DanS
46693a355a
The docs/packaging were largely un-rebranded Hush3 content, with several docs stating facts that are wrong for DragonX. This rewrites them against the verified DragonX source state. Corrections (not just branding): - PoW: RandomX (CPU), not Equihash/ASIC — README, overview.md, randomx.md - Privacy: private from genesis (ac_private=1, Sapling@height1), not "as of block 340000" — overview.md, payment-api.md - Removed the false "coinbase must be shielded" consensus claim (shield-coinbase.md, payment-api.md); coinbase is directly spendable - Fixed default fee 0.0001 (was 0.0010000, 10x); stratum port 22769 (was 19031) - datadir ~/.hush/DRAGONX, DRAGONX.conf, dragonxd/dragonx-cli/dragonx-tx, git.dragonx.is throughout; branch model dev->dragonx - Softened the inherited dPoW reorg claim (no live DragonX notary infra) Packaging: fix build-debian-package.sh + gen-manpages.sh to use the dragonx binaries/manpages; rename bash-completions to dragonx*; drop hush-arrakis-chain from the package. Keep /usr/share/hush (hardcoded in the binary for params). Also: README links/logo, ObsidianDragon + SilentDragonXAndroid wallets, networking/init/dev-process/contrib/util rebrand, and leftover helper scripts. Delete legacy duplicates (hushd.* init/service, HUSH3.conf examples, OLD_WALLETS.md, hsc.md) and rename hush-uri.bat -> dragonx-uri.bat. Out of scope (noted, not changed): historical changelog/copyright, the Hush mainnet airdrop snapshot, seed data files, depends/ source mirrors, and the in-code strCurrencyUnits="HUSH". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# DragonX Overview
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## Mining Algorithm
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RandomX (CPU). DragonX is CPU-mineable using the RandomX Proof-of-Work algorithm
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(the same family used by Monero). ASIC and GPU mining are not applicable. See
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[randomx.md](randomx.md) for details.
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## Block time
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36 seconds
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## Block reward
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3 DRAGONX per block, halving every 3,500,000 blocks.
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## Block size
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4 MB (consensus maximum)
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## P2P
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TLS1.3 via WolfSSL is enforced for all network connections. Many ciphersuites are
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technically supported by TLS1.3 but many of them are ancient, proved to be less secure
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than intended or likely backdoored. DragonX only uses what are widely considered to be the
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most secure and [best ciphersuites](https://ciphersuite.info/cs/).
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New DragonX P2P connections randomly choose between these two ciphersuites each
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time a new connection to a peer is created:
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* `TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`
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* `TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`
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Encrypted P2P connections are important because it means passive network spies,
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such as ISPs, cannot tell what nodes are communicating to each other and also
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prevents certain attacks against privacy at the network level, such as looking
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for which node was the first to relay a transaction. Bitcoin has no protection
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against this which is why it's trivial for network spies to tell which node
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(and hence which IP address) created a certain transaction and hence which
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IP address owns which addresses.
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## RPC
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Inherited many RPCs from Bitcoin and Zcash, with many new ones.
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## Consensus
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DragonX is a fully private blockchain from genesis. The consensus parameter
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`ac_private=1` is active from block 1 and Sapling is active at height 1, so every
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non-coinbase output must be shielded — you can only send to a shielded (`zs...`)
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address, never to a transparent address. This is sometimes called "z2z". Unlike
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chains that switched on mandatory privacy at a later height, DragonX enforces it
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from the very first block.
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Transparent addresses exist only to receive mining coinbase; mature coinbase is
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directly spendable and is not required to be shielded first (shielding it with
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`z_shieldcoinbase` is an optional privacy step). See
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[hd-transparent-keys.md](hd-transparent-keys.md).
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