DanS
1673cfb6dc
- Parallel RandomX PoW pre-verification pool (CCheckQueue) run ahead of the serial connect; consensus-neutral (inline CheckRandomXSolution fallback still verifies anything not pre-verified). New -randomxverifythreads (default = -par). - Adaptive dbcache: default sizes the UTXO/coins cache to most of RAM and shrinks under memory pressure, always leaving a reserve free; -dbcache pins a fixed value. - P2P block download: bounded socket recv-drain loop (tlsmanager); frontier-block reassignment to break head-of-line stalls (-blockreassigntimeout); ProcessGetData serves a bounded batch of blocks per pass instead of one (fixes the serve-side one-block-per-tick throttle that caps download network-wide). - assumeutxo: dumptxoutset RPC + LoadSnapshot machinery + AssumeutxoData chainparams. - Signed bootstrap verification (util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh, util/sign-bootstrap.md). - gtest: RandomX pre-verify consensus-equivalence test + UTXO-snapshot round-trip; revived the gtest harness (Makefile.am include fix, Makefile.gtest.include). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# Signing the DragonX bootstrap archive
|
|
|
|
`util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh` verifies a detached signature of `DRAGONX.zip` against a
|
|
public key **embedded in the script** (`BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY`). Because the key ships in the
|
|
repo/binary and is not downloaded from the bootstrap server, a compromised bootstrap host
|
|
cannot forge a valid signature — unlike the `.md5`/`.sha256` files, which are served from
|
|
the same host and only detect corruption.
|
|
|
|
Until a real key is embedded, `BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY` is the placeholder and the script skips
|
|
signature enforcement (with a warning), so existing users are unaffected. Once a real key
|
|
is pasted in, an unsigned or invalid bootstrap is **refused**.
|
|
|
|
## One-time: create the signing keypair (offline)
|
|
|
|
Keep the private key OFFLINE (air-gapped if possible). Ed25519 or RSA-4096 both work with
|
|
the `openssl dgst -sha256 -verify` check the script uses; RSA-4096 maximizes compatibility:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
# Private key — keep secret, never publish
|
|
openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:4096 -out dragonx-bootstrap.key
|
|
# Public key — paste into bootstrap-dragonx.sh
|
|
openssl pkey -in dragonx-bootstrap.key -pubout -out dragonx-bootstrap.pub
|
|
cat dragonx-bootstrap.pub
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Paste the full PEM (including the `-----BEGIN/END PUBLIC KEY-----` lines) into
|
|
`BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY` in `util/bootstrap-dragonx.sh`, e.g.:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
BOOTSTRAP_PUBKEY="$(cat <<'PEM'
|
|
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
... base64 ...
|
|
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
PEM
|
|
)"
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Each release: sign the archive and publish the signature
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign dragonx-bootstrap.key -out DRAGONX.zip.sig DRAGONX.zip
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Upload `DRAGONX.zip.sig` next to `DRAGONX.zip` (and its `.md5`/`.sha256`) on every
|
|
bootstrap host (`bootstrap.dragonx.is`, `bootstrap2.dragonx.is`). Verify locally first:
|
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
openssl dgst -sha256 -verify dragonx-bootstrap.pub -signature DRAGONX.zip.sig DRAGONX.zip
|
|
# -> "Verified OK"
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Rotating the key
|
|
|
|
Embed the new public key in the script, sign future archives with the new private key, and
|
|
release a new client version. Old clients keep trusting the old key; coordinate the cutover
|
|
with a release so users upgrade before the old key is retired.
|