previous calculation would display "Open for 0 blocks"
when the block height was such that the next block created would
finalize the transaction. Inserted the word "more" and changed the
calculation so that the last message would be "Open for 1 more block" to
better match user expectations.
Previously trying to create a multisig address that required less than
one signature would output something like the following:
"wrong number of keys(got 1, need at least 0)"
Peter Todd