Author SHA1 Message Date
DanSandClaude Opus 5 520e1e0ede audit: fix ADDR send amplification and the IVK-only witness deref (UNTESTED)
Two more findings from the general audit. Compile-verified only, like the rest of
this branch.

main.cpp SendMessages / ADDR: the per-address loop called
    pto->PushAddrMessage(msgMaker.Make(flags, msg_type, pto->vAddrToSend))
i.e. it pushed the ENTIRE vector once per accepted address. One 24-byte getaddr
therefore produced N messages of N addresses each instead of one message of N --
on a live addrman (GetAddr returning ~494) that is ~494 x ~14.8 KB = ~7.3 MB of
upstream for a 24-byte request, and up to ~30 MB with a full addrman. All of it
serialized, with a double-SHA256 checksum per message, while cs_main is held, so
each burst also stalls block validation and RPC.

The locally built vAddr was accumulated and then discarded, and the
`vAddr.resize(MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND)` sat exactly where upstream has `vAddr.clear()` --
it can never fire, because vAddr.size() already equals MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND there.
This is a local regression, not inherited: 512da314a rewrote the correct upstream
form into this one.

Restores the upstream idiom (accumulate, flush in MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND batches, send
the remainder after the loop) and hoists the msg_type/make_flags selection out of
the loop, since neither varies per address.

wallet.cpp VerifyAndSetInitialWitness: five sites dereferenced
`*item.second.nullifier` on a boost::optional that can legitimately be unset. A
Sapling note discovered through an imported INCOMING viewing key has no nullifier
-- computing one requires the full viewing key, and z_importviewingkey calls only
AddSaplingIncomingViewingKey. Dereferencing it aborts the daemon with a boost
assertion rather than an RPC error, at the end of the import's own rescan; and
because the IVK-only note data is already persisted in the wallet transaction and
BuildWitnessCache is re-driven from ChainTip on every connected block, the node
then fails the same way on every restart.

The codebase already had the right pattern in the two neighbouring functions --
DecrementNoteWitnesses guards with `if (nd->nullifier && ...)` and BuildWitnessCache
with `if (!nd->nullifier) continue;` -- so only VerifyAndSetInitialWitness was
missing it. Those guards also establish the intended semantics: a note whose spend
depth cannot be computed is treated as UNSPENT, keeping its witness rather than
pruning a note we cannot prove spent. Adds a boost::optional overload of
SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight doing exactly that, and routes all five sites through it.

NOT fixed here, deliberately, because none can be done responsibly without tests:
  - the inline TLS handshake on ThreadSocketHandler (architectural: one slow
    unauthenticated connection can freeze all P2P I/O for up to 60s);
  - the getblocktemplate function-static leaking a CBlockTemplate per concurrent
    caller, assigned with cs_main released;
  - z_sendmany's pre-flight size estimate omitting Sapling spends, so a wallet with
    ~499+ notes builds an oversize, unbroadcastable transaction after minutes of
    proving;
  - z_shieldcoinbase's opt-in donation paying a hardcoded upstream-Hush z-address
    that no DragonX party can spend (a policy decision, not a code fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
2026-08-31 22:11:42 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 5 fa3a4223ec audit: mechanical fixes from the general audit (UNTESTED - see below)
Six independently-verified defects, each restoring an idiom the surrounding code
already uses. Compile-verified only; no runtime testing has been done. Parked on
a branch deliberately.

net.h PushAddress: tested IsAddressKnown(addr) -- the CNode member holding THIS
PEER's own address -- instead of _addr, the address being queued. The filter was
therefore constant for the connection's lifetime, and once the peer's own address
entered its addrKnown (routine: the remote's AdvertizeLocal reaches us and we file
it) every relay path to that peer silently no-opped until the daily
addrKnown.reset(). Introduced by 63ad87f69, which rewrote
!addrKnown.contains(_addr.GetKey()) into !IsAddressKnown(addr). One token.

rpcdump.cpp importprivkey: `params.size() == 4` meant the documented `height`
argument was silently dropped whenever the optional 5th (secret_key) argument was
supplied, rescanning from genesis instead -- ~3.26M blocks holding cs_main and
cs_wallet. Every sibling RPC in the file already uses the `>` form.

blockchain.cpp getblockhashes: `if (fActiveOnly) LOCK(cs_main);` was unbraced, and
LOCK declares a scoped object, so the lock was constructed and destroyed on that
line while the timestamp-index walk ran unsynchronised. Note that merely adding
braces does NOT fix it -- the work is in GetTimestampIndex on the next line, which
calls blockOnchainActive() per row. The lock now spans that call, taken
unconditionally: a conditional lock is the exact shape that produced the bug.

blockchain.cpp getblockdeltas / getblockmerkletree: no lock at all while reading
mapBlockIndex, chainActive, and (getblockmerkletree) pcoinsTip's mutable anchor
cache, which inserts on a miss. Every sibling RPC in the file locks.

httpserver.cpp: libevent defaults max_headers_size to EV_SIZE_MAX and buffers the
request line and headers BEFORE the -rpcallowip ACL or auth check runs, so a single
connection could grow RSS ~1:1 with bytes sent. Capped at 8 KiB.

rpc/mining.cpp getblocktemplate: LEAVE_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_main) is followed by an
unguarded CreateNewBlockWithKey. The enclosing LOCK(cs_main) is a scoped CMutexLock
whose owns_lock is still true, so any wallet/BDB fault (disk full, EMFILE, corrupt
wallet.dat) made its destructor unlock an already-unlocked mutex during unwinding
-> BOOST_VERIFY -> SIGABRT. Asserts cannot be compiled out (main.cpp #errors on
NDEBUG). The daemon aborted instead of returning the actionable error, and because
the abort happened inside unwinding, nothing was logged. Now re-enters cs_main
before rethrowing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
2026-08-31 22:08:29 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 5 c1040028e4 wallet: checkpoint rescan progress when the scan is interrupted
An aborted or shutdown-interrupted rescan discarded all of its progress: nothing
advanced the on-disk best-block locator, so the next run started over. On a large
shielded wallet that is a multi-minute witness rebuild repeated from scratch.

Writes the locator ONCE, at the interrupt, rather than periodically through the
scan. That delivers the whole stated benefit -- "resume where it stopped" -- at
the cost of exactly one SetBestChain per interrupted scan. A periodic checkpoint
would additionally survive SIGKILL and power loss, a much weaker requirement, and
it is the part that carries all the cost: SetBestChainINTERNAL is O(whole wallet)
regardless of progress, so on the reported 5.3k-tx / 7.5k-note wallet a checkpoint
every 2500 blocks would plausibly cost more than the rebuild it was meant to save.
If someone later demonstrates a need for crash resilience mid-scan, add it then,
with a measured interval and fFlush=false -- not before.

Two guards, both necessary:

  - CONTIGUITY. The RPC entry points (rescan / importprivkey / z_importkey /
    z_importviewingkey) take a caller-supplied start height validated only against
    chainActive.Height(), never against the wallet's own persisted locator. A scan
    beginning above that locator must not checkpoint at all, or it would record
    the skipped range as scanned and hide any funds in it. Logged once when it
    applies, so an operator can see why an interrupt did not persist.

  - MONOTONICITY. A checkpoint may only advance the locator, never move it back.

The locator points at the last FULLY PROCESSED block -- the parent of the block we
were about to scan -- so resume restarts one block early. CChain::GetLocator pushes
its argument first and FindForkInGlobalIndex returns that same block, so resume
begins AT it; the one-block overlap is deliberate and idempotent, since AddToWallet
only takes its merge path when the transaction is already present.

No witness work is done at the interrupt, which answers the two "//TODO: should we
update witness caches?" comments this replaces: witnesses are re-derived from each
note's own witnessHeight independently of the locator, and witnessRootValidated is
never serialized, so every note is revalidated against hashFinalSaplingRoot on the
next start. A mid-scan checkpoint does capture notes at mixed witnessHeights -- the
in-loop BuildWitnessCache(pindex, true) returns before the extension phase and only
seeds new notes at their own transaction's height -- but that state is recoverable:
the post-loop BuildWitnessCache(tip, false) levels every note, and it now occurs at
most once per scan instead of hundreds of times.

Uses SetBestChainNoFlush so the checkpoint does not trigger a full BDB
txn_checkpoint over the whole cache, and reports failure rather than silently
leaving the operator to discover the replay.

Depends on the fLastRescanCompleted gate in the previous commit: without it
init.cpp would overwrite this checkpoint with a tip locator immediately after the
scan returns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
2026-08-31 20:54:37 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 5 a6b6f80db0 wallet: stop an interrupted rescan from hiding funds, and un-latch fAbortRescan
Two independent fund-visibility bugs on the rescan path, both pre-existing.

1. AN INTERRUPTED RESCAN RECORDED ITSELF AS COMPLETE.

ScanForWalletTransactions returns a bare `int ret` (a found-tx count) on both its
abort and shutdown bail-outs, so the caller could not tell "finished" from
"stopped at block H". init.cpp then ran, unconditionally:

    pwalletMain->ScanForWalletTransactions(pindexRescan, true);
    pwalletMain->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator());   // TIP locator

An interrupted scan therefore stamped the wallet as scanned all the way to the
chain tip. On the next start, the `chainActive.Tip() != pindexRescan` guard just
above sees no work to do and skips the rescan entirely, so every transaction in
the never-scanned range stays out of mapWallet -- permanently invisible to
getbalance and unspendable. That is exactly the case `-rescan` exists for: a key
import, right after ClearNoteWitnessCache has run.

Adds CWallet::fLastRescanCompleted, set false at scan entry and true only on the
normal exit, and gates the init.cpp locator write on it. Deliberately NOT
overloading the int return, which callers already use as a tx count.

2. fAbortRescan WAS NEVER RESET.

wallet.h declares it, AbortRescan() sets it true, and nothing in src/ ever sets
it false. The abortrescan RPC is live. After one call, for the remaining lifetime
of the process:
  - every ScanForWalletTransactions returns immediately, so re-running an import
    silently no-ops while the RPC still reports success;
  - BuildWitnessCache bails on the same flag on EVERY call, including the routine
    per-block extension from ChainTip.
Witness heights then diverge across notes while the chain advances, and
GetSaplingNoteWitnesses elects the majority root as the anchor and returns
boost::none for every note that disagrees. Those notes still show in the balance
but cannot be spent. Cleared at scan entry and consumed in the abort branch.

Also in BuildWitnessCache's abort branch: stop clearing fRescanning. A witness
rebuild is not a rescan and must not touch a flag ScanForWalletTransactions owns.

3. Both bail-out log lines had two format specifiers and one argument:

    LogPrintf("%s: Rescan aborted at block %d\n", pwalletMain->rescanHeight);

tinyformat's "too many conversion specifiers" guard is disabled in this tree
(tinyformat.h: `if(*fmt != '\0' && 0 ) // disabled due to complaints`), so this
does not throw -- verified by compiling the exact call against this tree's
tinyformat.h. It emits "3841207: Rescan aborted at block " with the height in the
__func__ slot, the real height dropped, and the trailing newline swallowed so the
next log line concatenates onto it. On the one path an operator has to diagnose
an interrupted rescan, the only record was corrupt. Fixed at both sites, and the
state updates moved above the log call.

4. Makes SetBestChainINTERNAL report whether the atomic write committed, so a
checkpointing caller can tell (six failure paths returned void). Adds
SetBestChainNoFlush, which opens the wallet DB with fFlushOnClose=false: the
default ctor makes ~CDB run a full BDB txn_checkpoint over the whole cache, which
is fine hourly but not from inside a scan -- the same flush wallet.cpp already
documents avoiding elsewhere "for performance reasons". Nothing calls it yet.

5. SetBestChainINTERNAL took each CWalletTx by value, deep-copying every note's
witness deque (WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE entries) per transaction per call, purely to
serialize it. Now by const reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
2026-08-31 20:52:40 -05:00
DanSandClaude Opus 5 3aac75e94f cli: report the port actually dialled, not a stale global
dragonx-cli resolves -rpcport correctly -- CallRPC does
  int port = GetArg("-rpcport", BaseParams().RPCPort());
and dials that port. But both connection-failure messages printed
ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT instead, a separate global defined at the top of
bitcoin-cli.cpp, initialised to the mainnet default 21769, and never assigned
anywhere in the CLI.

So every failure claimed port 21769 regardless of what was asked for:

  $ dragonx-cli -rpcport=21799 getblockcount
  error: couldn't connect to server at port 21769

That reads as "your -rpcport was ignored", which is a much more alarming and
much more misleading diagnosis than "nothing is listening yet". It cost an hour
of debugging on a node that was simply still loading a 15 GB txindex, and led to
the wrong conclusion that the CLI could be talking to the production daemon when
it was not.

Both sites now print the local `port`. Verified against the previous binary:

  new:  -rpcport=21799 -> "couldn't connect to server at port 21799"
        -rpcport=59999 -> "couldn't connect to server at port 59999"
  old:  both            -> "couldn't connect to server at port 21769"

and the CLI still reaches a live daemon on a non-default port.

ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT is left defined; it is referenced by other translation units.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FU87LdsJZiZkfq1eXubpeo
2026-08-31 17:35:52 -05:00
10 changed files with 214 additions and 48 deletions
+6 -2
View File
@@ -257,14 +257,18 @@ UniValue CallRPC(const std::string& strMethod, const UniValue& params)
event_base_dispatch(base.get());
if (response.status == 0) {
// Report the port we ACTUALLY dialled. ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT is a separate global that is
// initialised to the mainnet default at the top of this file and never assigned here, so
// using it made every failure claim port 21769 no matter what -rpcport was given -- which
// reads as "your -rpcport was ignored" and sends you chasing a config bug that isn't there.
throw CConnectionFailed(strprintf("couldn't connect to server at port %d : %s (code %d)\n(make sure server is running and you are connecting to the correct RPC port)",
ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT, http_errorstring(response.error), response.error));
port, http_errorstring(response.error), response.error));
} else if (response.status == HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED) {
throw std::runtime_error("incorrect rpcuser or rpcpassword (authorization failed)");
} else if (response.status >= 400 && response.status != HTTP_BAD_REQUEST && response.status != HTTP_NOT_FOUND && response.status != HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR) {
throw std::runtime_error(strprintf("server returned HTTP error %d", response.status));
} else if (response.body.empty()) {
throw std::runtime_error(strprintf("no response from server at port %d", ASSETCHAINS_RPCPORT ));
throw std::runtime_error(strprintf("no response from server at port %d", port));
}
// Parse reply
+8
View File
@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ static void libevent_log_cb(int severity, const char *msg)
LogPrint("libevent", "libevent: %s\n", msg);
}
/** Cap on the combined size of an HTTP request line + headers. libevent's default is EV_SIZE_MAX,
* i.e. unbounded, and it buffers before any ACL or auth check runs. */
static const size_t MAX_HEADERS_SIZE = 8192;
bool InitHTTPServer()
{
struct evhttp* http = 0;
@@ -467,6 +471,10 @@ bool InitHTTPServer()
evhttp_set_timeout(http, GetArg("-rpcservertimeout", DEFAULT_HTTP_SERVER_TIMEOUT));
evhttp_set_max_body_size(http, MAX_SIZE);
// libevent defaults max_headers_size to EV_SIZE_MAX, so without this a single connection can
// stream an unbounded request line / header block and grow RSS ~1:1 with bytes sent, BEFORE the
// -rpcallowip ACL or auth check runs (both happen after libevent has parsed the request).
evhttp_set_max_headers_size(http, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE);
evhttp_set_gencb(http, http_request_cb, NULL);
if (!HTTPBindAddresses(http)) {
+13 -2
View File
@@ -2654,8 +2654,19 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
nStart = GetTimeMillis();
pwalletMain->ScanForWalletTransactions(pindexRescan, true);
LogPrintf(" rescan %15dms\n", GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
pwalletMain->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator());
nWalletDBUpdated++;
// ONLY record "scanned to the tip" if the scan actually reached it. An aborted or
// shutdown-interrupted scan that stamps a tip locator tells the next startup there is
// nothing left to scan (the chainActive.Tip() != pindexRescan guard above then skips
// the rescan entirely), so every transaction in the unscanned range stays out of
// mapWallet permanently: invisible to getbalance and unspendable. The scan writes its
// own locator at the interrupt point instead.
if (pwalletMain->fLastRescanCompleted) {
pwalletMain->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator());
nWalletDBUpdated++;
} else {
LogPrintf("Rescan did not complete; leaving the best-block locator at the scan's own "
"checkpoint so the remaining range is rescanned on the next start\n");
}
// Restore wallet transaction metadata after -zapwallettxes=1
if (GetBoolArg("-zapwallettxes", false) && GetArg("-zapwallettxes", "1") != "2")
+22 -16
View File
@@ -8336,6 +8336,24 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
// Message: addr
if (fSendTrickle)
{
// Accumulate into vAddr and send it ONCE (or in MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND-sized batches).
// This loop previously pushed the ENTIRE pto->vAddrToSend on every accepted address,
// so a single 24-byte getaddr produced N messages of N addresses each instead of one
// message of N -- ~500x the intended bandwidth on a typical addrman, all serialized
// (with per-message double-SHA256 checksums) while cs_main is held. The locally built
// vAddr was accumulated and then discarded, and the vAddr.resize(MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND) was
// a no-op standing where upstream has vAddr.clear().
const char* msg_type;
int make_flags;
if (pto->m_wants_addrv2) {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDRV2;
make_flags = ADDRV2_FORMAT;
} else {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDR;
make_flags = 0;
}
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(std::min(pto->nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION));
vector<CAddress> vAddr;
vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size());
BOOST_FOREACH(const CAddress& addr, pto->vAddrToSend)
@@ -8343,29 +8361,17 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
if (pto->AddAddressIfNotAlreadyKnown(addr))
{
vAddr.push_back(addr);
if (vAddr.size() >= MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND)
{
// Should be impossible since we always check size before adding to
// vAddrToSend. Recover by trimming the vector.
vAddr.resize(MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND);
pto->PushAddrMessage(msgMaker.Make(make_flags, msg_type, vAddr));
vAddr.clear();
}
const char* msg_type;
int make_flags;
if (pto->m_wants_addrv2) {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDRV2;
make_flags = ADDRV2_FORMAT;
} else {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDR;
make_flags = 0;
}
pto->PushAddrMessage(CNetMsgMaker(std::min(pto->nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION)).Make(make_flags, msg_type, pto->vAddrToSend));
}
}
pto->vAddrToSend.clear();
vAddr.clear();
if (!vAddr.empty())
pto->PushAddrMessage(msgMaker.Make(make_flags, msg_type, vAddr));
}
CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId());
+5 -1
View File
@@ -607,7 +607,11 @@ public:
// Known checking here is only to save space from duplicates.
// SendMessages will filter it again for knowns that were added
// after addresses were pushed.
if (_addr.IsValid() && !IsAddressKnown(addr) && addr_format_supported) {
// NOTE: _addr (the address being queued), NOT addr (this peer's own address, net.h ~416).
// Testing the member made the filter constant for the connection's lifetime: once the peer's
// own address entered its addrKnown -- routine, via the remote's AdvertizeLocal -- every
// relay path to it silently no-opped until the daily addrKnown.reset().
if (_addr.IsValid() && !IsAddressKnown(_addr) && addr_format_supported) {
if (vAddrToSend.size() >= MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND) {
vAddrToSend[insecure_rand() % vAddrToSend.size()] = _addr;
+20 -4
View File
@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ UniValue getblockdeltas(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
if (fHelp || params.size() != 1)
throw runtime_error("");
// Reads mapBlockIndex / chainActive (and, below, pcoinsTip's mutable anchor cache),
// all of which are cs_main-guarded. Every sibling RPC in this file locks; this one did not.
LOCK(cs_main);
std::string strHash = params[0].get_str();
uint256 hash(uint256S(strHash));
@@ -602,11 +606,19 @@ UniValue getblockhashes(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
std::vector<std::pair<uint256, unsigned int> > blockHashes;
if (fActiveOnly)
{
// The lock must SPAN GetTimestampIndex: with fActiveOnly it calls blockOnchainActive() for
// every row, which reads mapBlockIndex and chainActive. The previous form was
// if (fActiveOnly)
// LOCK(cs_main);
// and LOCK() declares a scoped object, so as an unbraced substatement it was constructed
// and destroyed on that line -- the walk then ran completely unsynchronised. Taken
// unconditionally here: this RPC is explorer-only and not hot, and a conditional lock is
// exactly the shape that produced the bug.
LOCK(cs_main);
if (!GetTimestampIndex(high, low, fActiveOnly, blockHashes)) {
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_ADDRESS_OR_KEY, "No information available for block hashes");
if (!GetTimestampIndex(high, low, fActiveOnly, blockHashes)) {
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_ADDRESS_OR_KEY, "No information available for block hashes");
}
}
UniValue result(UniValue::VARR);
@@ -877,6 +889,10 @@ UniValue getblockmerkletree(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& m
+ HelpExampleRpc("getblockmerkletree", "290000")
);
// Reads mapBlockIndex / chainActive (and, below, pcoinsTip's mutable anchor cache),
// all of which are cs_main-guarded. Every sibling RPC in this file locks; this one did not.
LOCK(cs_main);
CBlockIndex* phushblockindex;
uint256 blockRoot;
SaplingMerkleTree tree;
+18 -2
View File
@@ -759,9 +759,25 @@ UniValue getblocktemplate(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& myp
#ifdef ENABLE_WALLET
CReserveKey reservekey(pwalletMain);
LEAVE_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_main);
pblocktemplate = CreateNewBlockWithKey(reservekey,pindexPrevNew->GetHeight()+1,HUSH_MAXGPUCOUNT,false);
// MUST re-enter cs_main before letting an exception escape. The enclosing LOCK(cs_main) is
// a scoped CMutexLock whose owns_lock is still true, so if CreateNewBlockWithKey throws
// (any wallet/BDB fault: disk full, EMFILE, a corrupt wallet.dat) its destructor unlocks an
// already-unlocked mutex during unwinding -> BOOST_VERIFY -> SIGABRT. Asserts cannot be
// compiled out here (main.cpp #errors on NDEBUG), so this aborts the daemon instead of
// returning the actionable error, and the abort happens inside unwinding so nothing is logged.
try {
pblocktemplate = CreateNewBlockWithKey(reservekey,pindexPrevNew->GetHeight()+1,HUSH_MAXGPUCOUNT,false);
} catch (...) {
ENTER_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_main);
throw;
}
#else
pblocktemplate = CreateNewBlockWithKey();
try {
pblocktemplate = CreateNewBlockWithKey();
} catch (...) {
ENTER_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_main);
throw;
}
#endif
ENTER_CRITICAL_SECTION(cs_main);
if (!pblocktemplate)
+4 -1
View File
@@ -299,7 +299,10 @@ UniValue importprivkey(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, const CPubKey& mypk)
bool fRescan = true;
if (params.size() > 2)
fRescan = params[2].get_bool();
if ( fRescan && params.size() == 4 )
// '> 3', not '== 4': with the optional 5th (secret_key) argument present the equality test
// failed and height silently stayed 0, rescanning from genesis. Every sibling RPC in this file
// already uses the '>' form.
if ( fRescan && params.size() > 3 )
height = params[3].get_int();
+89 -11
View File
@@ -801,10 +801,18 @@ bool CWallet::CommitAutomatedTx(const CTransaction& tx) {
void CWallet::SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
// Default ctor => fFlushOnClose=true => ~CDB runs a full BDB txn_checkpoint over the entire
// cache. Fine for the hourly/shutdown callers; ruinous inside a scan (see SetBestChainNoFlush).
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
SetBestChainINTERNAL(walletdb, loc);
}
bool CWallet::SetBestChainNoFlush(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile, "r+", false);
return SetBestChainINTERNAL(walletdb, loc);
}
std::set<std::pair<libzcash::PaymentAddress, uint256>> CWallet::GetNullifiersForAddresses(
const std::set<libzcash::PaymentAddress> & addresses)
{
@@ -1232,6 +1240,16 @@ int CWallet::SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(const uint256& nullifier, int nWitnessH
return nMinimumHeight;
}
int CWallet::SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(const boost::optional<uint256>& nullifier, int nWitnessHeight, int nMinimumHeight)
{
// No nullifier => an incoming-viewing-key-only note (z_importviewingkey without the full
// viewing key). Spend depth is unknowable, so treat it as unspent and keep its witness.
if (!nullifier) {
return min(nWitnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
}
return SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*nullifier, nWitnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
}
int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessOnly)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
@@ -1269,7 +1287,7 @@ int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessO
//Skip Validation when witness root has been validated
if (nd->witnessRootValidated) {
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
continue;
}
@@ -1281,12 +1299,12 @@ int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessO
CBlockIndex* whIndex = chainActive[nd->witnessHeight];
if (whIndex == NULL) {
//witnessHeight strictly above the active chain (transient catch-up): cannot validate yet
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
continue;
}
if (nd->witnesses.front().root() == whIndex->hashFinalSaplingRoot) {
nd->witnessRootValidated = true;
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
continue;
}
//root mismatch on the active chain -> desynced; fall through to rebuild below
@@ -1298,7 +1316,7 @@ int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessO
blockRoot = pblockindex->hashFinalSaplingRoot;
if (witnessRoot == blockRoot) {
nd->witnessRootValidated = true;
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
continue;
}
}
@@ -1350,7 +1368,7 @@ int CWallet::VerifyAndSetInitialWitness(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessO
}
nd->witnessHeight = pblockindex->GetHeight();
UpdateSaplingNullifierNoteMapWithTx(wtxItem.second);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(*item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
nMinimumHeight = SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(item.second.nullifier, nd->witnessHeight, nMinimumHeight);
}
}
}
@@ -1436,8 +1454,9 @@ void CWallet::BuildWitnessCache(const CBlockIndex* pindex, bool witnessOnly)
return;
}
if (pwalletMain->fAbortRescan) {
// Do NOT clear fRescanning here: a witness rebuild is not a rescan, and clearing it from
// this path desynchronises the flag from ScanForWalletTransactions, which owns it.
LogPrintf("%s: rescan aborted during witness rebuild\n", __func__);
pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
return;
}
int h = pbi->GetHeight();
@@ -3434,6 +3453,12 @@ int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
if(fZdebug)
LogPrintf("%s: fUpdate=%d now=%li\n",__func__,fUpdate,nNow);
// fAbortRescan is sticky: nothing else in the tree ever clears it, so without this a single
// `abortrescan` RPC would disable every later scan AND every later BuildWitnessCache for the
// lifetime of the process (BuildWitnessCache bails on the same flag), freezing witness heights
// while the chain advances and progressively rendering notes unspendable.
pwalletMain->fAbortRescan = false;
pwalletMain->fLastRescanCompleted = false;
pwalletMain->fRescanning = true;
CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexStart;
pwalletMain->rescanStartHeight = pindex->GetHeight();
@@ -3448,6 +3473,51 @@ int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
pwalletMain->rescanHeight = pindex ? pindex->GetHeight() : 0;
}
// --- interrupt checkpoint setup -------------------------------------------------------
// Where does the wallet currently believe it has scanned to? A checkpoint may only ever
// ADVANCE that point, and only if this scan is contiguous with it. The RPC entry points
// (rescan / importprivkey / z_importkey / z_importviewingkey) take a caller-supplied start
// height validated only against chainActive.Height(), so a scan can legitimately begin far
// ABOVE the persisted locator -- writing a checkpoint from such a scan would mark the
// skipped range as scanned and hide any funds in it.
CBlockIndex* pindexPersisted = NULL;
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile, "r+", false);
CBlockLocator locPersisted;
if (walletdb.ReadBestBlock(locPersisted))
pindexPersisted = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locPersisted);
}
const bool fMayCheckpoint = pindexPersisted != NULL &&
pindexStart->GetHeight() <= pindexPersisted->GetHeight() + 1;
if (!fMayCheckpoint) {
LogPrintf("%s: scan starts at %d but the wallet is persisted at %d; progress will NOT be "
"checkpointed on interrupt (a non-contiguous scan cannot safely advance the locator)\n",
__func__, pindexStart->GetHeight(),
pindexPersisted ? pindexPersisted->GetHeight() : -1);
}
// Persist progress when the scan is cut short. `pindexStopped` is the block we were ABOUT to
// scan, so the last fully-processed block is its parent. Resume restarts AT the locator's own
// block (CChain::GetLocator pushes it first; FindForkInGlobalIndex returns it), giving one
// block of deliberate overlap -- idempotent, because AddToWallet only merges when the tx is
// already present. No witness work is needed: witnesses are re-derived from each note's own
// witnessHeight, and witnessRootValidated is in-memory-only so every note is revalidated
// against hashFinalSaplingRoot on the next start.
auto checkpointProgress = [&](const CBlockIndex* pindexStopped) {
if (!fMayCheckpoint || !pindexStopped || !pindexStopped->pprev)
return;
const CBlockIndex* pindexDone = pindexStopped->pprev;
if (pindexDone->GetHeight() <= pindexPersisted->GetHeight())
return; // never move the locator backwards
if (SetBestChainNoFlush(chainActive.GetLocator(pindexDone))) {
LogPrintf("%s: checkpointed scan progress at height %d\n", __func__, pindexDone->GetHeight());
} else {
LogPrintf("%s: FAILED to checkpoint scan progress at height %d; the scan will replay "
"from height %d on the next start\n", __func__, pindexDone->GetHeight(),
pindexPersisted->GetHeight());
}
};
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 0); // show rescan progress in GUI as dialog or on splashscreen, if -rescan on startup
double dProgressStart = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), pindex, false);
double dProgressTip = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), chainActive.LastTip(), false);
@@ -3456,15 +3526,20 @@ int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
{
pwalletMain->rescanHeight = pindex->GetHeight();
if(pwalletMain->fAbortRescan) {
//TODO: should we update witness caches?
LogPrintf("%s: Rescan aborted at block %d\n", pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
// The witness caches do NOT need updating here: on resume each note's witnesses are
// re-derived from its own witnessHeight, independently of the locator, and
// witnessRootValidated is in-memory-only so a full validation pass runs next boot.
// What DOES need saving is the locator -- see the checkpoint below.
pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
pwalletMain->fAbortRescan = false; // consume it; see the note at scan entry
LogPrintf("%s: Rescan aborted at block %d\n", __func__, pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
checkpointProgress(pindex);
return ret;
}
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
//TODO: should we update witness caches?
LogPrintf("%s: Rescan interrupted by shutdown request at block %d\n", pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
LogPrintf("%s: Rescan interrupted by shutdown request at block %d\n", __func__, pwalletMain->rescanHeight);
checkpointProgress(pindex);
return ret;
}
@@ -3525,6 +3600,9 @@ int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
// we are no longer rescanning
pwalletMain->fRescanning = false;
// Reached only by running the loop to the end of the active chain. Callers use this to decide
// whether it is honest to record the wallet as scanned up to the tip.
pwalletMain->fLastRescanCompleted = true;
return ret;
}
+29 -9
View File
@@ -833,6 +833,10 @@ public:
bool fAutoShieldRunning = false;
std::atomic<bool> fAbortRescan{false};
//! True only when the last ScanForWalletTransactions ran to completion. An aborted or
//! shutdown-interrupted scan leaves this false, so callers must not record the wallet as
//! scanned up to the chain tip -- doing so makes the unscanned range permanently invisible.
bool fLastRescanCompleted = false;
// abort current rescan
void AbortRescan() { fAbortRescan = true; }
// Are we currently aborting a rescan?
@@ -892,6 +896,12 @@ public:
protected:
int SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(const uint256& nullifier, int nWitnessHeight, int nMinimumHeight);
//! Overload for a note whose nullifier may be unset. A note discovered through an imported
//! INCOMING viewing key has no nullifier (computing one needs the full viewing key), so
//! dereferencing the optional aborts the daemon. Treats such a note as unspent, which is the
//! conservative direction: it keeps the witness alive rather than pruning a note we cannot
//! prove spent.
int SaplingWitnessMinimumHeight(const boost::optional<uint256>& nullifier, int nWitnessHeight, int nMinimumHeight);
/**
* pindex is the new tip being connected.
@@ -904,17 +914,22 @@ protected:
*/
void DecrementNoteWitnesses(const CBlockIndex* pindex);
//! Returns true only if the atomic write actually committed. Callers that checkpoint during a
//! long scan need to know: a silently-failing checkpoint would otherwise be retried forever at
//! full cost while never making progress.
template <typename WalletDB>
void SetBestChainINTERNAL(WalletDB& walletdb, const CBlockLocator& loc) {
bool SetBestChainINTERNAL(WalletDB& walletdb, const CBlockLocator& loc) {
if (!walletdb.TxnBegin()) {
// This needs to be done atomically, so don't do it at all
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Couldn't start atomic write\n");
return;
return false;
}
try {
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& wtxItem : mapWallet) {
auto wtx = wtxItem.second;
// By reference: a copy here deep-copies every note's witness deque
// (WITNESS_CACHE_SIZE entries) for every transaction, on every call.
const CWalletTx& wtx = wtxItem.second;
// We skip transactions for which mapSaplingNoteData
// is empty. This covers transactions that have no Sapling data
// (i.e. are purely transparent), as well as shielding and unshielding
@@ -923,32 +938,33 @@ protected:
if (!walletdb.WriteTx(wtxItem.first, wtx)) {
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Failed to write CWalletTx, aborting atomic write\n");
walletdb.TxnAbort();
return;
return false;
}
}
}
if (!walletdb.WriteWitnessCacheSize(nWitnessCacheSize)) {
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Failed to write nWitnessCacheSize, aborting atomic write\n");
walletdb.TxnAbort();
return;
return false;
}
if (!walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc)) {
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Failed to write best block, aborting atomic write\n");
walletdb.TxnAbort();
return;
return false;
}
} catch (const std::exception &exc) {
// Unexpected failure
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Unexpected error during atomic write:\n");
LogPrintf("%s\n", exc.what());
walletdb.TxnAbort();
return;
return false;
}
if (!walletdb.TxnCommit()) {
// Couldn't commit all to db, but in-memory state is fine
LogPrintf("SetBestChain(): Couldn't commit atomic write\n");
return;
return false;
}
return true;
}
private:
@@ -1282,8 +1298,12 @@ public:
void RunSaplingConsolidation(int blockHeight);
void RunAutoShieldCoinbase(int blockHeight);
bool CommitAutomatedTx(const CTransaction& tx);
/** Saves witness caches and best block locator to disk. */
/** Saves witness caches and best block locator to disk. Overrides CValidationInterface. */
void SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc);
/** As SetBestChain, but for use INSIDE a long scan: opens the wallet DB with fFlushOnClose=false
* so the call does not trigger a full BDB txn_checkpoint over the whole cache (see the comment
* at CWallet::SetBestChain), and reports whether the write actually committed. */
bool SetBestChainNoFlush(const CBlockLocator& loc);
std::set<std::pair<libzcash::PaymentAddress, uint256>> GetNullifiersForAddresses(const std::set<libzcash::PaymentAddress> & addresses);
bool IsNoteSaplingChange(const std::set<std::pair<libzcash::PaymentAddress, uint256>> & nullifierSet, const libzcash::PaymentAddress & address, const SaplingOutPoint & entry);